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SUCCESS?

ESDP military conflict management operations: 2003-2009

Annamarie Peen Rodt. PhD, MA, BA Hons.

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**Abstract**

From 2003 to 2009, the EU launched five military conflict management operations within the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy. This thesis examines their success. To this end, the thesis develops a definition and a set of criteria for success. It applies this theoretical framework in an empirical case study of success in the five EU operations, which were undertaken in Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Chad and the Central African Republic. Having established the level and nature of their success, the thesis goes on to examine the conditions under which ESDP military conflict management operations can be successful. The key finding of the research is that for an operation of this nature to succeed, it is necessary that it secures sufficient support internally, within the EU, and externally, outside the EU, from domestic, regional and international actors involved in the conflict and its management.
Acknowledgements

There are many people to whom I owe gratitude with regard to this thesis. Those who have inspired me on this journey are far too many to mention. I am thankful to my interviewees for sharing their time, knowledge and experiences with me and to academic peers, who have encouraged and challenged my ideas over the last three years. I would like to take this opportunity to thank a few people, who have made a particularly great difference to me and to my research throughout the process of writing this thesis. My most sincere thanks go to Stefan Wolff. I could not have asked for a better supervisor. Thank you for always taking a personal interest in my research and believing in my ability. Thanks go out also to my former colleagues in Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially to Linda and Larry Butler. I would like to thank Alex Danchev for his enthusiasm, Catherine Gegout for her advice and Rod Thornton for helping me get to grips with the ins and outs of military parlance. Finally, I would like to thank my family and friends for their everlasting support. A special thank you goes to Kenny Poucher for his patience and love.
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Operation EUFOR DR Congo
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<tr>
<td>AMIS</td>
<td>African Union Mission to Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BiH</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNDP</td>
<td>Congrès National Pour la Défense du Peuple</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPC</td>
<td>European Political Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defence Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESS</td>
<td>European Security Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUMS</td>
<td>European Union Military Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUSR</td>
<td>European Union Special Representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FADRC</td>
<td>Armed Forces of the DRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCO</td>
<td>Full Operating Capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDLR</td>
<td>Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FNI</td>
<td>Front Nationaliste et Intégrationniste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRPI</td>
<td>Front de Résistance Patriotique d’Ituri</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GFAP</td>
<td>General Framework Agreement for Peace in BiH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HoM</td>
<td>Heads of Missions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR</td>
<td>High Representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICG</td>
<td>International Crisis Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICTY</td>
<td>International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFOR</td>
<td>Implementation Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOC</td>
<td>Initial Operating Capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LRA</td>
<td>Lord’s Resistance Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINURCAT</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Central African Republic and Chad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONUC</td>
<td>United Nations Organisation Mission in DRC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>----------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NLA</td>
<td>National Liberation Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OHR</td>
<td>Office of the High Representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARECO</td>
<td>Coalition des Patriots Résistants Congolais</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIC</td>
<td>Peace Implementation Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIWC</td>
<td>Person Indicted for War Crimes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRIO</td>
<td>International Peace Research Institute Oslo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCD</td>
<td>Congolese armed forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RFC</td>
<td>Rally of Forces for Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAA</td>
<td>Stabilisation and Association Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAP</td>
<td>Stabilisation and Association Process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SASE</td>
<td>Safe and Secure Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCR</td>
<td>Senior Civilian Representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFOR</td>
<td>Stabilisation Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SG</td>
<td>Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHAPE</td>
<td>Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPLA</td>
<td>Sudan’s People’s Liberation Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UFDD</td>
<td>Union of Forces for Democracy and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UFDD/F</td>
<td>Union of Forces for Democracy and Development-Fundamental</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNPREDEP</td>
<td>United Nations Preventative Deployment Force in Macedonia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNPROFOR</td>
<td>United Nations Protection Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSCR</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council Resolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSG</td>
<td>United Nations Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPC</td>
<td>Union of Congolese Patriots</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPDF</td>
<td>Uganda People’s Defence Forces</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Chapter one: Introduction

The European Union launched its first ever military conflict management operation in 2003. Since then the Union’s endeavors in military conflict management have developed rapidly both in terms of the number and nature of its operations, tasks and capabilities. From 2003 to 2009, the EU launched five military conflict management operations within the framework of its European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). These operations were intended to help facilitate the management of conflicts in Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Democratic Republic of Congo and the tri-border area between Sudan, Chad and the Central African Republic. This thesis is about these operations. It examines and explains the level and nature of their success. The purpose of this undertaking is to analyse the necessary conditions for success in ESDP military conflict management operations. In this way, the thesis seeks to add a new dimension to the current debate on the EU’s emerging role as a military conflict manager in the international security arena.

Military conflict management is a contentious issue. There are adamant arguments against it, just as there are strong and convincing arguments in its favour. Whether to intervene militarily to manage violent conflict is much debated in the scholarly literature (Bellamy, 2006; Kuperman, 2001; Mills and Brunner, 2003; Ramsey, 2002; Walzer, 2003). Although this is a crucial question, it is not the purpose of this venture. The focus of this thesis is on the undertaking of ESDP military conflict management operations. It evaluates the operations and explores the conditions under which they have been successful (or not). As such, the analysis is limited to the period from the launch of each
operation to its formal completion. The contentious nature of the subject matter, however, makes a sound theoretical framework for the systematic evaluation of success in this type of operation all the more important. The human tragedy of each individual conflict can easily bury a study of this nature in hindsight. Although thorough case-specific evaluation is important, the danger of looking backwards is that one fails to prepare for the challenges ahead. In military conflict management such failure comes at a high price. Therefore, this thesis takes a forward-looking perspective. Through a comparative analysis of the five operations undertaken to date, it seeks to contribute to a more theoretically grounded understanding of success in ESDP military conflict management operations. The thesis develops an analytical framework for the evaluation of success in operations of this nature. As any good analytical model should, it aims to describe, explain and make predictions regarding the subject of enquiry (Singer, 1961). That is success in ESDP military conflict management operations.

The emergence of the ESDP and its academic scholarship

Foreign policy cooperation among the member states of the European Community\(^1\) (EC) has officially existed since the establishment of European Political Cooperation (EPC) in 1970. The EPC was a loose and voluntary framework of consultation. Where possible, the member states were encouraged to take common positions in international organisations and to have regard for the views of the European Parliament. Although the EPC was formalised in the Single European Act in 1986, it was never brought fully into

\(^1\) The term *European Community* is used in the historical context before the Treaty on European Union entered into force on 1 November 1993. With reference to the period after 1993, the term *European Union* is used (Hill and Smith, 2000, pp.153-157).
the institutional structures of the EC and it never became much more than an exchange of opinions between its member states (Jones, 2001, pp.429-461; Smith, 2008, pp.1-24). In response to the changing security situation at the end of the Cold War, the EC began to develop a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The Treaty on European Union, signed in Maastricht in December 1991, formally established the CFSP as a pillar of the EU. The CFSP was intended to institutionally equip the EU to manage any foreign policy matters concerning the security of the Union. This was specified as safeguarding the values, interests and integrity of the Union; promoting international cooperation; developing and consolidating democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; and finally, preserving peace and international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, the Helsinki Final Act and the Paris Charter of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (Treaty on European Union, 1991; Smith, 2008, pp.1-24).

Despite the establishment of the CFSP the EU was wholly unprepared for the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the violent conflicts that followed throughout the 1990s (Cameron, 2006; Daalder, 1996; Dannreuter, 2004; Pentland, 2003). The failure to manage the break-up of Yugoslavia motivated the EU to further develop the CFSP and to establish the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) within it in 1999 (Bretherton & Vogler, 2006; Howorth, 2007). In 2003, the EU explicitly stated in the European Security Strategy (ESS) that managing violent conflict was to be one of its key security priorities (Council of the EU, 2003). That same year the EU launched its first two ESDP military
conflict management operations in Macedonia\(^2\) and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Since then the Union has launched another three operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), the Democratic Republic of Congo and, most recently, a joint operation in Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR) (Council of the EU, 2009a). An overview of all the ESDP military conflict management operations launched from 2003 to 2009 is provided in table 1.1 below.

\textit{Table 1.1: ESDP military conflict management operations: 2003-2009}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Completed operations</th>
<th>Ongoing operations</th>
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</table>

Scholars of the European Union have responded to the recent EU developments with extensive analysis of the institutional framework and policy processes of the CFSP and ESDP. Howorth (2007), Keukeleire and

\(^2\) Macedonia will be referred to by its constitutional name in this thesis.
MacNaughtan (2008) and Smith (2004) have made important contributions in this regard. There is also renewed academic interest in the role of the EU in the international arena. To mention but a few key contributions to this debate Bretherton and Vogler (2006) have examined *The European Union as a Global Actor*; Manners (2002) has investigated *Normative Power Europe*; Smith (2008) has explored *European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World*; and Whitman (2009) has considered the EU’s position as a potential 21st century superpower. A reoccurring theme in the ongoing academic debate is whether the EU can play a part in conflict regulation beyond its own borders. There has been considerable scrutiny of the EU’s early failures to manage the violent conflicts that followed the end of the Cold War in the Western Balkans (Cameron, 2006; Daalder, 1996; Dannreuter, 2004; Pentland, 2003). Tocci (2007) has looked at the EU’s role in conflict resolution in its backyard and Kronenberger and Wouters (2004) have examined EU policy on conflict prevention. As ESDP military conflict management operations have been undertaken in the field, so have corresponding case studies examining the origins, mandates and implementation of these operations. By way of example, Operation Concordia has been evaluated by Mace (2004); Operation Artemis has been examined by Ulriksen, Gourlay and Mace (2004); Haine and Giegerich (2006) have scrutinised EUFOR DR Congo; Operation Althea was assed by Friesendorf and Penska (2008) and Seibert (2007 and 2008) has undertaken a thorough investigation of EUFOR Chad/CAR.
The state of the ESDP debate

The academic scholarship of the ESDP, like the policy itself, is under constant development. The current state of the field and the speed at which this is developing is both impressive and exciting. Nonetheless, the existing literature on ESDP military conflict management operations still leaves much to be desired. In particular, the theoretical understanding of these operations and the necessary conditions for their success is underdeveloped. Considering that these are still early days both for the subject of enquiry and the enquiry itself, this is perhaps understandable. The ESDP, after all, was only established a decade ago. Nevertheless, it is important to begin to develop a more theoretically grounded and systematic approach to the evaluation of ESDP military conflict management operations. This, in turn, will enable a better understanding of success in this realm.

To date the evaluation of ESDP military conflict management operations has typically been undertaken on a case-by-case basis. A few recent studies have incorporated a regional dimension in their analyses (Cascone, 2008; Rye Olsen, 2009; Wolff and Rodt, 2008), but there is still a divide between the scholarship of ESDP military conflict management operations undertaken in Europe and those conducted in Africa. As of yet there has been little in-depth comparative analysis of the success of all the operations. Giegerich (2008) touched upon the characteristics of the EU approach to military conflict management more generally, but his study focused on the ambitions and performances of member states rather than the overall success of the EU approach.
A theoretical framework for the systematic evaluation and comparison of success in ESDP military conflict management operations has, thus, yet to be developed. In the same way, the conditions under which the EU is (or is likely to be) successful in ESDP military conflict management operations have received surprisingly little academic attention. In fact, what would constitute a success in this realm has not yet been convincingly conceptualised. Failure to appropriately address these issues may lead to misunderstanding in evaluation, misjudgement in prescription and, in the worst case, to unintended outcomes and less than successful operations. Failure in military conflict management may have serious implications both for those who conduct the operations and for those who live (and die) in the conflicts they seek to manage. This is why systematic scrutiny of success in ESDP military conflict management is important – not only in theory, but also in practice.

Research question and original contribution of the thesis

This research embarks on the task of systematically scrutinising success in ESDP military conflict management operations. It hopes to begin to fill the gap identified in the ESDP literature and the wider understanding of military conflict management operations. In particular, the thesis seeks to contribute to the development of a more theoretically grounded comprehension of success in ESDP military conflict management operations. This key contribution of the project is theoretical. However, this is a problem-based piece of research in the sense that it hopes to help solve a real-world problem. The thesis is, thus, intended to add also to the empirical knowledge of ESDP military conflict management operations and to address policy concerns of how to achieve
success in such endeavours. The thesis hopes to initiate and encourage a wider debate on the notion of success in ESDP military conflict management. To this end, it discusses how to define, evaluate and achieve success in this new realm of the European Security and Defence Policy.

The central research question of the thesis is: Under which conditions can an ESDP military conflict management operation be successful?

As any good research question this immediately raises a number of other questions: What is success in ESDP military conflict management? Have the individual operations been successful so far? Why or why not? The thesis sets out to answer these questions in a systematic fashion. Firstly, it develops a definition of success in ESDP military conflict management operations. It goes on to discuss how success is best evaluated. Subsequently, it introduces a set of criteria according to which to evaluate success. By way of the new definition and criteria for success, the thesis constructs a theoretical framework for the evaluation of ESDP military conflict management operations. It uses this framework to examine success in the five ESDP military conflict management operations launched from 2003 to 2009. Based on these findings the thesis goes on to examine the conditions under which operations have succeeded in the past and to predict when such operations are likely to succeed in the future.

The original contributions of this thesis to the theoretical knowledge and empirical understanding of the ESDP is the definition of success in military conflict management operations; the theoretical framework for its
evaluation; the comparative evaluation itself and the identification and analysis of the conditions for success in this realm. This is an important contribution not only to the study of the ESDP, but also to the understanding of military conflict management more generally.

Aims and objectives

The thesis has five main objectives:

(1) to conceptualise success in military conflict management operations;
(2) to develop a theoretical framework for the evaluation of success in military conflict management operations;
(3) to conduct a comparative case study of success in ESDP military conflict management operations applying the theoretical definition and evaluation framework for success;
(4) to identify and explain the conditions for success in this realm;
(5) to discuss what this means for ESDP military conflict management in the future and the study of military conflict management more widely.

Methodology, terminology and the analytical approach

To achieve its aims and answer the central research question this study adopts a qualitative research methodology. The following section explains the methodology and the analytical approach in further detail, but first it is useful to clarify a few conceptual issues. In order to evaluate success in ESDP military conflict management operations, it is important first to determine what in this context is meant by the terms conflict and conflict management.
Conceptualising conflict

In its most general form the term *conflict* refers to a situation in which opposed parties pursue incompatible goals. As such conflict is a common feature in any society. It is not necessarily negative, nor is conflict management a given positive. It is impossible and undesirable to manage all types of conflict. However, some conflicts turn violent and become dangerous both for belligerents involved in the violence and for innocent bystanders affected by its consequences. When conflicts turn violent, third-party intervention is often considered and at times deemed appropriate. Sometimes external actors intervene militarily to manage the violent aspect of the conflict. This is the case in ESDP military conflict management operations. The term *conflict* in the conceptual discussion of ESDP military conflict management operations, therefore, refers to the type of conflict that has turned violent. Violent conflict can range from a low-level violent campaign of sustained guerrilla insurgency to all-out civil war (Brown, 2006; Gleditsch et al, 2002; Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall, 2005, pp.3-31). The Uppsala Conflict Data Programme in cooperation with the International Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) has defined *armed conflict* as a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths per year (Gleditsch et al, 2002).

The terms *violent conflict* and *armed conflict* are often used interchangeably. However, conceptually they have different meanings. By definition, armed
conflict is a type of violent conflict. The term *violent conflict* also includes unarmed violent acts and one-sided violence such as ethnic cleaning and genocide against unarmed civilians (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall, 2005, pp.3-31). The term *violent conflict*, rather than *armed conflict*, is more appropriate here, as this includes all violent aspects of conflict rather than ‘just’ armed conflict. This reflects the reality in which ESDP military conflict management operations can be deployed and is particularly relevant because it is the violent aspect of the conflict as a whole that such an operation seeks to help manage. Although the focus here is on violent conflict, rather than armed conflict, the threshold of 25 battle-related deaths per year is helpful to distinguish between (a) sporadic violent incidents such as violent protests and riots and (b) sustained violent conflict. It is sustained violent conflict that is the focus of military conflict management operations. The Uppsala/PRIO definition above is, thus, expanded here to include one-sided violence, unarmed violence and confrontations between more than two primary parties. This is done to include all aspects of violent conflict in the definition and to reflect the empirical reality in which ESDP military conflict management operations can be deployed.

**Violent conflict is defined as a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of violence between belligerent parties results in at least 25 battle-related deaths per year.**

For the analytical purpose of this thesis is useful to clarify two key issues with regard to the dynamics of violent conflict: (1) why a conflict becomes violent
in the first place and (2) how the violent aspect of a conflict may develop further, and the conflict, in turn, may become more violent. The purpose of this section is not to engage in an in-depth discussion of the causes and consequences of violent conflict, but rather to highlight two aspects of conflict studies, which are particularly relevant to this research. It is important to take these two issues into account in order to understand the purpose of conflict management and to determine what constitutes and conditions success in ESDP military conflict management operations.

So why do conflicts turn violent? The reason why some conflicts turn violent can be explained through a two-stage process of permissive conditions and proximate causes. Permissive conditions are underlying factors that make a conflict prone to violence. Proximate causes are catalytic factors that trigger a violence-prone conflict situation to turn violent. In other words, permissive conditions make violence possible, and proximate causes make violence happen. Permissive conditions and proximate causes are both necessary, but neither are sufficient to make a conflict violent (Brown, 1996, pp.1-31 & pp.571-601; Cordell & Wolff, forthcoming). Figure 1.2 illustrates this point.

Figure 1.2: Why conflicts turn violent

| Permissive conditions + Proximate causes | Violent |

A variety of different permissive conditions and proximate causes can make conflicts violent. Brown (1996, pp. 1-31 & 571-601) synthesised the literature on the causes of conflict and identified four categories of permissive conditions
and proximate causes of internal conflict; namely, (1) structural, (2) political, (3) socio-economic and (4) cultural factors. Conditions within each of these categories, either individually or in combination, can cause the outbreak of a violent conflict. Table 1.3 below illustrates the four categories and highlights key permissive conditions and proximate causes of violent conflict within each of the categories.

Table 1.3: Permissive conditions and proximate causes of violent conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Permissive conditions</th>
<th>Proximate causes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Structural factors</strong></td>
<td>Weak states; Intra-state security concerns; Ethnic geography</td>
<td>Collapsing states; Changing military balances; Changing demographic patterns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political factors</strong></td>
<td>Discriminatory political institutions; Exclusionary national ideologies; Inter-group politics; Elite politics</td>
<td>Political transition; Increasingly influential exclusionary ideologies; Growing inter-group competition; Intensifying leadership struggles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Socio-economic factors</strong></td>
<td>Economic problems; Discriminatory economic systems; Economic development and modernisation</td>
<td>Mounting economic problems; Growing economic inequalities; Fast-paced development and modernisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cultural factors</strong></td>
<td>Cultural discrimination; Divisive group histories and perceptions</td>
<td>Intensifying patterns of cultural discrimination; Ethnic bashing and propagandising</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Brown, 1996, pp.1-31)

Brown (1996) argued that violent conflicts can be either internally or externally-driven, and that they can be triggered either by elite or mass-level actions. Elite-level actors and actions are usually the catalysts that turn potentially volatile situations into violent confrontations (Brown, 1996, p.23). By way of example, the violent conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina was
internally-driven and elite-triggered (Brown, 1996, p.582). Brown’s study focused on the conditions of conflict, whereas this thesis concentrates on the conditions of conflict management. However, the thesis supports Blainey’s (1988) argument that the reasons why conflicts start must be related to why they eventually end. This is not to say that the reasons are the same, but that they are related. This suggests that it is important to understand the causes of violent conflict in order to appropriately define what would constitute and condition success in its management. Conflict and conflict management are intrinsically linked phenomena. The next section examines the specific dynamics of violence that military conflict management operations are intended to manage.

The second conceptual issue, which is important in evaluating military conflict management operations, is to recognise that violence is not a constant state or stage of conflict. Once a conflict has turned violent, the violence may develop in a variety of different ways. Conflicts do not necessarily develop in a linear and logical fashion and may move back and forth between different stages of violence and non-violence. If, however, a conflict becomes more violent, this research has identified four different processes by which this may take place; namely, through (1) continuation, (2) diffusion, (3) escalation and (4) intensification of violence. *Continuation* refers to the process in which the violent aspect of a conflict continues over time. *Diffusion* describes the scenario when violent conflict in one geographic area directly or indirectly generates violent conflict in another area. Diffusion can take place either within the original conflict country or beyond international borders. *Escalation* occurs
when new external actors become involved in an already existing conflict within its confined geographic borders. Such external actors may be neighbouring states, ethnic kin, Diaspora or others that become directly involved in the conflict (Gelditsch, 2007; Lobell & Mauceri, 2004, pp.1-10).

*Intensification* refers the process by which the violence itself increases. It includes both an increase in the number and nature of violent incidents. Although these are four analytically distinct phenomena; continuation, diffusion, escalation and intensification may occur simultaneously. A violent conflict can also take a less violent turn and the violent aspect of the conflict may in effect diminish. This is the development that conflict management seeks to bring about. Conflict management by definition aims to prevent the continuation, diffusion, escalation and intensification of violent conflict. The next section will explain this in further detail.

*Conceptualising conflict management*

In the conflict regulation literature the term *conflict management* has been used as a *generic term to cover a whole gamut of positive conflict handling* (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall, 2005, pp.3-31, p.29). As such, it is a disputed concept. In particular, it is much debated what, if anything, distinguishes conflict management from conflict prevention and conflict settlement. For the analytical purpose of this thesis, it is useful to separate the three concepts and to discuss the notion of success specifically with regard to conflict management. This will facilitate a more accurate evaluation of success in ESDP military conflict management operations.
Conflict management is defined as an action, which seeks to manage the violent aspect of a conflict by addressing its proximate causes.

The following section will explain how conflict management is different, yet related, to these two other types on conflict regulation. Conceptually, this thesis argues, conflict management differs from conflict prevention and conflict settlement in four key areas; namely, in terms of its target, time frame, focus and main objective. The difference between the three concepts, as they are defined in this thesis, is illustrated in table 1.4 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Conflict prevention</th>
<th>Conflict management</th>
<th>Conflict settlement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Target</strong></td>
<td>Pre-violent conflict</td>
<td>Violent conflict</td>
<td>Post-violent conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Time frame</strong></td>
<td>Longer term</td>
<td>Shorter term</td>
<td>Longer term</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Focus</strong></td>
<td>Permissive conditions</td>
<td>Proximate causes</td>
<td>Permissive conditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Objective</strong></td>
<td>Prevent violence</td>
<td>Manage violence</td>
<td>Prevent renewed violence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In this thesis the term *conflict management* will refer exclusively to actions that seek to address the proximate causes that turn a conflict violent. The main objective of conflict management is to manage the violent aspect of a conflict. That is to prevent a continuation, diffusion, escalation and intensification of violence. Therefore, by definition, conflict management is limited to the timeframe in which a conflict is violent or at risk of turning more violent in the relative short term. *Conflict prevention*, despite a lack of consensus in the literature, will here be confined to actions seeking to address the underlying
permissive causes of a conflict to prevent it from turning violent in the first place. Finally, *conflict settlement* refers to efforts to address the underlying causes and consequences of conflict in the post-violent phase. The objective of conflict settlement is to prevent another violent conflict (Ackermann, 2003; Cordell & Wolff, forthcoming; Lund, 2002; Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall, 2005).

Although conceptually distinct, there is a close relationship between these three types of conflict regulation. Even though different phases of conflict in theory require different types of conflict regulation, different conflict phases can often not easily be separated in practice. Conflict prevention, conflict management and conflict settlement efforts often overlap and intertwine. Conflict management links to aspects of conflict prevention in that it seeks to prevent more violence. This is why it is sometimes referred to as a type of conflict prevention. Conflict management is also linked to conflict settlement, as the management of violence facilitates conflict settlement. Vice versa, a temporary aspect of acute settlement of certain aspects of the conflict is often necessary to help manage the violence. Finally, conflict settlement is linked to conflict prevention, because it seeks to prevent a new violent conflict. In the longer term, conflict settlement can become conflict prevention. This thesis argues that the relationship between the three types of conflict regulation is better understood as a cyclical process than a stage-by-stage development. This is illustrated in diagram 1.5 below.
When examining success in ESDP military conflict management operations, however, it is important to recall that despite the close links between the three concepts, the primary purposes of conflict management, conflict settlement and conflict prevention are distinct. The main objective of conflict management is to prevent a continuation, diffusion, escalation and intensification of the violent conflict.

There are two different types of conflict management: (1) military conflict management and (2) civilian conflict management. This thesis focuses on military conflict management. It is important to acknowledge that military and civilian aspects of conflict management sometimes overlap. As Moskos, Williams and Segal (2000, p.2) have argued, there is an increased inter-
penetrability of civilian and military spheres in the post-modern military and in particular in multipurpose operations such as conflict management operations. Schnabel and Ehrhart (2005) illustrated this phenomenon in their description of the post-modern soldier:

*The post-modern soldier is not only a fighter, but also a peacekeeper, policeman, diplomat, social worker and Peace Corps worker (Schnabel and Ehrhart, 2005, p.3)*

Nevertheless, there is a significant difference between (a) soldiers conducting some civilian tasks as part of a military conflict management operation and (b) civilian conflict management initiatives. Hybrid missions, which encompass both civilian and military components, bridge the gap between the two, but these are a different breed from military conflict management operations, which are the focus of this thesis.

Conflict management can be undertaken by a variety of actors, internal and external to the conflict. This thesis focuses on conflict management undertaken by the EU in violent conflicts beyond the Union’s borders. It is important to stress that the EU engages in a variety of different conflict management efforts. However, since 2003, the EU has launched ESDP military operations to help facilitate the management of violent conflicts. These operations are the subject of this enquiry. Before turning to the question of how to define success in these operations, it is important to stress that success here means the success of an ESDP military conflict management operation and not the success of the wider
EU approach to the country or conflict in question. This distinction is often fudged in the literature. It is an important distinction to make, however, because an ESDP military conflict management operation is usually only one aspect of a wider EU approach to the regulation of a conflict. The success of a specific ESDP military conflict management operation in a given conflict is, thus, different from the success of the wider EU effort in the same conflict. The next chapter will discuss the notion of success in greater detail, but first the next section will explain the selected methodology for this research.

The case study method: strengths and weaknesses

This research assesses the empirical validity of four hypotheses deduced from the literature on the ESDP and existing theories of international peacekeeping, military intervention, conflict and its management. The thesis will return to the issue of why and how these particular theories are relevant for the study of the conditions for success in ESDP military conflict management operations. Suffice here to say that this is a theory-testing piece of research. There are three basic ways of testing theory: experimentation, observation using large-\(n\) analysis and case study (Van Evera, 1997, pp. 49-88). A case study is conducted here, because this is the most appropriate method for this particular research puzzle. Experimental or counter-factual approaches would introduce unnecessary levels of uncertainty into the analysis, and the limited number of cases (ESDP military conflict management operations) available does not merit a large \(n\)-study. Therefore, this research applies the case study method. It conducts a comparative case study of the five ESDP military conflict management operations undertaken from 2003 to 2009. In a field dominated by
single-case studies typically confined to one country or region, the comparative case study approach offers a different perspective on ESDP military conflict management operations. The study includes five operations, some of which are particularly understudied and none of which have been studied in this way (comparatively examined specifically with regard to the necessary conditions for success). As such it is not just the analytical focus of this thesis that is original, but also the selected approach applied to the research topic. The thesis establishes a theoretical link between the cases and suggests that studying them comparatively can contribute to conflict management theory more generally. The selected methodology will, thus, allow the thesis to link the study of ESDP military conflict management operations to the wider scholarship of violent conflict and its management. This too is new to the ESDP literature.

**Case selection**

The basic unit of analysis is the ESDP military conflict management operation.

**ESDP military conflict management operations** are defined as military operations launched under the auspices of the European Union, within the framework of the ESDP, undertaken by EU troops on the ground in order to facilitate the management of the violent aspects of a conflict.

According to this definition three case selection criteria can be identified:

1. **The case must be an ESDP operation.**
An ESDP operation is an operation, which is launched by the EU within the framework of the ESDP. Such operations can be deployed through three types of Headquarters (HQ) and operational planning; namely, through the EU cell at NATO’s Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE); through the national HQ of a member state; or through the Civil/Military Cell of the EU Military Staff (EUMS) (Bretherton & Vogler, 2006, pp. 202-207). It is important to stress here that ESDP structures allow operations to be led by a single member state through the Framework Nation Concept³ or to use NATO assets or capabilities through the Berlin Plus arrangements.⁴ Such operations are still ESDP operations.

(2) The case must be a military operation.

A military operation is an operation where soldiers are deployed in the field primarily for a military purpose. This thesis focuses on military operations and does not include civilian or hybrid missions. It is useful to clarify the difference between an operation and a mission in military terminology. Much of the ESDP literature fails to appreciate the difference between the two and refers to ESDP military conflict management operations as missions. An interviewee explained the difference between a military operation and a military mission, as it is defined by the British Army, in the following way:

³ The EU Framework Nation Concept was adopted on 24 July 2002. It allows for the national HQ of a member state to be multi-nationalised for the purpose and duration of an ESDP military operation (Ulriksen, Gourlay, Mace, 2004).
⁴ An exchange of letters between High Representative for the CFSP, Javier Solana, and NATO Secretary General, Lord George Robertson, in March 2003, concluded the so-called Berlin Plus arrangements for the strategic partnership between the two organisations in crisis management. It allows the EU to make use of NATO assets and capabilities in such operations (NATO, 2006).
A mission, in military parlance, tends to be something quite small and specific. For example, a fairly junior army rank would be given a ‘mission’ for him and his men to ‘take a line of trenches’ or ‘assault a position’. The phrase ‘mission’ is very common, as all Commanders when they give their juniors tasks always call these them ‘missions’ – ‘Your mission is to…’ Missions are very much at the tactical level that is involving the use of just a few soldiers. Above the tactical level are the operational and strategic levels. An ‘operation’ would mean the ‘Bosnian operation’ or the ‘Kosovo operation’. These would be big things. So when soldiers talk about ‘the operational level’ they are talking about what they will do on an operation that fits in with the strategy set by government. ‘Strategy’ in the military sense is only ever set by politicians - with the advice, maybe, of some very senior generals. So the government would say, as a ‘strategic goal’ that Bosnia must be ‘stabilised’. It would then be up to the military commanders on the ground to develop an ‘operational plan’ that could attain this ‘strategic goal’. (...) Confusion starts with American use of the word ‘mission’: ‘My mission is to bring peace to Bosnia...’ You also get the phrase ‘mission creep’. This is almost slang use of the word ‘mission’ (Interview, former British army officer, 12/03/2009).

(3) The case must be a conflict management operation.

A conflict management operation is an operation launched to facilitate the management of a violent conflict. In EU jargon these operations are referred to as military crisis management operations, but this is again inaccurate use of military terminology. As a representative from the British Army put it:
Crisis, in the military understanding of the word, is a natural catastrophe or something of that sort, not a conflict (Interview, former British army officer, 12/03/2009).

These operations are deployed to facilitate the management of conflicts, but they are not necessarily launched in immediate crisis situations. Therefore, they will be referred to as conflict management operations. This thesis seeks to evaluate the EU’s success as a military conflict manager, thus, it evaluates ESDP operations from a conflict perspective only. The analysis does not include EU responses to natural disasters or non-conflict crisis operations. Because the thesis focuses on military conflict management, it does also not include operations such as EU NAVFOR Somalia\(^5\) or the EU support to the African Union Mission in Darfur (AMIS)\(^6\). Although these are conflict-related operations, they do not meet the above criteria and are not strictly speaking ESDP military conflict management operations.

Five operations meet all three case selection criteria: Operation Concordia (Macedonia), Operation Artemis (DRC), Operation Althea (BiH), Operation EUFOR DR Congo (DRC) and Operation EUFOR Chad/CAR (Chad/CAR).

\(^5\) EU NAVFOR Somalia is an EU military operation intended to contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the coast of Somalia (Council of the European Union, 2009a).

\(^6\) AMIS is an EU civilian-military action to support the African Union (AU)’s enhanced Mission to Sudan/Darfur (Council of the European Union, 2009a).
All five operations have been included in this analysis. In this way, the case study reflects and examines the entire spectrum of ESDP military conflict management operations, which have been undertaken so far. Including the whole range of cases is important, because it allows the research to compare and contrast success in all the operations to date and to examine the conditions for success in ESDP military conflict management operations more generally. It is important to stress that these cases are not randomly selected, however. These are the cases that the EU has chosen to engage in.

Including all five cases also means that the study incorporates data both from the operations launched in Europe and in Africa (the only two continents where the EU has so far undertaken ESDP military conflict management operations), which helps bridge the existing divide between the scholarship of ESDP military conflict management operations in Europe and in Africa. Moreover, this case selection allows for a comparison of operations launched during the most violent phase of a conflict (DRC and Chad/CAR) and in the aftermath of the most violent phase of a conflict (Macedonia and BiH). It also includes all the different types of ESDP military conflict management operations conducted to date. Each one of these operations has introduced a new aspect to ESDP military conflict management. The empirical analysis will explain this in further detail, but it is important to underline that the widest possible case selection allows the study to examine the development of ESDP military conflict management over time.
**Selected timeframe**

The analytical focus of this thesis is on the undertaking of ESDP military conflict management operations in the field. The analysis will focus on the period in which the operations are actively deployed. That is the period from the EU launches an operation until the operation is officially completed. It does not include the policy process in which the decision to launch the operation is taken, as this is not the primary focus of this enquiry. Each individual case is confined to the period in which troops were deployed in the operational theatre.

The selected timeframe for the analysis is the period from 1 March 2003 to 31 March 2009.

2003 was a watershed year for the ESDP for three key reasons. Firstly, the ESDP became operational, and the Union launched its first two military conflict management operations in 2003. Secondly, this was the year that the EU and NATO agreed on the Berlin Plus arrangements, which allow the EU to make use of NATO assets and capabilities in operations of this nature. Thirdly, the EU published the European Security Strategy in 2003, which identified conflict management as one of the Union’s key security priorities (Howorth, 2007). March 2003 is an appropriate starting point for the analysis, because this is when the ESDP became operational and the Union launched its first military conflict management operation, Concordia (Macedonia).

March 2009 is a logical end-point to the analysis, because the Union’s most recent ESDP military conflict management operation, EUFOR Chad/CAR, was
completed in March 2009. Because the analysis concentrates on the period in which troops are deployed in the field, it is not necessary to include the policy process in which an operation is evaluated internally within the EU directly in the timeframe.

The selected timeframe allows for the evaluation of the four completed operations and a provisional assessment of Operation Althea in BiH, which is still ongoing. For data gathering purposes the selected timeframe was useful, because it allowed for a period of reflection within and outside the EU after the most recent operation was concluded. A final round of interviews was conducted in this period, so as to include these reflections in the overall analysis. Although six years is a limited timeframe, it is possible to trace significant developments within the ESDP in this period. Considering the rapid development of the ESDP, this is a particularly significant period of time, in which much has changed. It is important to recognise this in order to understand why it is important to undertake this research at this point in time. As one interviewee put it:

*The problem with the academic literature is that it is so far behind. And the academics do not even seem to realise it. In ESDP terms five years is a long time. The ESDP now is not what it was in 2003 and the Petersburg tasks are ancient!* (Interview, national representative to the EU, 09/06/2009)

Including all five operations in the empirical analysis and examining these over the whole six year period available means that the thesis avoids selection bias.
Moreover, by including all the cases and the whole timeframe available, the study maximises its empirical scope. The analysis is able to assess the effect of variations on the independent variables (conditions for success) on the dependent variable (success) across the time and space available. This allows the research to carefully consider outside influences. Including all five cases rather than relying on a single case study allows for a systematic cross-time and -space analysis (including all the time and space available) of the evolving ESDP military approach to the management of violent conflict. The analysis can then comparatively examine the conditions, which according to the existing theory are expected to condition success in ESDP military conflict management operations. The comparative approach, thus, facilitates a more nuanced assessment of how variations on the independent variables, presented in the research hypotheses, affect the dependent variable in the five cases. The empirical relevance of the hypotheses presented in the theoretical part of the thesis will, thus, be tested in a series of different contexts at the different levels of the analysis.

Structured focused comparison: strengths and weaknesses

Rather than a case-by-case or chronological account of the cases, this thesis takes a so-called structured focused comparative approach to the case study (Howard, 2008). This means that the comparative analysis of the cases is systematically focused and structured around the research problem rather than around the individual cases. The benefit of this approach is that it allows for a more focused analysis of the causal link between the dependent variable (success) and different independent variables (conditions for success). The
weakness of this approach is obvious. Because there are more cases, the
description of each individual case is less detailed, however, as this study only
includes five cases this potential weakness is limited. Some limitation in terms
of the detailed account of each case is acceptable, as this is not the primary
focus of the analysis. In addition, each case has already been described by at
least one single-case study in the existing literature. This potential weakness,
therefore, does not limit the original contribution of this thesis to the literature
or the broader understanding the ESDP. The strength of the selected approach
is that it allows for a comparative investigation of the conditions under which
ESDP military conflict management operations can be successful. This strength
is crucial, as it is these conditions and their relationship with the dependent
variable (success) rather than a description of the operations themselves that is
the focus of the analysis. A thematic comparison is more appropriate than a
case-by-case account to answer to the research question at hand and to help fill
the theoretical and empirical gaps in the existing knowledge and understanding
of the ESDP (Howard, 2008, pp.1-21).

Due to the very recent nature of the phenomenon under investigation, the
empirical analysis can only cover a limited number of cases and a relatively
short timeframe. This naturally causes analytical limitations. It is simply too
evry early to analyze the long-term success of any of the individual operations or
indeed the long-term impact of the ESDP approach to military conflict
management. However, the relatively short-term goals of conflict management
(as opposed to conflict prevention and conflict settlement) make a short-term
evaluation of success in this realm an important subject of enquiry. Moreover,
an in-depth evaluation of short-term success is a necessary first step for a (later stage) long-term assessment. A longer-term evaluation of success in ESDP military conflict management is a logical and important follow-up to this research, but because it is still too early for such an undertaking, the analytical focus of this thesis is on the short-term success of ESDP military conflict management operations only. Hardly any work has been done on the conditions for success in ESDP military conflict management operations. This thesis posits that exactly because the EU is new to military conflict management operations, it is important to start taking stock of its success even at this early stage.

Primary and secondary data: problems and solutions

The primary data for this research was collected using a three-pronged approach. The three different vehicles of the primary data collection were (1) document analysis, (2) participant observation and (3) semi-structured interviews. The primary data was complemented by a wide selection of secondary sources. At the initial stages of this research, the relevant literature was carefully reviewed. In particular, the existing literature in EU studies, conflict studies and international security studies was consulted. The thesis brings together different aspects of these three bodies of literature. From EU studies the analysis is informed in particular by the literature on the CFSP, the ESDP and the military conflict management operations undertaken by the EU to date. The most important sources were outlined in the state of the ESDP debate section above. From conflict studies the thesis draws on the literature on the causes, consequences and dynamics of violent conflict and on the study of
conflict regulation. The most important sources for the analysis from this literature were outlined in the above sections, which conceptualised conflict and conflict management. Finally, from international security studies the thesis is inspired by the academic scholarship of military intervention, peacekeeping, international ethics and Just War theory. The most significant pieces of this literature, which have informed the thesis, are discussed in chapter two. A more detailed review of the literature with reference to the specific theories that have been used will be undertaken throughout the thesis, and especially, in the two theoretical chapters.

The literature review was focused around the research question: Under which conditions can an ESDP military conflict management operation be successful? As the existing scholarship of the European Union does not engage with this issue from a theoretical perspective, the research hypotheses for this research project were deduced primarily from existing theories on the conditions for success in international peacekeeping, military intervention and conflict management. The thesis will, thus, test the relevance of these existing theories to the study of ESDP military conflict management operations. The deduction of the hypotheses, the relevant theory and background literature is examined in further detail later in the thesis.

With regard to the secondary sources it is important to mention that the ESDP literature, like the ESDP itself, has expanded greatly throughout the course of this research project. Therefore, it has been crucial to review the literature on a regular basis throughout the last three years and to keep up to date with the
newest developments in the literature on the ESDP as well as in its practice. To this end, academic journals were regularly reviewed; and, to ensure that the most recent developments were accounted for in the analysis, media reports, press statements and independent commentary were used to complement the secondary academic sources. Current political debates on military intervention and international conflict management have also informed the analysis. Official documents and reports on foreign, security and defence matters issued by the EU and other international, national or sub-national, governmental and non-governmental institutions and organisations acting as or observing international military conflict managers were also critically assessed.

To complement the initial document analysis and in order to get a more in-depth understanding of the research problem, the researcher spent a year conducting primary research and participant observation in the Western Balkans. In this period the researcher worked for the Office of the European Union Special Representative, the High Representative for Peace Implementation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Royal Danish Embassy. Whilst working in Sarajevo, the researcher conducted a first round of interviews in the region. These interviews were semi-structured around the research problem and intended to increase the researcher’s general understanding of military conflict management, the ESDP and the wider EU approach towards the Western Balkans. These early stages of primary data gathering helped to develop the research question and the structure of the rest of the research project.
The security situations in the DRC, CAR and Chad were very unstable throughout the period during which this research was undertaken. In particular, the conditions in the areas where the ESDP military conflict management operations were deployed were precarious. Therefore, the researcher was not able to undertake a similar period of participant observation in Africa. The multi-pronged research methodology was adopted to limit the negative effect that this could have had on the analysis. In order to limit regional (or other) bias, the researcher undertook an extensive process of primary document analysis throughout the project; conducted 41 semi-structured interviews; and undertook a number of additional informal meetings and phone and email conversations regarding the research topic.

Interviews were conducted with representatives from EU member states and institutions as well as with people from the other main international actors involved at different levels and in different ways in conflict regulation in the countries in question (primarily UN, NATO and OSCE). Interviewees were selected from both HQ and field offices to highlight possible inconsistencies and differences of opinions. Representatives from both donor and host countries were consulted to investigate potential actor- and target-specific perspectives. The interviewees were selected from a range of different personal and professional backgrounds (nationalities, ethnicities and professional levels within the respective organisations). Further interviews were conducted with representatives from key bilateral actors involved in the conflicts and operations in question. Interviews were also held with representatives from EU member states that had opted out of some or all of the operations. Finally,
regional experts and security specialist were consulted, including observers and scholars of the ESDP, military conflict management and third party intervention.

Some of the individuals approached were reluctant to agree to formal interviews. In these cases, informal meetings were held instead to help develop the researcher’s understanding of the subject matter. Likewise, key interviewees were interviewed on several occasions and in different capacities. In this way, the researcher entered into a dialogue about the research problem with certain interviewees. This gave the researcher both access and deeper insight into otherwise confidential information as a relationship of trust was established. It often seemed to facilitate trust and access to information that the researcher had work experience in the field herself. Another tool used to overcome the initial barriers of confidentiality of information was the promise of anonymity to all interviewees.

The interviews were conducted in stages, in order to immerse the researcher in the empirical setting of ESDP military conflict management at different stages of her own understanding of the research problem as well as at different stages of the conflicts and operations at the centre of the analysis. At each stage the interviews were more structured and focused. The researcher conducted two main rounds of interviews in the Western Balkans and two main rounds of interviews in Brussels. Each round of interviews was conducted at strategically important times such as around the time of the transition of Operation Althea (BiH) and the conclusion of EUFOR Chad/CAR. In addition to these four
rounds, a series of phone interviews and email ‘conversations’ were conducted at the final stages of the research to avoid limited or outdated research results (as too often is the case). This also allowed the research to include an end-of-operation assessment of the EUFOR Chad/CAR operation despite the operation being withdrawn as the research itself was being concluded. Because the data collection was undertaken in stages, preliminary research findings could feed back into the next round of primary research, allowing the researcher to test the empirical relevance of the preliminary research results and allowing for a more in-depth analysis of the conditions under which ESDP military conflict management operations can be successful.

Three key issues posed difficulties in the primary research for this project: (1) accessibility, (2) confidentiality of information and (3) the contentious nature of the subject of the enquiry. Firstly, in terms of accessibility the volatile security situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Chad and the Central African Republic meant that it was neither safe nor practically possible for the researcher to go to the areas in which EU troops have been deployed. Participant observation was simply not an option. Likewise, because many potential interviewees were deployed in the field (here or elsewhere), it was often difficult to arrange interviews. Here phone interviews and informal email conversations were used as an alternative. The researcher also interviewed a number of retired military personnel to make sure that the analysis also considered the perspective of soldiers on the ground. Secondly, issues concerning confidentiality of information, lack of transparency and the absence of security clearance presented a potential problem for the research. Especially
because, as highlighted by Hadden (2009), the full range of information and internal EU reviews, which would be useful for a detailed assessment of these types of operations, are not made available by the European Union. The recent nature of the operations, and in the case of EUFOR Chad/CAR and Operation Althea, the ongoing deployments at the time, made it particularly difficult to access some information. The interviews were a useful way to get around this problem. Finally, the political motivations of some of the sources that are available (EU end-of-operation statements, for example) due to the highly political nature of the research topic presented a potential problem of bias.

These three issues were identified from the beginning as potentially limitations to the project and, as illustrated above, carefully considered in the development of the methodology, which incorporated a mix of qualitative methods and a vast variety of sources. This allowed the researcher to limit the potential negative effect of these challenges on the analysis. In addition to combining different methods of data gathering, the researcher made an extra effort to establish a rapport with interviewees and contacts in the field. When sources were reluctant to comment on the record, informal conversations allowed the researcher access to data and commentary. The developing trust between interviewer and interviewees facilitated a greater insight into the subject matter, although this information was not to be quoted directly in the thesis.

Overall, the selected methodology allowed for a thorough investigation of the different opinions of key actors and observers engaged, directly or indirectly, in ESDP military conflict management operations.
Thesis structure

This chapter has introduced the empirical, conceptual and methodological backbone of the thesis. It has explained the rationale behind the research question and outlined the original contributions that this thesis aims to make. It has clarified key terminology and set the boundaries of the project in terms of the cases and timeframe, which will be examined in the analysis. As such, this chapter has set the stage for the rest of the thesis. The nature of the research question necessitates a prior examination of success in ESDP military conflict management operations before the conditions for such a success can be identified and analyzed. Therefore, the rest of the thesis will be structured into two parts. The first part focuses on the notion of success in ESDP military conflict management operations. It theoretically defines and empirically evaluates success. To this end, the first part of the thesis develops and applies a theoretical framework for the evaluation of success in this realm. The second part of the thesis focuses on the conditions for success. It theoretically and empirically explains success. To this end, the second part of the thesis deduces a set of research hypotheses from the existing ESDP literature and theories of international peacekeeping, military intervention and conflict management, and tests the empirical relevance of these theories with regard to the conditions for success in ESDP military conflict management operations. Each of the two parts of the thesis is divided into three chapters. The first chapter in each part develops the theoretical framework for the empirical analysis, which is conducted in the two subsequent chapters in each part.
This final section will provide a brief road map of the rest of the thesis. Chapter two discusses how to define and evaluate success. It develops a definition and an evaluation framework for success, which incorporates both an internal-EU specific perspective and an external conflict-specific perspective on success. This chapter provides the theoretical framework for chapters three and four, which evaluate success from an internal and an external perspective, respectively. Chapter five develops the theoretical starting point for the second part of the thesis, which seeks to explain success. This chapter deduces four research hypotheses and develops a levels-of-analysis framework for the subsequent analysis of the internal and external conditions for success in chapters six and seven. Chapter eight sums up the key findings of each chapter and examines what the analysis reveals about the conditions for success in ESDP military conflict management operations. Finally, it explains how this is relevant to the academic scholarship of the ESDP and the study of conflict management more generally.
Chapter two: Defining and evaluating success

Chapter one explained how the European Security and Defence Policy has been subject to extensive scholarship in the first ten years of its existence. Individual ESDP military conflict management operations have also recently enjoyed increasing levels of academic attention. Nevertheless, a theoretically grounded understanding of how to define and evaluate success in these operations has yet to be developed. That is what this chapter sets out to do. This is an important endeavour, because in order to achieve success it is useful to know what it is, and to accurately evaluate success a sound understanding of what constitutes success is crucial. The purpose of this undertaking is to advance the study of the ESDP, but it also adds a new dimension to ongoing scholarly debates regarding military intervention, conflict management and international peacekeeping.

The conceptual discussion of success in the ESDP literature is limited at best. It is assumed that success is obvious. One knows it when one sees it. Why then is it so difficult to define? Because this conceptual issue has so far been neglected in the scholarship of the EU, this chapter takes its starting point in the literature on international peacekeeping. Recognising that there are significant differences between UN peacekeeping operations and ESDP military conflict management operations, this chapter seeks to investigate whether, and if so what, peacekeeping theory might contribute to a conceptual discussion of success in ESDP military conflict management operations. The peacekeeping literature is a suitable starting point for this discussion, because it is the most
closely related area of study, which has explicitly discussed the notion of success.

A review of the peacekeeping literature, however, reveals a similar deficiency. Although there have been different attempts to define success in peacekeeping, there is still no consensus on what constitutes a success in this realm (Diehl, 1994; Druckman et al., 1997; Howard, 2008; Pushkina, 2006). Peacekeeping scholars disagree on the definition of success, because they do not agree on the purpose of peacekeeping. A shared framework of analysis and standards for evaluation, thus, remain outstanding (Bures, 2007). This chapter also looks to the literature on conflict management, military intervention and foreign policy analysis, but neither of these bodies of literature provides a suitable framework, which could be directly applied in the evaluation of success in ESDP military conflict management operations (Baldwin, 2000; Freedman, 2006; Haas, 2006; Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall, 2005; Ross and Rothman, 1999).

This gap in the literature means that a theoretical framework for the systematic evaluation of success in ESDP military conflict management operations does not yet exist. This chapter sets out to construct such a framework. It applies different perspectives from the literature and discusses how best to define and evaluate success in ESDP military conflict management operations. The chapter develops a definition of success, which incorporates both internal EU-specific and external conflict-specific perspectives on success. Subsequently, it introduces four evaluation criteria for success: (1) internal goal attainment, (2) internal appropriateness, (3) external goal attainment and (4) external...
appropriateness. Together the definition and four criteria make up the components of a new theoretical framework for the evaluation of success in ESDP military conflict management operations.

*Discussing success*

In order to evaluate success in ESDP military conflict management operations, what is meant by the term *success* must first be defined. Generally speaking success means to reach a favourable or desired outcome. The question in this context is: favourable and desired according to whom or indeed what? This issue is at the very heart of evaluating these operations, yet it is hardly discussed in the ESDP literature. The scholarly practice varies considerably with regard to its definitions of success, which are implicit rather than explicit in the literature. The notion of success itself has not been subject of much in-depth debate in the study of ESDP military conflict management operations. Therefore, this chapter is theoretically grounded in conflict studies and international security studies. It takes into account scholarly perspectives from the existing literature on international peacekeeping, conflict management, military intervention and foreign policy analysis. This is justified, because the problem of which perspective to adopt when defining success is not confined to the evaluation of ESDP military conflict management operations. In the peacekeeping literature and in foreign policy analysis, for example, scholars such as Pushkina (2006) and Baldwin (2000) have highlighted disputes concerning whether to evaluate success from the perspective of the policy actor, the target or according to theoretically defined standards or principles.
This same problem exists implicitly in the emerging scholarship of ESDP military conflict management operations.

In practice a narrow understanding of success reflecting the interests and intentions of the policy actor is often applied. Success is understood as mandate fulfilment (Diehl, 1994, pp.33-61). This perception of success and perspective on its evaluation is common with regard military operations more generally (Interview, retired Major General from the British Army, 04/11/2008; Interview, national defence representative to the EU, 09/06/2009). It has also been adopted by the EU with regard to its ESDP military conflict management operations, where the Council evaluates success according to its own operational aims and objectives (Interview, representative from EU institution, 06/05/2009).

Howard (2008, p.7) has outlined a popular argument in favour of mandate implementation as a suitable criterion for success in the case of the UN:

Success in mandate implementation is the most relevant and equitable standard to which the UN can be held, even if we might wish at times that standards set by the often hard-won, negotiated accords and Security Council resolutions were higher.

Although a mandate may include considerations on behalf of the target, the corresponding definition of success is ultimately internal, in the sense that the success criteria are decided upon by the intervener. In other words, the success
criteria directly reflect internally defined goals. This narrow definition of success as defined by the intervener itself will be referred to as internal success. According to this definition, whether an operation is a success is ultimately assessed according to whether it has reached its stated objectives. This logic advocates that the EU should be judged on its own merits alone and that whether an ESDP military conflict management operation is a success depends on whether it fulfils its mandate.

The internal definition of success is problematic for three key reasons. Firstly, it suggests that an operation is successful, when its outcome is compatible with the intentions and interests of the intervener (EU), disregarding that these do not necessarily reflect the needs of the target (the conflict) or indeed the overall purpose of the operation (conflict management). Secondly, assessing the operation solely according to whether it has met its stated objectives is risky, as this logic suggests that success can be ensured by a vague mandate or operational objectives aiming to do very little (or nothing at all). This definition of success on its own would mean that an ESDP military conflict management operation could be declared successful, even if the conflict situation it leaves behind is less secure than it was when the operation was launched, as long as the operation has fulfilled its specific mandate, however narrow this may be. It is useful to draw a comparison to medical practice: would it be right to declare an operation a success, even if after the operation the patient was still dieing? This thesis argues that it would not. The absence of outright failure does not necessarily equal success. Finally, the narrow definition of success does not sufficiently evaluate the means by which the
intervener attempts to reach its goals. It simply suggests that the operation is a success, if its implementation went according to plan, without evaluating the plan itself. To carry on the medical analogy, one could then declare a success, if a patient’s toe stops hurting, even if this was achieved by amputating the whole leg.

It is important to recall that a fundamental premise to the legitimate use of force, according to Just War theory, is that one must:

Consider most carefully and honestly whether the good we can reasonably expect to achieve is large enough – and probable enough – to outweigh the inescapable harm in loss of lives, damage and disruption (...) It cannot be right for a (...) leader, responsible for the good of all the people, to undertake – or prolong armed conflict, with all the loss of life or other harm that entails, if there is no reasonable likelihood that this would achieve a better outcome for the people than would result from rejecting or ending combat and simply doing whatever is possible by other means (Guthrie and Quinlan, 2007, pp.20-21 and p.31)

To ensure that this principle is reflected in the definition of success, this chapter, in agreement Baldwin (2000) and Pushkina (2006), rejects the actor-specific definition of success based exclusively on the internal goals and intentions of the intervener alone. This is not, for the three reasons outlined above, an appropriate stand-alone definition of success. Internal success does not necessarily constitute an overall success in an ESDP military conflict.
management operation. This chapter will, however, argue that internal success is an important part of a broader definition of success.

The alternative practice to assessing an intervener on its own merits (internal criteria) is to define success according to the perceived interests of the target or a set of theoretical standards or principles (Baldwin, 2000). With regard to peacekeeping the interests of the target are often associated with what Fetherston and Johansen (Druckman et al, 1997) have referred to as *higher values of world peace, justice and the reduction of human suffering*. This suggests that success should be defined according to standards determined externally to the intervening actor (external criteria). But again – it is disputed what these external criteria should be. To give but a few examples of the external criteria for success presented in the peacekeeping literature: Stedman and Downs (2002, p.50) argue that a successful operation must *end violence* and leave behind *a self-sustaining cease-fire*. Diehl (1994, pp. 33-61) similarly suggests that success is when the *armed conflict is limited* and when the operation facilitates *conflict resolution*. Howard (2009, p.7) evaluates the *legacy* of a peacekeeping operation after its departure incorporating aspects of *maximalist standards of institution-building and positive peace, but does not go so far as to say that all missions that do not result in just, stable market economies are failures*. She fails, however, to clarify to what exact extent positive peace characteristics such as human rights; economic fairness and opportunity; democratisation and environmental sustainability are included even in her own definition of success. She concludes simply that they must to some extent be taken into account. This is not to single out Howard’s definition
as insufficient, but rather to illustrate general difficulty and inconsistency in defining success in this realm.

The conceptual problem of defining success causes further problems in the evaluation of success. Depending on which perspective one applies, the evaluation of success may vary greatly. Where the internal definition arguably asks too little for an operation to be a success, the external perspective often defines success according to an ideal state of peace. This reflects a misconception of the purpose of these operations, which often causes scholars to allocate the forces too much responsibility – accrediting or blaming the intervener for developments in which it is neither the only nor the decisive actor (Johansen, 1994). The external criteria for success, which are applied in the peacekeeping literature, make it, by definition, all but impossible for these operations to succeed. This problem is mirrored in the ESDP literature. This chapter argues that the definition of success in ESDP military conflict management operations should not expect EU forces to resolve conflicts. This is normatively unfair, analytically unsound and academically unproductive. It is important that the definition of success reflects the theoretical purpose of conflict management and the reality that the outcome of a conflict is dependent on the actions of belligerent parties and other actors, which may be engaged in the conflict and its regulation (Johansen, 1994). Therefore, this thesis also rejects definitions of success, which are based solely on external criteria. Instead the definition of success must take into account aspects of both internal and external perspectives on success, so as to reflect the interests of the
The following develops a theoretical framework for the systematic evaluation of success in ESDP military conflict management operations. This framework seeks to enable an evaluation of success taking into account actor, target and theoretical perspectives on success. This is based on the argument above, which suggests that it is important to include both internal and external aspects in the examination of success. The internal perspective will evaluate whether an operation was implemented well, its mandate was fulfilled and its goals achieved in a timely, efficient and cost-effective manner. The external perspective will assess the operation with regard to the theoretical purpose of conflict management; namely, to manage the violent aspect of a conflict. That is to prevent (a) continuation, (b) diffusion, (c) escalation and (d) intensification of violence. The external perspective will also include an assessment of the way in which the operation sought to enforce this purpose (Baldwin, 2000; Pushkina, 2006; Ross & Rothman, 1999).

Internal success is defined according to the narrow definition above; namely, according to whether an operation is successful from the point of view of the intervener (EU). External success, on the other hand, indicates a favourable overall outcome on the conflict situation in question, which takes into account the interest of the intervener (the EU), and the target (the conflict) as well as the overall purpose of military conflict management operations. Each of these categories can be divided into two key success criteria, the first of which
evaluates whether the operation achieved its purpose (goal attainment) and the second of which examines the way in which the operation sought to achieve this purpose (appropriateness). Examining success within each of these categories will allow for a more nuanced analysis of the level and nature of success in each operation.

**Internal success**

Although not a sufficient criterion for success in its own right, the assessment of whether an operation has been internally successful from the point of view of the EU is an important part of its overall evaluation. Two key criteria for internal success can be deduced from the theory and practice of foreign policy analysis. These criteria seek to determine (a) whether the main objective of the policy was successfully obtained and (b) whether the way in which it was obtained can be classified as successful (Baldwin, 2000). These two internal criteria for success will in the following be applied to the evaluation of ESDP military conflict management operations. The internal success criteria will be referred to as (a) internal goal attainment and (b) internal appropriateness.

**Internal goal attainment**

Military operations are goal orientated in nature and at the military-strategic level success is thought of in terms of fulfilling operational goals. Military operations are traditionally evaluated according to the extent to which they achieved these goals (Interview, retired Major General from the British Army, 04/11/2008). An ESDP military conflict management operation must in the same way first of all be evaluated according whether it achieved the task it set
out to do. To this end, the first criterion for internal success is internal goal attainment.

It is important to acknowledge that there may be a significant difference between the military-strategic and the political-strategic goals of an ESDP military conflict management operation. Chapter three, which examines the internal success of these operations, discusses various examples of this difference. In terms of their internal goal attainment, the operations will primarily be evaluated from a military-strategic perspective, as the focus is on their successful undertaking in the field.

Operations pursue multiple goals and goal attainment is often a matter of degree. This could complicate the process of determining success in internal goal attainment. However, because not all operational goals are equally important to the EU, evaluating their achievement evenly would be misleading. It is, therefore, important to rank the operational objectives according to the main goals of the operation and then evaluate whether the operation successfully obtained its overall operational purpose. Although this would not be a sufficient evaluation on its own, it is necessary criterion for overall success in ESDP military conflict management operations (Baldwin, 2000; Pushkina, 2006; Ross & Rothman, 1999). Success in internal goal attainment is best evaluated according to whether an operation fulfilled its mandate. In effect, the indicators of success in internal goal attainment are outlined in the key objectives specified in the mandate for each individual operation.
Internal appropriateness

Not only whether an operation achieved its goals, but also how it achieved these goals, is crucial for its overall internal success. This thesis suggests that it is necessary to complement the internal goal attainment criterion with an internal appropriateness criterion. This criterion examines whether the way in which an operation was implemented was appropriate from an internal perspective. Internal appropriateness assesses whether the operational purpose was implemented well on the ground. The timeliness, efficiency and cost-effectiveness of an operation are the key indicators of success in internal appropriateness.

Timeliness refers to the deployment of the force. In order for the operation to be able to implement its mandate in an appropriate manner, it is essential that the force is deployed according to schedule. This includes not only the first set of boots on the ground and the time it takes to reach Initial Operating Capability (IOC), but also the time it takes to reach Full Operating Capability (FCO). Likewise, the efficiency by which the operation fulfils its operational goals is important. A successful operation should implement its mandate as quickly and efficiently as possible without compromising its effect (Diehl, 1994, p.33-61; Interview, retired Major General from the British Army, 04/11/2008).

Finally, from an internal perspective it is important that the costs of an operation do not outweigh its benefits for the EU. Evaluating any policy based on its achievements without taking into account its cost is, as Baldwin (2000)
has suggested with regard to foreign policy analysis, like assessing a business solely in terms of its sales disregarding its expenses. Costs are an important part of evaluating internal appropriateness. In the internal evaluation of success in ESDP military conflict management operations, costs for the EU are not so much financial as they are political. This is because the financial costs of these operations are overwhelmingly borne by the contributing member states, whereas the internal success of the operation is evaluated from the perspective of the EU as a whole. Cost-effectiveness is, thus, examined with regard to the political aspect of internal appropriateness. For the EU, as a newborn military actor, battle-related fatalities among its soldiers represent an inappropriate cost. Failure itself, it is often argued, is another unacceptable cost for the EU at this early stage of its military career. As it was put in one interview: The EU will not launch an operation, if it is not sure that it will succeed (Interview, representative from ESDP military conflict management operation, 17/02/2009). One might be tempted to criticise this focus on achieving internal success; however, it is important to recall that the reasonable prospect of success is a fundamental premise of legitimate use of force according to Just War theory (Guthrie and Quinlan, 2007, pp.31-32). Table 2.1 illustrates the two internal criteria for success.

Table 2.1: Internal success criteria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Success criteria</th>
<th>Successful</th>
<th>Not successful</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Internal goal attainment</strong></td>
<td>Mandated successfully achieved according to the key operational objectives</td>
<td>Mandate not successfully achieved according to the key operational objectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Internal appropriateness</strong></td>
<td>Timely, efficient and effective implementation of the mandate</td>
<td>Not a timely, efficient or effective implementation of the mandate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**External success**

In order to evaluate whether an ESDP military conflict management operation is successful overall the theoretical framework must also reflect the interests of the target and the purpose of conflict management. In addition to implementing its mandate well a successful operation must help manage the violent aspect of the conflict through an appropriate use of force. The external evaluation of success must, thus, first assess whether an operation contributed to the management of the conflict, and then it must assess whether the use of force was appropriate. In this way, the analysis will be able to evaluate whether the operation was beneficial to the conflict as well as to the EU. To this end, it is important to complement the internal criteria for success with an equivalent set of external criteria. Two external criteria for success: (1) external goal attainment and (2) external appropriateness are deduced from the existing literature on conflict management (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall, 2005; Ross and Rothman, 1999; Reagan, 1996), international peacekeeping (Howard, 2008; Johansen, 1994; Diehl, 1994) and Just War theory (Evans, 2005; Guthrie & Quinlan, 2007; Ramsey, 2001; Walzer, 2006).

**External goal attainment**

It is necessary to have a criterion for external goal attainment complementing the requirement for internal goal attainment. From an external perspective goal attainment does not reflect the purpose of an operation from the perspective of the EU (internal goal attainment), but rather the overall purpose of military conflict management. The external goal attainment criterion assesses whether an ESDP military conflict management operation has successfully contributed
to the military management of the violent aspect of the conflict. That is, by
definition, to prevent the continuation, diffusion, escalation and intensification
of the violence. To fulfil the external goal attainment criteria an ESDP military
conflict management operation must help manage the conflict successfully.
This might seem an obvious criterion for success, but it is all too often
bypassed or misinterpreted when operations of this nature are evaluated.
Successful goal attainment overall is, thus, not achieved by an operation which
simply fulfils its mandate. However, it is also not necessary for the successful
goal attainment of an operation of this nature that the underlying conflict is
settled (Johansen, 1994; Reagan, 1996). Naturally, the peaceful settlement of a
conflict is desirable, and as Diehl (1994, p.40) has argued in the case of UN
peacekeeping operations:

*The ideal peacekeeping operation is one that is able to prevent or deter
fighting during its brief deployment in the course of which the disputants reach
an agreement and no longer need an interposition force.*

But it is crucial to distinguish between an ideal scenario and a successful
operation. ESDP military conflict management operations are always part of a
wider international (and EU) effort to regulate a conflict. It is important that the
external goal attainment criterion reflects this. Therefore, it is argued that an
ESDP military conflict management operation is successful in terms of its
external goal attainment when it fulfils its military conflict management role
within the wider effort to regulate the conflict. Military conflict management
operations (like peacekeeping operations) are sometimes undertaken in the
hope that they might bring about a peaceful settlement of the conflict (Diehl, 1994, p.3). However, conflict management must not be confused with conflict settlement. It is important to remember that there is a significant difference between successful conflict management (management of the violent aspect of the conflict) and successful conflict settlement (peaceful settlement of the underlying conflict). This distinction is not well recognised neither in the peacekeeping theory nor in the ESDP literature, but it is imperative in order not to confuse the responsibilities of international soldiers with those of the belligerent parties to the conflict. In the end, it is the adversaries, not the intervener, who must settle the conflict (Johansen, 1994; Wolff, 2006). The primary purpose of a military conflict management operation is to manage the violence. The external goal attainment criterion is developed here to help evaluate whether an ESDP military conflict management operation is successful in this regard in the specific conflict context in which it engages. The indicators of success in external goal attainment are, therefore, whether there is a continuation, diffusion, escalation or intensification of violence.

**External appropriateness**

The final criterion for success is one which has been neglected in the study of ESDP military conflict management operations – as it often is also in the wider literature on conflict management and international peacekeeping. That is the issue of external appropriateness. Appropriateness, in this thesis, assesses the manner in which an operation has sought to achieve its goals. Unlike internal appropriateness, which evaluates operational success according to an internal set of indicators, external appropriateness evaluates the implementation of the
operation according to a set of standards external to the EU. The purpose of this criterion is to evaluate whether a specific ESDP military conflict management operation in the pursuit of its goals did more harm than good to the conflict in question. This criterion is deduced from Just War theory, which, as Guthrie and Quinlan (2007) have argued, sets as a fundamental condition for the successful undertaking of a military operation that it does more good than harm.

One might question the application of Just War theory with regard to the evaluation of external appropriateness in ESDP military conflict management operations. After all, as one interviewee put it: *The EU does not fight wars* (Interview, national representative to the EU, 09/06/2009). Just War theory, however, provides a moral framework and a set of governing principles for the just application of force. Even if the EU does not fight wars in the traditional sense, ESDP operations are military operations mandated and equipped to use force. In some instances, EU soldiers have been involved in armed confrontations and people were killed as a direct result. Is important that the evaluation framework scrutinises the appropriateness of the use (or non-use) of force. Furthermore, this evaluation framework is intended to be applicable also in future cases, which makes it crucial to include this criterion, as these operations too are likely to be mandated and equipped to apply force. In the case of humanitarian intervention Walzer (2002, p.28) argued that:

*The same rules apply here as in war generally: non-combatants are immune from direct attack and have to be protected as far as possible from ‘collateral*
damage'; soldiers have to accept risks to themselves in order to avoid imposing risks on the civilian population.

This argument is equally valid with regard to ESDP military conflict management operations. If an actor engages in military confrontations, for whatever purpose, it is important to scrutinise such actions according to the principles governing the legitimate use of force provided in Just War theory. Military conflict management operations must be subject to the same limitations to the just use of force as other military operations. As Evans (2005, pp.204) asks:

We may wonder anyway what, morally speaking, actually hangs on the definitional issue (of war). Should we not wish morally to justify any resort to any form of violence?(...) It would seem odd to claim that, for example, violence should be used proportionately and as a last resort only in war and not similarly in any other circumstances.

Just War theory is traditionally divided into two categories: jus ad bellum and jus in bello. The first category addresses ‘justice of war’. It establishes a set of principles regarding the justified reasons for launching military operations mandated to use force. The second category concerns ‘justice in war’. It discusses the legitimate use of force once a military operation is underway (Walzer, 2006, pp. 21-33). More recently, a third category of jus post bellum addressing ‘justice after war’ has also been added to the tradition (Evans, 2005, pp. 1-21). Because this research is focused on the successful undertaking of
ESDP military conflict management operations, the thesis concentrates its analysis on the period in which operations are active in the field. That is from the point at which the EU decides to launch an operation until the operation is officially completed. The external appropriateness criterion, thus, assesses the appropriateness of the operation and the use of force in the field. It does not scrutinise the decision to launch the operation, nor does it evaluate EU efforts in the field after the ESDP military conflict management operation is concluded. Although these are important issues they are not the focus of this enquiry. The external appropriateness criterion, therefore, concentrates on the aspect of Just War theory, which deals with the application of force once an operation is underway. That is the ‘justice of war’ also called *jus in bello* (Walzer, 2006, pp. 21-33).

Two key principles condition *jus in bello* and govern the appropriate application of force in military operations. These are (1) the principle of discrimination and (2) the principle of proportionality. Discrimination draws a distinction between ‘combatants’ and ‘non-combatants’. This principle asserts that it is never justified deliberately to directly attack non-combatant civilians (Ramsey, 2002, pp.141-147; Walzer, 2006, pp.34-47, 138-159). Proportionality asserts that the application of force must always be proportional (Bellamy, 2006, pp.199-228; Walzer, pp.127-137). The principle of proportionality asserts that the good that the application of force is expected to deliver must be seen in relation to the harm that it is expected to cause. To fulfil the criterion for success the good must always outweigh the bad. The harm that an operation causes must be evaluated in relation to the lives and well-being of (a) ‘innocent
people\(^7\), (b) one’s own military personnel and (c) the adversary. Linked to this is the principle of military necessity (sometimes seen as a separate principle), which condemns the illegitimate use of more force than necessary (Guthrie & Quinlan, 2007, pp.1-49, Walzer, pp.144-151). The indicators of external appropriateness are, thus, discrimination and proportionality in the use of force during an ESDP military conflict management operation. Table 2.2 illustrates the external criteria for success in ESDP military conflict management operations.

*Table 2.2: External criteria for success*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Success criteria</th>
<th>Successful</th>
<th>Not successful</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>External goal attainment</strong></td>
<td>Continuation, diffusion, escalation and intensification of violence is prevented</td>
<td>Continuation, diffusion, escalation or intensification of violence is not prevented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>External appropriateness</strong></td>
<td>The use of force in the operation was appropriate according to the principles of discrimination and proportionality</td>
<td>The use of force in the operation was not appropriate according to the principles of discrimination and proportionality</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Four criteria have now been identified for an ESDP military conflict management operation to be classified as an overall success. These criteria may overlap in practice. Internal goal attainment, for example, overlaps with external goal attainment in the cases selected for this study in so far as all five operations are mandated to manage at least parts of the violent conflict. Likewise, it is part of both the internal and external appropriateness criteria that EU troops to not lose their lives unnecessarily. Such overlaps do not

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7 The term innocent is defined here according to its Latin origin *not involved in harming us or helping to harm us* (Guthrie & Quinlan, 2007, p.14).
constitute a problem for the theoretical framework because what is important is that the evaluation always considers all four criteria. An operation is only a success, if all four criteria have been met. Figure 2.3 illustrates this.

*Figure 2.3: Success in ESDP military conflict management*

![Diagram of success criteria]

According to the four success criteria:

**An operation is a success when its purpose has been achieved and implemented in an appropriate manner from both an internal and an external perspective.**

_Evaluating success_
As illustrated above, success is a multi-dimensional phenomenon. In practice it is often a matter of degree. Operations that do not constitute an overall success may still have positive aspects to them, just as operations that are successful overall may have negative side-effects. It is crucial that a theoretical framework applied to evaluate success is able to reflect this reality. The evaluation framework developed in this chapter is particularly useful for identifying mixed results within operations and comparing different degrees of success across several operations. It facilitates an analysis, which appreciates the multi-dimensional nature not only of success, but also of the operations themselves and the violent conflicts that they seek to help manage. Through the application of this framework, the thesis hopes to facilitate a more nuanced understanding and evaluation of success in ESDP military conflict management operations.

It is crucial that the extent to which the success criteria are met is evaluated rather than measured. Evaluation should also never be a simple box-ticking exercise. It must be based on thorough investigation, careful consideration and sound empirical analysis. It is too simplistic to categorise operational outcomes into a dichotomous evaluation framework of ‘success’ and ‘failure’. The evaluation must also include an assessment of the way in which the outcomes were achieved. It is important to remember that an absence of outright failure does not necessarily equal success. A quantitative assessment, for example, of the extent to which operational goals were achieved (operation X has been 35% successful in achieving goals Y and Z) without relating this to the way in which these objectives were achieved and taking into consideration the wider
context in which the operation occurred would leave out crucial aspects of the evaluation. There is no shared standard of value (like profit in business) that allows different levels of success to be quantitatively measured and compared in an empirically viable way (Baldwin, 2000). Consequently, this thesis does not advocate a quantitative analysis of whether or to what extent operations have been successful. Instead it advocates a qualitative assessment of the multiple objectives and achievements of each operation taking into account their relevance to the EU, to the dynamics of the violent conflict and to theoretical and empirical purpose of military conflict management. This allows for an in-depth assessment of whether a specific operation has been internally and externally successful in terms of its goal achievement. This must then be complemented with an evaluation of the internal and external appropriateness of the implementation of the operation. This thesis advocates a qualitative approach to the evaluation of success in ESDP military conflict management operations, because this will allow for a careful consideration not only (a) of what an operation achieved but also (b) of how it achieved it. This approach is particularly suitable for comparing the success of operations in a number of different contexts. It also allows for a further analysis of if and why an operation is (likely to be) successful in a given context. Acknowledging the dangers of simplification in any theoretical framework this chapter suggests that the evaluation of success should be done according to each of the success criteria (an operation may be successful in internal goal attainment, but not successful in external appropriateness). This will allow for a more nuanced approach to the further study of the conditions under which a specific operation is (or is likely to be) successful.
**Methodological challenges and solutions to evaluating success**

Evaluating success in ESDP military conflict management operations presents scholars with a number of methodological challenges. Firstly, a violent conflict is not a constant. Its dynamics change over time and the domestic context within a conflict-country may change while an ESDP operation is underway. In response to developments on the ground the operation may change its approach, its goals and its implementation plan during the deployment. Operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example, undertook a mid-mission transition. However, this is not necessarily the case. The EU may choose not to change the nature of its operation despite significant changes in the conflict context as was the case in EUFOR Chad/CAR. Secondly, the EU itself might change during the deployment, for example, through enlargement, institutional reform, developing capabilities and changing security priorities. Thirdly, the regional and the international contexts in which a conflict occurs and the operation takes place constantly change. The change in the contextual conditions of the operation may, in turn, affect its success. Moving targets and so-called ‘mission creep’ present a potential challenge to the evaluation of success in ESDP military conflict management operations, as both the conflict and attempts to regulate it may change throughout an EU force deployment. This is especially relevant in cases of longer term operations. It is crucial that this is acknowledged and taken into account in the evaluation of success rather than assumed constant.
In view of these methodological challenges the structured and focused comparative case study approach (described in chapter one) has been selected. Based on a combined methodology of qualitative data gathering and thematically structured comparative data analysis, this research ensures that the success of the operations is assessed according to each of the above criteria and examined in as great depth as possible. Through primary data collection by means of participant observation and several rounds of interviews, the researcher could double-check research findings for each specific case and compare findings across different operations. In this way, the theoretical framework developed above and the selected methodology and analytical approach together limit this potential weakness and ensures an in-depth assessment of changing circumstances on the ground, in the region, within the EU and in the international security arena, whilst also paying close attention to how the operation might have changed its means in order to meet certain ends.

The second challenge to the evaluation of success in conflict management is how to assess the impact of an operation on a conflict situation. An ESDP military conflict management operation never represents an isolated change in a conflict environment and EU soldiers have so far never been the only external actors involved in the regulation of a conflict. This could potentially exacerbate the methodological challenges of evaluating success in such operations and determining a causal relationship between the actions of a specific operation and conflict dynamics on the ground. This is particularly relevant with regard to ESDP military conflict management operations, because (a) they are always part of a wider international and EU effort to
regulate a conflict; and (b) they set out to prevent a certain development from taking place (continuation, diffusion, escalation and intensification of violence). It is, therefore, difficult not only to identify what - if anything - did happen as a result of the operation, but also what did not happen as a result of the operation (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall, 2005; Reagan, 1996). The uncertainty of ‘what might have been’ is an unavoidable limitation in the study of any conflict regulation effort (and indeed many other areas of causal analysis). It is important to acknowledge this potential problem and avoid any possible limitations it might cause in the analysis.

The empirical evaluation of success in ESDP military conflict management operations will in the following adopt a retrospective perspective. By adopting a retrospective perspective it is possible to make a comparison of each operation’s intended purpose and its actual achievements (both internal and external). With regard to external goal attainment it is important to convey an extra word of caution. The analysis will not distinguish violence directly attributable to the operational shortcomings of an ESDP military conflict management operation from that resulting from other actors involved in the conflict and its regulation. This approach is justifiable for two key reasons. Firstly, it is near impossible to accurately assign responsibility for such a specific conflict dynamic to a single actor involved in a wider conflict regulation effort. As argued in chapter one, conflict dynamics are usually not a reaction to one specific action, but a product of both proximate causes and permissive conditions. Assuming that an ESDP conflict management operation alone can succeed or fail to manage a given conflict is both theoretically and
empirically unsound. Secondly, it is the overall dynamic of the violent conflict, which reflects whether the operation has played a successful role in the wider conflict regulation effort. As Diehl argues (1994, p.34):

*A smoothly operating peacekeeping operation is little better than a poorly organised one, if the respective protagonists renew warfare (...) The outcome is the most important barometer of success, as the causes of success and failure will be many.*

In this quote Diehl touches upon an important aspect of the evaluation of success, which is all too often misunderstood. It is crucial to recognise that the intervener (here the EU) is not necessarily to blame, if its operation is not a success in terms of its external goal attainment. As argued above the intervener should not be blamed for the actions of belligerent parties or other actors involved in the conflict or its regulation, however, this does not mean that these actors do not affect the success of the EU’s operation. To make a final comparison to the medical example: if a patient dies, the operation is not a success, but this does not necessarily mean that the doctor is to blame. The absence of success does not equal failure. This is why it is important to carefully consider the conditions for success, which is what this thesis seeks to do. Part one will evaluate the success of the operations and part two will go on to examine the conditions for success, only some of which are expected to be attributable to the EU.
It is necessary to stress that although an ESDP military conflict management operation does not necessarily hold the full responsibility of the success or failure of the regulation of the conflict as a whole, it is intended to play part in its management. It is important, therefore, to examine the extent to which the operation played this part well and, thus, helped to prevent more violence (external goal attainment). It is imperative to evaluate each operation’s achievements in its role within the wider approach to managing the conflict. To this end, the retrospective approach is useful. With the exception of EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina, all the operations evaluated in this thesis have been completed. A mid-mission assessment of Althea is included, because this is the Union’s longest and largest operation, and as such it would be a greater loss to the analysis to leave it out than to include it. The research takes into account, however, that the findings for this operation can only be provisional.

Analysing the end-result of the operations (with the exception of Althea) from a retrospective perspective allows the analysis to apply both the internal and external criteria for success when evaluating whether an operation has been successful. This will also allow for a thorough investigation of the role that the ESDP military conflict management operation played in the wider international effort to manage each conflict. Together these methodological considerations, the definition and the criteria for success make up the theoretical framework for the following two chapters to undertake an in-depth evaluation of success in ESDP military conflict management operations (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall, 2005; Ross & Rothman, 1999).
Conclusion and key findings

This chapter developed a definition and four corresponding criteria for success in ESDP military conflict management operations. According to the definition an operation is a success when its purpose has been achieved in an appropriate manner from both an internal and external perspective. The four criteria for success are: (1) internal goal attainment, (2) internal appropriateness, (3) external goal attainment and (4) external appropriateness. Together these allow for an assessment of success, which takes into account the EU, the conflict and the purpose of conflict management. The internal criteria for success address whether the operation was successfully undertaken, whether its mandate was completed and its goals were achieved in a timely, efficient and cost-effective manner. The external criteria for success allow for an evaluation of whether the operation helped to manage the violent aspect of the conflict in an appropriate manner. The next part of the thesis will apply this theoretical framework to the empirical case study of success in ESDP military conflict management operations from 2003 to 2009. This will permit a systematic evaluation not only of success, but also of the evaluation framework itself. Chapter three will evaluate internal success and examine internal goal attainment and appropriateness in the five cases. Chapter four will subsequently go on to evaluate their external success and comparatively assess their external goal attainment and appropriateness.
Chapter three: Evaluating internal success

In order to examine the conditions under which ESDP military conflict management operations are successful, one must first determine to what extent these operations have been successful. That is what this first empirical part of the thesis sets out to do. Success will be evaluated according to the definition developed in chapter two, which contends that an operation is successful, if its purpose has been achieved and appropriately implemented from both an internal and external perspective. The evaluation of success will be structured around the four success criteria developed in chapter two: (1) internal goal attainment, (2) internal appropriateness, (3) external goal attainment and (4) external appropriateness. Internal goal attainment evaluates the achievements of the operations from an EU-specific perspective. Internal appropriateness assesses the implementation of the operations with regard to their internal timeliness, efficiency and cost-effectiveness. External goal attainment assesses the contribution that each operation made to the overall management of the violent conflict; that is to prevent the continuation, diffusion, escalation and intensification of violence. Finally, external appropriateness evaluates the implementation of each operation according to the Just War principles governing the appropriate use of force; namely, discrimination and proportionality. In this way, success will be evaluated from both an internal perspective and an external perspective. This chapter will focus on internal success and the next chapter will assess external success.

This chapter evaluates the internal success of each of the five operations. It first explains the conflict context in which each operation engaged. It then evaluates
each operation’s success in terms of its internal goal attainment and internal appropriateness. Finally, it compares the internal success of all five operations and sums up the key findings with regard to the overall internal success of ESDP military conflict management from 2003 to 2009. The subsequent chapter compares and contrasts these findings with the external success of these same operations. The purpose of this part of the thesis is to examine the level and nature of success in these operations in order to facilitate a subsequent analysis of the conditions for success in the next part of the thesis.

*Operation Concordia in Macedonia*

The EU’s first ESDP military conflict management operation was launched in Macedonia in March 2003. Since its independence in 1991, Macedonia has had difficult bilateral relations with many of its neighbours. Greece has insisted that the country’s name demonstrates territorial aspirations to Aegean Macedonia in Greece. Bulgaria has refused to recognise Macedonian identity as anything but western Bulgarian. Likewise, the wars following the break-up of Yugoslavia plagued the Western Balkan region throughout the 1990s, and although Macedonia herself was not at war, the violence threatened stability here too. In particular, there was much concern within Macedonia that the conflict in neighbouring Kosovo might destabilise Macedonia either through a large influx of refugees or by way of a perceived aspiration for a ‘greater Albania’ or a ‘greater Kosovo’ seeking to include parts of the territory and population of Macedonia (Glenny, 2001; ICG, 2005a).8

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8 The fear that an exodus of refugees from Kosovo would flee into Macedonia rang true during the NATO campaign in 1999, when displacements from the neighbouring province had a destabilising effect on the domestic situation in Macedonia (and Montenegro and Albania). However, the perceived threat of a ‘greater Albania’ or ‘a greater Kosovo’ to Macedonia’s
The greatest challenge to Macedonia’s stability, however, would prove to be a growing animosity between ethnic Albanian and ethnic Macedonian parts of its own population. The ethnic Albanian minority, which made up 25 per cent of the population, had suffered discrimination under the Communist authorities in the 1970s and 1980s, and following the country’s independence, ethnic Albanians remained under-represented in state institutions throughout the 1990s (Glenny, 2001; ICG, 2005a). Many ethnic Albanians feared that the discrimination against them was becoming embedded in the structures of the new Macedonian state. Ethnic Albanian communities expressed particular dissatisfaction with the unequal ethnic representation in the police and with the fact that Albanian was not recognised as an official language. Many ethnic Macedonians suspected that the ethnic Albanian community had a separatist agenda (Mace 2004).

To prevent a destabilisation of Macedonia the UN had deployed the United Nations Preventative Deployment Force in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (UNPREDEP) in December 1992. UNPREDEP had contributed significantly to conflict prevention in Macedonia by the time it came to an end in February 1999 (Ladzik, 2006; Mace, 2004; Sokalski, 2006). Albanian and Macedonian political elites had also worked hard to bridge the division between the two ethnic communities despite the fact that this was not always popular with their constituents. Consequently, Macedonia remained peaceful throughout the 1990s, despite sustained ethnic tensions in the country. Nevertheless, in 1999, when UNPREDEP withdrew and significant numbers of territorial integrity was undermined when Kosovo declared its independence within its existing borders in February 2008 (Glenny, 2001; ICG, 2008e).
refugees spilled over from the conflict in neighbouring Kosovo, ethnic tensions rose in Macedonia. In January 2001, the conflict became violent as the ethnic Albanian National Liberation Army (NLA) and Macedonian state forces clashed in Tetovo. The violence undermined the Macedonian government and caused popular protests in the capital, Skopje. Hostilities increased and the violence led to population displacements (Mace, 2004). Observers at the time feared that a fully-fledged civil war might break out in Macedonia and affect the security of all the country’s neighbours (Albania, Serbia-Montenegro (then including Kosovo), Bulgaria and Greece). Ultimately, it was feared that this could destabilise the entire southern Balkan region (Glenny, 2001). The EU and NATO (with support from the USA) pushed hard for a negotiated settlement for the Macedonian conflict. A Framework Agreement was reached in Ohrid in August 2001. The Ohrid agreement ended the violent aspect of the conflict and NATO forces were deployed to keep the peace in the country (Mace, 2004; Yusufi, 2005).

9 The Ohrid Agreement recognised the unitary character of the Macedonian state, while affirming that the country’s multi-ethnic character had to be reflected in public life. Decentralisation was identified as the key to peace and the agreement introduced measures on local self-governance and equal representation. The agreement paved the way for an amnesty for disbanded NLA fighters; the roll-out of Macedonian police and the November 2001 constitution recognising Albanian as an official state language (Framework Agreement, 2001; ICG, 2005a).

10 NATO had military peacekeepers in Macedonia from August 2001 until March 2003. Operation Essential Harvest deployed 4,600 NATO troops to collect and destroy weapons handed over by armed groups as they disbanded after the crisis. Operation Amber Fox roughly comprised 800 personnel to contribute to the protection of the international monitors overseeing the implementation of the Ohrid Agreement. Operation Allied Harmony, consisting of 400 troops, continued to support the monitors and advised the government on how to take ownership of security throughout the country. NATO also had a significant presence in form of KFOR Rear, which would later be identified as a theatre reserve, which EU Operation Concordia could call on in extremis. After Operation Allied Harmony was completed, NATO kept a small representation in the country to assist the continuation of the disarmament process (Mace 2004; Robertson, 2003).
In January 2003, the Macedonian authorities invited the EU to take over NATO’s responsibilities in the country. The Council expressed the Union’s readiness to conduct such an operation. On 31 March 2003, as NATO terminated its deployment the EU launched its first ever ESDP military conflict management operation. The operation, code-named Concordia, was authorised by United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1371 (2001). The EU-NATO Berlin Plus arrangements, which were completed just two weeks before the launch of Operation Concordia, allowed the EU to make use of NATO assets in the operation. Concordia’s Operational Headquarters were set up at NATO’s Supreme Headquarters of Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE) in Belgium. Admiral R. Feist, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander for Europe, was appointed EU Operations Commander and Brigadier-General P. Maral became the first EU Force Commander.11 France was the framework nation for the operation. Concordia comprised 350 soldiers from 13 of the 15 EU member states at the time (all except Ireland and Denmark) and from 13 additional countries. It was initially mandated for six months, but upon request from the Macedonian president, it was extended until 15 December 200312 (Council Joint Action 2003/92/CFSP 27/1/2003; Council of the EU, 2009a).

The mandated purpose of Concordia was to further contribute to a stable, secure environment to allow the Macedonian government to implement the Ohrid Framework Agreement. The operational objectives of the operation were

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11 Major General Luis Nelson Ferreira dos Santos took over as EU Force Commander on 1 October 2003.
12 On the 21 July 2003, the Council agreed to extend the operation under the previous terms until 15 December 2003. At this point Eurofor took over the framework responsibilities from France. When Concordia was terminated the EU launched a civilian police mission, Proxima, to support the development of the police service in Macedonia (Council decision 2003/563/CFSP).
vague. The UNSCR 1371 (2001) responsibilities, which the EU operation took over from the NATO deployment in Macedonia, endorsed three main objectives: (1) to support the implementation of the Framework Agreement; (2) to contribute to the security of its observers; and (3) to contribute to a safe and secure environment for its implementation. Mattelaer (2008, pp.29-30) has explained how a Safe and Secure Environment (SASE) mandate is perceived amongst military personnel as *the fuzziest mission one can receive.*

Nevertheless, the absence of violent conflict throughout the deployment, demonstrates a great improvement in the security situation in Macedonia since 2001, when the country was widely perceived to be at the brink of civil war. There were some minor incidents of civil unrest in northern Macedonia in September 2003, in which EUFOR supported the Macedonian security forces in defusing the situation (Howorth, 2007, pp. 231-241), but a fully fledged civil war never materialised. Although fully implementing the final aspects of the Framework Agreement remains a political challenge for the country, the security environment in which it is attempting to do so is now stable. The main threat to stability is no longer armed conflict but criminality (Howorth, 2007, pp. 232; Solana, 2003c).

In terms of its internal goal attainment Operation Concordia was a success. Its mandated purpose to further contribute to a stable and secure environment in which the Macedonian government could implement the Framework Agreement was successfully achieved. EUFOR has contributed to its implementation as well as successfully protected its observers (Augustin,
A break-down of the positive assessment of the operation’s internal goal attainment according to the indicators articulated in the three operational objectives is illustrated in table 3.1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key objectives</th>
<th>Success</th>
<th>Partial success</th>
<th>Failure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To support the implementation of the Framework Agreement</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To contribute to the security of its observers</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To contribute to a safe and secure environment</td>
<td>X</td>
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</table>

A broad consensus in the academic literature has highlighted Concordia as a military success and, thus, supported this positive assessment of the Concordia’s internal goal attainment (Cascone, 2008; Ladzik, 2006; Mace, 2004). The ICG (2005a, p.49) explained how:

*(Concordia) helped build confidence, demonstrating continued international interest in Macedonia and persuading the ethnic Albanians to remain engaged politically.*

With regard to the implementation of the operation twenty-two field liaison teams made up the tactical force in the former crisis area. These teams were each assigned to one of three multinational sectors (Swedish, Portuguese and French). Two heavy platoons (French and Italian) acted as light teams (in
pairs) and as a general reserve for the entire area of operations. Operational tasks included mobile patrols; armed deterrence; information-gathering; confidence-building; emergency evacuation of monitors; advising and coordinating border security (Augustin, 2005; ICG, 2005a, p.48-49). Concordia experienced a number of problems in its implementation. A senior western diplomat remembers one episode in particular:

In 2003, the Macedonian government bungled a raid on some ethnic Albanian criminals up in the Skopska Crna Gora Mountains north of Skopje bordering Kosovo/Serbia and nearly provoked a wider war. Austrian military intelligence officers, attached to EUFOR, were actually embedded with the small criminal group - kidnapping, small terrorist acts, unconnected to any larger group - and were feeding disinformation about the extent of the Government armed operations, for example, reporting that ‘there are stacks of dead unarmed civilians, everything is on fire’, which caused COMEUFOR to make a public, unsubstantiated claim of excessive government force. The truth was that two young members of the criminal gang had been killed while trying to get to a machinegun bunker. They were wearing sort of uniforms and were armed. The fires were the result of the criminal gang’s firing mortars into the dry brush around the village where they were hiding. Senior NATO Ambassadors had to intervene to correct the information; get COMEUFOR to retract his statement and prevent the ethnic Albanian party, DUI, from leaving the governing coalition and resuming hostilities that had stopped in 2001 (Interview, senior western diplomat, 17/07/2009).
The claim that EU officers were engaged in a criminal group has not previously been mentioned in the academic literature, however, as it was confirmed by a senior western diplomat based in Skopje at the time, it is important to include it in the evaluation of the operation’s internal appropriateness. Moreover, it is clear from this incident that the EU Force Commander had inadequate intelligence, at least on this occasion, to make an appropriate judgement (and public statement). Other practical problems in the implementation of the operation concerned security clearance for non-NATO EU member states; political turf battles between NATO and the EU in HQ; and disagreements regarding how long Concordia’s command arrangements should stay in place after the operation to perform remaining tasks like drafting lessons learnt reports and returning and selling assets. These problems were resolved on a case-by-case basis, but they had a negative effect on the operation’s efficiency. Politically, there were also differences of opinion between member states about the place of NATO’s regional command in Naples, Allied Force South Europe, in Concordia’s chain of command, but this was a political dispute rather than a problem affecting the implementation of the operation as such (ISIS, 2003; Mace, 2004).

The fact that the operation was a military-strategic success overall, however, contributed to its internal political-strategic success, because it demonstrated that the EU was now capable of conducting a small-scale ESDP military conflict management operation. It also illustrated that the Berlin Plus arrangements with NATO worked relatively well in practice. As such it set a precedent, however small, for subsequent ESDP Operations Artemis and
Althea. Moreover, Concordia added to the EU’s so-called comprehensive approach to Macedonia and to the Union’s political leadership (supported by the US) of the international efforts in the country. Finally, it added a new military dimension to EU’s role in the Western Balkans (Cascone, 2008; Dobbins et al, 2008; Mace, 2004). It was a politically effective operation for the EU at a comparatively low political cost. A break-down of Concordia’s success in terms of its internal appropriateness is provided in table. 3.2.

*Table 3.2 Internal appropriateness: Operation Concordia*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Success</th>
<th>Partial success</th>
<th>Failure</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Timeliness</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness</td>
<td>X</td>
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Concordia achieved the task set out to do in a timely manner, but it was only partially successful in its efficiency, as the operation experienced a number of minor practical problems and the involvement of EUFOR officers in organised crime raises serious questions not only about the appropriateness of these officers’ behaviour, but also about the intelligence based upon which Concordia was operating. Overall, the operation was, therefore, successful in its internal goal attainment, but only partially successful in its internal appropriateness.
In June 2003, the Council launched its second ESDP military conflict management operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). This operation was deployed in a much more challenging security environment than Operation Concordia had been. Since the mid-1990s, the DRC has been engulfed in a myriad of different conflicts intertwined. At the sub-state level there were local conflicts for power and resources. These conflicts, which were particularly fierce in the east of the country, often assumed a significant ethnic dimension. At the state level belligerent parties struggled for control of the state apparatus after the fall of President Mobutu Sese Seko, and at the regional level the DRC was directly affected by the diffusion of instabilities in Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi and Angola. Vice versa, the instabilities in the DRC affected and included much of central and southern Africa. Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, Angola, Sudan, Namibia and Zimbabwe were all, albeit at different levels, involved in the conflict within the DRC’s territorial borders. Rwanda and Uganda, in particular, have been directly engaged in the fighting (Prunier, 2009; Tull, 2009).

The Lusaka ceasefire agreement, signed in July 1999, made way for the authorisation of the United Nations Organisation Mission in DRC (MONUC). The Lusaka peace process stalled when DRC President Laurent Kabila was murdered in 2001. His son and successor, Joseph Kabila, later resumed the negotiations, which eventually resulted in the withdrawal of

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13 MONUC was initially established as a small military liaison team in 1999. It has since become one of the biggest and most expensive UN operations ever deployed. It is now a multidimensional peacekeeping mission with a broad mandate. With 18,434 uniformed personnel deployed in 2008, MONUC has become the centrepiece of the international efforts to regulate the conflict in the DRC (UN, 2009b; Tull, 2009).
23,000 Rwandan soldiers and most of the 10,000 Ugandan soldiers in the DRC in late 2002. Proxy militias supported by the two governments remained active in the country. In December 2002, the belligerent parties and opposed political groupings signed the Sun City peace agreement. This ushered in a transitional government in June 2003, in which President Kabila would share power with four vice-presidents including former rebel leaders Jean Pierre Bemba and Azarias Ruberwa. The war officially ended in 2004, but the violence continued and the security situation in the provinces of Ituri, North and South Kivu and Katanga remained volatile (ICG, 2008d; Prunier, 2009; Tull, 2009).

It was the violence in the Ituri region in northeastern DRC that became the focus of Operation Artemis, the first of two ESDP military conflict management operations in the DRC. In May 2003, a major crisis occurred in Bunia (capital of Ituri). Ethnic militias were fighting for control of the city after the withdrawal of the Ugandan soldiers. The Ituri crisis escalated with the recapture of the city by the Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC), to which the DRC government reacted by stationing Congolese armed forces (RCD) in Beni to dislodge the UPC from Bunia. The crisis undermined the Sun City Agreement and the RCD offensive risked re-engaging Uganda and Rwanda in the DRC conflict. The violence intensified and the humanitarian crisis was severe. Ituri and its people were once again left in turmoil. MONUC was not able to secure the situation and 400 civilians were massacred despite the presence of the peacekeepers. The UN called for urgent help from the international community to manage the Ituri crisis (Solana, 18/07/2003; Tull, 2009).
The EU, on French initiative, responded positively to the UN request. On 12 June 2003, the Union agreed to deploy its first ESDP military conflict management operation in Africa. The operation, code-named Artemis, was to be conducted in accordance the EU Joint Action adopted on 5 June 2003. The operation was designed as a stop-gap measure to fill the security vacuum in Bunia, while MONUC prepared reinforcements. The Artemis mandate was set out in UNSCR 1484 (2003). France acted as framework nation and the Operation Headquarters were located at the Centre de Planification et de Conduite des Opérations (CPCO) in Paris. Major General Neveux was appointed EU Operations Commander and Brigadier General Thonier became EU Force Commander. At its peak the operation comprised 2,200 troops. The Operation officially ended when it handed over its responsibilities to the reinforced UN force on 1 September 2003 (Council Joint Action 2003/423/CFSP 5/6/2003; Howorth, 2007, pp.231-241).

The mandated purpose of Operation Artemis was to contribute to the stabilisation of the security conditions and the humanitarian situation in Bunia pending MONUC reinforcements. The operation had three key objectives: (1) to ensure the protection of displaced persons in the refugee camps in Bunia and, if the situation so required, to contribute to the safety of the civilian population, UN personnel and humanitarian agencies in the town; (2) to ensure the protection of the airport; and (3) to give impetus to the overall peace process in the DRC and the wider Great Lakes region (Ulriksen et el. 2004; Council Joint Action 2003/423/CFSP 5/6/2003). Artemis had clear parameters
of size, duration and responsibilities. The operation was mandated for less than three months and its area of operations was confined to Bunia town and the 15 km surrounding it (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2008, pp.174-198).

In terms of achieving this operational purpose the operation was successful. The EU force prohibited the open bearing of arms in Bunia and established checkpoints to the entrances to the city. It secured the airport and the refugee camps in its area of operations. Several militia groups were successfully contained, some were disarmed and the EU force also disrupted the supply chains of some groups. Overall, the security situation in Bunia quickly improved. An important element of the operation was its presence and show-of-force missions carried out by ground forces patrolling throughout Bunia and the regular French Mirage over-flights. This allowed humanitarian organisations to travel to places outside the town that they had previously not been able to reach. It allowed a daily influx of 1,000-1,500 refugees into the city. Artemis also made it possible for the Interim Administration in Ituri to resume some of its activities. The operation re-established basic order in Bunia and filled the security gap until the UN reinforcements arrived. The improved situation in Bunia had a positive effect on the peace process in the DRC and the wider Great Lakes region. The operation stopped the situation from spiralling further out of control, as it was otherwise feared that it would. The next chapter will return to the external goal achievement of the operation, but as far as its internal goal to contribute to the stabilisation of the security conditions and the humanitarian situation in Bunia, the operation was undeniably a success (Gegout 2005; ICG Europe Report, 2005b, pp.46-49;
Ulriksen et al. 2004). Table 3.3 gives a breakdown of this assessment according to the indicators for Artemis’ internal goal attainment.

Table 3.3 Internal goal attainment: Operation Artemis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key objectives</th>
<th>Success</th>
<th>Partial success</th>
<th>Failure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To ensure the protection of displaced persons in the refugee camps in Bunia</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To ensure the protection of the airport</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To give impetus to the overall peace process in the DRC and the wider Great Lakes region</td>
<td>X</td>
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</table>

In terms of its implementation the operation was timely in the deployment of its troops. The EU reacted very quickly to the UN request and EU soldiers were on the ground, 6,500 km from Brussels, within seven days of the decision taken by the Political and Security Committee (PSC). The rapid force projection was an internal achievement for the EU, despite the fact that much of the planning had been undertaken by France before the EU had officially agreed to undertake the operation (ICG, 2005b, pp.46-49; Howorth, 2007, pp.231-241; Ulriksen et al, 2004). It is important not to underestimate the significant logistical challenges that Artemis did overcome. The local infrastructure was inadequate even for the relatively light EU force and the operation demonstrated a general EU shortage in strategic-lift capacity. Artemis was able to make up for this through a concerted effort by its engineers and access to the necessary assets through charter arrangements and
strategic lift support from Canada and Brazil. Had the operation required a heavier deployment of armoured units, combat support could have become a serious problem, complicating transports arrangements and requiring significant improvements to the local infrastructure. Further operational constrains could have been caused by inadequate communications systems between HQ and field staff and the lack of an adequate strategic reserve (Giegerich 2008; Homan 2007; Ulriksen et al, 2004). These issues illustrated potential challenges to future, more ambitious, ESDP military conflict management operations, but for its internally defined purpose Artemis was able to efficiently overcome these problems on a case-by-case basis. In effect, these issues did not hinder the operation’s efficiency in the implementation of its mandate.

During the operation EU forces went into combat together for the first time. When they were challenged militarily the Artemis troops proved willing and able to engage in combat and demonstrated a clear superiority over local opponents (Giegerich, 2008, p.24). Artemis ground forces were repeatedly caught up in fire-fights with local militia factions, but confrontations were localised and of short duration. The EU operation sustained no loss of life, but Artemis forces killed more than 20 local militiamen during the deployment (Gegout 2004; Giegerich 2008). This to some extent disarmed doubts regarding the EU’s will and ability to use force.

Artemis was both an important military-strategic and political-strategic achievement for the EU. It was the Union’s first operation beyond the
European continent. The operation was undertaken in a much more demanding theatre of operations than Concordia, and it was autonomously undertaken by the EU without support from NATO (and the US). As Ulriksen, Gourlay and Mace (2004, p.521) put it: *Artemis was a successful test of the political apparatus of the ESDP*. Artemis demonstrated that the Union could now successfully undertake military conflict management operations (a) on a significant scale, (b) on its own and (c) outside of Europe. In addition, it bridged the political divide on security and defence policy matters within the EU at the time and added a military dimension to the Union’s engagement in Africa (Hadden, 2009, pp.1-21; Homan 2007; Ulriksen et al, 2004). In the words of the ICG (2005b, pp.47):

*For the EU Artemis was a golden opportunity to gain credibility for its security and defence initiatives (...) politically it was a success even before the force arrived.*

These achievements all illustrate Artemis’ internal cost-effectiveness. But in this regard it is important to mention that Swedish Artemis officers made formal complaints about *torture-like methods* used in a French-led interrogation during the operation (Deutsche Welle, 2008). The French investigation into the case concluded that these allegations were unsubstantiated. However, the Swedish military concluded that this was in fact a case of clear misconduct. An independent investigation conducted by the Swedish National Television supported this assessment and concluded that a civilian had indeed been tortured. The next chapter will return to this incident
and examine it in further detail according to the external appropriateness criterion. It is important here in so far as it limits Artemis’ internal appropriateness, because the allegations among soldiers and between member states were potentially politically damaging for the Union; and, therefore, limited the operation’s otherwise stellar internal success. Table 3.4 illustrates Artemis’ internal appropriateness.

Table 3.4 Internal appropriateness: Operation Concordia

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<th></th>
<th>Success</th>
<th>Partial success</th>
<th>Failure</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Timeliness</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
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Operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina

The violent conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) started in April 1992. Over the next three and a half years the war, which was fought mainly between factions of ethnic Serbs, Croats and Muslims claimed at least 97,207 lives (Research and Documentation Centre Sarajevo, 2007).\(^{14}\) The civilian population on all three sides of the conflict suffered tremendously. Human

\(^{14}\) In 2007, an independent study conducted by the Research and Documentation Centre Sarajevo funded mainly by the Norwegian government concluded that at least 97,207 people were killed during the war in BiH. 65 per cent of the dead were Bosnian Muslims, 25 per cent were ethnic Serbs and more than 8 per cent were ethnic Croats. Mirsad Tokaca, who led the project, estimated that the total number of dead, which is significantly lower than previous estimates of around 250,000 deaths, could rise due to still ongoing research, but with a maximum of another 10,000 dead. The death toll refers to deaths directly related to military activities and does not include indirect causes of death during war such as death due to starvation, lack of medication or suicide, nor does it include people who died at an earlier age than would normally be expected during peacetime (Research and Documentation Centre Sarajevo, 2007).
rights abuses and ethnic cleansing were widespread. By the end of the war more than half of the population had been killed, expelled or fled their homes. The violent conflict ended when Croatian President Franjo Tudjman, Yugoslav President Slobodan Milošević and Bosnian President Alija Izetbegović, representing Bosnian Croats, Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) respectively agreed to a settlement forced through by the US in Dayton, Ohio, in November 1995 (Chandler, 2000; Glenny, 2001; Silber and Little, 1996).

The Dayton Agreement, officially named the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (GFAP), was signed in Paris on 14 December 1995. The agreement and the constitutional structures it put in place ended the war in the BiH at the time, but have since been criticised for not ensuring a sustainable peace in the country (Chandler, 2000). The GFAP authorised an international High Representative (HR) to facilitate, mobilise and coordinate the civilian aspects of the peace implementation process in the country. The UN endorsed the establishment of a multinational Implementation Force (IFOR) to undertake the military aspects of the conflict management. It was understood that NATO would establish the force and

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15 The GFAP envisaged BiH as one unified state made up of two separate entities: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska. The two entities were of roughly equal size and their population together made up the country’s three ‘constituent peoples’: ethnic Croats and Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims) living mainly in the Federation and Bosnian Serbs living mainly in Republika Srpska. The GFAP included provisions on the military aspects of the peace settlement; regional stabilisation; the inter-entity boundary line; elections; constitutional arrangements; arbitration; human rights; refugees and displaced persons; the commission to preserve national monuments; BiH public corporations; civilian implementation and the International Police Task Force (GFAP, 1995).

16 The Office of the High Representative (OHR) was established as an ad hoc international institution responsible for overseeing the implementation of civilian aspects of the GFAP. The Peace Implementation Council (PIC), the international body guiding the peace process in BiH, oversees the OHR’s work. On 13 March 2009, the PIC appointed Austrian diplomat Valentin Inzko the 7th High Representative in the country. On 30 June 2009, the PIC confirmed that the OHR would remain in place until its objectives and conditions for closure are met. In the intervening period the OHR is working towards transition into an EU civilian mission. At present the HR is also the EU Special Representative (EUSR) to BiH (OHR, 2009).
assume authority transferred from the existing UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the country. IFOR was mandated to implement the military aspects of the GFAP. After the September 1996 elections, a smaller NATO Stabilisation Force (SFOR) replaced IFOR. NATO had troops in BiH from December 1995 until SFOR transferred its responsibilities to the EU in December 2004 (NATO, 2005).

When NATO decided to withdraw SFOR in 2004, UNSCR 1551 (2004) endorsed the launch an ESDP military conflict management operation in its place. On 12 July 2004, the Council of the EU officially decided to launch Operation Althea. The idea that the EU might take over from NATO in BiH was first aired at the European Council in Copenhagen in 2002. However, the handover was not officially agreed until the Berlin Plus arrangements between NATO and the EU were in place and had been successfully tested in Operation Concordia (Cascone, 2008; ICG, 2005b, pp.49-51). On 2 December 2004, the EU force took over the official responsibilities from NATO. Althea is the largest and longest running ESDP military conflict management operation. As the operation was launched under the Berlin Plus, Operation Headquarters were located at SHAPE and Admiral R. Feist was appointed EU Operations Commander. Major General David Leakey became the first EU Force Commander in BiH. 28 countries have contributed to the operation, 22 of which are not EU member states. The EU initially deployed 7,000 troops to the

17When SFOR withdrew in 2004 a small NATO HQ remained in Sarajevo to provide assistance to local authorities on defence reform; counter-terrorism; detention of persons indicted for war crimes; and intelligence-sharing with the EU (NATO, 2004).
18Admiral Feist was replaced by General Sir John Reith in 2004. Major General Leakey was later replaced by Major General Gian Marco Chiarini (2005), Major General Ignacio Martin Villalain (2007) and Major General Stefano Castagnotto (2008) (Council of the EU, 2009b).
country under a Chapter VII mandate. The force was reduced to 2,200 troops (backed by over-the-horizon reserves) in 2007. The operation is still ongoing and an end-date has not officially been decided upon (Council of the EU, 2009b; Howorth, 2007).

The operational purpose of EUFOR Althea is to provide a military presence in order to contribute to the safe and secure environment in BiH. As such it is mandated (1) to deny conditions for a resumption of violence; (2) to manage any residual military aspect of the GFAP; and (3) thereby to allow all EU and international community actors to carry out their responsibilities in the country. The operation is explicitly framed as part of the EU’s so-called comprehensive approach towards BiH, which also comprises political, economic, commercial, cultural and policing instruments intended to support the country’s journey towards further European integration and eventual EU membership. This process is framed within the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP). In the short term Althea hoped to ensure a smooth transition from SFOR and to maintain a secure environment for the implementation of the GFAP (Annexes 1-A and 2). In the medium term it was intended to help the European integration process, assist BiH in reaching a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU and move closer towards eventual EU membership. In the long term Althea, as part of the wider EU approach, hoped to help create a stable and viable multi-ethnic BiH at peace with its neighbours (Council Joint Action 2004/570/CFSP 12/07/2004; Council of the EU, 2009b; Howorth, 2007).
In October 2006, the Council changed Althea’s mandate from a military conflict management mandate to a military policing mandate. EUFOR’s presence in BiH was subsequently reduced to some 2,200 troops (backed by over-the horizon reserves) in 2007. Althea’s operational focus remains the maintenance of a safe and secure environment in the country, ensuring compliance with the GFAP and supporting the HR/EUSR. Other operational tasks include collecting small arms and ammunition; deterring and controlling illicit trafficking; assisting local authorities in mine clearance and control of the lower airspace; border controls and support to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) through the detention of Persons Indicted for War Crimes (PIWCs). The Operation Commander is currently preparing Althea’s future evolution into a non-executive, capacity-building operation corresponding to the needs of the Bosnian army (Solana, 2009b). An official decision on the transition is outstanding. The operation and its future are subject to regular review (Council of the EU, 2009b).

As the operation is still ongoing it is too early to undertake a conclusive evaluation of its success, but some preliminary observations can be made. Most importantly, Althea has successfully maintained a safe and secure environment in the country throughout its deployment. As one interviewee put it:

_EUFOR's Althea took over from NATO and continued a completely successful operation designed to reassure all the parties to the civil war, including strong support for capturing war criminals and other Rule of Law efforts (Senior western diplomat, 17/07/2009)._
In terms of its internal goal attainment Althea achieved a relatively smooth transition from SFOR in the short term. The operation’s transition in 2007 was another indicator of its preliminary success in internal goal attainment and of the improved security situation in the country. With regard to the medium term political objectives BiH signed an SAA with the EU in 2007, but its further integration process towards eventual EU membership has stalled. The long term political objective of regional stabilisation and cooperation has also only been partly achieved so far. The security situation in the Western Balkans is stable, but political dynamics remain challenging. This was illustrated by the political ramifications of Kosovo’s declaration of independence, which caused the political leadership in Republika Srpska in BiH to call for a referendum on their independence (ICG 2008e and 2009e; Howorth, 2007). Whether the political objectives of the operation and the wider EU approach to BiH and the Western Balkan region succeed remains to be seen, but from a military-strategic perspective Operation Althea has so far been successful in terms of its internal goal attainment and its mandated purpose to provide a military presence in order to contribute to the safe and secure environment in BiH. It has so far successfully denied conditions for a resumption of violence, managed the military aspect of the GFAP and allowed the EU and other international actors to carry out their responsibilities in the country. This is illustrated in table 3.5 below.
### Table 3.5 Internal goal attainment: Operation Althea

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key objectives</th>
<th>Success</th>
<th>Partial success</th>
<th>Failure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To deny conditions for a resumption of violence</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>To manage military aspects of the GFAP</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To allow all EU and international community actors to carry out their responsibilities in the country</td>
<td>X</td>
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</table>

In terms of its implementation Althea has so far been timely, efficient and cost-effective. This was helped initially by the fact that the EU operation was taking over responsibilities from the existing SFOR operation in BiH. At the time of its departure SFOR was a largely European undertaking. SFOR personnel came from 27 countries, 16 of which were EU member states. Many of the former NATO troops remained in the country under the new EU banner. Much of the initial EUFOR mandate and operation plan also reflected previous SFOR commitments. The handover and successful implementation of the operation was further facilitated by the Berlin Plus arrangements between NATO and the EU and their joint experience in Operation Concordia (ICG, 2005b, pp.49-51). The setting up of Althea and the transfer of responsibilities was planned by the two organisations in cooperation. Detailed planning and preparation helped them avoid misunderstandings and overlap at the practical level and facilitated an internally successful implementation of Althea so far. Although there have been political disagreements between the two organisations, these have been resolved and did not significantly affect the positive achievements and
implementation of the EUFOR operation (Cascone, 2008). The successful reconfiguration and downscaling of Althea in 2007 is another testament to the timeliness, efficiency and cost-effectiveness of the implementation process (Friesendorf and Penska, 2008).

EUFOR has had a mixed record of cooperation with other EU agencies in BiH. At the beginning of its mandate Althea undertook a number of high-profile anti-organised crime operations, through the Integrated Police Unit, which caused friction with the EU Police Mission (EUPM) already deployed in the country. This caused disagreements between the EUFOR and EUPM leadership, but it did not cause any severe problems for the implementation of EUFOR’s mandate. In its second term EUFOR downscaled this engagement and the initial frictions with EUPM were overcome (Friesendorf & Penska, 2008). Likewise, EUFOR’s relationship with the OHR/EUSR has varied over time and between different Heads of Missions (HoM), but never to the extent that this seriously affected the internal success of Operation Althea (Interviews, Representatives from the OHR, 30/06/2006).

EUFOR was challenged militarily on one occasion. In early 2006, Italian Carabinieri under EUFOR command attempted to arrest Dragomir Abazovic, who was indicted by the Sarajevo Canton Court for war crimes committed in Rogatica. The EU force was fired upon, as they approached the house where Abazovic was staying. They returned fire and Abazovic’s wife was killed and his son was critically wounded in the shoot out. Both of them had fired shots against the EU soldiers (Bassuener and Ferhatovic, 2008). A senior western
diplomat based in Sarajevo at the time described the situation in the following way:

_This was a botched Carabinieri raid to capture a person for whom there was a domestic war crimes warrant, which had expired. One local person was killed and several wounded in an unfortunate shoot out - literally the only time any NATO or EUFOR soldiers came under fire in Bosnia or had reason to use their weapons. It was pretty messy - and unnecessary - if the proper coordination had been conducted in advance (Interview, senior western diplomat, 17/07/2009)._ 

It has been argued that this incident clipped General Chiarini’s wings from the beginning of his mandate (he had only been in command of EUFOR for two weeks at the time) and further reduced Althea’s appetite for operational activity (Bassuener and Ferhatovic, 2008). However, despite this unfortunate incident, the operation has been a preliminary success both in terms of its internal goal attainment and its internal appropriateness (Cascone, 2008). From a political-strategic perspective Operation Althea added a military aspect to the EU’s comprehensive approach to BiH. The OHR/EUSR has repeatedly stressed that EUFOR adds in a significant way to the Union's political engagement and assistance programmes in the country, which are all intended to help the European integration progress (Council of the EU, 2007; OHR, 2009). Althea also helped refine the ESDP and the structures and procedures for Berlin Plus operations (Cascone, 2008). It allowed the EU to test and prove its military capabilities in a larger and more ambitious operation (Howorth, 2007). Overall, this analysis supports Howorth’s (2007, p.238) assessment that: _Althea appears_
to have carried out its mission with efficiency, adaptability and success. This is illustrated in table 3.6 below.

Table 3.6 Internal appropriateness: Operation Althea

<table>
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<th>Success</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Timeliness</td>
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<tr>
<td>Efficiency</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Effectiveness</td>
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EUFOR DR CONGO

On 12 June 2006 the EU launched its second military operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo. This operation, codenamed EUFOR DR Congo, was deployed to support the UN mission in the country, MONUC, during the period encompassing the DRC elections in July 2006. The mandate was set out in UNSCR 1671 (2006), which authorised the temporary EU deployment. The EU Joint Action of 27 April 2006 appointed Operations Commander Lieutenant General Karlheinz Viereck and Force Commander Major General Christian Damay. Germany was the framework nation and Operations Headquarters were located at the Armed Forces Operation Command in Potsdam. The operation was invited by the UN, officially welcomed by the DRC authorities and to be conducted autonomously by the EU in close coordination and cooperation with both the DRC authorities and MONUC. EUFOR DR Congo deployed some 400 military personnel in an advance element to Kinshasa and an additional battalion-sized over-the-horizon force (1,200 soldiers) was deployed on stand-by in neighbouring Gabon. At
peak strength in mid-August 2006 EUFOR DR Congo had 2,466 troops in the field, but a maximum of 1,000 were deployed in the DRC at any one time. 22 member states participated in the operation with two-thirds of the troops coming from France and Germany. The operation was concluded on 30 November 2006 (Council Joint Action 2006/319/CFSP 27/4/2006; Council of the EU, 2006a).

The operational purpose of EUFOR DR Congo was to support MONUC during the elections. To this end its mandate singled out four key objectives: (1) support MONUC in its efforts to stabilise the security situation in its area of deployment (Kinshasa), in case MONUC faced difficulties in this regard within its existing mandate; (2) contribute to the protection of civilians under imminent threat of physical violence without prejudice to the responsibilities of the DRC government; (3) contribute to the protection of Kinshasa airport and (4) execute limited operations to extract individuals in danger (Council of the EU, 2006a).

In terms of its internal goal attainment the operation was a success. The elections went relatively smoothly and both rounds of the ballots were held in a generally peaceful and orderly manner. Although some violent incidents occurred in Kinshasa, these did not have a significant negative impact on the outcome of the election process or indeed the internal goal achievement of the EUFOR operation. Both national and international election observers confirmed that the organisation and the conduct of the elections under the aegis of the Independent Electoral Committee went well. Observers question the
extent to which this can be attributed to the EU’s military operation (Gegout 2007; Giegerich 2008; Howorth, 2007, pp. 231-241). But in terms of its contribution to MONUC’s efforts to manage the security situation in Kinshasa; to the protection of civilians under imminent threat; to the protection of Kinshasa airport and to execute limited operations to extract individuals in danger the operation succeeded. When fighting broke out between supporters of the two presidential candidates in Kinshasa in August 2006 EUFOR reinforced the existing MONUC efforts and helped separate the fighting factions and re-establish order. It also helped recover diplomats trapped by the violence and mediated between the belligerent parties. EUFOR airlifted weapons out of areas occupied by groups of demobilised soldiers and EU soldiers participated in humanitarian initiatives and helped rebuild schools, hospitals and roads (Gegout 2007; Giegerich 2008).

Table 3.7 Internal goal attainment: EUFOR DR Congo

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key objectives</th>
<th>Success</th>
<th>Partial success</th>
<th>Failure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To support MONUC in stabilising the security situation in Kinshasa</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To contribute to the protection of civilians under imminent threat</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To contribute to the protection of Kinshasa airport</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To execute limited operations to extract individuals in danger</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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With regard to its deployment the operation experienced some initial problems. As the EU did not have its own permanent planning and control capacities, the EU-level operational planning could not start until operational headquarters had been designated. No EU member state was keen to adopt the framework responsibilities for this operation. The force generation for EUFOR DR Congo was also a slow and cumbersome process. In effect the deployment was continuously delayed (Giegerich 2008). It took the EU almost three months to respond affirmatively to the UN’s request for it to undertake the operation and six months until the force was operational in the field. This was a significant difference from the EU’s quick response in the Artemis operation three years earlier.\textsuperscript{19} The delay was partly due to UK and German reluctance towards the operation and their hesitance to deploy troops. The UK ruled out participation, given its military commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan. Germany was eventually convinced on the condition that only 100 of its 780 troops would be deployed in Kinshasa, while the rest would remain as part of the reserve in Gabon (Howorth, 2007, pp. 231-241).

Once it was deployed the implementation of the operation was conducted efficiently. When tensions arose in Kinshasa EUFOR successfully brought in reinforcements. Observers agree that militarily the operation was a success, although they do suggest that this has at least in part been due to the limitations

\textsuperscript{19} In a letter dated 27 December 2005 the UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations invited the EU to consider deploying a military force to the DRC to assist MONUC during the elections. On 23 March 2006 the Council approved an option paper for possible EU support to MONUC, and on 25 April 2006 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1671 (2006), authorising the temporary deployment of an EU force (Council of the EU, 2009f).
of its mandated scope in time, space and function (Gegout 2007; Giegerich 2008; Howorth, 2007, pp. 231-241).

It is important, however, not to underestimate the importance of the operation from an internal EU perspective. As Dobbins (2008, pp.23-24) explains:

_The country has been a major focus for Europe and a proving ground for an evolving European policy. The EU has conducted two military operations in the DRC and has spent more money on state-building in the DRC than anywhere else outside of Europe (as a portion of EU military spending, not as a measure of bilateral spending). Europe’s experience in the DRC in turn had a major influence on the evolution of the ESDP, encouraging the developments of EU battle groups and the introduction of new mechanisms for common funding of joint operations while highlighting some of the problems inherent in coordinating nation-building within the EU itself._

Politically EUFOR DRC was an achievement for the EU. It confirmed the Union’s capacity for autonomous military action outside of Europe and it demonstrated again that the Union could serve as a partner for the UN in potentially difficult situations (Hadden, 2009; Rye Olsen, 2009). It also added another piece to the puzzle in the EU’s emerging comprehensive approach to the DRC (Dobbins, 2008). The operation was an internal success overall. Its only real failure was in terms of its timeliness. This is illustrated in table 3.8 below.
Table 3.8 Internal appropriateness: EUFOR DR Congo

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<th></th>
<th>Success</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Timeliness</td>
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<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness</td>
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In terms of its internal goal attainment the operation was a significant success for the Union. Due to the difficult EU decision-making and force generation processes, however, which caused delays and operational constraints to the operation, EUFOR DR Congo was only a partial success with regard to its internal appropriateness.

**EUFOR CHAD/CAR**

The EU’s most recent military conflict management operation, EUFOR CHAD/CAR, was launched in January 2008. EUSR for Sudan, Torben Brylle (2008), has explained the conflict context in which the operation was deployed:

*EUFOR was launched as part of an EU comprehensive regional approach to the serious regional ramifications of the conflict in Darfur and the deep humanitarian crisis that this conflict has created, spilling over, as it is, into eastern Chad and also into the border areas between the two countries and the Central African Republic. Destabilising, as it was, an already volatile region characterised by an already huge number of internally displaced people and refugees. The latest figures from the Secretary General’s report talk about a*
number of refugees in the order of 280,000 people and 180,000 internally displaced people. And beyond that of course there is a negative impact on the local population as well.

In order to understand the complexities of the EUFOR Chad/CAR operation it is important to take a closer look at the context in which it was launched. Although it is a common trend, describing the security situation in this region simply as a spill over of the conflict in the Darfur region of Sudan to Chad and the Central African Republic is a precarious simplification. As explained in chapter one, diffusion and escalation are conflict dynamics attributable to identifiable actors and actions. It is not simply an unconscious or uncontrollable spill over process. It is important to recognise the complex conflict formation, which exists in the tri-border region of Sudan, Chad and CAR. Within each of the three countries there is a multitude of separate, although closely interlinked, conflicts. The alarming security situation in the region is a consequence of sub-state, state, regional and international conflict dynamics. This thesis does not aim to describe the intricate details of the complex dynamics of these conflicts, but it is important for the purpose of this analysis to stress that both Chad and CAR were experiencing domestic conflicts of their own, before the Darfur conflict erupted in Sudan in 2003 (Berg, 2008).

In Chad President Deby supported by his Patriotic Salvation Movement, the Zaghawa military clan and the French government has monopolised state power since 1990. The authoritarian regime, which is characterised by corruption, clientelism, clan favouritism and repression of its opposition, has
caused an increase in social, political and ethnic tensions in the country and brought about a state of constant armed rebellion. In 2006 and 2008 rebel offensives brought Chad to the brink of all out civil war. The instability in the country, which experienced no less than three failed coup attempts from 2005-2008 culminating in the 2006 and 2008 rebel attacks on the capital, has three key causes: (1) the large-scale, systematic embezzlement of state revenues (incl. oil revenues) triggering an unprecedented social crisis; (2) the radicalisation of opposition within the inner ruling circles over the succession to President Deby and (3) the close links between the Zagawa (Deby’s ethnic group) leadership in Chad and the Darfur rebels. Chad is allegedly providing the Sudanese rebels with weapons and sanctuary to sustain their struggle in Sudan. In return Darfur rebels are reported to have helped the Chad army turn back the Chadian rebel offensives against President Deby in 2006 and 2008. Meanwhile armed Chadian opposition groups have aided the Sudanese government in the Darfur conflict, resulting in what since 2003 has developed into a proxy war between Sudan and Chad (Berg, 2008; Flint and de Waal, 2008; ICG, 2008b and 2008c).

Despite a tense political climate and sporadic clashes in the region eastern Chad was relatively stable until 2003, but since then the humanitarian and security situation has deteriorated to an unprecedented low. Ongoing internal tensions in Chad and the conflict in neighbouring Darfur have together caused large-scale internal displacement in the region and the massive influx of Sudanese refugees has intensified local struggles for resources.20 Both the

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20 In 2004 alone 200,000 refugees fled from the escalating crisis in Darfur to refugee camps in eastern Chad (ICG, 2008c).
Chad government and the rebels have armed their supporters, leading to intensification in inter-ethnic violence and higher levels of criminality and banditry, making the humanitarian situation on the ground ever more difficult. The belligerent parties exploit the situation to perpetuate themselves (ICG, 2009b; Oxfam, 2008). The refugee camps on the border between Chad and Sudan are fuelling tensions between the two countries. Sudan has repeatedly attacked the camps, and the camps, which are increasingly militarised, have become deeply entangled in the conflict in the tri-border region between Sudan, Chad and CAR. The weakest of the three countries, CAR, is caught in the middle of the conflict between Sudan and Chad. It has a national interest in normalising relations with the Sudanese leadership, but it cannot afford to upset its bilateral relations with the Chad government, who support and protect the CAR leadership against aggressive domestic opposition (Berg, 2008; ICG, 2008b).

When CAR President Bozize came to power in a coup in 2003 he was supported militarily by Chadian President Deby. This support was decisive not only to Bozize’s success in taking over the state apparatus. It also ensures the present-day survival of the CAR regime and the personal security of the President, who is guarded by members of the Chadian security services. Until 2005 Chad also had troops deployed on the border between the two countries in an attempt to halt the activity of Chad and CAR rebel groups in the area. When the Chadian soldiers were withdrawn due to an increased pressure on their own capital, the CAR authorities were considerably weakened in the fight against the rebellion in the north east challenging the government in Bangui.
The rebellion was supported by the Sudanese government. Therefore President Bozize now seeks to normalise CAR’s relations with Sudan as much as possible without jeopardising its Chadian support. However Chad needs CAR’s support to balance Khartoum’s opposition to its military presence in and access to CAR territory in the fight against the Chadian rebel movements, which are supported by Sudan and hiding in CAR. It is in Chad’s interest that the CAR military stays weak, so that Chad can legitimately deploy its troops on CAR territory. In this way Chad can sustain the CAR regime’s dependency on Chadian military support and prevent a Khartoum/Bangui alliance from developing. Chad and Sudan therefore shared, albeit for different reasons, their opposition to an international military presence in eastern Chad (ICG, 2008b; Mattelaer, 2008).

The regional dimension to the crisis in CAR has thus developed in recent years, but like in Chad, the origins of the CAR crisis were domestic. Since its first free elections in 1993 manipulated communal divisions have caused the outbreak of violent conflict both at the sub-state and the state level in the country. A series of mutinies and rebellions left CAR in a state of permanent crisis. President Bozize, as President Patasse before him, has provoked a continuous rebellion by sustaining widespread army and militia brutality with disastrous humanitarian consequences against any opposition. Hundreds of civilians have been killed and thousands of homes burned. In a report published just weeks before the EUFOR Thad/CAR deployment, the ICG (2007a, p.1) stated that:
The Central African Republic is if anything worse than a failed state: it has become virtually a phantom state lacking any meaningful institutional capacity.

Despite the domestic problems in Chad and CAR, the EUFOR Chad/CAR operation was focused on, and limited to, alleviating the direct consequences of the Darfur crisis on the security situation in eastern Chad and north eastern CAR. In a Joint Action adopted on 15 October 2007 the Council decided to launch the operation. Lieutenant General Patrick Nash was appointed Operation Commander and Brigadier General Jean-Philippe Ganascia became the Force Commander. Operational Headquarters were located at Mont Valérien. The operation was authorised by UNSCR 1778 (2007) and launched on 28 January 2008. The mandate authorised an operation of one year’s duration from the date upon which it reached Initial Operating Capability (IOC). It reached IOC in March and Full Operating Capability (FOC) in September 2008. The fully deployed force involved approximately 3,400 troops from 25 European states, 19 of which have personnel present on the ground. The deployment comprises Rear Headquarters at N’Djamena, Force Headquarters at Abeche and three multinational battalions stationed in the eastern parts of Chad at Iriba (north), Forchana (centre) and Goz Beïda (south), with a detachment at Birao (CAR) (Council Joint Action 2007/677/CFSP 15/10/2007; Council of the EU, 2009g).

EUFOR Chad/CAR was a bridging operation intended to support the civilian United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad.
MINURCAT, while the UN prepared a military component to MINURCAT. EUFOR Chad/CAR was as such one component of a wider integrated international plan to handle the regional ramifications of the Darfur conflict. The operation was also just one aspect of a broader EU’s comprehensive approach towards the region. The mandated purpose of the EUFOR operation was to contribute to the improvement of security in eastern Chad and northeastern CAR. EUFOR Chad/CAR had three key objectives: (1) protect civilians in danger, particularly refugees and displaced persons; (2) facilitate delivery of humanitarian aid and free movement of humanitarian personnel by helping to improve security in the area of operations and (3) contribute to protecting UN personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, whilst also ensuring the security and freedom of movement of its own staff (Council of the EU, 2009g; Hadden, 2009, pp.5-21).

There were minor initial delays to the deployment of the EUFOR Chad/CAR entry force due to resource shortfalls and to instabilities in the Chadian capital at the time of the scheduled deployment (Earley, 2008; Ehrhart, 2008). Once the boots were on the ground the EUFOR CHAD/CAR force was the largest, most multinational military operation that the Union has so far launched in Africa. It was undertaken in a vast, remote and inhospitable area of operations and its deployment alone represented an unprecedented logistical challenge for the EU. The construction of the operational infrastructure from brown-field sites to finished camps involved a massive building effort. EUFOR completed six camps of up to 2000 people capacity and undertook major work on N’djamena and Abeche airports to facilitate the deployment and the sustainability of the operation. Assembling the force and deploying it was an
equally great challenge for the Union. In terms of its logistics the operation required nine major sea moves; 1,500 containers; 540 strategic flights; 150 convoys of over 2000 km and 365 aviation flights (Council of the EU, 2009g; Nash, 2008). This is important for this analysis, because considering the delicate security situation, the vast area of operations, the logistical circumstances on the ground and the Union’s relative inexperience in the field, this deployment represented a great challenge, and upon its completion, a great achievement for the EU. Once the bases had been constructed, the airports developed and the troops and equipment had arrived safely in the field, operational tasks included reconnaissance operations and long range patrols to familiarise troops with security conditions on the ground; humanitarian tasks and the establishment of a robust military presence in order to deter the persecution of refugees and IDPs in the area of operations (Earley, 2008). The operation temporarily alleviated aspects of the humanitarian crisis and civilians in its area of operations felt safer as a result (Oxfam, 2008).

The EUFOR presence, its regular patrolling and targeted operations had a significant deterrence effect, which helped increase the security in its areas of operations throughout the operation. Mattelaer (2008, p.27) has explained this deterrence effect in the following way:

*(EUFOR) was provided by the UN Security Council with a Chapter VII mandate and correspondingly robust rules of engagement. Together with the mandate (...) the firepower of EUFOR’s modern weapons systems functions as a guarantee that the situation will not escalate into violence – simply because*
it is clear who will win the battle. Events on the ground seem to demonstrate the effectiveness of the threat. On one particular occasion, for example, a EUFOR patrol cornered an armed group that had stolen humanitarian aid supplies. Rather than risking confrontation, the goods were returned by the robbers with complementary apologies. On the ground the deterrence relies on the simple presence of EUFOR.

In this way EUFOR helped to protect civilians and facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid in the time and space that the EU troops were operating. EUFOR’s achievements in this regard, although limited, were successful from an internal goal achievement perspective. In terms of its objectives to protect the UN presence and to ensure the security and freedom of movement also of its own EUFOR staff, the operation was also successful. However due to significant delays in the deployment of the UN components of the MINURCAT mission, it took months before EUFOR could provide the UN with protection let alone assistance, as the UN was simply not there. Nevertheless by the time EUFOR left, neither MINURCAT nor the EU had sustained any loss of life in eastern Chad or north-eastern CAR despite regular attacks on international actors in the region (Ehrhart, 2008; Oxfam, 2008; Pop, 2009). Overall the operation was thus successful in its internal goal attainment. This is illustrated in table 3.9 below.
Table 3.9 Internal goal attainment: EUFOR Chad/CAR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Success</th>
<th>Partial success</th>
<th>Failure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To protect civilians in danger, particularly refugees and displaced persons</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To facilitate delivery of humanitarian aid and free movement of humanitarian personnel by helping to improve security in the area of operations</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To contribute to protecting UN personnel, facilities, installations and equipment</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In terms of its implementation EUFOR Chad/CAR has a mixed record. The initial delays to the deployment hindered a timely execution of the mission mandate in the first half of operation. EUFOR Chad RCA was launched on 28 January 2008. It reached Initial Operating Capability on 15 March 2008, but it did not reach Full Operating Capability until halfway through its mandate on 15 September 2008. The operation, which was initially intended to total 4,000 troops, had significant problems in acquiring the necessary troops and equipment from the EU member states. France, which was the main instigator of the operation, eventually announced that it would fill the gaps and supply the outstanding troops and logistical requirements.
Once the necessary capabilities (troops and equipment) were made available and the force was fully deployed, EUFOR Chad/CAR was both efficient and effective in achieving its objectives in the field. From a political-strategic perspective the operation had significant added value for the EU. It enhanced the operational experience of the ESDP and it was another autonomous operation in Africa conducted without the help or support of NATO or the US. As such it enhanced the Union’s role as a military actor in international conflict management. Rye Olsen (2009) has argued that some member states saw the operation as an opportunity to increase the EU’s image as an ethical and humanitarian actor willing and able to do something about Darfur. Finally it increased the EU’s involvement and influence not only in the region, but also in Africa (Mattelaer, 2008; Rye Olsen, 2009). This all added to the internal value of the operational achievements to EU and supports the overall assessment that the operation constituted a success in terms of its internal goal attainment and its internal cost-effectiveness. With regard to the internal appropriateness of the operation’s implementation, however, it was only partially successful due to the delays in the deployment and the limited capability of the operation in the field during the first half of the mandate. Furthermore the internal appropriateness of the operation was compromised when two EUFOR Chad/CAR soldiers accidentally crossed into Sudanese territory and came under fire. One was killed and the other wounded (BBC, 2008; EUFOR Chad/CAR, 2008a; Pineau, 2008). As a whole therefore the operation was only a partial internal success.
Table 3.10 Internal appropriateness: EUFOR Chad/CAR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Success</th>
<th>Partial success</th>
<th>Failure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Timeliness</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Conclusion and key findings

This chapter examined the internal success of the five ESDP military conflict management operations undertaken between March 2003 and March 2009. In each case, the chapter gave a short overview of the context in which the operation was launched. It introduced the operational purpose and identified the key operational objectives of each operation. The chapter then evaluated the internal success of each operation according to the definition and criteria for internal success (internal goal attainment and internal appropriateness), which were developed in chapter two of the thesis. The research findings with regard to each operation are illustrated in table 3.11 below.

Table 3.11: Internal success in ESDP military conflict management operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Internal goal attainment</th>
<th>Internal appropriateness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Operation Concordia</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>Partial success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Artemis</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>Partial success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Althea</td>
<td>Preliminary success</td>
<td>Preliminary success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUFOR DR Congo</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>Partial success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUFOR Chad/CAR</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>Partial success</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The chapter can conclude that from an internal EU perspective the five operations have been relatively successful. There were no overall failures. The operations all successfully completed their mandated purpose and achieved their main operational objectives (internal goal attainment). The partial successes in the internal appropriateness of the operations were mainly due to initial difficulties in force generation and decision-making at the political level in the EU, which in turn caused delayed deployments and some operational constraints in the field. In Operations Concordia and Artemis there were isolated incidents of misconduct by individual soldiers. But overall the operations have been more successful than not from an internal EU perspective.

In conclusion, ESDP military conflict management has been a relative internal success so far. With regard to the emerging ESDP approach to military conflict management this chapter also illustrated how the five operations each had an added political-strategic value for the Union. In terms of the development of the ESDP each operation presented a new challenge and upon its achievement a success for the Union. The chapter found that all five cases have enhanced the Union’s operational experience in terms of the military ESDP, providing it with important lessons for the future. Furthermore the operations have been a vehicle for the EU to prove that it is now capable of conducting operations both in cooperation with NATO and with the UN; within the Berlin Plus or autonomously through Europeanised national headquarters. The operations have all helped enhance the Union’s role, although this is still limited, both as a
military actor and a conflict manager in the international security arena. This is illustrated in table 3.12 below.

**Table 3.12: New challenges in ESDP military conflict management operations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>New challenge</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Operation Concordia, Macedonia 31 March 2003-15 December 2003</td>
<td>First EU military operation; first test of the military aspects of the ESDP; first test of Berlin Plus; first take over from a NATO operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Artemis, DRC 12 June 2003 – 1 September 2003</td>
<td>First operation outside Europe; first mid-crisis deployment; first autonomous operation; first bridging operation in support of a UN mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUFOR Althea, BiH 2 December 2004 – ongoing</td>
<td>Largest operation, longest operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUFOR DR Congo 12 June 2006-30 November 2006</td>
<td>First test of the Rapid Reaction Capability used to launch operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUFOR Chad/CAR 28 January 2008 – 15 March 2009</td>
<td>Biggest logistical challenge; first operation launched in several countries</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The operations contributed to the Union’s comprehensive approach towards the conflicts, countries and regions in question. The ESDP operations increased not only the Union’s engagement, but also its influence beyond its borders. The successful internal goal attainment of the five ESDP military conflict management operations has thus had an added political and strategic value for the Union in addition to the tactical achievements and operational importance of this internal success. In terms of internal appropriateness the internal success was not quite as stellar, although overall the Union performed relatively well here too. Part two of the thesis will investigate the conditions, which enabled (and at times limited) this internal success, but first the next chapter will take a closer look at the external success of these operations.
Chapter four: Evaluating the external success

The previous chapter evaluated the internal success of ESDP military conflict management operations from March 2003 and March 2009. It concluded that from an internal EU perspective the five operations have been relatively successful. The operations all successfully achieved their mandated purpose and core objectives (internal goal attainment), although in terms of their implementation most operations were only partially successful (internal appropriateness). In order to assess the overall success of these operations this thesis contends that the evaluation must include also an assessment of their external success. That is what this chapter sets out to do. According to the theoretical framework developed in chapter two the evaluation of external success must reflect the overall purpose of this kind of operation (to manage the violent aspect of the conflict) and include a judgement on the way in which this purpose was enforced. To this end, the thesis developed two criteria for external success: (1) external goal attainment and (2) external appropriateness. The following evaluation of external success in ESDP military conflict management operations is structured around these two criteria.

The external goal attainment criterion assesses whether each operation successfully helped to manage the violent aspect of the conflict. Its success can be evaluated according to whether (a) continuation, (b) diffusion, (c) escalation and (d) intensification of the violent conflict were prevented. Table 4.1 illustrates these four indicators for success in external goal attainment.
Due to the limited timeframe in which ESDP military conflict management operations have been undertaken so far, this thesis focuses on the short-term success of these operations. The evaluation of external goal attainment is focused on an assessment of the conflict situation in the period in which each operation was deployed. In order to assess the contribution of each operation to the management of the conflict as a whole the external goal attainment is contextualised in the wider international and EU effort in the country. This assessment takes into account the status of each of the conflicts at the end of the timeframe examined in this thesis; namely, March 2009. In this way, the chapter can assess the contribution of the operation to the wider EU approach and the broader international effort to manage the conflict in question. This is important because none of the ESDP military conflict management operations have so far been an isolated attempt at managing a conflict. They have all been part of a wider EU and international effort to manage (and ultimately settle) these conflicts. It is important not to evaluate these operations as if they occurred in a vacuum. The evaluation must reflect the reality and evaluate each operation in the light of this wider context. Therefore, the external goal attainment criterion examines to what extent each operation made a successful contribution to these wider efforts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Success criteria</th>
<th>Success</th>
<th>Not success</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>External goal attainment</td>
<td>Continuation, diffusion, escalation and intensification of violence is prevented</td>
<td>Continuation, diffusion, escalation or intensification of violence is not prevented</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.1: Success in external goal attainment
The external appropriateness criterion evaluates each operation according to the Just War principles governing the appropriate use of force; namely, discrimination and proportionality. It assesses, in the cases where the EU troops used force, whether this was done in an appropriate manner. The external appropriateness evaluates (a) whether the operation did more good than harm (proportionality) and (b) whether in its application of force the operation distinguished between combatants and non-combatants (discrimination). The table below sums up the two key aspects of external appropriateness.

Table 4.2: Success in external appropriateness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Success criteria</th>
<th>Successful</th>
<th>Not successful</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>External appropriateness</strong></td>
<td>The use of force in the operation was appropriate according to the principles of proportionality and discrimination</td>
<td>The use of force in the operation was not appropriate according to the principles of proportionality and discrimination</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In this chapter the operations are assessed region by region rather than in a chronological order. This is done to incorporate the regional dimension of the conflicts and their management into the evaluation. All the conflicts, in which the EU has so far undertaken ESDP military conflict management operations, have been part of wider regional conflict formations. The conflicts in Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina were both part of the dissolution process of the former Yugoslavia, which engulfed the Western Balkan region in a decade of inter-linked violent conflicts from 1991 to 2001. The conflicts in the DRC are at the heart of a wider conflict context in the Great Lakes region of Africa, and the conflict in the tri-border area between Sudan, Chad and CAR is
at the centre of a regional conflict formation in central Africa (Berg, 2008; Glenny, 2001; Prunier, 2009; Flint & de Waal, 2008). This is not to ignore or down-play the sub-state and state-level conflicts in these countries, but simply to take into account that each of these conflicts have a regional dimension, which in turn has been mirrored in the regional approach that the EU and the wider international community has increasingly taken towards their management. A regionally structured assessment of the operations will allow the analysis to examine this regional dimension.

The chapter contextualises each operation with regard to the status of the conflict in question in March 2009. It evaluates the external goal attainment according to the continuation, diffusion, escalation and intensification of violence (indicators of success in external goal attainment). This is complimented by an assessment of the extent to which the implementation of the operation was proportional and discriminatory (indicators of success in external appropriateness). The conclusion summarises the extent to which the five operations have been externally successful and relates this to the findings regarding internal success in the previous chapter. The purpose of this undertaking is to examine whether the operations have been successful overall. Based on this evaluation the second part of the thesis goes on to examine the conditions under which ESDP military conflict management operations can be successful.
Operation Concordia in Macedonia

Operation Concordia, which was undertaken in Macedonia from March to December 2003, was an internal success. It fulfilled its mandate to further contribute to a stable and secure environment, which would allow the Macedonian government to implement the Framework Agreement, in an overall internally successful manner. With the exception of relatively minor security incidents the country remained stable and secure throughout the deployment. The absence of sustained violent conflict both during and after the operation demonstrates a great improvement in the security situation since the crisis in 2001. In his description of Macedonia at the time immediately after the withdrawal of the EUFOR troops Yusufi (2005, pp.72-73) states:

*Armed insurgents and secessionist movements no longer challenge Macedonia* (...) *the country passed the ‘existential test’ of its transition – now there is no longer any question about the prospect of its future existence.*

In March 2009 the security situation in Macedonia was still stable. The violent conflict has successfully been managed and a continuation, diffusion, escalation or intensification of violence has not occurred after the crisis in 2001. The question from an external perspective on the success of the ESDP military conflict management operation is to what extent the positive development in Macedonia is attributable to Operation Concordia? Scepticism is often expressed with regard to the usefulness of the operation because Macedonia, it is argued, was already stable by the time the EU troops were deployed. It is often stressed how it was NATO, not the EU, which stepped in
militarily to manage the crisis in 2001 (Cascone, 2008). So was it NATO, rather than the EU, who successfully managed the Macedonian conflict?

This research found that the management of the violent conflict and the stability of Macedonia today is the joint achievement of Macedonia’s political leadership, civil society and population (all three both ethnic Albanian and ethnic Macedonian), on the one hand, and the international community, on the other. The EU engagement (of which Operation Concordia was one aspect) played a crucial part in this process.

Although it is all but forgotten in the ESDP literature it is important to recall that the effort to manage the ethnic conflict and prevent violence in Macedonia started long before the Ohrid Agreement and the NATO deployment in the country. Throughout the 1990s, a joint effort by Macedonia’s political forces representing both ethnic Albanians and ethnic Macedonians, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and a host of international organisations (including the UN, OSCE, NATO, EU and Council of Europe) together sought to address the conflict in the country. The hope was that they might prevent the outbreak of a war in Macedonia similar to those which had befallen its neighbours. From 1992 to 1999, the UN made two preventative deployments in the country, first through an extension of the UNPROFOR mission and later in a separate UNPREDEP deployment.21 As the UN’s military deployment in Macedonia

21 When UNPROFOR was established in February 1992 it was mandated to ensure demilitarisation of designated areas in Croatia. In April 1992, the mandate was extended to support the delivery of humanitarian relief, monitor no fly zones and safe areas in BiH. In November 1992, the mandate was extended for preventive monitoring in border areas in Macedonia (UN, 2009c). UNPREDEP, which followed UNPROFOR in Macedonia, was the
came to an abrupt end in 1999\textsuperscript{22}, the successful management of the 2001 crisis cannot be attributed directly to this UN presence. However, the UN played an important role in securing the situation in the country and coordinating efforts to resolve the underlying conflict throughout the 1990s. The domestic and international efforts in the country in the 1990s arguably contributed indirectly to the 2001 crisis not deteriorating further than it did (Ludlow, 2003; Sokalski, 2006; UN, 2009c).

During the 2001 crisis, the EU and the US worked together with ethnic Macedonian and Albanian political leaders to reach a conflict settlement and prevent more violence. Together they managed to facilitate the signing of the Framework Agreement in 2001. Subsequently, NATO launched its first operation in Macedonia. NATO completed three military conflict management operations in the country before handing over its responsibilities to the EU force in March 2003 (Mace 2004; Ludlow, 2003; Robertson, 2003). In effect, from 2001 to 2003, NATO was indeed the key international provider of military security in the country. But since the Ohrid Agreement was successfully facilitated by the EU in cooperation with the US, the EU has taken the political lead of the international community in Macedonia. As a senior western diplomat based in Skopje at the time put it:

\footnotesize{UN’s first and only preventative peacekeeping mission launched before the outbreak of a violent conflict (Sokalski, 2006).}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{22} The People’s Republic of China vetoed the extension of the UNPREDEP mandate. Observers linked the veto to Macedonia’s newly established diplomatic ties with Taiwan, which only weeks before the veto had severed Chinese diplomatic relations with Macedonia (Sokalski, 2006).}
NATO had the muscle and the heaviest role in Macedonia, but the EU’s political role was essential. The US played an important, but supporting role. It was an equal partnership and in the ensuing implementation of the Ohrid Agreement the EUSR in country was the primus inter pares with the American Ambassador supported by NATO’s SCR (senior civilian representative) and NATO Task Force Fox commanders (Interview, senior western diplomat, 17/07/2009).

Under the joint leadership of the EUSR and EC delegation, which now share a joint mission in Skopje, the EU through a combination of political, financial, technical, military (Concordia) and police (Proxima) assistance has played a crucial part not only in the securitisation, but also in the stabilisation and normalisation of the conflict situation in the country. The EU’s multifaceted approach towards Macedonia integrates conflict management within the wider European integration process in the country. The EU’s integrated approach is framed within the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP), which aims at eventual EU membership for the country. As a result of the SAP Macedonia is now officially an EU candidate country. One interview explained the integrated EU approach in the following way:

The EU provides assistance to Macedonia based on a: the traditional enlargement model and b: the peace agreement, which of course is particular for this country. The EU profile here has, therefore, been divided between the EC, which deals with enlargement orientated assistance for EU approximation, and the EUSR, which is politically orientated on the viability of the Ohrid
Agreement. Recently the European Commission and the EUSR missions have been merged and the two institutions are now headed by one double-hatted Head of Mission. The merging of European Commission and EUSR offices is a clever strategy and has created a more integrated approach to dealing both with Ohrid Agreement implementation and EU integration. Coordinating the voices of Solana and Rehn in Macedonia in terms of policy guidelines for Macedonia on both EU approximation and Ohrid Framework Agreement implementation has definitely increased cohesion (...) The EU message is clearer. There is now one voice, one figure head, one office and one staff (Interview, Representative from European Agency for Reconstruction Skopje, 29/01/2007).

Although the US still plays an important part in support of these processes and the local authorities must be commended for their efforts it is the EU that has taken the lead in stabilising and securing the situation in Macedonia (Mace, 2004). Several interviewees have stressed the EU’s importance in this regard:

The implementation process (of the Framework Agreement) would be devastated, if the prospect of EU membership disappeared. The prospect of EU membership is essential in preventing ethnic inflammation. The EU mission has a powerful voice here and through the weekly principals meeting we make sure that the other major international players are also in tune – so the international community here speaks with one voice (Interview. Representative from Office of the EUSR Skopje, 30/01/2007).
There are two main entities here, but it is all too often neglected to recognise other minorities. In such a diverse society it is unavoidable that there are so many diametrically different interests. So far the EU integration process has been the thing that unites everybody. Almost 98 per cent, I think, support EU membership. I think, if this promise was taken away it would be much more difficult to implement the Ohrid Framework Agreement. The Albanians want to see changes over night and feel that changes are not going fast enough. I would not dare to speculate, but EU membership is the main driving force of the decentralisation process. If this would be taken away progress would be much more difficult to achieve (Interview, Representative from the OSCE delegation Skopje, 30/01/2007).

As a Macedonian citizen, I think the impact of the EU is very significant. EU accession is the number one priority for the public and the number one priority for the (political) parties. If this prospect of EU membership was taken away everything would slow down and the focus would be lost and the will to get things done would disappear (Interview, Representative from European Commission delegation Skopje, 30/01/2007).

These quotes confirm how, although NATO had handled the military aspect of the 2001 crisis, the EU took the political lead in the management of the conflict after 2001. With the launch of Concordia, the EU took over also the military aspects of the conflict management process in the country. Although the security situation in Macedonia was more stable in 2003 than when NATO engaged in 2001, the security challenges it still faced must not (as it often is) be
underestimated. A senior western diplomat based in Skopje at the time described an incident, which illustrates this:

(In 2003) there was a standoff in the hills above Tetovo, when relatives of Macedonian security forces insisted on visiting the site of a bloody ambush in 2001, where eight Macedonian security force members were killed. The area was well inside an exclusively ethnic Albanian population area and the local ethnic Albanians rejected that they visit and were blocking the road up into the hills with a peaceful sit-in. The Macedonian Army was getting ready to force a way through the sit-in of several hundred men and boys with APCs (armoured personnel carriers) and soldiers. (A senior NATO Ambassador) got word of the impending clash, which would have resulted in bloodshed, and convinced the Minister of Interior and COMEUFOR to join him in attempting to mediate a solution. It nearly failed when a Macedonian police helicopter started circling above where they were talking in the midst of this large group, and someone in the trees near them opened fired with a machinegun. EUFOR was completely passive in the endeavour, which ended happily - or at least as happy as a visit to the site of a massacre can be for the loved ones - a few days later (Interview, Senior western diplomat, 30/06/2006).

This quote illustrates the high tensions, which still existed in Macedonia at the time of the Concordia deployment and the perception among international representatives on the ground that the violent conflict could break out again. The fact that the UNSC deemed it appropriate to authorise an EU follow-up operation to the NATO deployment is another indicator of the security concern
at the time. Likewise, although Operation Concordia was only one aspect of a wider EU (and international) approach towards the management of the conflict it did play an important part here too by helping to provide a secure environment, in which the implementation of the Framework Agreement and the SAP could take place. By guaranteeing the military management of the conflict it facilitated its political management. This demonstrates Concordia’s importance within the EU’s broader strategy of securing peace and stability in the country (Yusufi, 2005). In its role within the wider EU approach towards Macedonia and the Western Balkans, as well as in terms of its part in the broader international effort in the country, the operation was successful in facilitating the management of the conflict and contributing to the prevention of a continuation, diffusion, escalation and intensification of violence during and after its deployment. In effect, the operation was successful in its external goal attainment. This is illustrated in table 4.3.

Table 4.3 External goal attainment: Operation Concordia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators of success</th>
<th>Success</th>
<th>Partial success</th>
<th>Failure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preventing <em>continuation</em> of violence</td>
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EUFOR Concordia never applied force. As the quote above illustrates there are different opinions on whether it should have been more forceful in its approach. Doubts have also sometimes been expressed as to whether EUFOR would have been willing - and able - to manage the situation in the event that hostilities would have recommenced (ICG, 2005b; Howorth, 2007). However, it is important to base the evaluation of the operation on actual events rather than on hypothetical scenarios. The security situation did not deteriorate. Because the conflict did return to violence, it was clearly possible to manage the security situation without the application of force. Therefore, EUFOR’s choice not to apply force was a proportionate response to the situation. The EU force did also not indiscriminately inflict harm on any civilians (discrimination). Overall, the operation did more good than harm and was, thus, not only successful in terms of its external goal attainment, but also in its external appropriateness. This is illustrated in table 4.4.

Table 4.4 External Appropriateness: Operation Concordia

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<th>Indicators of success</th>
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<td>Proportionality</td>
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Other actors helped to make sure that the situation did not deteriorate and in this way added to Concordia’s external success. It is important to remember that the definition of success, which was developed in chapter two, does not
necessarily accredit or blame the EU alone for the success or failure of its operations. The second part of the thesis will return to the conditions that bring about success (or failure), but first this chapter will examine the external success of the remaining four operations.

*Operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina*

The second ESDP military conflict management operation in the Balkans, EUFOR Althea, was launched in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) in December 2004 and is still ongoing. By March 2009, the operation had performed well according to its mandate to contribute to a safe and secure environment; denying conditions for a resumption of violence; managing any residual aspect of the GFAP; and thereby allowing all EU and international community actors to carry out their responsibilities in BiH. Despite some political and operational challenges the operation has so far been an internal success. Throughout EUFOR’s deployment sustained violent conflict has been kept at bay and the return of violence remains, at worst, a threat rather than a reality. A threat, the seriousness of which is much disputed. What is widely agreed upon, however, is that the current situation in BiH is far from ideal and that it may get worse.

In a joint article in October 2008 Former HR and EUSR to the country, Paddy Ashdown, and US Dayton negotiator, Richard Holbrooke, warned that BiH was in a real danger of collapse. The suspicion and fear that began the war in 1992, they contended, had been reinvigorated. Ethnic nationalism was on the rise, as was support for nationalist parties at the time. Ashdown and Holbrooke argued that a serious deterioration of the situation could only be prevented by
maintaining an effective troop presence and a sustained international commitment in the country. Otherwise, their forecast was alarming:

*It is time to pay attention to Bosnia again, if we don’t want things to get very nasty quickly. By now we should all know the price of that (Ashdown and Holbrooke, 2008)*

Chris Patten (2009), former EU External Relations Commissioner and co-chair of the International Crisis Group (ICG), described the state of affairs in the country in March 2009 in the following terms:

*Tensions are high and stability is deteriorating. The Bosnian state is weak and its leadership is too hostile and divided to take charge...The problem is that none of the communities are really content with the Dayton compromise. All still hope to leverage international support to change Dayton to their liking. For the Bosniaks this means drastically reducing the autonomy of Republika Srpska or eliminating it all together. The Croats have not given up on creating a third territorial entity that they could dominate. And the Serbs still aspire to independence. As a result Bosnia is stuck.*

In his report to the Helsinki Commission Ashdown agreed with Patten’s assessment and warned that BiH could become another Cyprus (Maher, 2009). Again his predictions were damning:
Divided, dysfunctional, a black hole, corruption heavily embedded, a space that we cannot afford to leave because it is too destabilising if we do, but we cannot push forward toward full statehood, either (...) That I think is the danger.

It remains unclear whether the current tensions in BiH are of a purely political nature or whether the country is really at risk of another violent conflict. Policy makers and analysts disagree. But it is clear that ethno-political tensions in the country remain high. On 26 March 2009, the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) announced that the Office of the High Representative (OHR) will remain open and active until the deadlock is resolved. Along with the appointment of yet another ‘last’ High Representative in March 2009 the open-ended mandates of both the OHR and EUFOR suggest that the PIC perceives the situation in the country not yet to be stable enough for the international community to disengage and the EU troops to leave. The PIC, which comprises 55 countries and agencies, has underlined that EUFOR remains crucial to the maintenance of a safe and secure environment in the country (PIC, 2009a, 2009b and 2009c). A number of interviewees supported this assessment. As one former Balkans analyst (Interview, 07/05/2009) put it:

*The cost of keeping them (the EUFOR troops) in is much less than the potential cost of pulling them out - especially at a time when the situation is likely to become less stable with the eventual closure of the OHR.*
This illustrates how Operation Althea has been (and still) is perceived to be playing a deterrent role in BiH. A closer look at the conflict dynamics throughout the deployment confirms this. Like in the Macedonian case the security situation in BiH had much improved since NATO initially engaged immediately after the signing of the peace agreement. The most important NATO achievements in BiH were the separation of warring factions and the development of a relatively stable security situation. An authoritative international presence, both military and political, was perceived to remain essential in BiH after NATO’s withdrawal (ICG, 2004), although throughout the duration of the EUFOR mandate, the principal challengers to domestic security in BiH have been weapons smugglers, war criminals and extremist religious groups. One might be tempted to ask, therefore, whether EUFOR Althea was (and still is) really a conflict management operation? When this question was posed to a senior western diplomat, who had worked in the region for many years, he said: *No, but it could have been!*

This quote illustrates precisely why EUFOR was - and still - is deployed in BiH. It is there in case things deteriorate. When Althea was launched it was widely believed to be a necessity for the national security and territorial integrity of BiH that the troops would provide a credible military and political deterrent in the country. This was a similar line of thinking as in the Concordia case, although in Macedonia the threat was perceived to be much less perilous. In BiH the political structures were fragile and not yet self-sustainable, partition or a return to war was perceived as real threats both by Bosnians and international observers (Black, 2003; Harton, 2004; ICG, 2004).
Nevertheless, the security situation in BiH has remained stable and the country’s territorial integrity has not been challenged militarily since the signing of the Dayton Accords. This is attributable in part to EUFOR’s presence. National events, such as the ten-year commemoration of the Srebrenica massacre, which divided the population and was widely perceived as a threat to national security, took place without major disturbances. This is but one indicator that EUFOR, which had the principal responsibility for national security and the military aspects of conflict management in the country, has been doing its job well. Furthermore, regional events such as the Kosovo declaration of independence and the dissolution of the state union of Serbia and Montenegro, which it was feared might provoke a deterioration of the security situation in BiH, did not do so. They had a significant destabilising effect, politically, but militarily BiH remained safe and secure (ICG, 2004; 2008e).

EUFOR is only one aspect of a mammoth effort to consolidate peace and security in the BiH. The EU with its efforts to promote the further European integration and the future EU membership of BiH provides the political backbone to the international engagement in the country. Like in Macedonia the EU has combined and made conditional its enlargement agenda on conflict management in BiH. EUFOR contributes to this wider EU effort by guaranteeing a secure environment, in which this can take place, should the political leadership in BiH want it to. As in Macedonia this process is framed within the SAP framework (Cameron, 2006; OHR, 2009). Whether Althea will continue to successfully manage the security aspects of this process and the
GFAP and prevent more violence in BiH in the future remains to be seen. So far there has been no resurgence of sustained violent conflict in the country throughout the EUFOR deployment in BiH. The operation as part of the wider EU and international community approach has thus far succeeded in preventing the continuation, diffusion, escalation and intensification of the violent conflict. In other words, it has until now been successful in terms of its external goal attainment. This is illustrated in table 4.5.

Table 4.5 Preliminary external goal attainment: Operation Althea

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<th>Indicators of success</th>
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In terms of its external appropriateness EUFOR Althea only used force on one occasion. As discussed in chapter three this was a shooting incident involving Italian EU officers in pursuit of a person indicted for war crimes. The EU forces came under fire and in the exchange one person was killed. Although some observers suggest that this incident could have been avoided, it is important to recognise that the EUFOR soldiers opened fire only once they were fired upon (Interview, senior western diplomat, 17/07/2009; Bassuener and Ferhatvic, 2008). The person who was killed in the confrontation was
firing at the EU soldiers at the time. Therefore, despite its unfortunate outcome, this incident does not compromise the external appropriateness of the operation. Althea meets the external appropriateness criterion both with regard to the proportion and discrimination of its use of force. It is important to stress that the EU troops only actively used force on this one occasion. Overall, the analysis can conclude that Althea has done more good than harm in BiH. This is illustrated in table 4.6.

Table 4.6 Preliminary external appropriateness: Operation Althea

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Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo

Operation Artemis was undertaken in the Ituri region in north-eastern DRC from June to September 2003. The operation was a success in terms of its internal goal attainment. It achieved its stated objectives and contributed to the stabilisation of the security conditions and the humanitarian situation in the town of Bunia pending UN reinforcements. It was implemented in a timely and efficient manner. With the exception of an incident of torture-like behaviour by French troops the operation was an overall success from an internal perspective. From an external perspective Artemis’ success was rather more limited.
Between 1999 and early 2003, factional fighting in the Ituri region had killed an estimated 50,000 people. An additional 500,000 people had fled the district due to its long conflict over land, resources and power (Homan, 2007). The Ituri conflict was part of a wider conflict in the DRC, which at the time of the Artemis deployment included domestic actors in Kinshasa and Goma as well as regional actors, Rwanda and Uganda, who had supported and shipped weapons to rival factions in the DRC (Homan, 2007; Prunier, 2009).

At the time of the Artemis deployment Ituri and its district capital, Bunia (Artemis’ focus of attention), were engulfed in crisis following the withdrawal of the Ugandan People’s Defence Force in May 2003, subsequent to the Luanda Agreement between Uganda and the DRC in September 2002. Predominantly ethnic Lendu-militias and the Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC) mostly from the Hema ethnic group were both attempting to take control of Bunia. In search of safety thousands of civilians left their homes. Many of the internally displaced persons (IDPs) gathered around the airport and the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC)23 Headquarters in Bunia, where a 700-strong Uruguayan battalion was based. The thousands of civilians (numbers vary from 5-12,000) that had sought refuge outside the UN compound were kept alive by the UN and a handful of humanitarian workers (Homan, 2007, p.2). Tensions mounted, fighting continued and large-scale atrocities were inflicted upon the civilian population. Observers warned of the risk of another genocide in the Great Lakes region of Africa. The UN peacekeepers were unable to cope. Artemis

23 MONUC had been present in Ituri since 1999 (Homan, 2007).
was launched, on invitation from the UN, to temporarily relieve the Uruguayan battalion until a larger UN force could be put in place (Hendrickson, Strand and Raney, 2007; Homan, 2007).

Ulriksen, Gourlay and Mace (2004, p.510) described the situation in which the EUFOR troops were deployed in the following way:

The violent chaos in Ituri includes a range of local conflicts with shifting links to the regional conflict. More than a dozen ethnic militias and the governments of Rwanda, Uganda and DRC have fought for power and control over Ituri’s resources. These militias are not disciplined military units but are to a large extent manned by child soldiers. Gross atrocities, including cannibalism, have been committed on a massive scale. An estimated 50,000 men, women and children have been killed since 1999. Alliances are highly volatile, and although most militias are based on ethnicity they are internally unstable.

Upon its deployment Operation Artemis immediately alleviated the security situation in its area of operations. It regained control and prevented what was otherwise expected to be a serious deterioration of the security situation in Bunia. A common criticism of Operation Artemis is that it was too limited in terms of the time, scope and geographical area of operations (Homan, 2007). Similarly, it has been argued that Artemis restored stability in Bunia only temporarily; and because it did this by driving the militia out of this area rather than by disarming or dismantling the groups it allowed them to continue to operate elsewhere (Giegerich, 2008; Ladzik, 2009).
Operation Artemis, like the international management of the DRC conflict more generally, left much to be desired in terms of security in the country. But the impact of the Artemis operation must not be underestimated. It is important to recall that over 50,000 people had been killed in Ituri since 1999 and that at the time of the Artemis deployment the region was in complete turmoil. No other international security actor was willing or able to provide even a short-term stabilisation of the situation at the time. The impact that this operation had on the ground was significant both in terms of the direct limitation of killings and human rights abuses inflicted on civilians and indirectly as the lull in violence allowed access to humanitarian aid (medical assistance, food and drink supplies); movement for refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs) and a recommencement of the political negotiations in Kinshasa (Howorth, 2007, pp.231-241; Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2008, pp.174-198; Tull, 2009). These were significant achievements. The operation, therefore, despite its limitations, was an important contribution to the overall management of the violence in the DRC and the protection of civilians in Bunia.

As with any military conflict management operation and in particular one as limited as Artemis there was a danger that the violent conflict would recommence after the operation terminated. The geographical, temporal and functional constraints of its mandate compromised the sustainability of the positive impact that the Artemis operation had on the Ituri conflict. Shortly after Artemis handed over its responsibilities to MONUC the security situation in Ituri deteriorated once again. Renewed massacres in Katchele on 6 October
2003, just a month after the EUFOR withdrawal, added to the enormous suffering already sustained by the population. This happened despite MONUC’s continued peacekeeping efforts in the region. However, even with its reinforced mandate, MONUC had lesser capabilities in Ituri than Artemis. Consequently, it failed to sustain the positive momentum and prevent more violence in the region (Giegerich 2008).

Although Artemis performed well and made significant achievements in Bunia throughout its deployment, the broader international strategy of securing peace and stability in the region, let alone the country, was only marginally and temporarily advanced by the EUFOR deployment (Giegerich, 2008; Homan, 2007). Since then there has been another upsurge in violence. In November 2008, there were several attacks against the Congolese Army (FADRC) by the Front de Résistance Patriotique d’Ituri (FRPI) in the Irumu territory. In December 2008, the FADRC, supported by MONUC, was able to reoccupy some of the villages that had been captured by the FRPI, but renewed clashes took place in mid-February 2009. In March 2009, the situation in Ituri remained volatile (UNSG, 2009).

This illustrates how not even in the specific area in which the EU force was deployed did the operation have a sustainable impact in terms of preventing more violence. After the EUFOR withdrawal the violent conflict in Ituri continued and intensified. It did not, however, bring in new external parties to the conflict (escalation) or spread further geographically (diffusion) than it had before the EU troops were deployed. The deterioration in the security situation
was arguably primarily due to the limitations to Artemis’ mandate and MONUC’s failure to sustain the advance after the EU operation. The ESDP deployment had been successful in terms of its external goal attainment during its deployment, but the larger international conflict management effort of which Artemis was part failed to prevent the continuation and intensification of violence beyond the withdrawal of the EU force.

From an external goal attainment perspective the operation is, thus, only a partial success, as its achievements, although significant in the short term proved short-lived and unsustainable in the longer term. This is not to blame EU soldiers for EU decision-making in Brussels or for the actions of belligerent parties in the DRC, but rather to reflect that as part of the wider international conflict management effort Artemis did not succeed in preventing more violence in Bunia, in Ituri or in the DRC. In effect, it was only a partial success in terms of its external goal attainment. This is illustrated in table 4.7 below.

Table 4.7 External goal attainment: Operation Artemis

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<th>Indicators of success</th>
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<td>Preventing <em>continuation</em> of violence</td>
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With regard to its external appropriateness Operation Artemis was the first ESDP military conflict management operation that repeatedly came under fire. EU ground forces were on several occasions caught up in violent confrontations with local militia factions. The EU forces killed more than 20 local militiamen during their deployment, but the armed confrontations were localised and of short duration (Giegerich 2008). Considering the volatile security situation in which the troops operated, the specificities of the situations in which they engaged in armed confrontations and their positive impact on the security situation for civilians in Bunia at the time, the use of force was proportionate to the challenge at hand. It was also discriminatory in the sense that it made the appropriate distinction between combatants and non-combatants. Overall, the operation did more good than harm. However, former Swedish Artemis soldiers have accused French soldiers of using torture-like methods against a Congolese civilian on at least one occasion during the operation (Deutsche Welle, 2008). The Swedish national television, SVE (2008), broadcast the following account by the Swedish soldiers:

_In July 2003, French soldiers captured a young man in his twenties, and took him to the Swedish-French base (...) The man was paraded around the base with a snare around his neck by a French Colonel’s aide. During the interrogation, which continued several hours in the French section, the prisoner was subjected to mock drowning. The prisoner’s screams were heard over the entire base (...) The prisoner was bent down against the ground and an officer performed a mock execution by shooting his gun at the prisoner’s_
head without a shot going off (...) The torture continued all evening until midnight when the prisoner with a hood over his head was loaded onto a French jeep and driven out of the camp. His destiny is unknown.

SVT (2008) quoted one soldier saying:

They said they let him go, the question is only where? If it was in the enemy camp then it was equivalent to a death sentence.

Swedish soldiers at the time filed a complaint with the Swedish operational chief, who was also head of the Special Protection Group. Upon their return to Sweden several members of the Swedish force reported the incident to their superiors there too. The Swedish Armed Forces subsequently undertook an investigation, which concluded that torture had indeed taken place. The Swedish report of the incident was sent to the French Defence Department, which in turn undertook its own investigation and concluded that no offence had been committed (SVE, 2008; Interview, Researcher, 31/07/2009). An interviewee, who has investigated this case extensively, claims otherwise:

It was an operation where one of the nations, Sweden, more or less acted as a chaperone for the other one, France. Mainly to gain points in the intra-EU defence game. Although the case in question was ‘just’ one prisoner there were reports of other, less brutal, incidents of violence towards prisoners and there was rampant racism among the French officers during the operation (Interview, Researcher, 31/07/2009).
Academic sources make no reference to this incident, except Hadden (2009, p.139) who briefly dismisses the claim: *No evidence of any cases of alleged violations by EU forces*. Instead it has been suggested that Artemis was a French success rather than an EU success and that the French force, which made up the majority of the Artemis operation, was *coherent, prepared and highly experienced in operations in Africa* (Ulriksen, Gourlay and Mace, 2004, p.516). Interviews conducted for the purpose of this research have revealed different perceptions with regard to these allegations. No EU or member state officials were willing to speak about this on the record (despite the promise of anonymity) or able to confirm or deny the allegations outright. Several interviewees claimed, often convincingly, that they had never heard of the incident. The German government, which did not send troops, but provided logistical support to the operation, could also not confirm the allegations to Deutsche Welle (2008). The data concerning this incident is limited. However, the accounts and official complaints from the Swedish soldiers, the Swedish Army’s formal investigation and the independent report from the Swedish National Television all indicate that this was in fact a disproportionate and indiscriminate use of force against a civilian. Although the implementation of the operation was otherwise appropriate, the gravity of this incident justifies the conclusion that the operation was only a partial success in terms of its external appropriateness. This is illustrated in table 4.8 below.
Table 4.8 External appropriateness: Operation Artemis

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This is a particularly important contribution to the academic debate, as this incident has so far been ignored in the ESDP literature. The torture of a civilian and the alleged mistreatment of prisoners during an otherwise successfully conducted operation demonstrates why it is important to include this criterion in the overall evaluation of success.

Operation EUFOR DR Congo

EUFOR DR Congo was undertaken in the DRC capital, Kinshasa, from June to November 2006. It was an internal success in the sense that it achieved its internally defined purpose to support the UN operation, MONUC, during the elections. Its delayed deployment, however, caused a partial success only in its internal appropriateness. From an external perspective the operation was also only partially successful. Although it successfully provided support to MONUC in Kinshasa, it contributed little to the management of the violence still ongoing in other parts of the country at the time.

When the EU launched EUFOR DR Congo in 2006 the overall security situation in the country was still dire. The International Rescue Committee estimated that 1,200 people, half of them children, died daily as a direct or
indirect consequence of the conflict in the country (UNICEF, 2006). The security situation in the east of the country was particularly unstable. In July alone, while EUFOR DR Congo was being deployed in Kinshasa, 17,000 people fled renewed fighting in Ituri. Despite the increased violence and the need for further international assistance in the east of the country, EUFOR DR Congo was not deployed there. The EU troops were confined to their area of operations in the capital and much of the force remained in Gabon, where the over-the-horizon reserve was stationed in case of a deterioration of the security situation in the capital during the elections. Except for relatively minor disturbances in Kinshasa in August 2006 the security situation there was comparatively stable throughout the EUFOR deployment. Although the operation did successfully support MONUC in the handling of these disturbances the achievements of the operation with regards to the peace and stability of the country as a whole did not constitute an external success (Gegout, 2007). At its beginning Haine and Giegerich (2006) warned: The operation is limited, brief, risk-averse and ultimately ineffective.

In its contribution towards the management of the DRC conflict operation EUFOR DR Congo became exactly that. It did not in any tangible way contribute to the prevention of more violence in the country as a whole. Consequently, the violence continued and intensified in the east of the country. In terms of its external goal attainment the operation was, therefore, only a partial success. This is illustrated in table 4.9.
Table 4.9 External goal attainment: EUFOR DR Congo

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With regard to its external appropriateness the operation was successful as it did not use force in its handling of any incidents in Kinshasa. This is illustrated in table 4.10. Although it did not do much good in terms of improving the conflict situation in the country it did play a deterrent role in Kinshasa. In effect, the operation still did less harm than good.

Table 4.10 External appropriateness: Operation EUFOR DR Congo

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In March 2009, the security situation in the DRC was still volatile and the humanitarian situation was desperate. 70 per cent of the population according to the UN Secretary-General (UNSG) was affected by food insecurity in the
Many refugees have repeatedly been displaced by further violence. The population displacements, the overcrowded conditions in the refugee camps and the limited access to health care caused by conflict have led to significant increases in illnesses such as cholera (Medicins Sans Frontieres, 2008). Civilians remain vulnerable as a result of the recent rise in insecurity. Exploitation, abduction and sexual harassment of men, women and children are taking place on all sides of the conflict. Recent reports confirm that armed rebels and undisciplined members of the security services (both military and police) have committed grave human right abuses including arbitrary executions and torture. Looting is widespread and human rights defenders, journalists and politicians are regular victims of arbitrary arrest, harassment and intimidation by local authorities. Since February 2009, harassment and attacks on humanitarian workers by armed groups have significantly increased, which in turn has worsened the already dire humanitarian situation. With the exception of a few recent cases of prosecution of low-ranking officials, impunity remains the rule rather than the exception in the DRC (HRW, 2009; Medicins Sans Frontieres, 2008; UNSG, 2009).

The country was hit hard by the global economic downturn. The decline of global commodity prices followed by a sharp rise in DRC food prices added to the already grave humanitarian situation. Activities in the national mining sector have dramatically dropped, while the deteriorating security situation has compelled the government to allocate additional budgetary resources to military rather than humanitarian activities (HRW, 2009; UNSG, 2009).

A recent UNSG report (2009) confirms that sexual and gender based violence is still widespread in the DRC. Some 1,100 rapes are currently being reported each month with an average of 36 rapes per day for the first three months of 2009. More than 10 per cent of the rape victims are under the age of ten. Reports also confirm that children are still being systematically recruited, voluntarily or forced, and used as child soldiers by the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR), Front Nationaliste et Intégrationniste (FNI), Ugandan Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and Mayi-Mayi groups, including the Coalition des Patriots Résistants Congolais (PARECO). Children have also been reported present in the official ranks of the Armed Forces of the DRC (FADRC) and the integrated and non-integrated Congrès National Pour la Défense du People (CNDP) brigades (UNSG, 2009).
In the last year the security situation in the country has slightly improved. In his most recent report on MONUC the UN Secretary-General stated that from November 2008 until March 2009 some progress had been made by the DRC government and its neighbours towards stabilising the security situation in the country. In December 2008, the DRC and Rwanda had announced a joint military plan to address the continued presence of the FDLR in eastern parts of the country. The agreement also introduced concrete steps to restore democratic relations between the two countries. In January 2009, the CNDP, after an internal leadership rift between Laurent Nkunda and Bosco Ntaganda also reached a ceasefire agreement with the DRC government. The agreement included provisions for CNDP participation in the operation against FDLR and the immediate integration of CNDP combatants into the FADRC. A few days later, Nkunda, who had been a long-time ally of the Rwandese government, was arrested in Rwanda (BBC, 2009c). Alongside the CNDP ceasefire PARECO also released a statement promising a cessation of hostilities. Similar announcements followed from other Congolese armed groups in North Kivu. The integration of combatants from the CNDP, PARECO and Mayi-Mayi into the FADRC followed. The joint DRC/Rwanda operation was not extended to South Kivu, where the FDLR control the Mwenga territory economically as well as militarily. It is also controlling the mines and collecting ‘taxes’ from the civilian population. In the Orientale province FADRC, Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) and Sudan’s People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) launched a joint operation against the Ugandan Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) from December 2008 until March 2009. The operation was not successful in destroying the LRA command-and-control structures or capturing the LRA
leadership. The LRA has since split into groups and dispersed into the surrounding area including the Central African Republic and southern Sudan. Subsequently, LRA elements undertook brutal reprisals against the civilian population (UNSG, 2009). Violence is still occurring in the mineral rich eastern provinces and the situation remains fragile in particular in the Kivus and Haut Uélé (UNSG, 2009).

It is clear from the present day situation that neither of the two ESDP operations, Artemis and EUFOR DRC, facilitated an end to violent conflict in the DRC. However, these two operations, unlike Operations Concordia and Althea in the Balkans, were not mandated, equipped or as such intended to operate throughout the country or indeed to manage the DRC conflict as a whole. Artemis and EUFOR DRC were each only a small piece in a much larger international conflict management puzzle. The EU forces were in the DRC, supporting the 17,000 strong UN mission, only for a few months at a time. Unlike in the Balkans, where the EU had a lead role in the international conflict management effort during the Concordia and Althea deployments, in the EU and its military conflict management operations played only a supporting role to the much larger UN operation in the DRC. MONUC is the backbone of the international attempt to manage the violent conflicts in this country. It is important to keep this in mind, when considering the limitations to the external success of the two ESDP military conflict management operations. With these two military operations and the civilian ESDP operations to assist the police and security sector reform (EUPOL and EUSEC) in the country, however, the EU has increased its role in the DRC.
The EU undertook its most recent ESDP military conflict management operation in eastern Chad and north-eastern CAR from January 2008 to March 2009. This operation successfully achieved its mandated purpose to support the UN’s MINURCAT mission. But the timeliness and efficiency of EUFOR was compromised by the delayed deployment both of its own troops and the civilian MINURCAT component. The EU launched EUFOR Chad/CAR under precarious conditions in both Chad and CAR and with the crisis in neighbouring Darfur threatening to make the situation even worse.

From its very beginning conditions for EUFOR Chad/CAR were tough. Just 24 hours after the operation was officially launched the deployment was interrupted by a major rebel offensive on Chad’s capital, N’djamena. Sources suggest that the rebel alliance consciously decided to storm the city in anticipation of the EUFOR deployment (Fletcher, 2008; Interview, National Representative to the EU, 09/06/2009). Both EUFOR Chad/CAR and MINURCAT were initially delayed, but EUFOR managed to deploy its forces and start implementing its mission with much less of a delay than MINURCAT. The problems facing MINURCAT, however, directly affected the external success of the ESDP operation, as its success was dependent on effective cooperation and coordination with the UN operation. Nevertheless, EUFOR’s presence, its regular patrolling and targeted operations contributed to an increased sense of security in its area of operations (Oxfam, 2008). In December 2008, the ICG reported that there was a lull in violence in northern CAR, although it stressed the frailty of the situation, which it argued could
only be sustained by an appropriate UN takeover upon EUFOR’s withdrawal (ICG, 2008a). EUFOR had a positive, albeit limited, impact on security in Chad as well, but here too its achievements risked being compromised, if the UN follow-up mission did not successfully manage to sustain them. Some observers at the time suggested that MINURCAT was not up to the challenge (Ehrhart, 2008; ICG, 2009). After the handover a representative from the Council of the EU (Interview, 08/06/2009) begged to disagree:

The handover went well. There is no security vacuum. The problems have been in terms of logistics. Of course the EU and the UN have different standards. But some of the European troops stayed, for example, the French contingent stayed in the country under a UN badge. I do not understand why people think there is a security vacuum, but the situation between Chad and Sudan is difficult.

When EUFOR handed over responsibility to MINURCAT in March 2009 the situation in the tri-border area encompassing western Sudan (Darfur), eastern Chad and north-eastern CAR was still precarious. The operation, which was specifically mandated to protect refugees from the conflict in Darfur, withdrew amid rising tensions resulting from the international arrest warrant against Sudanese President, Omar al-Bashir. Al-Bashir responded to the indictment by expelling thirteen western humanitarian agencies from Darfur, which in turn threatened the already dire humanitarian situation. UN Secretary-General Ban-Ki-Moon and US President Obama warned that the situation in the region might deteriorate even further. Observers on the ground confirm that the
regional security situation is still precarious (Pop, 2009). It is clear from the current instability in the region that EUFOR Chad/CAR has not helped facilitate an end to violent conflict in the region. The situation in the area is far from secure. The situation in Chad is still one of permanent political crisis. President Deby is threatened and the security situation in the east of the country has the potential to destabilise Chad further. This in turn could have a negative effect on stability in the neighbouring countries and could potentially worsen the already severe security conditions and humanitarian crisis in the region (ICG, 2008b; ICG 2008c; ICG 2009b; Ladzik, 2009).

Like operation Artemis in the DRC the EUFOR Chad/CAR operation did have some success in temporarily alleviating the violence in its area of operations pending the UN reinforcements (Ladzik, 2009; Mattelaer, 2008; Oxfam, 2008). However, unlike Artemis, which was deployed with remarkable speed, EUFOR Chad/CAR, had less of an impact than its mandate allowed, due to the delays in its own and MINURCAT’s deployment (Ehrhart, 2008). Moreover, the EU soldiers were not authorised to provide security within the camps. The intention was that this should be provided by Chadian police officers trained by MINURCAT. However, the Chadian police were not fulfilling this role throughout most of EUFOR’s deployment; in effect, a security vacuum, which was exploited by local bandits and militias, left refugees and IDPs in the camps unprotected (Mattelaer, 2006; Oxfam, 2008). As aid workers in the area were also increasingly threatened, humanitarian efforts were down-scaled. This negatively affected EUFOR’s ability to support the delivery of humanitarian aid (Ehrhart, 2008). Finally, President Deby’s objection to an EU deployment
directly on the border between Chad and Sudan limited the operation’s success in managing the regional aspect of the conflict. Consequently, the proxy war between Sudan and Chad continued, while the EU troops were deployed in the region. As the EU force was not operating in the area, where the instability was worst, the operation had less of an impact on the humanitarian consequences of conflict in these areas (Ehrhart, 2008; Ladzic, 2008). Rye Olsen (2009, p.256) has argued that this demonstrated that:

*The EU does not (and will not for the foreseeable future) have the capacity to manage a complex and year-long regional crisis such as the one in Darfur.*

It is important to recognise that this operation, like the two operations in the DRC, was not mandated, equipped or intended to operate throughout the whole territories of these three countries. It was, for example, not mandated to deploy to the border area between Chad and Sudan. The force was also not authorised to enter Sudan. When two EUFOR Chad/CAR soldiers accidentally crossed into Sudanese territory they immediately came under fire (BBC, 2008; EUFOR Chad/CAR, 2008a; Pineau, 2008). Under these conditions and with significant limitations to its mandate the EU force was not able to manage the violent conflict. In effect, the EU forces did not succeed in preventing more violence. In its area of operations, however, the operation did help to improve the situation. From this perspective the operation was, therefore, a partial success in its external goal attainment, as illustrated in table 4.11.
Table 4.11 External goal attainment: EUFOR Chad/CAR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators of success</th>
<th>Success</th>
<th>Partial success</th>
<th>Failure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preventing <em>continuation</em> of violence</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preventing <em>diffusion</em> of violence</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preventing <em>escalation</em> of violence</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preventing <em>intensification</em> of violence</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The EU did not decide to extend its operation, despite an invitation from the UNSG to do so. It did, however, offer that some of its force could stay on under the UN mandate. It remains to be seen, whether the UN and EU together have prepared for an effective MINURCAT follow-up of the EUFOR operation (Council of the EU, 2009g; Pop, 2009). What is clear so far is that the EUFOR Chad/CAR operation was only partially successful in terms of its external goal attainment. Where it was deployed, once it was deployed, EUFOR did deter violence and significantly improved the security situation, however, the operation’s contribution to the international efforts to manage the conflict was limited by a lack of support from domestic, regional and international actors involved both in the conflict and its management. Part two of the thesis will examine these conditions for success in greater detail.

With regard to its external appropriateness EUFOR Chad/CAR repeatedly came under fire and on at least three occasions it fired back. Two of these incidents were confrontations with local armed groups in Chad and the third
incident occurred when a single EUFOR land rover strayed into Sudan and came under fire. In Chad both attacks on EUFOR were conducted by unidentified armed groups. EUFOR sustained no serious casualties here and there are no reports of the two groups suffering any fatalities. In both incidents EUFOR opened fire only after they had been fired upon and on both occasions civilians were helped from the scene by EUFOR soldiers. There are different accounts of what happened when the EUFOR vehicle crossed into Sudan. Both the Sudanese authorities and EUFOR claim to have fired in self-defence and both have reported casualties. Although France has officially criticised the Sudanese army for its un-proportional response, the incident could have been avoided, if the troops had not strayed into Sudanese territory (EUFOR Chad/CAR, 2008a, 2008b and 2008c; Pineau, 2008). Nonetheless, it is important to recognise that under the circumstances EUFOR’s use of force was both proportionate and discriminatory. Throughout its deployment the operation did more good than harm. The operation was a success according to the indictors for external appropriateness. This is demonstrated in table 4.12 below.

Table 4.12 External appropriateness: Operation EUFOR DR Congo

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators of success</th>
<th>Success</th>
<th>Partial success</th>
<th>Failure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Proportionality</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discrimination</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Conclusion and key findings

The violent aspect of the conflicts in Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina has been successfully managed. Violence has not continued, diffused, escalated
or intensified in Macedonia during or after Operation Concordia or in Bosnia and Herzegovina during EUFOR Althea (still ongoing). The security situation in both countries is now relatively stable. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, Chad and the Central African Republic the security situations are much more precarious. These violent conflicts have not been successfully managed and after the launch of the ESDP military conflict management operations the violence in all three countries has continued and periodically intensified. According to the definition developed in chapter two, success in external goal attainment depends on whether the operations have contributed significantly to the management of the violent conflicts in which they engaged. It is clear from the above analysis that none of the operations have had a negative impact on conflict management. As such none of the operations outright failed in this regard. In Macedonia and BiH the EU forces acted as the primary military guarantors of peace during their deployments and both operations have (so far - in the case of Althea) succeeded in playing their part in the international effort to prevent more violence. In effect, they are both classified as successes in terms of their external goal attainment. Operation Artemis too succeeded in managing the localised conflict in Bunia during its deployment, but after its withdrawal the situation deteriorated once more. Likewise, in terms of its contribution to the management of the wider DRC conflict Artemis’ success was only partial. Although it provided an important relief both to civilians and international actors in Bunia at the time, its positive achievements proved both limited and unsustainable after the EU force departed. Therefore, Artemis was only a partial success in external goal attainment. EUFOR DR Congo succeeded in its supporting role to the UN mission, which prevented sustained
violent conflict in Kinshasa during the DRC elections. However, EUFOR DRC failed to make a significant contribution to the management of the wider conflict in the country. Its external goal attainment was, thus, only a partial success. Finally, EUFOR Chad/CAR made an important contribution in terms of improving the security situation around the refugee camps in Chad and the Central African Republic. But it was only partially successful in its external goal attainment, as its role in the management of the wider regional conflict was limited. All the five ESDP military conflict management deployments had a positive impact on the violent conflicts in the areas where they operated for the duration of their mandates. The degree to which they have helped prevent more violence has, however, varied significantly.

All the operations did more good than harm. With regard to the external appropriateness of the operational use of force Concordia and EUFOR DRC did not apply force and were consequently successful in this respect. With the exception of the 2006 shooting incident Operation Althea did also not use force. Despite this unfortunate episode the operation was successful according to the external appropriateness criterion, because its use of force was proportionate and discriminatory. It did only fire when fired upon and it did not directly target civilians. Artemis and EUFOR Chad/CAR both repeatedly applied force. In EUFOR Chad/CAR this was done in an appropriate manner, whereas the torture case compromised Artemis’ external appropriateness. The external success of all the five operations is outlined in table 4.13.
Table 4.13: External success in ESDP military conflict management operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>External goal attainment</th>
<th>External appropriateness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Operation Concordia</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Althea</td>
<td>Preliminary success</td>
<td>Preliminary success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Artemis</td>
<td>Partial success</td>
<td>Partial success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUFOR DR Congo</td>
<td>Partial success</td>
<td>Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUFOR Chad/CAR</td>
<td>Partial success</td>
<td>Success</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The five operations engaged in different conflict situations in different ways. From the above analysis it seems that these dissimilar scenarios have affected the success of these operations, but it is unclear how and why. The next part of the thesis will carefully examine the conditions for success in ESDP military conflict management operations.
Chapter five: A theoretical discussion of conditions for success

Part one of this thesis evaluated the success of the ESDP military conflict management operations undertaken from 2003 to 2009. It found that the five operations vary significantly with regard to their success. The findings above indicate that the success of an ESDP military conflict management operation is related to the context in which the operation occurs. Why and how exactly this is the case is not yet clear. The second part of the thesis will examine this in greater detail, as it seeks to answer the central research question: under which conditions can ESDP military conflict management operations be successful?

Before initiating the analysis, it is necessary to present a few words of caution. The analytical focus of this thesis is on the conditions that determine success in ESDP military conflict management operations. This must not be confused with the conditions for success of the overall EU policy towards the countries in question or the successful settlement of the conflicts, in which these operations engage. Furthermore, the research question concerns the conditions that are necessary for operations to be able to succeed, rather than conditions, which are simply conducive to success. The research question is explored from a strategic rather than a tactical perspective, as this will allow for a comparative analysis of the conditions that are necessary for any ESDP military conflict management operation to be able to succeed.

This chapter develops the theoretical framework for the empirical analysis of the conditions for success, which follows in the next two chapters. This chapter introduces a set of theoretically grounded research hypotheses regarding the
conditions for success. The hypotheses are based on the theoretical assumption and the preliminary empirical finding in part one, which suggests that the success of an ESDP military conflict management operation is conditioned by the context in which it occurs. The chapter contends that there are two different dimensions to this context: the internal dimension and the external dimension. The internal dimension is the EU-specific context, in which the operation is undertaken. It is made up of EU member states and EU institutions. The external dimension is the conflict-specific context, in which an operation takes place. This encompasses domestic, regional and international actors, which are actively involved in the conflict and its management. The two contextual dimensions are illustrated in table 5.1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Internal context</th>
<th>External context</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU-specific context: EU member</td>
<td>Conflict-specific context: domestic,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>states and EU institutions</td>
<td>regional and international actors</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This chapter hypothesises that if an ESDP military conflict management operation cannot secure sufficient support then it cannot succeed. It suggests that for an operation to succeed it is necessary that it secures support both (a) from the key actors inside the EU, which are involved in the operation and (b) from the key actors outside the EU that are involved in the conflict and its management.
Levels of analysis

The context in which an ESDP military conflict management operation occurs is complex. As mentioned above it has two different dimensions: an internal dimension and an external dimension. Each of these contextual dimensions is made up of different actors. The internal dimension comprises the key actors at the EU level, which are involved in the ESDP military conflict management operation. These are primarily EU member states and EU institutions. The external dimension is divided into three levels: (a) the domestic, (b) the regional and (c) the international level. At each of the three external levels there are different actors, who are expected to affect the success of an ESDP military conflict management operation. The key actors at each of these levels of the analysis are outlined in tables 5.2 and 5.3 below.

Table 5.2: Internal dimension: the EU level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of analysis</th>
<th>Key actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU level</td>
<td>EU member states and EU institutions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.3: External dimension: the domestic, regional and international levels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Levels of analysis</th>
<th>Key actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Domestic level</td>
<td>Domestic actors involved in the conflict and its management (sub-state and state level): state, army and irregular armed groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional level</td>
<td>Regional actors involved in the conflict and its management: states, armies, irregular armed groups and regional security organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International level</td>
<td>International actors involved in the conflict and its management: states and international security organisations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In order to examine if and how actors at the different contextual levels affect success the thesis applies a levels-of-analysis approach. This is traditionally an International Relations approach. It has typically been used to explain the foreign policy behaviour of states and its international outcomes (Levy, 2001). The levels-of-analysis framework was first systematised by Waltz (1959), who argued that causes of war could be examined and explained at the level of the individual, the nation-state and the international system. Singer (1961) has also stressed the significance of different levels of analysis in the study of international relations. He focused on the system (international) and the unit (national) level and argued that scholars must choose to apply either one or the other in their study of international relations. He accepted that it may be possible to combine the two, but did not explore this option in any further detail. Levy (2001, p.4) has argued that in the study of interstate and intrastate war:

It is logically possible and in fact usually desirable to combine causal variables for different levels of analysis, because whether war and peace occur is usually determined by multiple variables operating at more than one level of analysis.

Cordell and Wolff (forthcoming, p.10) support this point and contend that:

Despite the traditional focus on states and their relations with one another there is nothing inherently prohibitive in the levels-of-analysis approach to extend its application to non-state actors and structures and issues that fall
somewhere outside the actor and structure dichotomy yet remain important independent variables when accounting for the causes of ethnic conflicts and for success and failure of specific policies adopted to prevent, manage or settle them.

This thesis endorses this argument and applies the levels-of-analysis approach to the study of conditions for success in ESDP military conflict management operations. The analytical framework developed here comprises one internal level (EU) and three external levels of analysis (domestic, regional and international). These four levels of analysis reflect the complex context in which ESDP military conflict management operations are undertaken and allow for a systematic analysis of the conditions for success that exist at each of the levels. This distinction between the levels of analysis is not to suggest that the levels are empirically isolated. On the contrary, the thesis argues that the levels of analysis are inherently linked through processes such as conflict diffusion and escalation. By way of example, an internal conflict can become a regional conflict or vice versa either of which will usually have international ramifications. Another example of how the different levels of analysis may overlap is in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the highest authority in the domestic context is in fact international, because the Office of the High Representative representing the international Peace Implementation Council has effectively run the country since the 1995 Dayton Agreement (Chandler, 2000). Complexities like these complicate an analysis of this nature, but they do not hinder it, as long as they are recognised and taken into consideration. The levels-of-analysis approach is a useful analytical tool in this regard. The
following two chapters will examine the conditions for success at each level in more detail, but first it is necessary to take a closer look at the question of structure and agency in this realm.

Structure and agency

As outlined in chapter one Brown (1996) explained the violent aspect of conflicts through a framework of permissive conditions and proximate causes. Permissive conditions are the underlying factors that make some conflicts more likely to turn violent. Proximate causes are the catalytic factors, which cause violence-prone conflict situations to actually turn violent. This thesis posits that Brown’s framework for understanding why and how conflicts turn violent can also be used to explain the dynamics of a conflict once it has turned violent. It suggests that there are permissive conditions that make more violence likely and that there are proximate causes that make continuation, diffusion, escalation or intensification of violence happen. This is not to suggest that the specific factors that cause a given conflict to turn violent are necessarily the same factors that cause it to remain or become more violent. But there is a common denominator between the two in the importance of agency. With regard to proximate causes Brown (1996, p.23) argues that:

*Most major conflicts are triggered by internal, elite-level activities – to put it simply, bad leaders (…) Elite decisions and actions are usually the catalysts that turn potentially volatile situations into violent confrontations (…) External forces are occasionally the proximate causes of internal conflicts, but the*
discrete actions of some neighbouring states – bad neighbours – are more important than mysterious, mass-level ‘contagion’ or ‘diffusion effects’.

In other words, proximate causes of violent conflict are specific actions undertaken by often identifiable actors (agency), whereas permissive conditions are the underlying structures of a conflict. Conflict prevention and conflict settlement aim to address the underlying permissive conditions of a conflict. Conflict management by definition seeks to prevent more violence. To this end, it must address a conflict’s proximate causes. Because conflict management focuses on the proximate causes of conflict and because proximate causes are specific actions by key actors in the conflict it is logical for this analysis to focus on agency rather than structure. This is not to suggest that structures are insignificant for the development of violent conflicts, but rather to emphasise that it is primarily the actions of specific actors that cause a conflict to turn more (or less) violent (Brown 1996; Lake and Rothchild, 1998; Wolff, 2006).

Every conflict in which the EU has launched an ESDP military conflict management operation has had a complex constellation of actors involved – directly and indirectly – in the conflict and its regulation. Were all these actors to be included in this analysis, its thematic focus and comparative nature could easily be lost in the detail of their description. For the purpose of analytical clarity only the key actors, which are directly involved in each violent conflict and its management are included in the analysis. This focus is justified, because these are the actors, which are expected to determine success in ESDP
military conflict management operations. The analysis, thus, leaves out other actors, for example, with trade links (legal or illegal) to belligerent parties. This is not to say that actors such as these are not significant to the successful settlement of the conflict, but the analytical focus here is on ESDP military conflict management operations and the key actors and actions that are expected to condition their success. The following section examines what the existing literature on the ESDP, international peacekeeping and conflict management reveal with regard to the conditions for success in ESDP military conflict management operations. Reflecting the two contextual dimensions, the conditions for success will be examined first from an internal and then from an external perspective.

Internal conditions for success

The internal dimension of the context in which an ESDP military conflict management operation is undertaken consists of a variety of different actors. The key actors involved in these operations are member states and institutions of the EU. It is important to include both the member states and institutions at this level of the analysis, because together they determine the EU support for an operation, which, as the following will explain, is expected to affect the operation’s success.

It is important to underscore that this thesis examines the conditions for success in the undertaking of ESDP military conflict management operations. That is the period from the official launch to the formal completion of an operation. Because this thesis focuses on the deployment in the field rather than the
decision-making and planning procedures leading to it, these are not described in great detail in the following; although, naturally, they have informed the analysis. The ESDP decision-making structures and planning procedures have been covered extensively in the literature (Howorth, 2007; Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008; Mattelaer, 2008). An overview of the EU’s institutional structure for decision-making regarding ESDP military conflict management operations is provided in figure 5.4 and an example of the planning process for such an operation is illustrated in figure 5.5.

Figure 5.4: EU institutional structure for ESDP military conflict management

(Wolff and Rodt, 2008, p. 141)
This section of the thesis explores the internal EU-level context in which ESDP military conflict management operations are undertaken and examines how this might affect success in the field. The key actors within the EU, which are expected to affect the success of an ESDP military conflict management operation, are those actors that are actively involved in the operation. That is the contributing member states to the operation and the ESDP institutions, which support it. An example outlining the key actors involved the implementation of EUFOR Chad/CAR is provided in figure 5.6.
Because of its intergovernmental nature EU member states play a particularly important role in the ESDP. The member states have not only a decisive part in ESDP decision-making, but also in the undertaking of the ESDP military conflict management operations. At the political-strategic level the member states are the dominant players in the Council, the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and the EU Military Committee (EUMC). Moreover, most of the financial and practical burden of supplying the operations rests with participating member states (and non-EU contributing countries), as does much of the responsibility at the operational level, where staff from the contributing member states, and framework nations in particular, have an important role to play. At the tactical level, the operations are undertaken by military staff also provided by the participating member states (and non-EU contributing nations) (Giegerich, 2008; Hadden, 2009; Howorth, 2007). In effect, the EU support
allocated to a given operation depends in large part on the interests and resources of the Union’s member states.

In the undertaking of the operations the contributing member states are supported by ESDP institutions and staff within the Council (Howorth, 2007, pp. 61-91; Rye Olsen, 2009, p.248-249). Like the member states these institutions are expected to affect success in these operations. In a discussion regarding the internal conditions for their success it is crucial not to underestimate the role of EU institutions. These increasingly have their own interests and resources and can contribute significant support to ESDP military conflict management operations. With regard to role of the institutions in EU conflict management efforts Rye Olsen (2009, p.248) has argued that:

Not only do decision-makers and states have interests and preferences, so also do common European institutions (...) institutions are important when it comes to establishing a conflict management policy, giving decisions political clout, but also producing challenges for coordinating EU crisis management policies.

The role of individual member states and institutions varies in each operation. This will be explored in the empirical analysis. However, the purpose of this thesis is not to investigate the divisions of power, influence and labour within the ESDP, nor is it to judge the underlying motivations for different national or institutional involvements. The thesis concentrates on the conditions, which are necessary for success in ESDP military conflict management operations. In this context both member states and institutions are important. It is critical to make
a distinction between the role of EU member states and EU institutions in their
capacity within a specific ESDP military conflict management operation and
other activities that they might be involved in (outside of the operation) in the
country in question. EU member states and institutions are usually otherwise
engaged in countries, where ESDP military conflict management operations are
undertaken. By way of example, the Council has launched civilian ESDP
operations in Macedonia, BiH and DRC alongside its military conflict
management operations; and France has been active militarily, outside the
ESDP military conflict management operations, in the DRC.

Having established who, internally in the EU, may affect the success of an
ESDP military conflict management operation, it is important to examine how
they may condition success. Hill (1993) in his influential article on the EU’s
capability-expectations gap argued that what the Union can achieve
internationally depends on the capabilities it has at its disposal. Biscop (2004)
has similarly suggested that what the EU can achieve militarily depends on
both its will and its ability in this regard. Gordon, Rodt and Wolff (2008) posit
that the EU’s achievements in conflict management also depend on the
capabilities and the political will that it demonstrates in these endeavours.
Together these three arguments suggest that an ESDP military conflict
management can only succeed, if it has sufficient support at the EU level both
in terms of EU commitment and EU capabilities.

What constitutes sufficient EU support naturally depends on the task at hand.
However, it has been suggested that there are three categories of capabilities
that the EU must possess in order to succeed in conflict management; namely, (1) capabilities to act, (2) capabilities to fund and (3) capabilities to cooperate and coordinate (Gordon, Wolff, Rodt, 2008). The three categories of capabilities are illustrated in figure 5.7 below.

Figure 5.7 EU conflict management capabilities

As these three categories refer to the necessary capabilities for both civilian and military conflict management, only certain aspects are expected to be necessary conditions for success in military conflict management operations. The necessary *capabilities to act* here are (a) personnel and hardware allocated to the operation and (b) EU institutions and instruments backing the operation. The necessary *capabilities to fund* relate to short-term funding of the ESDP military conflict management operation. The *capabilities to cooperate and coordinate* refer to EU efforts to cooperate and coordinate initiatives between EU member states and EU institutions as well as with relevant third parties. Together these three categories make up the expected necessary EU *capabilities to succeed* in ESDP military conflict management operations. In

(Gordon, Rodt and Wolff, 2008, p.7)
order to make the necessary capabilities available to a given operation, the thesis posits that the EU must have the commitment to do so.

The above suggest that for EU commanders in the field to be able to undertake an ESDP military conflict management operation successfully the EU (encompassing its member states and institutions) must dedicate the necessary commitment and capabilities to support them. This assumption is pervasive in the ongoing debate on EU military conflict management (Giegerich, 2008; Howorth, 2007; ICG, 2005b; Smith, 2008). It is also implicit in the academic practice of evaluating ESDP military conflict management operations, which in large part focuses on issues of political commitment and military capabilities (Cascone, 2008; Mace, 2004; Gegout, 2005, 2007 and 2009; Haine and Giegerich, 2006; Mattelaer, 2008). Although it is often taken for granted it is important to carefully examine the empirical relevance of this theoretical assumption to confirm whether and why EU support is a necessary condition for success in ESDP military conflict management operations. This aspect of the analysis is particularly important considering that the responsibility for success (or failure) in ESDP military conflict management operations is usually allocated to the EU (Interview, former Balkan analyst, 18/09/2007 and 07/05/2009). This thesis, therefore, introduces the following research hypothesis concerning the internal conditions for success:

(H1): If an ESDP military conflict management operation cannot secure sufficient EU support, it cannot succeed.
EU support here refers to the sum of support from the member states and institutions of the EU to an ESDP military conflict management operation. The term sufficient EU support suggests that the internal actors within the EU together must allocate both the necessary commitment and capabilities for an operation to succeed: that is to achieve its goals and implement its purpose appropriately from both an internal and an external perspective. The following chapter will examine the empirical relevance of this hypothesis, but first the remaining part of this chapter will discuss the external conditions, which are expected to be necessary for an ESDP military conflict management operation to be able to succeed.

External conditions for success

Although they are comparatively under-emphasized in the ESDP literature this thesis posits that external conditions for success exist alongside the internal conditions. This chapter suggests that together internal and external conditions determine whether an ESDP military conflict management operation can be successful or not. This section of the thesis develops a set of research hypotheses regarding the external conditions for success, but first it is useful to have a closer look at what the external context consists of.

The external context, in which ESDP military conflict management operations are undertaken, can be divided into three external levels of analysis. The distinction between the levels is useful for the analytical purpose of this thesis, because there are three contextual levels, outside of the EU, at which conditions are expected to influence success in ESDP military conflict
management operations. These are (1) the domestic level, (2) the regional level and (3) the international level. The three levels that make up the external context for ESDP military conflict management operations are illustrated in figure 5.8 below.

*Figure 5.8: External context of ESDP military conflict management operations*

The following section will explain why and how each of these three levels represents a potential condition for success. As the relationship between the external context and success in conflict management operations is under-theorised in the ESDP literature, this section takes its starting point in the literature on international peacekeeping, military intervention and conflict management.
The domestic level

The first external level of analysis is the domestic level. This level encompasses the conflict setting in the country of engagement and the specific area of operations. This level includes state and sub-state actors within the country, in which each ESDP military conflict management operation is undertaken. The term *domestic* must not be confused with domestic conditions within the EU or its member states. The domestic level does also not include actors or actions, which originate at the other contextual levels, although these may have domestic-level consequences, which in turn may affect the success of an operation. These will be addressed within the level at which they originate.

The domestic-level hypothesis suggests that:

**(H2): If an ESDP military conflict management operation cannot secure sufficient domestic support, it cannot succeed.**

This hypothesis is deduced from the existing scholarship of international peacekeeping and military intervention. With regard to external military intervention Freedman (2006) has explained that there is a critical difference between (a) conflicts where the warring parties are willing to accept an intervention and (b) conflict situations in which they are not. Freedman (2006) argues that it is essential to distinguish between what in military terminology is referred to as a *permissive environment* and a *non-permissive environment*. A permissive environment is a conflict setting in which all the belligerent parties consent to the presence of the intervening troops, whereas in a non-permissive environment consent from all or some of the warring parties is absent.
Traditional peacekeeping, for example, is governed by a principle of domestic consent. Traditional peacekeeping operations are always undertaken in permissive environments where the conflicting parties have formally accepted the presence of the peacekeepers (Cooper and Berdal, 1993). Traditional peacekeeping troops are also not conventionally mandated to militarily impose the management of a conflict (Howard, 2008, pp.13-14). UN Chapter VI mandates typically authorise peacekeeping operations. A Chapter VI mandate authorises troops to use force only in self-defence. It relies on the host country for infrastructural support and fields a broad-based, neutral international force, which is expected to behave in a pacific and conciliatory fashion both towards the parties to the conflict and the civilian population. A Chapter VII mandate, on the other hand, considers one or more of the parties to the conflict as adversaries. Here the commanders on the ground are mandated to use force strategically, for example, to secure positions. Such operations cannot always rely on the host country for support and the troops must be prepared for war-like scenarios. Chapter VII mandates typically authorise peace enforcement operations in non-permissive environments (Howard, 2008, pp.13-14).

A consensus in the peacekeeping literature suggests that cooperative operations in permissive environments are more likely to succeed than coercive operations in non-permissive environments. This suggests that the domestic context is directly linked to the success of an operation of this nature. In much of the peacekeeping literature domestic consent is perceived as a condition for success (Cooper and Berdal, 1993; Diehl, 1994; Howard, 2008). Brown (1993) has highlighted how operations launched with the approval of local authorities
have higher probabilities of success and lower costs than their coercive counterparts. Consequently, Brown (1996, p.620) suggests that coercive operations should be undertaken selectively:

*Coercion is more expensive and riskier and should be employed only when important interests are at stake or when crimes against humanity such as genocide or the deliberate slaughter of civilians are being committed (…) The international community should engage in these kinds of high-cost, high-risk undertakings only when the stakes are high and only if it is determined to see a serious campaign through to the bitter end.*

This thesis does not address the question of whether the EU should engage in ESDP military conflict management operations, but it does endeavour to determine which conditions are necessary for such operations to succeed. Here the arguments put forward by scholars such as Brown (1996), Cooper and Berdal (1993) and Freedman (2002) are important. Their shared logic suggests that the EU’s military conflict management operations (like those conducted by other international actors) are more likely to succeed where the domestic parties to the conflict consent to the operation and are willing to accept and support the troops. Kaldor (2007, p.119-149) has argued that consent from the domestic population as well as from the belligerent parties is necessary for an operation to be perceived as legitimate. A domestic perception of legitimacy, she suggests, makes a military intervention more likely to succeed. In support of her argument Kaldor (2007) cites the British Peacekeeping Manual’s argument that without the broader co-operation and consent of the majority of
the local population and the leadership of the principal ruling authorities, be they parties to the dispute or government agencies, success is not a reasonable or realistic expectation. Domestic consent and support, Kaldor (2007) argues, are, therefore, necessary for an operation of this nature to succeed.

In some conflicts there may be a significant difference, as highlighted by Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall (2005) between consent and support from (a) the belligerent parties and (b) the civilian population. In violent conflict the interests (and attitudes towards external interveners) of civilians and their professed leaders may differ substantially. Political and military leaders, soldiers, rebels, warlords, profiteers and the like may have vested interests in the continuation of a conflict; and in effect, oppose external conflict management operations. For example, protagonists, who are closely related to and/or identified with the violence, may oppose a military conflict management operation out of fear of losing power, being overthrown, prosecuted and/or killed as a consequence of outside intervention. Civilian populations, which often suffer immensely in violent conflicts, are more likely to benefit from conflict management. In effect, civilians are more likely to support a military conflict management operation. This is frequently the case in conflicts where the number of civilians affected is high and the way in which they are affected is grave.

Persecution of civilians in violent conflict is often a conscious military strategy. In such a scenario the public interest in peace, and thus, also in the external military management of the conflict as a means to peace is more
likely. Public support for a military conflict management operation may indeed to be shared among civilians across conflicting communities. In this way, moderate leaders and constituencies on different sides of a conflict make up a large reservoir of potential support for a military conflict management operation, if it is perceived as credible, reliable and legitimate (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall, 2005). Domestic support for military conflict management operations is often divided. Moreover, domestic support may be anything from passive acceptance to active cooperation. It is important to examine the type as well as the level of domestic support towards ESDP military conflict management operations and assess both if and how this affects success in the operations.

As illustrated above the peacekeeping literature suggests that domestic consent is necessary, but not sufficient for an operation to succeed. It must also have domestic support - and ideally support from (a) the political leadership, (b) the fighting factions and (c) the wider population. In practice, however, such wide support may be difficult to achieve as the different belligerent parties to the violent conflict may be many and are often disconnected from the publics that they claim to represent. Consensus and shared support for external military conflict management operations may, in effect, be near impossible to reach. The need for troops rather than unarmed, non-coercive conflict management initiatives usually indicates, as Kaldor (2007) has argued, that all parties to the conflict will not support the operation. For example, one party to the conflict may seek external military conflict management as armed protection from another, who opposes it. Building and/or retaining the support of a local
population may mean acting without or directly against the consent of belligerent parties. Domestic support is not a constant. It can increase or decrease throughout an operation. This illustrates why it is important to comparatively assess and evaluate empirically not only if, but also how and to what extent domestic support is a necessary condition for success in ESDP military conflict management operations.

The regional level

The second external level of analysis is the regional level. In comparison to the domestic and international levels, the regional context of military conflict management is understudied. The next hypothesis, however, posits that the regional level is important for success in ESDP military conflict management operations:

(H3) If an ESDP military conflict management operation cannot secure sufficient regional support, it cannot succeed.

The regional level of the analysis is based on the studies of regional conflict formations by Vayrynen (1984); of regional dimensions of internal conflict by Brown (1996, pp. 590-601); and of regional conflict complexes by Wallensteen and Sollenberg (1998). Academic debates on conflict diffusion and escalation such as the works edited by Lobell and Mauceri (2004) have also informed this part of the thesis. The regional aspect in conflict studies is complemented by an emerging regional focus in case studies of specific conflicts. Here the hypothesis is inspired by the works on the regional dimension of the conflicts
in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the wider Great Lakes region by Rubin, Armstrong and Ntegeye (2001), Quinn (2004) and Prunier (2009); the regional examinations of the Balkan wars by Glenny (2001, pp. 634-663) and Silber and Little (1996); and Berg’s (2008) report on the conflict dynamics in the tri-border region of Sudan, Chad and the Central African Republic. Comparative academic analyses of the regional aspects of military conflict management operations are few and far between. However, the recent increase in academic attention on the regional dimension of conflict is reflected in a growing regional focus in EU discourse and policy towards conflict management more generally (Interviews, EU representatives in Sarajevo, 29/06/2006; Interviews, EU representatives in Skopje, 29/01/2007; Interviews with EU representatives in Brussels, 18/09/2007 and 07/05/2009). This makes it ever more important to investigate the regional conditions for success in ESDP military conflict management operations.

The regional setting in which a violent conflict occurs is expected to influence the success of ESDP military conflict management operations for a number of reasons. Brown (1996) has argued that conflicts are more difficult to manage, once the fighting spreads to neighbouring countries (diffusion) and/or brings in external support for one or more of the belligerent parties (escalation). Once regional actors become embroiled in a conflict through support (be it military, political, ideological and/or material) to belligerent parties and/or through the spread of violence or its consequences to neighbouring countries (for example, through refugees or fighting factions seeking shelter in or launching attacks from neighbouring territories), an otherwise internal conflict can quickly
become a regional conflict. Likewise, a regional conflict may increase tensions in the domestic context of a country, which had so far been excluded from the initial regional conflict. This is, for example, happening in the Central African Republic at present, where the regional conflict between Sudan and Chad is adding to the existing domestic instability in CAR and gradually engulfing the country in a wider regional conflict (Berg, 2008). The nature of regional conflict dynamics depends on the type, degree and source of external support for belligerent parties. Once new structures, actors and issues are injected into an existing conflict, additional sets of interests and resources affect the situation of the combatants (and any external interveners) and as a consequence the conflict is expected to be more difficult to manage (Brown, 1996).

Vice versa, the third hypothesis suggests that support for an ESDP military conflict management operation from regional actors would increase the likelihood of its success. Regional support can come not only from states and rebel groups involved in the conflict, but also from neighbours or regional security organisations involved in the management of the conflict. With regard to peacekeeping Henrikson (1995) has suggested that without regional involvement these missions are likely to lack continuity and consistency. Bellamy, Williams and Griffin (2004) have argued that regional organisations can provide a framework of rules and accountability in which an operation can operate. However, Pushkina (2006) found that support and involvement of regional organisations, contrary to her expectations, did not appear to correlate with success in UN peacekeeping operations. This illustrates why it is
important to establish whether and how support from regional actors affect success in ESDP military conflict management operations.

The international level

The third external level of analysis is the international level. The theoretical assumption here is that the successful outcome of an ESDP military conflict management operation is conditioned by the international context in which the conflict occurs and the operation is undertaken. The fourth and final research hypothesis suggests that:

(H4) If an ESDP military conflict management operation cannot secure sufficient international support, it cannot succeed.

The international level includes the international security actors that are directly engaged either in the violent dimension of the conflict or in its management. These include third countries (outside the region) and international security organisations (excluding regional organisations from the region). This is not to suggest that other actors are not involved (directly or indirectly) in the dynamics of the underlying conflict and its wider regulation, but the focus of this analysis is on necessary conditions for success in ESDP military conflict management not for the successful settlement of the conflict. International actors can arguably condition the operational environment of ESDP military conflict management operations in two different ways: (a) through their actions in the specific conflict context on the ground or (b) through their actions in the international security arena. The actions of
international actors involved in the violent conflict can, thus, have domestic, regional or international level consequences, but as they originate at the international level, they will be dealt with here. Based on the logic of the hypotheses above it might be expected that support also at the international level is a necessary condition for success. The existing literature supports this expectation. Croker (2006, pp.229-448) has argued that in the context of intervention, disunity, confusion or divided loyalties among international actors must be avoided. He has argued that agreement and coherence between international actors both in military and political spheres is necessary for successful military conflict management. International support for an ESDP military conflict management operation can vary from a congruence of interest or a shared sense of unity in purpose to a negotiated consensus with international agreement or acceptance not to actively disrupt or discredit the operation. Different international security actors may (and often do) have radically different perceptions of a conflict and of the actions and actors that are appropriate – or not – to manage it, if indeed international actors agree that it should be externally managed at all.

Different international actors may also have different interests at stake, which may affect their behavior both in the international security arena and in the conflict situation on the ground. Brown (1996) and Pushkina (2006) have both pointed out how external actors may engage in a conflict in a way which opposes, and sometimes directly hinders another international intervention. International actors, like regional actors, may – directly or indirectly – support belligerent parties through material, ideological, political, diplomatic, financial,
military and/or other means. The difficulty that this causes for the intervener depends on the type, degree and source of any international support for the warring parties and of the intervention. Military or financial support to one of the belligerent parties, for example, has a direct effect on the conflict environment in which conflict management operations engage; whereas political, diplomatic and ideological support may affect the international security environment in which the conflicting parties and the conflict manager make their strategic decisions.

For the purpose of this analysis it is useful to distinguish between actors at the regional and the international levels. There is a difference between regional organisation with a regional reach like the African Union and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe and regional organisations with an international reach like NATO and the EU. NATO and the EU will be considered at the international level because of their wider international role and reach beyond their own borders.

The EU has (so far) never undertaken an ESDP military conflict management operation anywhere where other international actors were not already heavily engaged. In fact, all the ESDP military conflict management operations launched from 2003 to 2009 were undertaken in cooperation with other international actors as part of a wider international effort to manage the conflicts. Consequently, cooperation and coordination with other international actors is expected to be of particular importance to the success of ESDP military conflict management operations. As Hadden (2009, p.4) points out:
Liaison and intervention with these other bodies, the United Nations, NATO, the African Union and voluntary coalitions, is an essential element in decision-making and deployment at every level.

In line with this argument, the final level and the interplay between different bilateral and multilateral international actors involved in the international security arena and in the conflict environment on the ground is expected to condition success in ESDP military conflict management operations.

Analytical considerations

To test the empirical relevance of the four hypotheses the selected analytical approach of this research project (retrospective, structured and focused comparison) is advantageous, as it makes the link between causes (conditions) and effect (success) clearer. It minimises the danger of misinterpreting single events in individual cases throughout the period of evaluation. Three analytical considerations in particular help to increase the integrity of the analysis. Firstly, it is essential to establish a likely causal relationship. That is that a given development cannot be attributed to another condition alone. Secondly, it must be expected that the absence of this condition would have led to another outcome. Thirdly, the condition must have proceeded and be credibly associated with a specific development and theoretically sufficient to explain it. In this way, the selected analytical approach allows for a careful comparison of the expected (theoretical) and actual (empirical) effects of the conditions for success in ESDP military conflict management operations across time and
space (Druckman et al., 1997; Ross and Rothman, 1999). To avoid misinterpretations the multi-pronged data gathering and analytical processes have ensured that the data collected from the interviews and participant observation was complimented by a chronological document analysis and a thorough review of independent reports concerning each conflict and operation. The empirical data will in the following two chapters be used to test the hypotheses deduced from the existing literature (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall, 2005; Ross & Rothman, 1999).

Conclusion and key findings

This chapter developed four hypotheses concerning the necessary conditions for success in ESDP military conflict management operations. These hypotheses are all based on the theoretical assumption that operations are conditioned by the specific context in which they occur. The chapter suggested that there are two different dimensions to this context: the internal dimension and the external dimension. The internal dimension refers to the EU-specific context in which the operation is undertaken. This is made up of the EU member states and institutions that are involved in the operation. The external dimension reflects the conflict-specific context in which an operation is undertaken and includes the key domestic, regional and international actors actively involved in the conflict and its management. The overall expectation deduced from the existing literature on the ESDP, international peacekeeping, military intervention and conflict management is that if an ESDP military conflict management operation does not secure sufficient support, it cannot succeed. The four hypotheses suggest that for an operation to succeed it is
necessary that it has sufficient support both internally within the EU from the member states and institutions actively involved in the operation and externally outside the EU from the domestic, regional and international actors actively involved in the conflict and its management. The four hypotheses deduced in this chapter are illustrated in tables 5.9 and 5.10.

Table 5.9: Research hypothesis: Internal conditions for success

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition for success</th>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU support</td>
<td>H1: If an ESDP military conflict management operation cannot secure sufficient EU support, it cannot succeed.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.10: Research hypotheses: External conditions for success

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conditions for success</th>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Domestic support</td>
<td>H2: If an ESDP military conflict management operation cannot secure sufficient domestic support, it cannot succeed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional support</td>
<td>H3: If an ESDP military conflict management operation cannot secure sufficient regional support, it cannot succeed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International support</td>
<td>H4: If an ESDP military conflict management operation cannot secure sufficient international support, it cannot succeed.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above suggests that the internal and the external conditions for success are all necessary but neither is sufficient on their own to facilitate a success. If an operation does not have sufficient support both internally (at the EU level) and externally (at the domestic, regional and international levels) it is not expected to succeed. Success refers to overall success as it was defined in chapter two; that is, when the operation’s purpose has been achieved and implemented in an appropriate manner from both an internal and an external perspective.
The following two chapters will examine the empirical relevance of the four hypotheses in a comparative case study of the conditions for success in ESDP military conflict management operations from 2003 to 2009. Chapter six concentrates on the internal conditions and chapter seven focuses on the external conditions for success. Finally, the last chapter of the thesis compares the empirical findings to the theoretical expectations regarding the conditions for success in ESDP military conflict management operations. It considers the relationship between the internal and external conditions for success and examines how this affects the overall success in these operations.
Chapter six: An empirical assessment of internal conditions for success

The previous chapter developed four hypotheses concerning the conditions for success in ESDP military conflict management operations. These hypotheses are deduced from the existing literature on ESDP, international peacekeeping, military intervention and conflict management. The hypotheses are based on a theoretical assumption deduced from this literature, which suggests that for an operation of this nature to be successful it must secure sufficient support internally within the intervening organisation (the EU) and externally in the context in which it engages (domestically, regionally and internationally). This final part of the thesis will compare and contrast the empirical data from the five ESDP military conflict management operations and examine whether this supports or dismisses the research hypotheses. The empirical analysis of the conditions for success is structured around the four hypotheses. This chapter focuses on the internal conditions for success within the EU and chapter seven explores the external conditions for success, which exist beyond the EU.

This chapter examines whether the empirical evidence supports the theoretical expectation that: (H1) if an ESDP military conflict management operation cannot secure sufficient EU support, it cannot succeed. The analysis will first examine the level and nature of support from the EU (member states and institutions) to each operation. This will allow for a comparative assessment of whether EU support has proved to be a necessary condition for these operations to be successful – and if so, why and how?
Operation Concordia in Macedonia

Operation Concordia was an overall success. It experienced some problems in terms of the internal appropriateness of its implementation, but its success in internal and external goal attainment and the external appropriateness of its non-application of force made the operation a success overall. Table 6.1 provides an overview of the operation’s success. The following section looks at the internal conditions under which this was achieved.

Table: Analytical breakdown of success in Operation Concordia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Success</th>
<th>Partial success</th>
<th>Failure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Internal goal attainment</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal appropriateness</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External goal attainment</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External appropriateness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When Operation Concordia was launched in Macedonia in March 2003, it had broad support from within the EU. 13 out of the then 15 member states took part in the operation (Hadden, 2003, p.133). Some member states were particularly important to the success of the operation. At the political-strategic level the UK played a crucial bridging role between the US and the EU in negotiating the Berlin Plus arrangements between the EU and NATO, which made Concordia possible both in practical and in political terms. At the

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26 13 non-EU member states also took part in Operation Concordia: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Turkey (Hadden, 2009, p.133).
operational level France performed the Framework Nation responsibilities for the duration of the original mandate. It also provided the first EU Force Commander Major General Maral who was followed by Portugal’s General Dos Santos in September 2003. At the tactical level France, Portugal and Sweden were each responsible for the one of the three multinational sectors to which the twenty-two field liaison teams, which made up the force in the former crisis area, were assigned. France and Italy provided the heavy platoons, which acted as the reserve for the entire area of operations. There was widespread support from the member states to undertake the operation in Macedonia. Denmark and Ireland were the only EU member states, which did not take part in the operation, but their abstention was based on political reservations with regard to military aspects of the ESDP rather than opposition to the specific operation in Macedonia (Hadden, 2009, p.133). The high level of support among the member states lasted for the duration of the operation (Augustin, 2005; Council Joint Action 2003/92/CFSP 27/1/2003; Council of the EU, 2009a; ICG, 2005b, p.48-49).

The support for Operation Concordia among the member states was reflected in the Council, which was enthusiastic about the EU undertaking its first ESDP military conflict management operation in Macedonia. The Council had already through the HR for the CFSP Javier Solana (alongside NATO SG Lord Robertson) been deeply involved in the negotiations leading to the Ohrid Agreement for Macedonia. Therefore, it had an extra interest in seeing the country stabilised and the Ohrid Framework Agreement; and in effect, the Union’s efforts in its facilitation succeed. Solana and his staff had also worked
hard to conclude the Berlin plus arrangements. Once the operation was underway it was strongly supported by the Council - both in word and deed. The Council extended the mandate for another six months in July 2003 and transferred the framework responsibilities from France to multinational EU Headquarters. Upon Concordia’s conclusion the Council launched an EU police mission, EUPOL Proxima, in its place. This illustrates that the Council had a wider commitment towards Macedonia also after the withdrawal of the Concordia troops (Cascone, 2008; ICG, 2005b, pp.48-49; Mace, 2004).

EUFOR Concordia was part of a much wider EU effort in Macedonia and the Western Balkans. In June 2003, the Council endorsed The Thessaloniki Agenda for the Western Balkans, which confirmed the EU’s support for European integration and the prospect of future membership of the Union for the countries in the region. The Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) model, which had steered the EU accession process in Central and Eastern Europe, was now to provide the framework for European integration in the Western Balkans. The SAP was intended to further consolidate peace and promote stability and democratic development in the region (Council of the EU, 2003a). This process launched a number of new initiatives in Macedonia, which helped the EU establish a lead role in the country. The SAP also facilitated more EU institutional support on the ground for the ESDP military conflict management operation. As a result, the European Commission delegation in Macedonia supported Concordia, which was seen to add another important aspect to the wider EU engagement in the country. As one interviewee from the Commission delegation in Skopje explained:
Concordia’s presence enabled the government of Macedonia to concentrate on the reform process and the implementation of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement. Concordia demonstrated crucial support for the political process and to the legitimate institutions in the country and led to the establishment and maintenance of an environment conducive to the democratic governance, multi-ethnicity, rule of law and economic regeneration that are the prerequisites for European integration. (...) Concordia demonstrated to the wider EU circles the importance of building a strong, fully functioning state capable of delivering on the needs of the citizens and of ensuring of more advanced relations with the European Union. Reconstruction needs required the European Union to have the capability to instruct and train and to rebuild local judicial or police structures rather than mere rebuilding of war-torn infrastructure and monitoring security in the former crisis areas. The Union had to combine its stabilisation and crisis management tools with communitarian integration policies. Concordia was a turning point for the Union’s presence in the country. With the launch of Concordia and its work the Union became aware of the challenges on the ground and redefined its presence accordingly. That led to a shift of its overall policy from stabilisation to institution-building that had effects to all missions of the European Union (Interview, representative from the European Commission Delegation in Skopje, 30/04/2009).

Operation Concordia enjoyed strong commitment from the EU institutions both in Skopje and in Brussels as well as from the EU member state capitals. It had support both from those EU-level actors, which actively engaged with the
operation and more widely from those involved in the resolution of the conflict and the SAP in Macedonia. The widespread EU commitment to the operation was expressed in the allocation of the necessary EU capabilities for the operation to fulfil its purpose in an appropriate manner. In this case the EU had sufficient capabilities to act, to fund and to cooperate and coordinate internally within the Union as well as with third parties.

With Operation Concordia the EU demonstrated that it could successfully undertake an ESDP military conflict management operation. It established that the new ESDP mechanisms and the Berlin Plus arrangements with NATO worked in practice, although there were aspects that could have worked better. This was a great achievement for the Union and had arguably been a strong incentive for the decision to undertake the operation in the first place. Especially considering that the operation was launched at a time when the Iraq-crisis had created great foreign policy divisions both within Europe and across the Atlantic. Concordia was a chance to bridge this gap and demonstrate a unity of purpose in international conflict management (Felicio, 05/2003). Therefore, it was important for the EU and for NATO to use the Berlin Plus, although some observers argue that militarily the EU could have undertaken the operation autonomously (Mace, 2004). In reality, the launch of the operation was delayed in waiting for the Berlin Plus agreement, which had been halted by Turkish objections to the co-operation with non-NATO member states. A former Balkan analyst remembers the scenario:
The purpose of Concordia was not to keep the peace in Macedonia, which was already being kept by locals, thank you, but to demonstrate that the EU could deploy a military mission without destroying the transatlantic relationship incidentally at a time when that relationship was as stressed as I can remember it being in my lifetime. Remember (...) that there had been no EU military missions at all before this. The whole idea of Berlin Plus was not only integration with NATO, but also compensating for the EU's inadequate and untested command and control structures (Interview, former Balkan analyst, 23/05/2009).

Another interviewee made a similar point:

The discussion of a NATO-EU transition in (Macedonia) predates the conclusion of the Berlin Plus package. Actually, from what I know, the transition from NATO operation, Amber Fox, to a possible EU operation had been kept on hold for a while, because there was no framework through which it could take place - except NATO leaving on one day and the EU taking over without any coordination or handover mechanism the following day. On the other hand, I am sure that once Berlin Plus was approved, the Amber Fox-Concordia transition constituted a kind of proving ground to see if the framework could actually work. So, in short, my impression is that some kind of coordination mechanism was genuinely needed, but once it turned into the full blown Berlin Plus package the chance was too good to let it slip and not try as much as possible to see if this was an arrangement that could work (Interview, representative from NATO, 23/05/2009).
In conclusion, *this was an operation high in political symbolism* for the EU (Howorth, 2007, p.231). It had great levels of EU support both from its member states and institutions. It is clear that in this first case the commitment and capabilities allocated to the operation from the EU were sufficient to facilitate an overall successful operation from both an internal and an external perspective. In terms of the limitation to the internal appropriateness of the operation the teething problems within the Berlin Plus were resolved on an ad-hoc basis and the criminal activity of some EUFOR officers in Macedonia demonstrated a lack of personal rather than member state or institutional commitment to the success of the operation. This demonstrates how EU support can create the necessary internal conditions for an operation to succeed, but it is still up to the soldiers on the ground to do the job properly.

Concordia illustrates how now that the EU had the capabilities it was keen to commit them and demonstrate its ability as well as its will to undertake an operation of this nature. This explains the general EU enthusiasm for the operation. The case also indicates that there was a link between the high level of EU support and the success of the operation. However, in terms of its capabilities it is important to recognise that because the operation was launched under the Berlin Plus it could make use of NATO assets. This also meant that much of the institutional support came from NATO in addition to EU institutions. This suggests that the necessary level of EU support can be supplemented by support from an external actor (here NATO). The next chapter examines this relationship between internal and external conditions for success in greater detail.
Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo

Operation Artemis is widely perceived as a military success, but this research found that the operation’s success was only partial. It was a success in terms of its internal goal attainment. However, according to the three other criteria, it was only a partial success due to its limited (although important) contribution to the management of the wider conflict and to the misconduct of individual soldiers involved in the torture of a Congolese civilian. Table 6.2 gives a breakdown of the research results concerning the success of this operation. The following section looks at the internal conditions under which it was undertaken.

Table 6.2: Analytical breakdown of success in Operation Artemis

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Operation Artemis, which was launched in June 2003, was undertaken on French initiative. When the UN first called for an interim force to be deployed to help manage the conflict in Ituri, France agreed to contribute to such a force on three conditions: (1) that it would have a strong and robust mandate; (2) that it would not be acting alone; and (3) that the regional governments involved in
the crisis, the DRC, Rwanda and Uganda, formally accepted the operation. Having received the relevant assurances from the UN, France started preparing the operation. France played a significant role in persuading the other member states that this was an operation that the EU was ready to undertake. France also took a lead role in formulating the official EU response to the UN request and drafting the operation’s mandate. Once Operation Artemis was launched, France acted as its Framework Nation and the Operation Headquarters were located in Paris. At its peak Operation Artemis comprised 2,200 troops, 1,785 of which were provided by France (Council Joint Action 2003/423/CFSP 5/6/2003; Howorth, 2007, pp.231-241).27

France had a significant hand in undertaking the Artemis operation. In fact, because of the considerable French involvement Artemis has often been called an *Europeanised* French operation (ICG, 2005b; Ulriksen, Gourlay, Mace, 2004). This view is common also among practitioners, as the following quote from one interviewee demonstrates:

> *Artemis was 95 per cent French. It was French in all but name. As a French military operation in Africa, there was really nothing new about it* (Interview, national representative to the EU, 09/06/2009).

The French Artemis contribution was substantial, but it is important not to overlook the fact that other nations both within and outside the EU made significant contributions to the operation. Besides France, the main EU

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27 For a more in depth discussions on why France had an interest in launching this operation see Rye Olsen (2009), Gegout (2005 and 2009) and Ulriksen, Gourlay, Mace (2004).
member state contributors were: Sweden (infantry unit including Special Forces), UK (engineering units) and Belgium (medical teams). Germany also agreed to contribute 350 non-combat troops and a medical component, but only once a certain number of other countries had agreed to take part, so that the contribution could be justified in the German Bundestag. Seven other member states took part in smaller capacities: Austria, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain (Hadden, 2009). Although the extent to which the operation was supported by other EU member states (in addition to the large French contribution) is often downplayed or ignored in the ESDP literature, it is an important aspect in explaining the level and nature of its success. The condition, which France put to the UN before the decision to launch the operation, is the first indicator of the importance of the multinational force. In this condition, France itself indicated that it was more likely to succeed, if it was supported by other EU member states.

In the undertaking of the Artemis operation France’s most important EU partners were Sweden and the UK. The Swedish participation was particularly important to the success of the operation in two ways. The Artemis force included 230 Special Forces, 150 of which were French, Sweden contributed the remaining 80. The Swedish Special Forces played an important role both in terms of the operation’s internal and external success. At the tactical level it had a significant hand in Artemis’ goal attainment, but it also facilitated a higher level of appropriateness, in so far as the Swedish contingent helped

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28 The German Bundestag voted 441-31 in favour of sending troops to the DRC on 19 June 2003 (Hadden, 2009).
29 Participating non-EU member states were Brazil, Canada, Hungary, South Africa and Cyprus (Hadden, 2009).
monitor and control the French force. It was Swedish officers, who raised concerns about the torture of a civilian by their French peers. Apart from the torture case the Swedish contingent also objected to racism and maltreatment of prisoners by French soldiers. The Swedish commander raised these issues with the French commander in the field and warned against it happening again. This affected the appropriateness of the operation for the remainder of the deployment. One interviewee described it in the following way:

*It was an operation where one of the nations, Sweden, more or less acted as a chaperone for the other one, France* (Interview, Researcher, 31/07/2009).

The UK’s support was important to the success of the operation for three key reasons. From a tactical perspective the UK provided key engineering units to the operation. Alongside their French peers the UK engineers were tasked with the preparation and maintenance of Bunia airport. This included building some 10,000m² of aircraft parking and repeatedly resurfacing the runway. The British support was essential to the success of the tactical-airlift of the 220 flights from Entebbe (Uganda) to Bunia, which were necessary to deploy the Artemis personnel and equipment (Giegerich, 2008). From a military-strategic perspective the UK participation helped secure formal support for the operation from the key regional security actors involved in the conflict: Rwanda and Uganda. Support, without which France had declared that it would not intervene, and in effect, the UN would not have received the assistance it needed so badly in Bunia at the time. From a political-strategic perspective the UK was important because its contribution helped convince other EU member
states such as Germany, which had initially been hesitant to support the operation. It also helped persuade other international security actors that this was indeed a multilateral EU operation. In political terms Franco-British cooperation became the driving force behind the operation. Overall, the UK, alongside France and Sweden, thus, contributed tactical, operational and strategic support to the operation without which it could not have achieved the level of success that it did (Hadden, 2009; ICG, Europe Report 160, 2005; Ulriksen, Gourlay, Mace, 2004). But as Giegerich (2008, p.22) has pointed out:

*The mission was attractive to participants because it had clearly set limits on the key parameters of size, duration and responsibilities.*

Although some member states were initially hesitant once the troops were in the field there was general support among the member states for the operation. This was reflected in the Council, where Artemis was perceived as another important test for the ESDP and a chance to prove the EU’s ability to act (a) autonomously; (b) beyond the European continent; (c) in a more challenging operational environment than Macedonia; and (d) in partnership with the UN; but also (e) to prove that the EU remained united on ESDP matters after the recent political crisis over Iraq. Solana’s staff conducted a feasibility study for the operation, which was followed by the Council decisions on the objectives and limitations of the operation. The PSC exercised political control and strategic direction for the operation and was explicitly given powers to change the Operation Plan, Rules of Engagement and Chain of Command. It also set up the Committee of Contributors for non-EU participating countries. The EU
Military Committee (EUMC) monitored the operation and reported on the development to the PSC. This would become the framework for EU institutional support in autonomous ESDP military conflict management operations. As such, the operation was subject to close multilateral political and military scrutiny at the EU institutional level, although it is unclear how the misconduct by the French soldiers was dealt with internally at the time (Ulriksen, Gourlay, Mace, 2004). Otherwise, the EU institutional support clearly helped facilitate the partial success in the undertaking of the operation.

Despite initial hesitation among some EU member states, most notably Germany, about whether the EU could manage an operation of this calibre; once it was launched Operation Artemis was widely supported both by the member states and the institutions of the EU. Once the troops were in the field the EU demonstrated sufficient capabilities to act, to fund and to cooperate and coordinate for the operation to succeed fully in terms of its internal goal attainment and partially according to the three other success criteria. The fact that the operation was only a partial success in internal and external appropriateness was due to the behaviour of individual soldiers rather than the level of commitment and capabilities allocated to the operation from the EU. Limits to the EU support, however, were expressed in the mission mandate, which set clear boundaries to the time, space and function in which the force could operate. This limited the operation’s chance of success in external goal attainment. The limited mandate and the extensive French contribution, which were both direct consequences of the initial reservations of other member states, paradoxically facilitated the operation’s success in internal goal
attainment, but limited its success according to the other three success criteria. The Artemis case, thus, shows how strong support from one member state can to some extent make up for lack of support from other member states, but a lack of shared support among the member states does still condition the success of the operation, for example, by limiting the terms of its mandate. Finally, this case also illustrates the significant benefits that multilateral participation from several member states have for success, in particular in terms of this operation’s level of appropriateness.

*Operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina*

The EU’s third conflict management operation, Operation Althea in BiH, is the most successful ESDP military conflict management operation to date. Because the operation has not yet been completed, this assessment can only be preliminary, but so far the operation has succeeded according to all four success criteria. Table 6.3 illustrates the preliminary success of the operation.

*Table 6.3: Analytical breakdown of preliminary success in Operation Althea*

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Operation Althea is the largest and longest running ESDP military conflict management operation to date. Its 7,000 strong deployment to BiH in 2004 indicates that there was strong and widespread EU-level support for the operation from its beginning. An ICG report at the time explains this:

*Bosnia was the painful crucible of European foreign policy in the 1990s demonstrating all too clearly its gravest weaknesses. The EU has a strong commitment - moral, financial and political, to do better this time (ICG, 2005b, p.49)*

The numerous extensions of Althea’s mandate and the fact that four and a half years on 2,200 EU troops are still operating in country demonstrate that at the EU level Althea’s support has been significant throughout the deployment. This is confirmed also by the open-ended nature of the operation’s current mandate (Council of the EU, 2009b; ICG, 2005b, p.49). In comparison to the other ESDP military conflict management operations exceptional levels of both EU commitment and EU capabilities were dedicated to Althea. 28 countries have together provided the necessary capabilities to the operation, 22 of which are EU member states. The active participation of a wide range of member states has been a characteristic of the operation from its very beginning, when 11 of then 15 member states took part (Council of the EU, 2009b).³⁰

³⁰ The European commitment to sending troops to BiH did not start with EUFOR. SFOR, IFOR and UNPROFOR all had significant European contributions. The ESDP format was a new framework for deployment, but SFOR, from which EUFOR took over its responsibilities, transferred significant numbers of its European troops to stay on under EUFOR (ICG, 2005b, p.49).
Like Operation Concordia in Macedonia, Operation Althea in BiH is part of a wider EU approach to the country. EU institutions and member states have launched a wide range of initiatives intended to promote conflict management (and settlement) in the country. The foundation, upon which this wider approach is based, like in the rest of the Western Balkans, is the SAP and the prospect of EU membership. The EU has introduced a series of *carrots and sticks* to encourage this process in BiH (ICG, 2005b, p.49).

From an institutional perspective the EUSR coordinates the EU initiatives in BiH. The fact that the EUSR is also the High Representative for peace implementation in the country has allowed for Althea to be integrated into the broader conflict management efforts of the wider international community represented in the country. Although EUFOR has a separate chain of command its Force Commanders have worked closely with the Office of the HR/EUSR. The relationship between the two organisations and between EUFOR and other members of the so-called *EU family* in BiH has varied over time (ICG, 2005b, p.49). This will be discussed in further detail in the next chapter, which examines the relationship between internal and external conditions for success in ESDP military conflict management operations. But overall the EU support for the operation was strong and consistent.

The sustained EU support for Operation Althea has facilitated the operation’s overall success to date. A shared sense of purpose between the EU member states and institutions meant that the EU as a whole in this case committed the necessary capabilities to act, to fund and to cooperate and coordinate. The
operation has had sufficient support to help it achieve and implement its goals appropriately from both an internal and an external perspective.

**EUFOR DR Congo**

EUFOR DR Congo successfully achieved its internally defined purpose to support the UN operation (MONUC) in Kinshasa during the 1996 DRC elections. With the exception of its delayed deployment, the operation was implemented in an internally appropriate manner. From an external perspective the operation was only a limited success. Although it provided support to MONUC in Kinshasa, it contributed little in terms of the management of the violent conflict in other parts of the country at the time. However, the operation was a success in terms of its external appropriateness. Table 6.4 illustrates this mixed assessment of the operation’s success. The following section takes a closer look at the internal conditions under which this operation was undertaken.

**Table 6.4: Analytical breakdown of success in Operation EUFOR DR Congo**

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Operation EUFOR DR Congo is the ESDP military conflict management operation, which has so far enjoyed least EU support. As such, it was a stark contrast to Operation Althea. A lack of enthusiasm for this operation among the EU member states conditioned its success from the beginning. Out of the big three initially both the UK and Germany were disinclined to take part in or support the operation. This reluctance among key member states caused a delayed EU response to the UN invitation to conduct the operation. The UN made its formal request in December 2005 and received an affirmative reply from the EU only in March 2006 (Haine & Giegerich, 2006). This delay is particularly striking considering the quick response and rapid deployment of the Artemis troops in the country three years earlier. The delayed response illustrates not only less commitment shared across the cohort of member states, but also that there was less enthusiasm from France, or any other single member state, to take the lead in this operation. The UK, which was heavily engaged militarily in both Iraq and Afghanistan, maintained its decision that it would not take part. However, Germany was persuaded not only to contribute, but eventually also to officially lead the operation. France played a great part in persuading Germany to take on this responsibility, and eventually, France and Germany together provided two-thirds of the EUFOR DRC personnel. Officially 22 EU member states took part in the operation, but in real terms both the commitment and the capabilities dedicated to this operation from the EU member states were limited (Hadden, 2009). More than half of the countries involved sent only a symbolic contribution, as Haine and Giegerich (2006, p.2) put it: just to add their flag to the European pole, whether it makes operational sense or not.
The main EU member state contributors to EUFOR DR Congo were: Germany, which deployed 780 troops (280 only in Kinshasa) and made available three helicopters (CH-53); France, which contributed some 500 troops and had three Mirage aeroplanes (f1CR) based in N’djamena at EUFOR’s disposal; Portugal and Spain, which deployed 100 troops each; Sweden and Belgium each sent 50 people; and Belgium contributed four unmanned aerial vehicles (Gegout, 2007). National caveats and limitations to the Rules of Engagement constrained the operation. For example, Germany, despite accepting an official lead role in the operation, restricted its few forces deployed in the DRC to operate in the capital area only and otherwise sought to keep as many of its soldiers as possible in Gabon throughout the deployment (Haine and Giegerich, 2006).

With less than half its soldiers actually deployed in the DRC and the rest of the force stationed over-the-horizon in Gabon, EUFOR DR Congo has been accused of tokenism (Howorth, 2007, p.239). With a maximum of 1,000 troops on the ground in the DRC at any one time, confined to a small area around the capital city in a country three times the size of Western Europe with 50,000 polling stations and serious instability in its eastern regions, it is clear that the EU support for this operation was limited. Especially considering the fact that twice as big a force was actually generated for the operation, but half of the soldiers were kept in waiting in Gabon. As DRC Presidential Candidate, Christophe Mboso, has pointed out, the elections after all did not take place in Gabon (Howorth, 2007, p.239).
The limits to the EU commitment and capabilities allocated to the operation were a great contrast to the 7,000 EU troops deployed in BiH at the time and particularly striking considering the severe security situation in the DRC. As the EU force was being deployed to Kinshasa, Haine and Giegerich (2006) stressed that if the Union was serious about the electoral process in Congo, it should deploy its troops in the east of the country, where troubles were likely to arise. Instead, Haine and Giegerich (2006, p.1) argued:

*The mission’s rationale has more to do with Franco-German cohesion and with the desire to bolster the credibility of the European Security and Defence Policy after the fiasco of the Constitutional Treaty’s rejection in referendums in France and the Netherlands. The actual reality on the ground in Congo is only a secondary factor.*

Vogel (2008) supported this argument and stressed that the unstable region on the country’s eastern border with Rwanda and Uganda is 2,000 km from Kinshasa, where the EU force was deployed. Gegout (2009 and 2007) has argued a similar case, pointing out that the EU did not chose to extend the operation beyond the end-date of its initial mandate despite the UN request to do so and the tense situation in Kinshasa at the time. Although France and Belgium favoured an extension of the mandate, Germany decided to withdraw as planned in December 2006 (Hadden, 2009). These criticisms are supported by the fact that the EU has not since EUFOR DR Congo responded positively
to further calls from the UN and the French government for another EU military intervention in the DRC (Vogel, 2008).

From the EU institutions the operation received operational, political and diplomatic support. EUFOR DR Congo was framed as part of the Union’s developing comprehensive approach to the country, which amounts to a sizeable measure of assistance (Howorth, 2007). On the Council side, in addition to the two military operations, the Union had also deployed three civilian ESDP missions in the DRC: EUPOL Kinshasa, EUPOL RD Congo and EUSEC RD Congo. EUPOL Kinshasa was assisting the Congolese National Police during the electoral period from April 2005 to June 2007. EUPOL RD Congo was subsequently deployed in July 2007 (mandated until June 2010) to assist the DRC authorities with police reform. EUSEC RD Congo is a EU advisory and assistance mission for security reform in the country. This mission was launched on 8 June 2005 and is mandated until 30 September 2009 (Council of the EU, 2009a). The two EUSRs to the African Union and the Great Lakes region sought to support both the military operations and the civilian missions and coordinate these efforts with the Commission’s engagement in the country. The European Commission is currently one of the most significant donors in eastern DRC. It has donated €300 million to the region in humanitarian assistance and rehabilitation and capacity building programs since 2003 (European Commission, 2008).

The limitations to the success of EUFOR DR Congo, however, shows that a significant amount of EU institutional support to the country in which an ESDP
military conflict management operation engages cannot alone facilitate the operation’s success or make up for a lack of support dedicated to the operation from the EU member states. Ironically, the operation’s success in its internal goal attainment and its external appropriateness was facilitated by the limitations to the operation’s mandate, which were caused by lack of support from the member states. The operation achieved everything it set out to do, because it set out to do very little (internal goal attainment). It also did not use force, because it was practically ensured beforehand that the troops would not be deployed in a situation where they would need to use force. In terms of its internal appropriateness and its external goal attainment, however, the operation was only a limited success, as it failed to make a timely deployment (internal appropriateness) and any real contribution to the management of the conflict (external goal attainment). These partial failures were attributable to the lack of support from the EU member states, which were reluctant not only to participate in the operation, but also to support it. Overall, this case highlights two important findings of this analysis. Firstly, it shows that more EU support than was available in this case is necessary for an operation of this nature to make a timely deployment and a significant contribution to the management of a conflict of this magnitude. With regard to the EUFOR DRC operation the EU did not dedicate the necessary capabilities to allow the operation to succeed. In particular, the capabilities to act were limited by the restrictions in the mandate and the size and scope of the force. Although the EU had the capabilities to fund the operation and to cooperate and coordinate with its internal and external partners, this could not facilitate a success without the necessary personnel and hardware. Secondly, this case demonstrates how the definition
and criteria for success, which were developed in this thesis, ensure that a success cannot be achieved simply by aiming to do very little in the mandate.

**EUFOR Chad/CAR**

The Union’s most recent ESDP military conflict management operation, EUFOR Chad/CAR, was only a partial success. It succeeded in its internal goal attainment and its external appropriateness. The incident, in which two EU soldiers accidentally crossed over into Sudan and one of them was killed, hindered EUFOR’s internal appropriateness. Moreover, although the EU force significantly improved security conditions in its area of operations for the durations of its mandate, the operation’s contribution to the management of the violent conflict in the region was limited. The following takes a closer look at the extent to which EU support conditioned EUFOR Chad/CAR’s partial success. Table 6.5 gives an analytical break down of the operation’s partial success according to the four criteria developed in chapter two.

*Table 6.5: Analytical breakdown of success in Operation Chad/RCA*

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EUFOR Chad/CAR was another French initiative. The Chadian government had opposed a plan to deploy a UN military component to the MINURCAT mission in the region. In response, France proposed an ESDP military conflict management operation in its place. In May 2007, the French foreign ministry submitted the proposal to its EU counterparts. The reaction from other member states was mixed. Although the scepticism was not as profound as in the case of EUFOR DRC, there was still not a shared sense of purpose or widespread support for the operation among the EU member states. The tough negotiations between the member states regarding the motivations and logic behind the proposed deployment illustrate this. France was keen to stabilise the situation in Chad and favoured an EU rather than a bilateral intervention. Because France already had troops in Chad supporting President Deby, there was cynicism among some member states as to the underlying interests of both France and Chad in the proposed EU operation. Moreover, the operation was predicted to be the most expensive and cumbersome ESDP military conflict management operation yet undertaken. Germany raised the issue of how immense efforts to renovate the Chadian infrastructure would have to be undertaken and paid for by the EU to allow for the relatively short deployment. Germany questioned whether the main beneficiary of such an investment in the end would be France. Other member states felt that since it was now a year since EUFOR DRC it was time for another military deployment to demonstrate the continued development of the ESDP. There was also some discussion about whether to try out the newly developed Nordic battle group in eastern Chad, but this plan never materialised.
In an interview at the time a national representative to the EU described the negotiations concerning the proposed Chad/CAR deployment:

_Sarkosy is completely politically driven and wants an EU mission in eastern Chad, but the UK and Germany think it is a stupid idea. It is expensive and cumbersome. The borders that we are supposed to defend are thousands of kilometres long and there is no infrastructure to do it (...) So France is there diplomatically convincing everyone to go, and the UK wants to support France on this in hope of getting something on Zimbabwe, but Germany is not keen on intervening in Africa at all. It is a mess. And then when Sarkosy gets his resolution on eastern Chad, he gets the diplomatic glory. At the same time he does not want to send the troops and he’s wondering why everyone is looking at him. Meanwhile, the UK and Germany are trying to escape paying too much and they want to limit the mandate by having a clear exit strategy_ (Interview, national representative to the EU, 18/09/2007).

Despite these divisions among the member states there was a shared frustration in the PSC about the humanitarian crisis in Darfur. In the end, this caused the EU to launch the operation in Chad and the Central African Republic (Seibert, 2007; Mattelaer, 2009). Although most of the member states were still reluctant to contribute to the operation, a consensus was finally reached. The EU member states as a whole consented to the operation on condition that it would be a French-led endeavour. Agreement was reached once again by imposing strict political constraints on the operation both in terms of its mandated time and function. Impartiality was made an absolute condition and
the operational objective was limited to contributing to a safe and secure environment. The operational concept for EUFOR Chad/CAR was as such developed from the lowest-common denominator agreed upon by the politically divided member states (Mattelaer, 2008).

The lack of support among the member states was illustrated also in the force generation process. Not a single member state, other than France, agreed to contribute in any significant way to the operation at the initial force generation conference. Another five conferences would be held before 23 EU member states finally agreed to contribute to the operation. France ended up having to fill the gaps, providing half of the troops for the operation and a General for the position of Force Commander.  

Despite the tough negotiations, the six force generation conferences and the additional support from France, EUFOR Chad/CAR was still more than 600 soldiers short of the planned 4,000 forces when it reached Full Operating Capability (Berg, 2008; Ehrhart, 2008; Council of the EU, 2009g). The difficult force generation process also meant that the operation did not reach its full strength until halfway through its mandate. In terms of military hardware EUFOR Chad/CAR was also short-handed. The operation had to rely on Russia for four helicopters, as the EU member state failed to provide the 16 helicopters needed for the operation (Ehrhart, 2008; Pop, 2009). These helicopters, according Operation Commander Pat Nash, are particularly

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31 Since the mid-1980s, France had at least 3,000 troops stationed in Chad. This enabled her to provide military support to President Deby and maintain a strategic role in the country. Most of the French troops, which took part in EUFOR Chad/CAR, came from this force already deployed in the country (Council of the EU, 2009g; Mattelaer, 2008; Rye Olsen, 2009).
important in an area of operations of this size, because it increases the
operation’s mobility and ability to maintain an element of surprise and
reactivity. As Nash (2008) put it himself: *The more helicopters I have the more
c flexibility the Force Commander has.*

Once the operation was deployed the political quarrels among the EU member
states undermined the operation politically and caused confusion at the
operational level (Mattelaer, 2009). In particular it was unclear both to the
Chad authorities and the rebels it was fighting, whose side the EU was on,
despite the Union’s insistence on its impartiality. This confusion, Chad expert
Bjoern Seibert has argued, directly caused a rebel offensive on Chad’s capital,
N’djamaena, as EUFOR was being deployed. The next chapter will explore the
domestic context of the operation in further details. However, for the purpose
of this level of the analysis, this event exemplifies how the disagreements
among the EU member states had a negative effect on the domestic
circumstances for the operation in the field.

Despite the serious political, conceptual and logistical hurdles, the EU
institutional support for the operation was significant. The military planning
system did a remarkable job, all things considered, in preparing the operation.
Once the force was deployed, it completed its tasks well. It received the
operational support from HQ to be able at the tactical level to reach its stated
objectives and make a valuable contribution to security situation on the ground
in its area of operations (Mattelaer, 2009; Oxfam, 2008). Despite an invitation
from the UNSG the EU did not decide to extend the operation beyond its initial
mandate. Instead Solana offered that some of the EU soldiers would stay on in a UN capacity (Council of the EU, 2009g; Pop, 2009).

This case illustrates once again how the member states have a crucial impact on the success of an operation. It demonstrates that the EU institutions, although important to the overall level of EU support, cannot make up for such significant limitations of the commitment and capabilities allocated to the operation by the EU member states. EUFOR Chad/CAR had significant trouble securing sufficient support both in terms of the EU capabilities to act (hardware and forces) and to fund the operation. This, as well as the limitations to the mandate, again caused by lack of commitment from the member states, had a negative impact of the external goal attainment of the operation. Although this case illustrates that other actors cannot substitute the necessary support from EU member states, it does indicate that EU support at the institutional level is important for the smooth running of the operation (internal appropriateness) once it is launched. The Russian supply of helicopters to this operation also indicates that external actors can help to contribute necessary capabilities to act (personnel and hardware), when the EU struggles to provide them.

Conclusion and key findings

This chapter examined the internal conditions for success in ESDP military conflict management operations from 2003 to 2009. Internal conditions for success are the conditions, internally within the EU, which are necessary for operations of this nature to be able to succeed. The research hypothesis concerning the internal conditions for success suggested that: if an ESDP
military conflict management operation does secure sufficient EU support, it cannot succeed. The findings in this chapter confirm the empirical relevance of this hypothesis. In all five cases it is clear that EU support is necessary for ESDP military conflict management operations to succeed. There is a clear correlation between high levels of EU support and high levels of success on the one hand and limited success and limited EU support on the other.

The case study also illustrated that EU support is not static. It can increase over time and can be encouraged by the actions of individual member states. For example, France has often taken the initiative to launch operations and then convinced other member states to take part through a combination of diplomatic pressure and persuasion and the practical promise of a French lead or a significant French contribution to the operation.

The analysis found that if an operation cannot secure sufficient EU support, as was the case for example in EUFOR DRC, it cannot fully succeed. It is important to recall, as the first part of the thesis concluded, that an operation could succeed in some aspects, whilst not in others. An operation may, thus, have sufficient EU support to succeed according to one criterion, but not another. All five cases had sufficient EU support to succeed in their internal goal attainment. In terms of their external goal attainment, the operations had very different levels of success and of EU support for such success. The findings above suggest that there is a causal link between the two. Limitations to success in internal appropriateness were generally attributable to a lack of sufficient EU support. Limitations to success in external appropriateness;
however, were caused by individual staff of the operations rather than conditions at the EU level.

Overall, the five cases indicated that the more EU support an operation has, the better able it will be to succeed. In Macedonia and Bosnia high levels of support both from the EU member states and the EU institutions, not only towards the operations, but also to the wider management of the conflicts proved advantageous to their success. This indicates that not just the level but also the nature of the EU support has an effect of the likelihood of success. The experience of Concordia and Althea, which were both overall successes, suggest that when operations are an integrated part of a wider comprehensive EU approach towards the conflict and the country, in which the operation engages, there is more EU support for the operation, and in turn the operation is more likely to succeed. However, EUFOR DRC illustrated that a wider EU approach towards the country in question does not facilitate success in the ESDP military conflict management operation, if the operation itself does not have sufficient EU support.

What constitutes sufficient EU support for an operation to succeed proved to vary on a case-by-case basis, but the chapter found that there are two conditions, internally within the EU, which are necessary for ESDP military conflict management operations to be able to succeed. These two conditions are: EU commitment and EU capabilities. The analysis can conclude that it is necessary that the EU, as a whole, supports the operation both in word and in deed. It is not enough that EU member states or institutions have a general
interest in the operation’s success or indeed in the successful management of the conflict. For the operation to succeed this interest must translate into actual commitment dedicated to the successful undertaking of an operation. Interest is conducive to success, but commitment is necessary.

Likewise, it is not sufficient the EU, as the sum of its parts, has the resources that are needed for an operation to succeed. It is a condition for success that the necessary capabilities are also made available to the operation when it needs them. For example, EUFOR Chad/CAR illustrates that it is not enough that the EU member states have 16 helicopters between them, if they are not willing or able to commit them to the operation. With regard to the necessary capabilities to succeed the analytical findings support the claim that EU capabilities (a) to act, (b) to fund and (c) to cooperate and coordinate are all significant for an operation of this nature to be able to succeed. Most important are the EU’s capabilities to act and to fund. The chapter found that if the EU does not allocate the necessary personnel and hardware to the operation and fund it sufficiently, then it would not be able to succeed. Support from the EU member states is, therefore, crucial to success, as it is the contributing member states, which supply the operations with manpower, equipment and money. Moreover, it is the member states, which together determine the operation’s mandate, which this chapter found, can limit an operation’s success especially in external goal attainment. The member states, thus, decide both what the operation should do and to a large extent what it is able to do. In this way, commitment from the EU member states has a significant impact on an operation’s ability to succeed. On this basis, the chapter can conclude that sufficient support
(commitment and capabilities) from the EU member states is the *sine qua non* for success in ESDP military conflict management operations, but support from the EU institutions is also necessary in the successful implementation of the operations. EU institutions play an important part in the capabilities to act and in the capabilities to cooperate both with actors both within and outside the EU. The next chapter will examine the cooperation with external actors in further detail.

The comparative case study above can conclude that it is support for the operation from the EU as a whole that facilitates success. To achieve success it does not matter which member states contributes what as long as the sum of EU support as a whole is sufficient for the operation to succeed. Why the EU or individual member states and institutions support an operation does also not directly affect its success. This is a question of legitimacy rather than a condition for the success in the undertaking of these operations in the field. As such, although legitimacy is an important question more generally, it did not prove a necessary condition for success. It is the active support from the EU as a whole to the operation, which is important for success. If the EU does not allocate sufficient commitment and capabilities to an operation, it cannot succeed. The chapter found that the commitment and capabilities, although necessary, are not sufficient on their own to facilitate a success. The findings above suggest that the external context in which the operation engages also conditions the success of these operations. The next chapter will examine if, how and why this is the case.
Chapter seven: An empirical assessment of external conditions for success

The existing scholarship of the ESDP has yet to undertake a structured analysis of the conditions for success in ESDP military conflict management operations. It is this gap in the literature and the conceptual understanding of the ESDP, which the second part of this thesis set out to address. To this end, chapter five made an analytical distinction between the two categories of (1) internal and (2) external conditions for success. It deduced hypotheses concerning the conditions for success within each category. Chapter six analysed the internal conditions for success in a comparative study of the five ESDP military conflict management operations conducted from 2003 to 2009. It concluded that if an operation does not have sufficient EU support, it will not succeed. This support must comprise sufficient commitment and sufficient capabilities dedicated from the EU member states and institutions to the operation for it to be able to achieve its purpose in an appropriate manner. The research findings suggest that these internal conditions are necessary, but not sufficient for success. In addition to the internal conditions, the two previous chapters suggest, the success of an operation depends also on conditions in the external context in which the operation is undertaken. This chapter examines whether external conditions for success do indeed exist, and if so – why and how they condition success. The study of the external conditions for success is divided into three levels of analysis. This is based on the theoretical premise, developed in chapter five, which suggests that there are three contextual levels outside the EU, which are expected to influence the success of ESDP military conflict
management operations. These are the domestic level, the regional level and the international level. Chapter five developed a hypothesis for each of the external levels of analysis. The three hypotheses are presented in the table below.

Table 7.1: Research hypotheses: External conditions for success

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conditions for success</th>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Domestic support</td>
<td>H2: If an ESDP military conflict management operation cannot secure sufficient domestic support, it cannot succeed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional support</td>
<td>H3: If an ESDP military conflict management operation cannot secure sufficient regional support, it cannot succeed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International support</td>
<td>H4: If an ESDP military conflict management operation cannot secure sufficient international support, it cannot succeed.</td>
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The three hypotheses suggest that domestic, regional and international support is necessary for an ESDP military conflict management operation to be successful. This chapter tests the empirical relevance of this assumption in the five ESDP military conflict management operations from 2003 to 2009. The five cases will be examined region by region rather than in their chronological order. The chapter will first examine the two operations in the Western Balkans (Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina), then the two operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and finally, the joint operation in Chad and the Central African Republic. This is analytically useful in order to examine how operations that engage in conflicts, which share similar domestic, regional and international circumstances compare in terms of the external conditions for their success. This separation will also help illustrate how the EU has undertaken different types of military conflict management operations and
allow for an investigation of how the type of military conflict management affects the conditions for its success. The analysis takes a comparative perspective on the external conditions for success in ESDP military conflict management operations and relates this to the internal conditions for success presented in the previous chapter.

The external context of operations Concordia (Macedonia) and Althea (BiH)

This first section takes a closer look at the external context of operations Concordia and Althea, which the EU has been and in the case of Althea still is undertaking in the Western Balkans.

The domestic level

When Operation Concordia was launched in Macedonia in 2003 the domestic situation in the country had already much improved since the crisis two years earlier. There had been genuine signs of political compromise. The Ohrid Agreement and the subsequent elections had resulted in the main Albanian political party being represented in government and both political and security relations between the conflicting parties were improving. The Macedonian authorities now representing both ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians fully supported Operation Concordia. The operation was launched upon explicit invitation from the government and the domestic authorities greeted its deployment with enthusiasm (Council Decision 2003/7537/CFSP, 18/3/2003; ICG, 2005b).
At the time President Boris Trajkovski explained the government’s motivations behind its invitation and its support for the Concordia operation in the following way:

The successful ending of this mission will mark the termination of the last phase of the process of the consolidation of the security. It will mean taking on our own responsibility for the internal stability and fulfilment of one of the preconditions for membership of the Republic of Macedonia in the European Union and NATO (...) This mission offers us a chance to develop a particularly close collaboration with the EU forces from the moment of their establishment, a chance that we do not intend to miss (...) Our ambition is full membership in the Union, and I would like to see this mission and our joint efforts in promoting stability as a step in that direction. The more of EU we have in Macedonia, the more of Macedonia there is in the EU (Trajkovski, 2003).

An interviewee from the European Commission delegation in Skopje confirmed the widespread domestic support for Concordia and explained the government’s enthusiasm for the operation in a similar way:

Concordia was a symbol of Macedonia’s ambition to establish tighter links with the EU in all areas, including full membership in the Union. It was one dimension of the European integration of Macedonia and a symbol of an ever-closer union and partnership between the EU and Macedonia. By inviting the EU to launch (the) military mission Macedonia signalled its willingness and ability to adopt the logic, norms, patterns of behaviour and regulations
associated with European integration into its political, security and defence system (Interview, Representative from the European Commission delegation to Macedonia, 30/04/2009).

The high level of domestic support for the operation at the state-level was shared at the sub-state level (Mace, 2004). The relationship between the EU forces and the Macedonian population was good, as an interviewee explained:

In the sphere of improving the social and economic situation of the country, Concordia conducted civil military cooperation projects in the villages of former crisis areas with the aim of improving the living conditions of people. These projects helped the members of Concordia to establish close relationships with the local population that contributed to improving their mutual rapport (Interview, representative from European Commission delegation to Macedonia, 30/04/2009).

Colonel Pierre Augustin (2005), the operation’s representative from France, also stressed the importance of what he called the Concordia’s systematic contact with the ethnic communities. In particular, he highlighted that:

The combination of light and heavy teams performing missions strongly reinforced a palpable deterrence in addition to establishing the perception of the EUFOR as an integrated force dedicated to restoring public confidence. Building this confidence set the foundation for the information collection effort and proved essential to restoring a peaceful environment lost following the
events of 2001. EUFOR has become a federating security element in the daily life of the ethnic communities. Immersion and openness of these patrols in the FCA (former crisis area) has been elemental (Augustin, 2005, p.58).

Mace (2004) has suggested that the handover from NATO to the EU and the continuity of the approach between the two operations helped Concordia to quickly win the trust and confidence of domestic parties in Macedonia. This chapter will return to the link between the two organisations at the international level, but it is important to note that the operational connection between the two made Concordia look more robust both in the eyes of the domestic authorities and the different ethnic communities in Macedonia. This fostered further domestic support for Operation Concordia from key state and sub-state actors in Macedonia (Cascone, 2008; Howorth, 2007; Mace, 2004).

The high level of domestic support was essential for EUFOR’s success both in terms of its internal and its external goal attainment in Macedonia. The fact that the EU force had political support from the authorities and communal support from the population made it easier for the operation to achieve its goals in a timely, cost-effective and relatively efficient manner. The fact that there was domestic support also for the wider EU-led international effort to manage the political conflict through the implementation of the Ohrid Agreement and the Stabilisation and Association Process to bring Macedonia on track for EU membership meant that Concordia was able to contribute positively also to this wider process. Finally, the domestic support meant that the EU troops were never challenged militarily and in effect they never decided to apply force. In
this way, domestic support also made it easier for Concordia to be successful in terms of its external appropriateness. The domestic consent and support for the operation provided a permissive environment on the ground in which Concordia could succeed. As explained in the previous chapter, the only spoilers to the operation and limitation to its overall success were a few of its own staff involved in criminal activities in the country.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina too the security situation when EUFOR was deployed in 2004 had much improved since the end of the war in 1995. However, the legacy of the war had left the former parties to the conflict wary not only of each other, but also of the EU’s capability as a conflict manager. The political leaders of the Bosnian Muslim, Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat communities agreed, albeit with different degrees of enthusiasm, that an international military presence was still necessary to ensure stability in the country after NATO’s planned departure in 2004. But there was also a shared domestic perception that Europe had failed Bosnia during the war. An ICG report from the time when Operation Althea was launched explained this domestic scepticism:

Due to its failure to act unanimously and decisively during the war the EU is still viewed with considerable suspicion in Bosnia (ICG, 2005b, p.50).

Unlike the EU, NATO had proved itself as a credible security provider in BiH. The majority of domestic authorities and large parts of the population believed that the NATO presence had played a significant role in preventing the return
to war. A new international military deterrent was still deemed necessary, but the potential hand-over to a EU operation raised domestic concern. It was not just the European Union that experienced domestic scepticism. European soldiers also had a tarnished reputation in the country after the mostly European UNPROFOR mission had failed to protect civilians on all sides during the war in the 1990s. The wariness of the EU’s political commitment and military capability, although shared across ethnic divisions in the country, was particularly strong among Bosnian Muslims. One interviewee remembered how when British diplomat Robert Cooper attempted to reassure Bosniak PM Adnan Terzic that the EU would make sure that the security situation did not deteriorate Terzic looked at Cooper and said:

*That is what you said last time. I guess, I will just have to trust that you will do it this time* (Interview, representative from the European Commission, 07/05/2009).

This initial domestic scepticism about the EU’s ability as a military conflict manager must not be mistaken for lack of domestic support for Operation Althea. On the contrary, the domestic fear that it would fail demonstrates a high level of domestic support for EUFOR’s principle purpose: to prevent more violence. The majority of the population and the political leadership wanted peace. Although the political context in the country was difficult, all sides wanted to prevent further violence and, therefore, supported the operation once it became clear that it would become NATO’s replacement. The Presidency, representing all three constituent peoples of BiH, officially
welcomed the NATO-EU transition and 74 per cent of the country’s population supported the EU force once the troops arrived in the country (Budin, 2006). The only real opposition that the operation has encountered at the domestic level has been from a criminal minority and not from the majority of population or the political leadership.

It is important to make a distinction between domestic support for EUFOR and domestic support for the EU, which have not always gone hand in hand. Whereas EUFOR has received a high level of domestic support during its deployment, the EU has at times been very unpopular in the country. It is also important to recognise that the highest domestic authority in BiH is the international Office of the High Representative (OHR). Because the High Representative (HR) is mandated to sanction any anti-Dayton behaviour and EUFOR’s own mandate is annexed in the Dayton Agreement, domestic support for the operation is to a certain degree institutionalised in the constitutional arrangements of BiH. Although the relationship between the different High Representatives and EUFOR Commanders has varied over time, the state structures of post-Dayton BiH have by law limited potential political obstruction to the EUFOR operation. This is not to say that without these structures EUFOR would have met much more domestic opposition, but rather to underline that domestic support could be facilitated by the OHR/EUSR (Council of the EU, 2009b; Friesendorf and Penska, 2008; GFAP, 1995; OHR, 2009).
Domestic support has been imperative to the overall success of operations Althea and Concordia. In both cases, there was domestic consent from (a) the political leadership, (b) the former belligerent parties and (c) the domestic populations. There was no domestic obstruction to the operations and they both enjoyed active support from the key political and security actors at the domestic level. It is important to stress in this context that the operations did not engage in an active violent conflict, but rather acted as a deterrent to prevent more violence. Overall, this suggests that a permissive environment and consent and support for the operations at the domestic level facilitate success in ESDP military conflict management operations.

**The regional level**

During the violent break-up of Yugoslavia in the 1990s the instability affected the entire Western Balkan region. The conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina actively involved regional actors: Serbia (then Yugoslavia) and Croatia (Glenny, 2001; Silber and Little, 1996). When the Macedonian crisis broke out in 2001, the security situation in the region was different. This conflict was for the most part contained within the Macedonian territory and fought out between domestic state and sub-state level actors. Although it is still disputed to what extent the National Liberation Army, the armed wing of the ethnic Albanian rebels in the conflict, were aided from Kosovo (Mace, 2004; Vankovska, 2002).

At the time of the launch of both operations Concordia (2003) and Althea (2004) unsettled status issues with regard to Kosovo and the Serbia-
Montenegro state-union were generating wider concerns about the stability of other borders and geo-political entities in the region. In BiH the status of Republika Srpska was (and still is) disputed and in Macedonia there were fears of insecurity on the border with Kosovo (ICG, 2005a). By March 2009, the regional security context in the Western Balkans had much improved. As one interviewee put it:

_in the Western Balkans regional security is no longer in danger. Serbia and Croatia are focusing on EU accession. They are not interested in interfering in Bosnia. Albania and Montenegro are stable. So are Kosovo and Macedonia, although there may be some isolated violence with regard to Serbia-Kosovo relations regarding the northern part of Kosovo, and this could spill over the Macedonian border. But all in all - the situation is stable. This is not the EU’s achievement as such, but the EU has succeeded in changing the focus and priorities on the national political agenda in these countries towards EU membership. This is now the first priority (Interview, representative from the European Commission, 07/05/2009)._ 

Since their deployments neither Operation Concordia nor Operation Althea has been challenged by any actors at the regional level. The operations have also not been actively supported by regional actors. In fact, both operations have been free from interference at the regional level. As the quote above illustrates regional political and security actors did not have an interest in hindering these operations or interfering with the security situation in Macedonia or BiH during their deployments. Therefore, all the key security actors in the Balkans

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accepted the presence of the EU forces in both countries. As operational support from regional actors was absent in these two cases, which have both been largely successful, such support did not prove to be a necessary condition for success in these two cases. Political support, in the sense that these actors accepted and did not seek to hinder the operations, however, is widely perceived as a necessary condition for their success. This issue was often raised by interviewees, in particular in BiH, with reference to the way in which regional interference, at least in part, caused the failure of the UN’s attempt (UNPROFOR) to militarily manage the conflict in BiH a decade earlier. This supports the domestic-level finding, which suggested that the nature of the conflict affects the necessary conditions for success in ESDP military conflict management operations. The fact that these were not active violent conflicts helped operations Concordia and Althea to succeed in the sense that they were not challenged militarily or politically (Interviews, Representatives from BiH Council of Ministers, 29/06/2006; Interview, Representative from the European Commission delegation in BiH, 30/06/2006; Interview, Representative from the OHR, 30/06/2006). The research findings also support the argument above that the Stabilisation and Association Process has changed political and security agendas throughout the Western Balkans. Several interviewees suggested that the prospect of EU membership to which all the countries in the region have declared a desire has increased the Union’s leverage in the region. This in turn has positively affected regional security and indirectly discouraged actors in the region from interfering in a negative way with the two ESDP military conflict management operations.
The international level

For both Operation Concordia and Operation Althea the most important international security partner was NATO; firstly, because both operations had operational support and access to NATO assets through the Berlin Plus arrangements; and secondly, because both operations took over responsibilities from previous NATO operations in the field. NATO had completed three operations (Essential Harvest, Amber Fox and Allied Harmony) in Macedonia before the EU launched Operation Concordia. Likewise, NATO had undertaken two operations (IFOR and SFOR) in BiH prior to Operation Althea. In both countries NATO had engaged at the height of the crisis and facilitated a significant improvement in the overall security situation throughout its deployments. At the termination of its operations in both countries NATO transferred most of its authority and responsibility for security to the EU (and some to local authorities). In this process the EU benefited from NATO’s extensive operational experience in both planning and undertaking its many operations in the Balkans, which were not limited to these two countries (Cascone, 2008; Howorth, 2007; Mace, 2004).

The relationship between the EU and NATO was of paramount importance for the successful undertaking of both these ESDP military conflict management operations. Apart from relatively minor turf battles the two organisations worked closely, professionally and well together during both Operation Concordia and Operation Althea. With regard to Concordia Mace (2004) has argued that the relationship between the two was good, although competitive at times. Cascone (2008) has made the case that these operations were successful
and useful tests for NATO-EU cooperation, but he stresses that the coordination between the two organisations in the Balkans was mostly practical coordination in the field, facilitated more by individual member states of the two organisations pushing for a coherent message than from a genuinely joint EU-NATO approach towards the conflicts in the region.

A smaller NATO presence remained in both countries after the official termination of its peace support operations. NATO kept a Senior Civilian Representative and a Senior Military Representative in Skopje to help the Government with security sector reform and adaptation to NATO standards for the Partnership for Peace and eventual NATO membership (Mace, 2004). The situation was much the same in BiH, where NATO opened a new HQ in Sarajevo when it officially terminated the SFOR operation. The new NATO HQ led by a Senior Military Representative was intended to provide advice on and assistance to the Bosnian authorities in reforming the armed forces and moving towards a single military force. NATO HQ Sarajevo was also intended to undertake certain operational tasks in relation to counter-terrorism; intelligence sharing with the EU; and ensuring force protection and support to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the detention of persons indicted for war crimes (NATO, 2004).

For the purpose of this analysis it is important to recognise that the international community in both countries was no larger than that EU and NATO representatives would continue to be in close contact. For example, the two organisations were co-located in Camp Butmir outside Sarajevo for the
first few years of EUFOR Althea. In both countries the respective EUSRs are in charge of coordinating the international community, which also reinforced cooperation. Overall, the coordination and cooperation was good both in Macedonia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina, although to some extent this did depend on personalities and personal rapport between specific Head of Missions. For example, several interviewees pointed out how it benefited NATO-EUFOR-OHR/EUSR cooperation in BiH that EUSR and High Representative Paddy Ashdown had both a political and military background. As one interviewee explained:

*Paddy’s military background was helpful. It made it easier for him to cooperate with military people at all levels* (Interview, Representative from the European Commission, 07/05/2009).

The role of individuals is underestimated in the ESDP literature. However, as Friesendorf and Penska (2008) have suggested with regard to EUFOR Althea personalities and how well different individuals work together are of utmost importance to the success of these operations. Another important factor with regard to inter-organisational cooperation between NATO and the EU in Macedonia and BiH is that the previous NATO operations in both countries had large European contingents, which ensured a degree of shared institutional memory and understanding across the official NATO-EU divide. Many of the member states of the two organisations and contributing nations in the operations were the same. This does not necessarily mean that member states always behave consistently in the two organisations (or in the different
operations), but in these two cases it has facilitated a better cooperation and coordination between the EU and NATO. For example, the UK, which had played a significant role in IFOR and SFOR, initially took the lead in Operation Althea. A number of NATO staff also stayed on under the EU flag in both operations Concordia and Althea. These important details are sometimes neglected in the literature, which often refers to the two organisations as further apart than they were in reality on the ground.

A final issue which must not be overlooked in the international context of Operations Concordia and Althea is the role of the US both within and outside NATO. The Balkan wars of the 1990s left the US with a powerful reputation in the region. The US had made it clear that it had the capability to act and that it was willing to use it. Whether people agreed with its specific actions or not America was (and still is) recognised throughout the region as an important actor, in particular, in matters of security. In BiH, for example, previous to Operation Althea the US (through NATO) was seen as the only trustworthy guarantor of peace. As the ICG wrote six months before the launch of Operation Althea:

*Most Bosnians – the Bosniaks in particular – see the US as playing a major part in maintaining the peace and unity of the country. Serb and Croat citizens acknowledge that without the US presence the political and security situation might deteriorate (ICG, 2004, p.6)*
The empirical accuracy of this analysis was demonstrated in February 2004 (two months into the Althea deployment) when the collective BiH Presidency, which represented all three parties to the conflict, formally asked the US authorities to consider maintaining a base in the country (ICG, 2004). But the Bush administration was eager to downscale its military contributions to the NATO operations in the region and had repeatedly expressed its distaste with NATO’s involvement in nation-building in BiH (Mace, 2004). Nonetheless, the US needed to ensure that its political investments in the region pay off (ICG, 2004, p.3) This made the US support an EU take-over of military conflict management responsibilities from NATO in BiH, although only once the Berlin Plus had been negotiated and successfully tested in Concordia. For the US, Operation Concordia was a trial run for Operation Althea. The following quote illustrates this:

EUFOR carried out a ‘live fire’ exercise there (in Macedonia). Here was no threat to a safe and secure environment and no operations that carried any risk other than traffic accidents or alcohol poisoning by the troops on Friday night. But it offered a benign environment in which the EU could find out the complexities and challenges of mounting a real operation without any risk of failure. The exercise was successful as EUFOR confronted important issues like communications, logistics and operational mobility and found solutions (Interview, senior western diplomat, 17/07/2009).

A good strategic relationship between the US and the EU proved essential for the successful functioning of the Berlin Plus at the operational level, which
facilitated the necessary institutional support for the successful undertaking of the operation at the tactical level. With regard to the relationship between the EU and the US, the UK played an important part in both cases. In negotiating the Berlin Plus and the terms for Concordia, the UK, which had led NATO Operation Essential Harvest, played an important bringing-role between the US and the EU (Mace, 2004). The fact that the UK had already proved itself to the Americans in IFOR and SFOR also helped muster up the necessary US support (Interview, representative from NATO, 02/02/2007). This is but one example of how in the Balkan operations the EU often became its own partner either through its member states and institutions represented in the field or through their advocacy in international negotiations. This illustrates how the EU can affect the international context in which ESDP military conflict management operations operate.

There were many other international actors involved in conflict regulation in both Macedonia and in BiH, but as the above demonstrates NATO with the US within it was the Union’s single most important security partner. At the tactical, the operational and the strategic levels NATO’s support for these two operations was crucial to their success. The UN was important in so far as it authorised the mandates for both operations. But although the UN had deployed peacekeeping operations in both countries in the past (before NATO), these were withdrawn long before Operations Concordia and Althea were on the drawing board and the UN no longer had a strong security profile in either country. The UN, in operational and tactical terms, therefore, did not have a direct impact on the success of operations Concordia and Althea. It was
conducive to the success of both operations that they cooperated and coordinated well with non-military international partners in the field. However, support from these other international actors did not prove to be necessary for the success of the operations. As this thesis focuses on the necessary conditions for success only, the role of other international actors in these countries will not be examined in further detail here.

With the exception of the criminal behaviour by individual EU soldiers in Macedonia, the two operations in the Balkans were successful. The above illustrates how both EUFOR Concordia and EUFOR Althea had good relationships with all the key political and security actors at the domestic, regional and international levels. This helped the operations succeed both internally and externally. Active support from key actors at the domestic and international level proved necessary for success, as did the absence of obstruction at the regional level. Moreover, the operations in Macedonia and BiH demonstrated how the EU could influence the domestic, regional and international contexts in which its operations engage. The EU soldiers can foster support for the operations by engaging actively and positively with domestic actors and populations; and through its member states and institutions the EU can help (or hinder) itself at each of these levels through simultaneous initiatives on the ground or in the international security arena. In other words, the EU itself can affect the external conditions, which determine the success of its operations. Through its integrated comprehensive approach in the Western Balkans and the prospect of EU membership the EU indirectly encouraged
support for its ESDP military conflict management operations domestically, regionally and internationally in both these cases.

The external context of Operation Artemis and EUFOR DR Congo in the DRC

This next section looks at the external context of operations Artemis and EUFOR DR Congo, which the EU deployed in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2003 and 2006, respectively.

The domestic level

When Operation Artemis was launched in the DRC in 2003 the domestic context in which the EU soldiers were deployed was complex and dangerous. The Ituri conflict, which was the focus of the Artemis operation, was part of a wider conflict in the DRC, which at the time included domestic actors in Kinshasa and Goma as well as regional actors from Rwanda and Uganda. From 1999 to 2003, factional fighting in the Ituri district alone had killed 50,000 people and caused another 500,000 to flee the area. When the EU soldiers arrived the situation in the district capital, Bunia, was out of control. The withdrawal of the Ugandan People’s Defence Force, which was officially initiated in May 2003, had led to fierce fighting between the ethnic Lendu-militia and the ethnic Hema Union of Congolese Patriots. Thousands of civilians sought refuge at the UN compound hoping for protection, which the UN peacekeepers were unable to provide. The humanitarian crisis was acute. On urgent request from the UN, Artemis was launched to temporarily relieve the UN in Bunia until it could bring in reinforcements (Homan, 2007; Prunier, 2009).
It is important to recognise the serious and complex nature of the conflict in Ituri at the time in order to appreciate why the UN battalion was unable to get the violence under control and to understand the domestic context in which Artemis operated. There was no active support for Operation Artemis at the domestic level in the DRC. Instead, the EU troops were faced with direct, armed opposition. In May 2003, when France agreed to help the UN stabilise the situation in Ituri, the Ugandan People’s Defence Force leader, Thomas Lubanga, declared that French troops would be treated as enemies (Hendrickson, Strand and Raney, 2007). The following month the first French forward elements (100 French troops) of the Artemis operation were deployed to Bunia. Less than a week later the force was caught up in its first violent confrontation with the local Lendu militia, and in early July, the EU forces experienced violent opposition also from armed ethnic Hema. For the rest of the deployment Artemis soldiers were repeatedly challenged militarily from both sides (Hendrickson, Strand and Raney, 2007; Homan, 2007).

The lack of support from key domestic security actors limited Artemis success even before its soldiers’ arrival in the DRC. The domestic context in Ituri caused hesitance with regard to the operation in EU capitals. This in turn led to the strict limitations to the operation’s mandate and the French troop dominance. These, as concluded in the previous chapter, would become the primary reasons for the limits to the operation’s overall success. The geographic, temporal and functional limits to the mandate clearly signalled the boundaries and transitory nature of the Artemis deployment to the belligerent
parties. Homan (2007) has argued that the strict insistence by the EU member states on a very limited area of operations merely pushed the conflict out of Bunia into other areas where atrocities continued. The relief that Artemis did provide for civilians in Bunia positively affected EUFOR’s relationship with local non-military actors and the civilian population in Bunia. The good relationship with the non-military domestic actors, however, did not constitute sufficient domestic consent to facilitate an overall success in this case. Artemis demonstrates that the lack of domestic support from key security actors involved in the conflict limits an operation’s chance of overall success. Nevertheless, it is important to recognise that the groups, which attacked the EU troops, were the same groups that threatened the civilian population in Bunia. The success that the operation did have, although limited, was crucial to the wellbeing of civilians in Bunia, which the UN alone could not protect. Therefore, although the operation did not succeed overall, it demonstrates how even a partial success can be an important achievement considering the dangerous domestic context in which it engaged. Finally, the Artemis operation also demonstrated that high levels of EU support could to some extent make up for low levels of domestic support. Because the EU, with a firm French lead, dedicated the necessary commitment and capabilities for the force to be deployed quickly and to implement its mission in an efficient manner the operation was able to successfully fulfil its mandate (internal goal attainment) despite the lack of domestic support.

In 2006, when the EU launched its second ESDP military conflict management operation in the DRC, the humanitarian situation in the country was still
dreadful. Nevertheless, for EUFOR DRC the domestic context in its area of operations, which was limited to the area around the capital, was very different from that which EUFOR Artemis had encountered in Bunia three years earlier. In Kinshasa, Operation DR Congo was endorsed by the DRC’s Supreme Defence Council. Some of the domestic parties standing at the elections, however, did not politically support the operation from its beginning. The leader of the country’s political opposition, Jean Pierre Bemba, claimed that the operation was not neutral. Bemba alleged that EUFOR was supporting the incumbent President Joseph Kabila. These claims seemed convincing to many, given the historic ties between France and the DRC and the large French contribution to the EU operation. Even before its deployment, EUFOR DR Congo was drawn into the DRC’s political game. EU Special Envoy for the African Great Lakes region, Aldo Ajello, rejected these allegations as domestic political campaigning and insisted that there was no truth to them (Gegout, 2007). The EU repeatedly reiterated the operation’s political neutrality. Interviewees across the board support the neutrality claim. One interviewee pointed to the fact that Bemba took a U-turn in sudden support of the operation after a Polish EUFOR contingent came to his rescue, when his home came under attack (Interview, national representative to the EU, 09/06/2009).

Regardless of its underlying motivations the domestic political opposition to EUFOR resulted in demonstrations against the operation in Kinshasa in the period leading up to its deployment (May and June 2006). As the troops were deployed and started operating, actions such as the move to protect Bemba
allowed the force to demonstrate its neutrality (Interview, representative from national representation to the EU, 09/06/2009; Interview, representative from the European Council, 08/06/2009). In effect, the domestic political and public opposition to the operation diminished as the operation came under way and EUFOR eventually secured domestic support for its mission (Gegout, 2007). This again demonstrates how the EU can affect the external context in which its troops operate. This case is important also because the domestic political opposition to the operation in Kinshasa did not cause the limits to the success of EUFOR DR Congo. The operation was a success in terms of its internal goal attainment. It provided the service it was meant to in Kinshasa, despite the political opposition it experienced there. It was the fact that it was not mandated to operate beyond Kinshasa, which limited its success in external goal attainment. This was caused by the political decision by EU member states to strictly limit the mandate. This decision was based on the lack of EU support for the operation, which also caused the delayed deployment and in effect the limitation to EUFOR’s internal appropriateness.

Despite the fact that the overall security situation in the DRC had not changed significantly from 2003 to 2006, the two ESDP operations engaged in two very different domestic contexts. They enjoyed different levels of support from domestic actors on the ground. Both operations experienced opposition, but Artemis was challenged militarily in Ituri, whereas the challenge to EUFOR DRC in Kinshasa was mainly political in nature. The domestic support that the two operations enjoyed was also different. Artemis had the support of the local population in its area of operations, whereas EUFOR DRC in the beginning did
not (although this developed over time). EUFOR DRC, on the other hand, had greater political support from the domestic authorities than Artemis. Overall, the domestic opposition to EUFOR DR Congo was less threatening than the domestic opposition to Artemis, yet Artemis made a bigger contribution to the management of the conflict in the DRC as a whole (external goal attainment). This is an important finding, because it suggests that the higher levels of EU support for Operation Artemis than for EUFOR DR Congo was more important for its success than the lower levels of domestic opposition for operation EUFOR DR Congo than for Artemis. The lack of domestic support limited both operations indirectly through the hesitation this caused in the EU capitals.

The regional level

The conflicts that Artemis and EUFOR DR Congo engaged in were not confined to Bunia or Kinshasa or even to the DRC. They were part of what Ulriksen (2004) has called Central Africa’s web of wars. Over the last decade this complex conflict scenario has involved eight regional governments, the state-level authorities in Kinshasa, at least a dozen rebel movements and a vast number of smaller armed groups and militias dispersed throughout the eastern parts of the country (Ulriksen, Gourlay and Mace, 2004; Ulriksen, 2004). For the purpose of this thesis, it is important to recognise the regional complexity in which Operation Artemis and EUFOR DR Congo were operating. This is important because it contextualises the operations and allows for an examination of whether and to what extent support from key regional actors involved directly in the violent conflict in the country of engagement is
necessary for an ESDP military conflict management operation to be able to succeed.

Before France agreed to help the UN in Ituri in 2003, it set as a condition for its military engagement that the countries in the region that were involved in the fighting, the DRC, Rwanda and Uganda, all officially supported the operation (Homan, 2007). This illustrates how France, which had extensive experience in the country, deemed official support from the regional actors involved in the conflict important. What France was requesting was consent and a promise of non-interference from Rwanda and Uganda. Both countries were initially weary of the prospect of France’s engagement due to its strong ties with the government in the DRC. The fact that this became an EU operation, rather than a bilateral French operation, helped ensure the regional support that France deemed necessary for a successful operation. HR Solana and EU Special Envoy Adjello engaged in diplomatic overtures with Rwanda, Uganda and the DRC to facilitate the regional consent. The promise of UK participation in the operation helped reassure Rwanda and Uganda, which eventually granted France their official support for the operation (ICG, 2005b; Hadden, 2009; Hendrickson, Strand and Raney, 2007). This is another example of how the EU can help muster up domestic and regional support and create the necessary external conditions for its own success. In the Artemis case this enabled EUFOR to alleviate a crisis where other actors (the UN and France) could not. Because EUFOR DR Congo by its mandate was confined to the area surrounding Kinshasa, the regional dimension of the conflict was of less importance to the internal success of this operation and the EU operation of
less of concern to the regional actors involved. In this way, the nature of an operation affects the importance of the regional conflict context and the support for the operation of the actors involved.

These two cases also illustrate another important regional aspect, which although it is often overlooked in the ESDP literature, was of utmost importance to the success of these two operations. That is operational support from regional actors. The grouping base for Operation Artemis was located in Uganda and the over-the-horizon reserve for EUFOR DR Congo was deployed in Gabon (Council of the European Union, 2009a). The consent and operational support of these regional actors was a necessary condition for the success of both these operations. Without this support neither of the operations could have taken place, let alone succeed.

The international level
The EU’s main international security partner in Operation Artemis and EUFOR DR Congo was the UN. Both operations were invited and authorised by the UN. Moreover, the main purpose of both operations was to assist the UN mission in the DRC, MONUC. The nature of the assistance that the UN requested and that the EU troops provided was very different in the two operations. Because the operational theatre on the ground; the task at hand; and the role of domestic, regional and other international actors varied significantly in the two cases, the partnership between the UN and the EU was very different in the two operations. In 2003, the EU force was deployed to help the UN regain control of the situation in Ituri, whereas in Kinshasa in 2006 the EU
troops were there to help prevent the UN from losing control in the first place. The EU took over the lead in Bunia, whereas the UN kept the lead in Kinshasa. In both instances the UN remained the primary conflict manager in the country as a whole, with the EU filling the gaps where the UN was lacking capabilities (Morsut, 2009). The EU troops were, thus, supporting the UN mission, rather than the UN troops supporting the EU operations. In effect, the two ESDP military conflict management operations in the DRC had much lower levels of international operational support than operations Concordia and Althea in the Balkans. This in turn affected what the operations could successfully achieve, which illustrates the link between the level of international support and the level of operational success.

The cooperation between the EU and the UN in these two operations was good. In 2003, there had been some initial confusion among MONUC officials in the field as to the nature of the Interim Emergency Multinational Force, which was to be deployed in Bunia. Once the EU troops were deployed, however, clear and simple procedures for a mutual flow of information were set up and worked well. Also in Kinshasa in 2006 the cooperation with MONUC went relatively smoothly (Homan, 2007; Morsut, 2009). Nonetheless, there were significant differences between the two organisations. In particular, their diverse operational cultures have been raised by a number of interviewees:

_We need to make the UN better, not just bail it out. The UN could do better in the DRC. There are already 15,000 troops there. These are not being made proper use of. (...) There is also an issue of the EU - and NATO for that matter,
having better equipment, better troops, better command and control structures and better behaviour. We do not steal from the people we are supposed to protect (Interview, national representative to NATO, 14/05/2009).

Another interviewee explained the differences between the two organisations in terms of their institutional structures:

*The cooperation (between the UN and the EU) is good, but the UN is a different kind of organisation. The EU and NATO are almost identical in their set up. If there is a committee in one, then there is a parallel committee in the other. The EU is modelled on NATO. (...) The UN has an easier structure. There are a lot less people dealing with this in UN HQ. NATO and the EU have almost as many people in HQ for each operation as they have in the field. That is why the EU and NATO are so detailed in the planning of their operations. The UN is more ‘fire and forget’. They give a mandate and then you go away and do it. Their mandates are less specific. The EU and NATO micro-manage (Interview, national representative to the EU, 09/06/2009).*

As facilitating the work of non-military international actors was among the key objectives of both Operation Artemis and EUFOR DRC, the relationship with non-military international actors was also important to the success of the two operations. Artemis, for example, aimed to help facilitate the provision of international humanitarian assistance to resume, to which a good working relationship with those that provided humanitarian assistance was necessary. Unlike the often difficult relationship between military and humanitarian actors
in conflict situations, cooperation between Artemis and the international humanitarian agencies on the ground in Bunia was good. For the purpose of this analysis, this is important in so far as it attributed to the success of Artemis, which benefited tactically from the good dialogue, cooperation and information-sharing that it had with its humanitarian partners on the ground (Homan, 2007). Likewise, in Kinshasa in 2006, the 2,000 election observers from a range of partners contributed to the successful undertaking of the DRC elections, which was part of the overall political purpose of EUFOR DRC (Gegout, 2007). In the international security arena, there was generally a positive atmosphere towards both operations. This was reflected in the invitation that the UN extended to the EU to undertake the two operations and in its robust authorisation in the Chapter VII mandates for both operations (Interview, representative from the Council of the EU, 08/06/2009; Council of the EU, 2009d).

Overall, both the DRC operations enjoyed support at the international level, although not to the same extent as Concordia and Althea in the Balkans. At the regional level both Artemis and EUFOR DRC secured formal consent from the key regional actors involved in the conflict. Both operations also had operational support from regional actors willing to let the EU locate temporary military bases and troops within their territory. At the domestic level the conditions for the two operations were less permissive (military opposition in Ituri and political opposition in Kinshasa). These cases illustrate how lack of domestic support can threaten the success of an operation. However, the DRC cases also underline how EU support to these operations can affect the extent
to which domestic, regional and international contexts condition their success, and vice versa. For example, the warning of domestic military opposition to the French troops, announced before Artemis was launched, made the French government insist on a Chapter VII mandate from the UN, which then affected what the EU troops were able to achieve. On the other hand, the domestic context in Ituri also made the EU restrict itself in the time, space and function of the mandate, which had a negative effect on the operation’s overall success. This illustrates how both the internal and the external dimensions of the context in which an operation is undertaken affects its chance of success. It also shows how actors within the internal and the external contexts affect each other’s behaviour, which in turn may have an effect on the success of ESDP military conflict management operations.

The external context of Operation EUFOR Chad/CAR

This next section takes a closer look at the external context of the ESDP military conflict management operation, which the EU undertook jointly in Chad and the Central African Republic from January 2008 to March 2009.

The domestic and regional level

The security situation in which EUFOR Chad/CAR engaged is the product of a multi-layered set of conflicts. At the sub-state level both Chad and CAR alongside neighbouring Sudan were experiencing a multitude of smaller conflicts between local groups. At the state-level rebel groups in all three countries were seeking to topple the regimes of President Deby (Chad), President Bozize (CAR) and President al-Bashir (Sudan). At the regional level
Chad is involved in proxy warfare with Sudan. CAR is increasingly becoming embroiled also in this conflict. Although Chad and CAR are not directly opposed in this wider regional conflict, they are also not wholly aligned or allied in the traditional sense (Berg, 2008; ICG, 2008b; Mattelaer, 2008). The following will take a closer look at how domestic, regional and international conditions affected the success of EUFOR Chad/CAR. The domestic and the regional levels will be examined together as they overlap significantly in this particular case, because the operation itself had a regional character.

EUFOR Chad/CAR was deployed amid an escalation both in the regional conflict and in the state-level power struggle in Chad. The 2007 Sirte Agreement, brokered by Libya, had proved short-lived and fighting between the Chadian armed forces and various rebel groups continued especially in the east of the country. In 2008 three rebel groups\(^{32}\) had formed an alliance and launched a joint attack on the capital. The attempt to overthrow President Deby failed, but the power struggle within Chad and tensions between the three countries in the region continued, as President Deby clamped down on security and accused Sudan of supporting the rebel attack.

Already in December 2007, Deby had ordered air strikes on Chadian rebels in Darfur. Meanwhile, Sudan was assisting the newly established Chadian rebel alliance in preparing their attack on N’djamena. After the attack Deby promised retaliation. While Darfur rebels had rushed to support Deby in N’djamena the Sudanese government took advantage of the situation and

\(^{32}\) Rally of Forces for Change (RFC) led by Timane Erdimi, Union of Forces for Democracy and Development (UFDD) led by Mahamat Nouri and Union of Forces for Democracy and Development-Fundamental (UFDD/F) led by Abdel Wahid Aboud Mackaye (Seibert, 2008).
stepped up its campaign in Western Darfur. The increased fighting in Darfur caused further population displacements across the border into Chad. This influx of Darfur refugees increased the pressure on the security situation in Chad and caused existing tensions there to increase even further (Seibert, 2008).

At the time of the EUFOR deployment Chad specialist, Bjoern Seibert, warned that as Deby was losing control of the country and a fully fledged regional war was becoming a distinct possibility. Seibert also suggested that the rebel offensive on N’djamena was directly linked to the EUFOR Chad/CAR operation. He perceived it as a pre-emptive tactical move by the rebel alliance aimed at interrupting the EU deployment, which given its large French component was not perceived as neutral (Seibert, 2008). The rebels had already criticised the operation in planning for its large number of French troops, which were perceived as a threat because of France’s existing military and political support to the Chadian regime (Fletcher, 2008). One interviewee explained the domestic context in which the EU force was deployed in the following way:

*Just as EUFOR was flying in the rebels launched an attack on the capital. They probably saw it as their last chance for a while to oust Deby. This shows why it is so important that the EU communicates its purpose well. The EU troops were not there to meddle in internal Chadian politics. The EU does not have a strong Chad policy. The focus was on doing something about Sudan and the*
refugee camps. So as long as the rebels stayed out of the camps, they would be left alone (Interview, national representative to the EU, 09/06/2009).

This quote illustrates how the operation originated from the pressure on European policy-makers to do something about the situation in Darfur. This had proved difficult especially because of Khartoum’s strong objections to any outside intervention in Darfur. Unable to do anything about the situation in Darfur directly the EU sought to launch an operation on the borders between Sudan and Chad to tackle the regional aspect of the conflict, but the Chadian authorities (despite pressure from France) objected to the idea of a EU military presence operating directly on the border. Consequently, the operation was eventually launched to support the UN and the Chadian security services in managing the security situation in the vast camps of refugees, which had been forced across the border by the violent conflict in Darfur (Seibert, 2008). This sway from its original purpose demonstrates how the domestic and regional context influenced the development of the mandate and the planning of the operation as well as the conceptual understanding of the operation itself within the EU (Mattelaer, 2008; ICG, 2008). Seibert (2008, p.3) suggests that:

There appears to have been little appreciation of the linkage between the humanitarian crisis in Chad and the domestic power-struggle in Chad (...) the possible implications of deploying a European force were not well understood.

The rebel attack on N’Djamena and the subsequent EUFOR deployment support this point. The operation, although it sought neutrality, was even before
its launch drawn into and itself had an impact on both the intra-Chadian conflict and the wider regional security situation (Seibert, 2008). When asked about the internal EU reaction to the situation at the time a national representative offered this account:

*The rebel attack focused everyone before departure. (…) It meant that the troops were being deployed in a different operational theatre. There was a need for better intelligence, but at the time that was impossible. Nobody had it. Nobody knew what was happening in the country that we were getting ready to deploy to. But nobody’s hands were shaking. The operation was deployed with only ten days delay, which was later caught up. Of course it meant some adjustments. For example, the airport we were meant to fly in to had just been bombed (Interview, national representative to the EU, 09/06/2009).*

A staff member from EUFOR Chad/CAR had this account:

*We didn’t know what was going to happen. As all the supplies were being driven through Cameroon, we didn’t even know if they would make it to Chad. It is a long way. Had the trucks been attacked, the soldiers would not have been deployed (Interview, representative from EUFOR Chad/CAR, 17/02/2009).*

The rebel attack on N’djamena, which was a manifestation of domestic opposition from the rebels to the operation, only shortly delayed the EUFOR
Chad/CAR deployment.\textsuperscript{33} As the domestic opposition was based on a perceived threat to the rebels from the Deby’s French ally, the EU could appease it by making clearer to the domestic parties to the conflict its operational objectives and its intended neutrality in the internal Chadian power-struggle. To this end, it launched an information campaign, which successfully managed to soothe the opposition from the rebels. Once the operation was underway it met little sustained violent opposition from domestic and regional actors. However, this can in part be attributed to the fact that by then the Sudanese government, the Chadian authorities and the rebels had between them made sure that the operation would not interfere where it was not wanted. State-level authorities in Sudan and Chad had effectively decided what the EU could and could not do militarily in the region. In effect, the proxy war between Sudan and Chad deteriorated, while EUFOR Chad/CAR was deployed (Arteaga, 2008; Fletcher, 2008; Seibert, 2008). This is why the operation was only a partial success in its external goal attainment.

At the sub-state level local authorities also repeatedly hindered EUFOR actions, for example, the governor of Abeche forbade EUFOR personnel to patrol the town at night. The Abeche authorities also rejected EUFOR’s offer to increase its patrolling after the shooting of an ICRC employee in Abeche in July 2008. In both instances EUFOR adjusted its actions to suit the domestic authorities (Oxfam, 2008).

\textsuperscript{33} Further delays in the deployment to Full Operating Capability were due to the lack of internal EU support.
The EU soldiers were well received by the civilian population. In particular, the refugees and IDPs living in the area where EUFOR patrolled felt safer due to their presence (Oxfam, 2008). There was little understanding among the domestic population, however, as to how EUFOR was different from the French Epervier force, which was stationed in the country to provide bilateral military support to the Chad authorities (Ehrhart, 2008).

The international level

EUFOR Chad/CAR’s main international partner was the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT). This is a multidimensional mission launched in September 2007 to address the security situation and alleviate the looming refugee crisis in the region. MINURCAT had three planned security components: (1) a civilian UN element of 300 international police officers (intended to help train the Chad police); (2) a contingent of 850 Chadian police officers (to be trained to assume the responsibility of security in the refugee camps); and (3) the 3,400 strong EUFOR Chad/CAR, which provided the military component of MINURCAT (later to be relieved by a UN force) (Ehrhart, 2008; UN, 2009a). Originally, the military component was to be provided by the UN, but President Deby opposed this. To appease this domestic opposition, France proposed an EU operation in its place. The Chadian authorities were persuaded and EUFOR Chad/CAR was launched as the military support element to MINURCAT (Mattelaer, 2009).

EUFOR’s success would to some extent come to depend on MINURCAT. The two other components of MINURCAT, which EUFOR was effectively there to
support, were both continuously delayed. One year into the MINURCAT mission only 70 Chadian police commanders and 230 police officers out of the planned 850 had been trained. None had entered the camps. In effect, they were not providing any security for refugees and IDP from the rampant banditry, criminality and forced troop recruitment, which were taking place in the camps. The MINURCAT delays left EUFOR in a difficult situation, because according to its military mandate, it could only react to situations where civilians were directly at risk. The troops were not mandated to undertake the investigations, arrests or prosecutions needed to combat the culture of criminality and impunity festering in the camps. In fact, they were not allowed to enter the camps. When EUFOR did try to assert itself in policing functions, the Chadian authorities immediately objected and EUFOR obeyed. Consequently, the first weapons search conducted by UN-trained Chadian police in a refugee camp, a key objective of the whole MINURCAT mission, took place only six weeks before the EUFOR mandate expired in March 2009 (Oxfam, 2008; Mattelaer, 2008). MINURCAT’s failures in this way directly limited EUFOR’s success in terms of its external goal attainment.

Upon EUFOR’s withdrawal observers feared that it would leave behind a security vacuum. Only six months into the operation, it had become clear that the planned military component of MINURCAT would be deployed (Ehrhart, 2008; Oxfam, 2008; Mattelaer, 2008). UNSG Ban Ki-Moon had invited an extension of the EUFOR operation, in case MINURCAT could not be deployed on time, but the EU had rejected this option (Ehrhart, 2008). Instead the EU pledged that 2,000 of its troops would temporarily stay on as part of the UN

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operation to facilitate a smooth and successful handover (Pop, 2009). In the end, the handover to MINURCAT went relatively well, as one interviewee explained:

*It was a good handover. There is no vacuum. Of course the EU and the UN have different standards. But the main problems have been logistics. But some of the European troops stayed. For example the French contingent remained in the country with a different badge. This helped the transition* (Interview, representative from the Council of the EU, 08/06/2009).

EUFOR Chad/CAR had a good working relationship with the UN both at the political-strategic and the military-strategic levels. The operation was planned in cooperation with the UN. Once they were both deployed, EUFOR and MINURCAT worked well together also at the operational and tactical levels and the handover between the two operations went relatively smoothly (Interview, representative from the Council of the EU official, 08/06/2009; Interview, national representative to the EU, 14/05/2009).

Overall, EUFOR Chad/CAR had limited external support. At the domestic and regional levels key political and security actors were not always supportive of the operation. At the international level the UN’s failure to deploy and implement its own mission and cooperate with the EU operation negatively affected EUFOR’s success. Coupled with the lack of sufficient EU support this led to the partial success of the EUFOR Chad/CAR operation. This case once
again illustrates how domestic, regional and international support is necessary, although not sufficient, for an operation of this nature to succeed.

Conclusion and key findings

This chapter examined the external conditions for success in ESDP military conflict management operations. The three hypotheses concerning the external conditions for success suggested that if an operation cannot secure sufficient domestic, regional and international support, it cannot succeed. The analytical findings above support all three hypotheses. It is clear that domestic, regional and international support is necessary for an ESDP military conflict management operation to be able to succeed. The analysis also found that all three external conditions are necessary, but none are sufficient for an operation of this nature to succeed. The external conditions are interlinked both with each other and with the internal conditions for success.

This chapter can conclude that it is the specific ESDP military conflict management operation, rather than the EU as a whole, which must be supported for the operation to succeed. Wider support for the EU, as was the case domestically in Macedonia, is a conducive, but not a necessary condition for success. With regard to the level of the necessary external support for an operation to succeed, this varies in different cases. The case study suggests that the more external support an operation has the better able it will be to succeed. What constitutes sufficient support at each level depends on the nature of the operation itself and the internal and external context in which it is undertaken. The five cases demonstrate that a degree of external support is necessary at
each of these three levels for any ESDP military conflict management operation to be able to succeed. At all three levels the minimum degree of support necessary for an operation to succeed is the absence of obstruction. Obstruction is active and sustained opposition from key security actors involved in the conflict to an extent, which makes a successful operation unattainable. Obstruction can be present both before the operation is launched and once the EU troops are deployed in the field. How much opposition an operation can overcome, depends on how much EU support (commitment and capabilities) the operation has secured. In the Artemis case, for example, the EU supported the operation to such an extent that it could defeat localised armed opposition, but only for a limited time and in a limited area of operations. EUFOR DR Congo also illustrates that an operation can overcome political opposition in the field, but it shows that how much opposition the EU is willing to take on is sometimes limited. An operation can succeed without active domestic or regional support, if the EU is willing and able to make up for the low level of external support by a higher level of internal support. If it is not, then the operation cannot succeed.

It is clear from the empirical data that opposition in deed rather than in word poses more of a threat to a successful operation. Political opposition to the operation (as was the case in EUFOR DR Congo) or to the EU more generally (which has periodically been the case in BiH) does not necessarily hinder a successful operation, whereas when such opposition is backed by a significant and sustained military threat (like from across the border in Sudan in EUFOR Chad/CAR) this limits the likelihood of success and EU will to overcome the
opposition. The extent to which it limits success depends on the EU support that an operation has to overcome such opposition.

At the domestic level support from key political and security actors towards the operation (its troops and its mission) facilitates success. At this level the nature of the conflict also affects whether an ESDP military conflict management operation is able to succeed. The findings in this chapter suggest that an operation is more likely to succeed in a permissive environment where the operation has the consent and enjoys the support of the domestic actors than in a non-permissive environment where it does not. An operation can overcome some domestic opposition, like in the Artemis and EUFOR DRC, but this can still limit the operation’s chances of success especially from an external perspective. The extent to which it does depends on whether the task at hand can be handled with the tools that the operation has at its disposal, which in turn depends on the EU support that the operation has secured. At the regional level the degree of support from key regional actors toward the operation also affects success. Here again success is dependent on the absence of negative regional interference to the extent that it becomes obstruction. At this level operational support from regional actors can also be necessary for success, as it was in all the African cases. At the international level too support from key actors involved in the conflict and its management on the ground and in the international security arena affect an operation’s success. This study found that the EU can help secure external support or overcome opposition at all three external levels. Vice versa, the comparative case study can conclude that domestic, regional and international support can make up for some deficits in
EU support. For example, operational support from third countries like in the case of EUFOR Chad/CAR, where Russia supplied the four helicopters and staff that the EU itself could not provide made up for a gap in EU capabilities allocated to the operation.

In conclusion, the key finding of part two of this thesis is that for an ESDP military conflict management operation to be successful it must have sufficient support. Such support must be present internally within the EU and externally beyond the EU. Internally this includes support from the member states and institutions of the EU and externally support must be present at the domestic, regional and international levels. At each of these levels the actions of the key actors involved in the conflict and its management affect the ESDP military conflict management operation’s ability to succeed. The analysis also found that neither support nor obstruction is a constant. Actors at none of these levels are necessarily immune to pressure and persuasion. Contextual conditions can be affected by the EU itself through its relationship and leverage with the key actors involved (internally and externally).
Chapter eight: Conclusion

From 2003 to 2009, the EU launched five ESDP military conflict management operations. Concordia, Althea, Artemis, EUFOR DR Congo and EUFOR Chad/CAR were launched to help manage conflicts in Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Democratic Republic of Congo and the tri-border area between Sudan, Chad and the Central African Republic. This thesis set out to examine their success and to analyse the conditions under which ESDP military conflict management operations can be successful.

The nature of the research question necessitated an examination of success in ESDP military conflict management operations, before the thesis could go on to identify and analyse the conditions for such success. Therefore, the first part of the thesis focused on the notion of success. It theoretically defined success and empirically evaluated it in the five ESDP military conflict management operations. The second part of the thesis subsequently examined the conditions for success. It deduced a set of research hypotheses from the existing literature on ESDP, international peacekeeping and conflict management. It then tested these hypotheses with regard to the conditions for success in the five ESDP military conflict management operations. In this way, the thesis defined, evaluated and explained success in ESDP military conflict management operations both theoretically and empirically.

Defining success

The review of the ESDP literature revealed that a shared theoretically grounded understanding of how to define and evaluate success in ESDP military conflict
management operations did not yet exist. In fact, there has been little conceptual discussion of success at all in the scholarly ESDP debate. The wider literature on international peacekeeping, military intervention and conflict management did also not provide an appropriate conceptualisation of success applicable to ESDP military conflict management operations. This literature suggested that the operations could be evaluated either (a) on their own merits alone or (b) according to higher values of peace and justice. The former perspective is referred to in this thesis as an internal perspective on success and the latter as an external perspective on success. This thesis argued that neither of these approaches offers a suitable definition or an appropriate framework for understanding and evaluating success in ESDP military conflict management operations. Instead it suggested that the definition and the evaluation of success in this new sphere of the ESDP must take into account aspects of both internal and external success.

The thesis warned against an emerging trend in the ESDP literature, where EU military conflict management operations are evaluated as if they take place in a vacuum. Too little attention is paid to the fact that these operations have always been part of a wider international effort to manage the conflicts in question. It is important that the evaluation of success reflects this reality and examines how well the EU force played this part. The evaluation of success must, thus, take into account the external as well as internal context in which the operations are undertaken. Moreover, the evaluation of ESDP military conflict management operations, as it is presently conducted, focuses on the outcome of operations only and neglects to assess the appropriateness of their
implementation. The thesis argued that it is important not only to evaluate what an operation has achieved but also how it has achieved it. Consequently, success in ESDP military conflict management operations was defined in the following way:

An operation is a success when its purpose has been achieved and implemented in an appropriate manner from both an internal and an external perspective.

To evaluate success accordingly this thesis argues that this definition can be broken down into four success criteria: (1) internal goal attainment, (2) internal appropriateness, (3) external goal attainment and (4) external appropriateness. The internal goal attainment criterion evaluates whether an operation successfully fulfilled its mandate. The internal appropriateness criterion assesses the implementation of the operation from an internal perspective with regard to its timeliness, efficiency and cost-effectiveness. The external goal attainment criterion examines the contribution that the operation made to the overall management of the violent conflict, in which it engaged; that is, its contribution to preventing the continuation, diffusion, escalation and intensification of violence. Finally, the external appropriateness criterion evaluates the implementation of each operation according to the Just War principles governing the appropriate use of force. That is the appropriate discrimination between combatants and non-combatants and proportionality in the use of force.
This definition and the criteria for success were developed to allow for an assessment of success in ESDP military conflict management operations, which takes into account both an internal perspective and an external perspective on success. The criteria and the corresponding indicators for success are illustrated in figure 8.1.

Figure 8.1: Success in ESDP military conflict management operations

![Success Criteria Diagram]

Evaluating success

Applying this theoretical framework to the comparative analysis of the five ESDP military conflict management operations to date, the thesis undertook a systematic evaluation not only of success and the conditions under which it can be achieved, but also of the theoretical framework itself. The empirical analysis concluded that **Operation Concordia** was largely successful. Its purpose was achieved and the operation was implemented in an appropriate manner overall. The only divergence was the involvement of some EUFOR officers in
organised crime in Macedonia. This compromised the internal appropriateness of the operation. In Operation Artemis too the conduct of individual EU officers involved in the mistreatment of a Congolese civilian subtracted from the internal appropriateness of the operation. Because in this incident the use of force was neither discriminatory nor proportionate, it also compromised the external appropriateness of the operation. The operation was limited with regard to its contribution to the overall management of the conflict as well (external goal attainment). Artemis was only a complete success with regard to its internal goal achievement. Operation Althea has been a significant success so far. EUFOR has to date achieved its short-term operational objectives (internal goal attainment) and contributed significantly to the management of the security aspects of the conflict (external goal attainment). The implementation of the operation has been appropriate from both an internal and an external perspective. EUFOR DR Congo was only a partial success. Although it successfully supported the MONUC mission in Kinshasa during the 2006 elections (internal goal attainment), the operation contributed little to the management of violent conflict in the DRC (external goal attainment). In terms of its appropriateness the operation was an external success because it did not apply force, but its internal appropriateness was limited by the delays to its deployment. EUFOR Chad/CAR was a partial success. It achieved its mandated purpose (internal goal attainment), but it took six months before the operation was fully deployed (internal appropriateness). The operation was externally appropriate, but it only made a limited contribution to the management of the conflict (external appropriateness). A break-down of the success of each of the operations is illustrated in table 8.2.
Table 8.2: Success in ESDP military conflict management operations: 2003-09

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Internal goal attainment</th>
<th>Internal appropriateness</th>
<th>External goal attainment</th>
<th>External appropriateness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Operation Concordia</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>Partial success</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Artemis</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>Partial success</td>
<td>Partial success</td>
<td>Partial success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Althea</td>
<td>Preliminary success</td>
<td>Preliminary success</td>
<td>Preliminary success</td>
<td>Preliminary success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUFOR DR Congo</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>Partial success</td>
<td>Partial success</td>
<td>Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUFOR Chad/CAR</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>Partial success</td>
<td>Partial success</td>
<td>Success</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The different degrees of success in these operations illustrate why it is important to include both goal attainment and appropriateness criteria for success and to evaluate them from both internal and external perspectives. It also demonstrates why it is crucial for the purpose of this thesis to evaluate success comparatively and to undertake this comparison in a structured and focused way. The empirical analysis of success illustrated not only the analytical value of the new definition and criteria for success, but also the usefulness of the selected methodology and analytical approach to the evaluation of success in ESDP military conflict management operations.

**Explaining success**

Having defined and evaluated success the thesis turned its attention to the conditions for success in ESDP military conflict management operations. This part of the analysis sought to explain when operations of this nature can be successful. To this end, the thesis deduced four research hypotheses concerning
the necessary conditions for success in ESDP military conflict management operations from the existing literature on ESDP, international peacekeeping and conflict management. The four hypotheses were based on the theoretical assumption that ESDP military conflict management operations are conditioned by the specific context in which they occur. The thesis suggested that there are two different dimensions to this context: (1) the internal dimension and (2) the external dimension. The internal dimension is the EU-specific context, in which an operation is undertaken. This is made up of EU member states and EU institutions. The external dimension is the conflict-specific context, in which an operation is implemented. This includes the domestic, regional and international actors actively involved in the conflict and its management. The overall theoretical expectation deduced from the existing literature suggested that if an ESDP military conflict management operation cannot secure sufficient support, it cannot succeed. The four hypotheses suggested that for an operation to succeed, it is necessary that it secures sufficient support both within the EU from the actors involved in the operation and outside the EU from the actors involved in the violent conflict and its management. Because of the multiplicity of actors involved in the operations, the conflicts and their management, the thesis developed a levels-of-analysis framework to structure the investigation of the conditions for success. The levels of analysis and the key actors at each level are illustrated in tables 8.3 and 8.4 below.

*Table 8.3: The internal level of analysis*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Levels of analysis</th>
<th>Key actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU level</td>
<td>EU member states and EU institutions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Applying this framework the analysis tested the empirical relevance of the research hypotheses in a comparative case study of the conditions for success in ESDP military conflict management operations from 2003 to 2009. The key finding of this part of the thesis is that for an ESDP military conflict management operation to be successful it must secure sufficient support. Such support must be secured both internally within the EU and externally outside the EU. The analysis also found that the each of the two might complement and to some extent compensate for low levels of support from the other. Internally, support must be secured from the member states and institutions of the EU; and externally, support must be secured from domestic, regional and international actors. At each of the analytical levels, the actions of the key security actors involved in the operation, the conflict and its management affect the ESDP military conflict management operation’s ability to succeed.

The thesis found that neither support nor opposition to an operation is constant. Actors at none of these levels are necessarily immune to pressure and persuasion. Contextual conditions can be affected by the EU itself through its relationship and leverage with the relevant actors involved (internally and externally). This means that an operation can succeed in situations where support only becomes available gradually over time, as EU or domestic,
regional and international actors are persuaded to support the operation or as opposition to it is overcome. The thesis also found that operations can succeed in situations where there is only passive external support, if there is not sustained opposition to the operation beyond the level that the operation can successfully handle with the means it has at its disposal. These means are determined by the level of EU support, especially from the EU member states, which is the *sine qua non* condition for success in ESDP military conflict management operations.

*Predicting success*

The central finding of this thesis is that if an ESDP military conflict management operation can secure sufficient support, it can succeed. The analysis found that for an operation to succeed, it is necessary that it has sufficient support from the member states and institutions of the EU and from the domestic, regional and international actors actively involved in the conflict and its management. For sufficient support to be secured; and in effect, for an operation to be able to succeed, all the key actors involved must have both the commitment and the capabilities to support the operation sufficiently. Actors at the different levels can compensate for limited support at other levels, as long as the support for the operation overall enables it to achieve its purpose in an appropriate manner from both an internal and an external perspective. To this end, the EU level of support is vital.

From these findings the thesis can conclude that there are four necessary conditions for success in ESDP military conflict management operations: (1)
EU support, (2) domestic support, (3) regional support and (4) international support for the operation. The findings in this thesis suggest that if an ESDP military conflict management operation cannot secure sufficient support at the EU level as well as at the domestic, regional and international levels the operation cannot fully succeed. Based on these findings this thesis can predict that in scenarios where an ESDP military conflict management operation cannot secure sufficient support at all four levels it will not be able to succeed. The key findings are illustrated in table 8.5.

Table 8.5: Conditions for success in ESDP military conflict management

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conditions for success</th>
<th>Key findings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU support</td>
<td>If an ESDP military conflict management operation cannot secure sufficient EU support, it will not succeed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic support</td>
<td>If an ESDP military conflict management operation cannot secure sufficient domestic support, it will not succeed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional support</td>
<td>If an ESDP military conflict management operation cannot secure sufficient regional support, it will not succeed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International support</td>
<td>If an ESDP military conflict management operation cannot secure sufficient international support, it will not succeed.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Conclusion: Conditions for success – important to whom and for what?

Violent conflict and military conflict management are both complex phenomena. Consequently, success in military conflict management operations is a complex issue to define, evaluate, explain and predict. Because of this complexity it is crucial that evaluations of success in military conflict management operations are based on a theoretically grounded understanding of success and a sound analytical framework for its evaluation. This is particularly
important if scholars seek to compare the success of several operations and to draw lessons from completed operations to future operations and to the study of military conflict management more generally.

Paris (2000) and Bures (2007) have called for more theoretically oriented research in the study of international peacekeeping, which is one type of military conflict management. This thesis concurs with the need for more theoretically grounded research in this realm. It contends that conceptual refinement concerning how to define, evaluate, explain and predict success in military conflict management is a vital part of such theory development. Failure to appropriately address these issues can lead to analytical misunderstanding, misguided policy prescription and in the worst case to less than successful military conflict management operations. Naturally, the intervening organisation has an interest in succeeding in these operations, but it is important to recall that failure in military conflict management may also have serious implications for the soldiers who implement the operations, and for those who live (and die) in the conflicts, they seek to manage. This is why systematic scrutiny of success in military conflict management is important – not only in theory, but also in practice.

The thesis hopes to encourage a wider debate on the notion of success in military conflict management. To this end, it has discussed how to define, evaluate, explain and predict success in ESDP military conflict management operations. Its findings are relevant not only for scholars of the EU, but also for the study of military conflict management more generally. The thesis hopes to
add a new dimension to the scholarly debate on the EU as a military conflict manager in the international security arena, which in turn can facilitate further comparative study of the success of different international conflict managers. As it is still too early to undertake a long-term assessment of these operations, the analytical focus in this thesis is on the short-term success of ESDP military conflict management operations. As hardly any work had been done on the conditions for success in ESDP military conflict management operations and precisely because the EU is new to military conflict management operations, it is important to start taking stock of its success even at this early stage. A logical and important follow-up to this research in due course would be a longer-term evaluation of success in ESDP military conflict management operations. This thesis can, therefore, not claim to be the end point of the comprehensive study of success in ESDP military conflict management, but hopes to be the beginning.
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Appendix 1: Institutional structures of the ESDP

Institutional structure for ESDP military conflict management

(Wolff and Rodt, 2008, p. 141)

Example of command structure for ESDP military operation

(Hadden, 2009, p. 82)
Appendix 2: Map of the Western Balkans

(ICG, 2005a)
Appendix 3: Map of the Democratic Republic of Congo

(ICG, 2008d)
Appendix 4: Maps of Sudan, Chad and CAR

(ICG, 2008f)
(ICG, 2008c)

(ICG, 2009a)