

The German Question and the International Order (1943-8): an English School approach



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ABSTRACT

Using the interpretative framework of the English School of international relations, the thesis explores the extent to which the inter-Allied treatment of the German Question during the 1943-8 period influenced the making of the post-war international order. Linking international relations theory with historical research, the thesis reinstates the importance of the resolution of the German Question as the most influential issue in the development of the post-war international order. The thesis explores the institutionalisation of international relations and the dynamic interaction of the legal, consensual and conflictual elements involved in the treatment of the German Question, portraying them as the main informative aspects of the origins of the Cold War international order.

Employing the 'trilateral approach' espoused by Martin Wight, the thesis tackles the Realist aspects of the treatment of the German Question by analysing superpower interaction in relation to the enforcement of their structural interests and the socialisation of conflict at occupation and diplomatic level. The thesis evaluates the transformation which occurred in Germany and the post-war international order due to the inter-Allied work on denazification. The thesis also analyses the Rationalist aspects of superpower interaction, with particular emphasis on the legal and diplomatic framework which sustained not only the treatment of the German Question but also the general context of inter-Allied relations. The main conclusion of the thesis is that by restricting superpower intervention to specific spheres of influence, the treatment of the German Question contributed to the creation of a 'pluralist plus' international order which inhibited a systemic disruption of the bipolar settlement imposed by the main Allies.

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INTRODUCTION

The treatment of the German Question and the making of the post-war international order (1943-8)

The discussion and implementation of policy regarding the future of Germany from the declaration of 'unconditional surrender', made at the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, until the partition into two states in 1949, constituted the most important factor in the configuration of the post-war international order. Germany was given the most comprehensive treatment ever dispensed to a vanquished nation in the modern history of the international political system. The fundamental premise of this treatment was the acknowledgment of Germany's central position in the European political and economic order and its implications for the post-war international order. Germany had challenged the international order during the 1930s by rearming and gearing herself towards a war economy. Since 1938, Germany had redrawn its borders with her advance into Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland and much of Western and Eastern Europe until the turn of the tide in favour of the Allies in 1942-1943. Germany was the only member of the Axis against whom all the major Allies campaigned together. This meant that at the end of the war, the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain and France would have troops stationed on German soil. The new balance of power system and the formation of the spheres of influence were created in Germany. Both the United States and the Soviet Union had significant vested interests in the political and economic reorganisation of Germany. The United States were fundamentally interested in fostering the political and economic conditions that would

satisfy its 'grand design' for the post-war international order: the preservation and expansion of the free market system of exchange. Moscow's primary objectives were to prevent a future German aggression and to extract reparations from Germany. These objectives were geared towards rebuilding its devastated economy and influencing the political process in post-war Germany.

Applying the theoretical framework provided by the English School of international relations, this thesis explores two arguments. Firstly, that the treatment of the German Question from the period spanning from the Casablanca Declaration until the breakdown of four power control unfolded within the trilateral perspective espoused by Martin Wight. The trilateral context of the treatment of the German Question comprised Rationalist elements which stemmed from the practical association framework that originated during the war, such as international law, diplomacy and the formation of spheres of influence. The treatment of the German Question was also informed by the pursuit of the national interest by each of the Allies, which spawned the conflict that would ultimately cause the polarisation of Germany and Europe into two camps. It also included the Revolutionist elements which would overhaul the political, social and economic system of both Germanys and create a transformation in the 'society of states'.

Secondly, this thesis argues that the trilateral context not only influenced the outcome of the German Question but also the shape of the post-war international order. Developments regarding Germany would influence the order of things in Europe and the international political system as a whole for the duration of the Cold War. The treatment of the German Question would shape the post-war international order in a 'pluralist plus' manner, for the

elements of intervention and coexistence interacted in order to prevent a systemic disruption of the bipolar settlement imposed by the superpowers and create a series of transformations in the composition of the 'society of states'.

Thus far, the historical debate on the treatment of the German Question by the Allies from the declaration of 'unconditional surrender', agreed by Roosevelt and Churchill at the Casablanca Conference of January-February 1943, until the walkout of the Soviet representative from the ACC in March 1948, has been mainly tackled by isolating specific aspects. This study reinstates the importance of the German Question as the most important factor in the configuration of the post-war international system. Moreover, unlike works tackling the same subject, this thesis charts the influence of the German Question on the origins of the Cold War using international relations theory. The interdisciplinary nature of this study brings to light the different theoretical perspectives on the treatment of the German Question and on the origins of the Cold War and contrasts them against the framework of the English School of international relations. Within this interpretative framework, I will analyse the treatment of the German Question by analysing the different theoretical possibilities of the 'trilateral approach' outlined by Martin Wight as well as by exploring the various aspects involved in the 'pluralist-solidarist' debate.

Martin Wight suggests that the most distinguished theories of international politics can be divided into three basic categories: Realism, which emphasises the concept of 'international anarchy'; Revolutionism, which concentrates on the aspect of the 'moral unity' of the international society and Rationalism, which is based on the aspect of 'international dialogue

and intercourse'.¹ Wight argues that the three traditions influence and cross-fertilise each other, constantly evolving but without losing their inner identity.² By rejecting each extreme, the English School embodies the notion of a middle course between practical demands and moral claims. In contrast to the Realist approach, the English School maintains that states are not entangled in a permanent struggle for power and that they limit their conflicts through common rules, institutions and moral imperatives. Unlike the Kantian tradition, the English School accepts the Realist premise that the state is the primary reality of the international political system and maintain that these imperatives foreswear the replacement of the society of states by a universal community of mankind.³ One of the basic assumptions of this approach is that although the three traditions overlap, Rationalism provides a *via media* between national interest pursuits and moral claims.

Wight's categorisation of the different traditions of international relations theory was taken by Hedley Bull, C.W. Manning, H. Butterfield and John Vincent among others, and its subsequent development came to be known as the English School of international relations. The English School, which has its roots in the Grotian view of an international order based on the rule of law among nations, describes the international political system as a society of states or international society. An international society comes into existence when a group of states perceive themselves to be bound by rules in their relations with one another and share common institutions.⁴ The goals of international society are the preservation of the system and the society of states itself, the maintenance of external sovereignty (subordinate to the

¹ Wight M., *International Theory*, (London: Leicester University Press, a division of Pinter Publishers) (1991), p. 7-8

² Wight M., *International Theory*, p. 260

³ Bull H., *The Anarchical Society*, (Basingstoke: Macmillan) (1995), p. 26-7

⁴ Bull H., *The Anarchical Society*, p. 13

preservation of the society of states itself, by way of balance of power) and the goal of peace, to be breached only on special occasions.⁵

Another way in which the English School engages in the discussion over the nature of 'international society' is from the perspective of the 'pluralist-solidarist' debate. The English School tradition differentiates between the pluralist and the solidarist conception of international society. For pluralists like Hedley Bull and Robert Jackson, international relations are constituted through rational fixed principles of interaction and coexistence, such as sovereignty, diplomacy and international law. Denying an analogy between national and international societies, the pluralists maintain a common identity or culture is not necessarily seen as a precondition of international society. Within this approach, states are the only members of international society.⁶ Solidarists like R. J. Vincent stress substantial values and a common tradition as the normative foundation of international society, which is based on the principle of solidarity. They uphold an ethical universalism that serves as a moral standard of conduct. Within this approach members of the international society are both states and human beings. Therefore, next to the regulative norms emphasised by pluralists, human rights norms (enforced through the element of intervention, if necessary) are stressed as essential constitutive elements of the international society.⁷

The Allies configured a 'pluralist plus' post-war international order by restraining the typically solidarist element of intervention to the demarcation imposed by the pluralist-

⁵ Bull H., *The Anarchical Society*, p. 17

⁶ See Bull, *The Anarchical Society*. Also, Jackson, R., *The Global Covenant-Human Conduct in a World of States*, (OUP: Oxford and New York) (2000)

orientated spheres of influence system. This interaction, which informed the development of the Cold War international order, stemmed from the treatment of the German Question. Apart from the obvious implications that this interpretative approach has for the study of the international political system, it also has the potential to shed new light on the pluralist-solidarist debate. In the case of the treatment of the German Question, the unfolding of the 'pluralist plus' formula can be analysed from the Rationalist, Realist and Revolutionist dimensions of the English School schema.

From the Rationalist perspective, the plurality of interests involved in the treatment of the German Question and the difference of ideologies between the superpowers compelled the Allies to intervene in the establishment of an assiduous legal and diplomatic framework and the setting of spheres of influence in order to restrain the conflictual side of relations. The precedent created by the wartime practical association framework would enable the Allies to proceed with a non-disruptive settlement of the German Question and enforce an orderly transition to a bipolar international order. This interpretation constitutes a *via media* between the centrality given to intervention by the solidarists and its rejection by the pluralist camp. In effect, the interventionism exercised by the superpowers in the treatment of the German Question and the creation of the post-war international order constituted a 'selfish solidarism': a kind of solidarism which responded to the pursuit of the national interest, but also to the need to achieve a significant modicum of coexistence.

⁷ Vincent, R.J., *Human Rights and International Relations: issues and responses*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) (1986) p. 126. See also Vincent, R.J., *Nonintervention and international order* (Princeton: Princeton University Press) (1974)

From the Realist standpoint, the ‘pluralist plus’ dimension of the treatment of the German Question responded to the importance given by the superpowers to the role of intervention in the attainment of their long range structural interests. The ‘selfish solidarism’ employed in the pursuit of their respective ‘grand designs’ was demarcated by pluralist spheres of influence. The principle of intervention involved in the treatment of the German Question was socialised in order to enforce the superpowers’ bottom line interests within the boundaries of coexistence.

The Revolutionist aspects of the treatment of the German Question denote a ‘pluralist plus’ interaction in the reordering of the post-war international order. Superpower intervention served to rid Germany of the ideology which could have posed a threat of disruption to the society of states. This aspect of intervention unfolded within the spirit of coexistence: the process of denazification provided the superpowers with the opportunity to reconcile the transformation of Germany with their own long-term political and economic interests.

It is worth mentioning that from its very beginnings, the English School had an interdisciplinary approach to the study of international relations. The British Committee for the theory of international politics, the gathering point for English School scholars in the late 1950s, included people with different training such as historians, diplomats and public servants.⁸ In this context, and using the interpretative methods of international society thinking described above, this work intends to chart the importance of the German Question as the most important system-defining issue in the reconfiguration of the international order after 1943.

Among the few scholars that have tackled the German Question from a systemic perspective, Eisenberg argues that the partition of Germany into two separate states after the war was fundamentally 'an American decision'.⁹ According to Eisenberg, the Truman administration chose to overlook what the Allies agreed on at Yalta and Potsdam in regards to reparations, the shape of the post-war German government and various other areas. Added to this, the American push for the rehabilitation of the Western zones along conservative, capitalist and anti-Communist lines minimised the impact of the denazification process, limited the decartelisation of German industry and prevented a substantial reform of organised labour. Eisenberg's thesis is that a more accommodating stance of the United States to the demands of the Soviet Union could have prevented the division of Germany, Berlin and Europe.

Trachtenberg, who elaborates on the German Question from the perspective of the Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations, is of the view that Germany constituted the central element of the Cold War and that its resolution was the key to a stable international order.¹⁰ Trachtenberg argues that in spite of the acquiescence of the United States to the hegemonic drive of the Soviet Union towards Eastern Europe and to a four-zones occupation structure in Germany, Stalin's desire to extend Soviet power beyond his European area of influence in Europe into Iran and Turkey prompted the policy of

⁸ Adam Watson notes on the British Committee for the theory of international politics (November 1998). From the English School site www.leeds.ac.uk/polis/englishschool

⁹ See Eisenberg, C., *Drawing the line: the American decision to divide Germany, 1944-1949* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996)

¹⁰ Trachtenberg, M., *A Constructed Peace*, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press) (1999) p. 7

containment.¹¹ McAllister tackles the American involvement in Germany from the perspective of the ‘distribution of power’ that unfolded after the war and analyses how Washington’s policies influenced the polarisation of the post-war international order.¹²

In contrast to these American-focused accounts, Deighton looks at the influence of Britain in the creation of a Western policy for Germany.¹³ Hughes follows from Deighton in adding to the debate on Britain’s role in the evolution of the German Question. By examining the British input on the treatment of the German Question, Hughes brings to light the changed role of Britain in the international political order after 1945 and enhances our perspective on the position of the less predominant actors in the unfolding of the Cold War.¹⁴ However, even these systemic works are very partial in their coverage, tending to focus on the policies of one state.

Within the historical debate on the origins of the Cold War there are three mainstream traditions. The orthodox or traditionalist view, which prevailed during the first two decades of the Cold War, pins the blame on the origins of the conflict on the Soviet Union, adducing that Moscow imposed its hegemony on Eastern Europe and that the United States only reacted in 1947, in the form of Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. The orthodox view

¹¹ Trachtenberg, M., *A Constructed Peace*, p. 13 and pp. 35-41

¹² See McAllister, J., *No Exit: America and the German Problem, 1943-1954*, (Cornell University Press) (2002), p. 12

¹³ See Deighton, A., *The Impossible Peace: Britain, the Division of Germany and the Origins of the Cold War* (Oxford: Clarendon) (1990)

¹⁴ Hughes, R. G., *Britain, Germany and the Cold War-The Search for a European Détente 1949-1967*, (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge) (2007)

sees security concerns and the protection of capitalism and democracy as the principal motivations of US foreign policy in the aftermath of World War Two.¹⁵

The revisionist school maintains that Washington conducted an aggressive foreign policy sustained by massive economic and military power, which motivated the Soviet Union to defend herself against the Western expansionism led by the United States. The revisionists see the need of the United States to invest abroad, to export its surplus and to import certain goods needed by the US economy as the prime objectives of post-war American foreign policy.¹⁶

¹⁵ See, inter alia, Schlesinger, A., *Origins of the Cold War*, Foreign Affairs 46, no. 1 (October 1967) pp. 22-52; Feis, H., *From Trust to Terror: The Onset of the Cold War, 1945-50* (New York, 1970); Ulam, A., *The Rivals: America and Russia since World War II* (New York, 1971); Ulam, A., *Expansion and Coexistence*, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston) (1973); Kennan, G., *Realities of American Foreign Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954); Mosely, P., *The Kremlin and World Politics* (New York, 1960); Maddox, R., *The New Left and the Origins of the Cold War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press) (1973); Ferrell, R., *Truman Foreign Policy: A Traditionalist View*, in Kirkendall, R., (ed.), *The Truman Period as a Research Field* (Columbia, 1974); Taubman, W., *Stalin's American Policy* (New York: W. W. Norton) (1982); Kuniholm, B., *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987); Thomas, H., *Armed Truce* (New York, 1987); Kissinger, H., *Necessity for Choice* (New York, 1961). While John Lewis Gaddis spent most of his career as a post-revisionist, he has recently switched to the traditionalist camp. See *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (Oxford: Clarendon) (1997)); see also MacDonald, D., *Communist Bloc Expansion in the Early Cold War*, International Security 20, no. 3 (Winter 1995-96): 152-88; Raack, R. C., *Stalin's Drive to the West, 1938-1945* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995). Traditionalists emphasising Stalin's pursuit of power and security over ideological ends are Woods R. and Jones, H., *The Dawning of the Cold War* (Athens, GA.: University of Georgia Press, 1991); Mastny, V., *Russia's Road to the Cold War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979); Mastny, V., *The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); Halle, L., *The Cold War As History* (New York: Harper and Row) (1967) and Spanier, J., *American Foreign Policy Since the World War II* (New York: Praeger) (1973)

¹⁶ See Kolko, G., *Politics of War* (New York: Pantheon) (1990); Kolko, G. and Kolko, J., *The Limits of Power* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972); Williams, W. A., *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, rev. ed. (New York, 1962); LeFeber, W., *America, Russia, and the Cold War* (New York, 1967); McCormick, T., *America's Half Century* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989); Fleming, D. F. *The Cold War and its Origins, 1917-1960*, 2 vols. (Garden City, NY.: 1961); Horowitz, D., (ed.), *Containment and Revolution* (Boston, 1968); Gardner, L., *Architects of Illusion* (Chicago, (1970); Bernstein, B., *American Foreign Policy and the Origins of the Cold War*, in Bernstein, B., (ed.) *Politics and Policies of the Truman Administration* (Chicago, 1970); Alperovitz, G., *Atomic Diplomacy*, rev. ed. (London: Pluto) (1994); Alperovitz, G., *The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb* (New York: Vintage, 1995); Horowitz, D., *The Free World Colossus*, rev. ed. (New York, 1971). For early critiques, see Tucker, R., *The Radical Left and American Foreign Policy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press) (1971); Maier, C., *Revisionism and the Interpretation of Cold War Origins*, Perspectives in American History 4 (1970): 313-47; Richardson, J. L., *Cold War Revisionism*, World Politics 24 (1972): 579-612; Maddox, R. J., *The New Left and the Origins of the Cold War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press) (1973). For recent consideration, see Leffler, M., *Interpretative Wars over the Cold War, 1945-60*, in Martel, G., (ed.), *American Foreign Relations Reconsidered, 1890-1993* (London: Routledge) (1994), 108-11, 114-17.

In the latter years of the Cold War, there were attempts to forge a 'post-revisionist' synthesis. Rather than attribute the beginning of the Cold War to the actions of either superpower, post-revisionist historians have focused on reciprocal misperception, mutual reactivity and shared responsibility between the superpowers. According to this synthesis, 'Communist activity' was not the root of the difficulties of Europe, but rather a consequence of the disruptive effects of World War Two on its economic, political and social structure.¹⁷ My work parries the views of the three main lines of interpretation of the origins of the Cold War against the English School framework by charting the Realist aspects of superpower interaction over the treatment of the German Question. In order to do that, it explores the implementation of structural interests on the part of the superpowers as well as the elements involved in the socialisation of conflict.

This work analyses the German Question from a systemic standpoint. By examining the treatment of the German Question within the context of overlapping conflict, cooperation and legality, this work endorses a post-revisionist stance. The Allies pursued their objectives as dictated by their national interest. However, they also established in a highly complex

¹⁷ See Gaddis, J.L., *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947* (New York: Columbia University Press) (1972); Gaddis, J.L., *Strategies of Containment* (New York: Oxford University Press) (1982); Gaddis, J.L., 'The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War', *Diplomatic History* 7 (Summer 1983): pp. 171-90; Gaddis, J.L., *Long Peace* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987); Lundestad, G., 'Empire by Invitation? The United States and Europe, 1945-1952', *Journal of Peace Research* 23, no. 3 (1986): 263-77; Lundestad, G., *The American Non-Policy Towards Eastern Europe, 1943-1947* (New York, 1978); Parrish, S., 'USSR and the Security Dilemma' (Ph.D diss., Columbia University, 1993); McMahon, R., *The Cold War on the Periphery* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994); Trachtenberg, M., *History and Strategy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press) (1991); Yergin, D., *Shattered Peace*, rev. ed. (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1990); Wolhforth, W., *The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions During the Cold War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press) (1993); Wolhforth, W., 'New Evidence on Moscow's Cold War', *Diplomatic History* 21, no. 2 (Spring 1997) pp. 229-42; Paterson, T., *Soviet-American Confrontation* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press) (1973); Pollard, R., *Economic Security and the Origins of the Cold War, 1945-1950* (New York: Columbia University Press) (1985); For a recent discussion of post-revisionism, see *The Origins of the Cold War: A Symposium*, led off by Howard Jones and Randall Woods's 'Origins of the Cold War in Europe and the Near East: Recent Historiography and the National Security Imperative', with commentaries by Rosenberg, E., Stephanson, R. and Bernstein, B., in *Diplomatic History* 17, no. 2 (Spring 1993): pp. 251-310

framework of law and diplomacy, and a spheres of influence system. At the same time, they attempted to transform the post-war international order by creating a discontinuity with the Nazi regime and enhancing the scope of international organisation and cooperation. The treatment of the German Question became the microcosm of the post-war international order and initiated the overlap of legality, conflict and cooperation that extended to the international political system as a whole. In the treatment of the German Question, the elements of legality, conflict and cooperation overlapped and influenced the ultimate outcome towards a bipolar system. In the making of bipolarity, the elements of intervention and coexistence interacted in a 'pluralist plus' manner and prevented a systemic disruption of the settlement imposed by the superpowers. Germany, Europe and the international political system embarked on a process of polarisation as the result of superpower interaction. However, polarisation emerged within a legal and diplomatic framework which compelled the actors involved in the treatment of the German Question to achieve an effective and orderly transition from a quadripartite to a bipolar arrangement. This Rationalist framework tamed the effects derived from the state of tension produced by the clash of interests between the four occupying powers and enabled the transformation of Germany on the basis of the denazification of political life, the Europeanisation of its economic system (particularly in the Western zones) and the 'sovietisation' of Länder east of the Elbe.

An analysis of the treatment of the German Question cannot be divorced from the general context of inter-Allied relations. In the following chapters, I will tackle the general aspects of superpower interaction in regards to configuration of the post-war international order and examine to what extent these influenced the process of polarisation.

As well as referring to the abundant literature and published primary sources on the subject, including Soviet and French policy, this study has also exploited British government documents in the National Archives at Kew Gardens, London and US sources at the National Archives in College Park, Maryland. Time restrictions and the vast volume of potentially useful material available necessitated a selective process involving the examination of documents related to strategic policy and the diplomacy of the German Question. I have looked in great detail at the FO 371 and CAB 129 files at the National Archives in Kew Gardens and the Miscellaneous German Files 1943-5, the State Files (Lot), the Interdepartmental and intradepartmental Committee (State Department) SWNCC 1944-9, the Documents Series and the Interdepartmental & Intradepartmental Committee (State Department)-SWNCC-Decimal files 1944-49 in the National Archives in Washington, DC. It is worth mentioning that there is a considerable number of good primary material accessible online, which is especially useful when examining the legal and policy aspects of inter-Allied relations.¹⁸

Although I was able to come across some good secondary sources and published primary sources relating to the French and Soviet participation in the policy-making, diplomacy and occupation network, I did not use any sources from the Moscow and Paris Archives. The French Archives at Quai d'Orsay and the military archives at Colmar remain underworked. In the case of Soviet sources, there is a good number of published primary documents which

¹⁸ This is particularly true of American documents. The Truman Presidential Library www.trumanlibrary.org and the Roosevelt Presidential Library (<http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/>) provide very useful documents related to US policy during the latter stages of the war and the early Cold War. The National Security Archive (<http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/>) is a great source for primary documents related to US intelligence, particularly in regards to assessments of Soviet Union during the early period of the Cold War.. The Foreign Office has a collection of documents pertaining to the diplomatic relations between the main Allies in regards to Germany

reflect Moscow's thinking on inter-Allied relations in general and the treatment of the German Question in particular. These published sources are indicative of the mindset prevailing amongst the Soviet leaders and its influence on the treatment of the German Question and the configuration of the post-war international order.

Turning to the structure of the thesis, chapter 1 exposes the practical association between the Allies during World War Two, emphasising the Rationalist aspects of inter-Allied relations regarding the German Question and the creation of the post-war international order. Chapter 1 focuses on the spectrum of military, legal and diplomatic cooperation as well as the issues of dismemberment, occupation and reparations. Following from the Rationalist perspective outlined in chapter 1, the treatment of the German Question in relation to the way it influenced the creation of the 'primary institutions' of the post-war international society is charted in chapter 4. The application of diplomacy, international law and formation of the balance of power created an outcome for Germany and the post-war international order that was enforced through the instruments of intervention and coexistence. This overlap between intervention and co-existence explains the creation of a 'pluralist plus' international society following the aftermath of World War Two.

Chapters 2 and 3 tackle the Realist aspects of the treatment of the German Question parrying the theoretical debate on the origins of the Cold War against the interpretative framework of the English School. Chapter 2 examines how the conflictual elements involved in the treatment of the German Question influenced the bipolar outcome in the post-war

(<http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1007029395375>)

international order, exposing Soviet security concerns as the most important element in her policy regarding Germany and the American willingness to rehabilitate the Western zones as the engine of a free trade orientated Western European bloc. Chapter 3 exposes the socially-constructed dimension of the competitive struggle over Germany and the post-war international order and analyses the different aspects of its unfolding, with particular attention to developments at zonal level and the issue of the economic principles guiding the occupation process.

Chapters 5 and 6 bring to light the Revolutionist aspects of the German Question and its transformative influence on the post-war society of states. Chapter 5 focuses on the discontinuity with Nazism, achieved through the denazification of Germany. Chapter 5 establishes how these Revolutionist elements affected Germany's position in the international political system and how the outcome of the German Question transformed the post-war international order. Chapter 6 deals with the treatment of the German Question and its influence on the configuration of 'international society' in the aftermath of World War Two. The chapter highlights four transformations deriving from the treatment of the German Question: the political emasculation of Germany and Europe, the ideological divide as the driving force of the post-war international order and the expansion and institutionalisation of international society.

The conclusion will show that the interpretation of the origins of the Cold War benefits from a more systemic approach, linking the different aspects involved in the treatment of the German Question to the making of the Cold War international order. It will also illustrate that using an interdisciplinary approach, combining historical analysis and international

relations theory, enables us not only to realign the interpretations of the origins of the Cold War but also to refine the conceptual aspects of English School thinking having to with the trilateral approach and the pluralist-solidarist debate.

Chapter 1

The practical association framework between the Allies during World War Two

1.1 The nature of the practical association framework

The prosecution of the war and the treatment of the German Question motivated the configuration of a practical association framework shaped by a process of military, legal and diplomatic cooperation. This framework of cooperation extended to issues which although primarily concerned with Germany, also contributed to the formation of the post-war international order. Because of the eclectic nature of the Alliance and its interventionist approach, this associative framework operated under a ‘pluralist plus’ vision, permitting the Allies to cooperate on the vital issues, whilst allowing them room for independent political manoeuvre over a wide area of interests.

This practical association is best interpreted by using the normative approach characteristically associated with the English School. Oakeshott recognised two distinct modes of human association, *universitas* and *societas*. A *universitas* is an association of people united in the pursuit of a common objective. Its practices are ‘prudential’ in nature, designed to realise an end. Conversely, a *societas* constitutes a ‘moral’ relationship between free agents who jointly *acknowledge only the authority of certain conditions that are necessary to association and action* but otherwise leave those involved to pursue their own goals.¹ Nardin replicates Oakeshott’s model of human association on a global scale: international society is best seen

¹ See Oakeshott, M., *On Human Conduct* (Clarendon Press: Oxford) (1991)

as a *practical association* made up of states, each devoted to its own conception of good. For Nardin, the common good ‘resides not in the ends that some, or at times even most of its members may wish collectively to pursue, but in the values of justice, peace, security and co-existence, which can only be enjoyed through participation in a common body of authoritative practices’.²

The English School explores the moral possibilities of international society via the pluralist-solidarist debate.³ The normative approached espoused by Nardin is linked to the pluralist conception of international society. For pluralists like Bull, international relations are constituted through rational fixed principles of interaction and coexistence, such as sovereignty, diplomacy and international law, without the precondition of a common identity or culture. Jackson upholds the *societas* vision of international society, referring to the independence of states in order to endorse ‘jurisdictional pluralism’ as the constitutional basis of world politics, permitting states to compose their own ‘domestic values and orchestrate them in their own way’.⁴ Solidarists like Vincent stress substantial values and a common tradition as the normative foundation of international society based on the principle of solidarity and ethical universalism, with a special emphasis on human rights norms.⁵ He also argues that if states systematically and massively violated human rights ‘then there might fall to the international community a duty of humanitarian intervention’.⁶ This

² Nardin T., *Law, Morality and the Relations of States*, (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press) (1983) p. 19

³ See Wheeler, N.J., *Pluralist or Solidarist Conceptions of Humanitarian Intervention: Bull and Vincent on Humanitarian Intervention*, *Millennium, Journal of International Studies*, 21/2 (1992), Dunne, T., *Inventing International Society*, (New York : St. Martin’s Press in association with St. Antony’s College, Oxford) (1998) and Linklater, A., *The Transformation of Political Community: ethical foundations of the Post-Westphalian era* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, (1998)

⁴ Jackson, R., *The Political Theory of International Society* in Booth, K. and Smith S., *International Relations Theory Today*, (Polity Press: Cambridge) (1995), pp. 178-9

⁵ Vincent, R.J., *Human Rights and International Relations*, p. 126. See also Vincent, R.J., *Nonintervention and international order* (1974)

⁶ Vincent, R.J., *Human Rights and International Relations*, p. 127

view is also sustained by Walzer, who argues that humanitarian intervention is justified when it is a response to acts that 'shock the moral conscience of mankind'.⁷

For the Allies, the procedural *societas* described by Nardin would be crucial for the purposes of achieving a solid working arrangement in their treatment of the German Question during the 1943-8 period. The practical association put in place by the Allies applied the principle of intervention in a very pragmatic manner. As such, it fell short of creating a solidarist framework because it respected the diversity of interests in regards to the treatment of the German Question, the conduct in the war against the Axis and the kind of intervention needed for the purposes of restoring stability to international society.

At first glance, it could be said that the cultural affinity between Britain and America and the assiduous diplomatic intercourse and the law-making in which they were engaged, approximated that association to a purposive one. However, the United States expressed concerns about the Anglo-Soviet Treaty.⁸ Roosevelt stated his desire to bring about the dismantling of the British Empire. America had assigned a number of essential constraints on its Lend Lease aid to London. The President's conciliatory attitude towards Stalin at Teheran along with the perception in Washington of a convergence of interests between the Soviet Union and the United States after the war puts this relationship in the pluralist camp.

⁷ Walzer, M., *Just and Unjust Wars: a moral argument with historical illustrations* (London: Allen Lane) (1978) p. 107. A solidarist account of international society is also given by Wheeler, N., *Saving Strangers-Humanitarian Intervention in International Society*, (Oxford : Oxford University Press) (2000) chapter 1. See also, Falk, R., 'A New Paradigm for international Legal Studies: Prospects and Proposals' in Falk, R., Kratochwil, F. and Mendlovitz S., (ed) *International Law: A Contemporary Perspective* (Boulder, CO and London: Westview Press) (1985), pp. 651-702.

⁸ Telegram from the Foreign Office. *FRUS*, 1942, Europe, vol. III, 517-18

At the same time, the United States made a significant financial contribution to the Soviet war effort and the spirit of friendship between Washington and Moscow seemed to be at its highest during the Teheran Conference. At Teheran, Roosevelt entertained the idea of giving part of the American-British merchant fleet to the Soviet Union after the war and agreed with Stalin on a number of issues, including the demotion of France and decolonisation, particularly in relation to India.⁹ The two leaders discussed post-war organisation, agreeing at the behest of Stalin on 'the control of certain strong physical points either within Germany along German borders...to ensure that Germany would not embark on another course of aggression'.¹⁰ Furthermore, there seemed to be a convergence in regards to macroeconomics, which took root in America in the mid-1930s thanks to the introduction of the New Deal, the rise of Hitler and the increasingly conservative nature of the Stalinist regime. In a book published in 1946, Varga had suggested that the increased role played in the economy by the governments of the Western capitalist states might make possible the emergence of a limited form of economic planning in those economies after the war. With such planning, Varga contended, these economies might be able to avoid economic crises of the type that had caused the Great Depression in the 1930s.¹¹

Stalin was aware that after the war the Soviet Union would be in no condition for an early trial of strength with the Anglo-Americans, from whom, moreover, the Kremlin wanted

⁹ Roosevelt-Stalin meeting, November 28, 1943, Teheran. Bohlen minutes. *FRUS 1943, Conferences at Cairo and Teheran 1943*, pp. 482-6

¹⁰ Roosevelt-Stalin meeting, November 29, 1943, Teheran. Bohlen minutes. *FRUS 1943, Conferences at Cairo and Teheran 1943*, pp. 529-533

¹¹ See Varga, E., *Изменения в экономике капитализма в итоге второй мировой войны* (Changes in the Economy of Capitalism as a Result of the Second World War) (Moscow: Gospolitizdat) (1946)

various forms of economic aid. Other reasons were more subtle, but they too figured importantly in Soviet calculations.¹²

However, the divergent nature of the ideologies rendered impossible any purposive association between the Western powers and the Soviet Union. The Soviet system revolved around premises which were radically opposed to the worldview of the West. The Soviet Union curtailed freedom of expression, association and religion and its economy was planned at state level instead of relying on the market for the exchange of goods, capital and manpower. The convergence of interests was temporary, and the association, while solid for the duration of the war, was informed by the historical animosity between the two camps¹³ and the fact that America envisaged a free market reorganisation of the world economy. Tensions would arise towards the end of the war when the defeat of Germany appeared to be certain.

Nevertheless, the practical association produced an implicit principle of recognition of the Soviet system and a tacit differentiation, accepted by the Western Allies, between Hitlerism and Stalinism. Overy argues that the fundamental difference between the two dictatorships resides in the fact that whilst Stalin, in spite of internal economic dislocation and political repression, was fighting for the worldwide triumph of the underprivileged, Hitler remained convinced until the very end of the war about the idea of a racial empire.¹⁴ Stalin operated within a rational context. It could be argued that collectivisation and the purges of the 1930s

¹² See, for example, the long list of American 'enemies' of the Soviet Union provided by Ambassador Konstantin Oumanskii in a cable of 22 June 1941: *Sovetsko-amerikanskiye Otnosheniya vo Vremya Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voiny, 1941-1945. 1, 1941-1943* (Moscow: Politizdat) (1984), p. 42-44.

¹³ Ruotsila M., *British and American anticommunism before the Cold War*, (London and Portland, OR : Frank Cass) (2001), p. xiii

were carried out in order to protect the Soviet Union, encircled by the Western Powers. In contrast, and particularly after the German debacle in Stalingrad, Hitler was determined on setting Germany on a course of self-destruction. The Führer favoured the complete demise of Germany to any sort of compromise with the Allies. On March 1945, as the end of the Nazi regime approached, he told Albert Speer, minister for armaments, that there was no need

to consider the basis even of a most primitive existence [of Germany] any longer...it is better to destroy even that, and to destroy it ourselves. The nation had proved itself weak, and the future belongs solely to the stronger eastern nation. ¹⁵

The practical association imposed on the main Allies the responsibility for creating a post-war international system diametrically opposed to the ideology of the Axis and one in which Communism and democracy would be allowed to co-exist. In spite of the systemic conflict which loomed when the defeat of Germany became certain, the view of Stalin as a leader who pursued the national interest of the Soviet Union by rational means would survive the war. There was no 'cognitive closure' between the Allies ¹⁶ as they were fully aware of each other's intentions and interests; and most importantly the need to cooperate for achieving victory over the common enemy. Indeed, on August 15, 1941 Churchill and Roosevelt recognised

¹⁴ Overy, R., *The Dictators-Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Russia*, (Pimlico: London) (1995), p. 636

¹⁵ Bullock, A., *Hitler-A Study in Tyranny*, (Pelican Books Ltd.: Harmondsworth, Middx.) (1965), p. 774-5

¹⁶ See Lebow, R.N. , *Between Peace and War-The Nature of International Crisis*, (The John Hopkins University Press: Baltimore) (1981)

how vitally important to the defeat of Hitlerism is the brave and steadfast resistance of the Soviet Union...we feel therefore that we must not in any circumstances fail to act quickly and immediately in this matter on planning the program for the future allocation of our joint resources. ¹⁷

After the signing of the Anglo-Soviet treaty of 1942, Stalin informed Molotov that he hoped the United States would adhere to the pact, though he did not want Molotov to hint at that lest the British interpret the cue as 'disparagement of their role.' ¹⁸

Whilst at the core of the practical association framework there was a definite pluralist overtone, the creation of a post-war international society would have unprecedented solidarist elements attached to it, because it elevated the importance of intervention in the international political system through the military, legal and diplomatic cooperation and the comprehensive treatment of the German Question. This chapter will now proceed to describe the elements that defined the practical association and examine their influence on the making of the post-war international order.

1.2 Military cooperation

The framework of military cooperation forged between the Allies emerged as a result of the Axis' campaigns in Europe and East Asia. The Tripartite Pact of September 27, 1940, which called for the political, economic and military co-operation between Germany, Japan and

¹⁷ Joint declaration Churchill-Roosevelt, *Department of State Bulletin*, November 8, 1941 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office) (1941)

¹⁸ Document 58, cable, Stalin to Molotov, 25 May 1942, in Rzheshesky, O. A. (Ed), *Voina i Diplomatiya* p. 141.

Italy,¹⁹ prompted the unfolding of an extensive military collaboration network between Britain and the United States. The Soviet Union would join the framework of military cooperation upon the launching of the German invasion on June 1941. Overall strategy for the defeat of Germany evolved through a policy framework which had profound implications for the shaping of the post-war international political system. This included the policy of the unconditional surrender of Germany, the strategic bombing of the German homeland and the cross-channel invasion of Nazi-occupied Europe. Major tensions arose between the Allies from the pursuit of these policies. The unfolding of the war gave rise to the possibility of a separate peace with Germany, which had proven to be a resilient enemy. Moreover, the failure of the Western Allies to open a Second Front in the European continent until 1944 made the Soviets apprehensive about their association with the Western Allies.

However, the ultimate success of the Allied effort in the war was based on a framework of action that was generally cohesive and extremely efficient. On the eve of the Casablanca Conference, and notwithstanding some apprehension by Churchill, Roosevelt was favourable to conferring with the Soviets on military matters. The President stated the need

to sit down at the table with the Russians. My notion would be a conference in Cairo or Moscow: that each of us would be represented by a small group meeting very secretly [and] that the conclusions of the conference would of course be approved by the three of us.²⁰

¹⁹ Tripartite Pact between Italy and Japan, September 27, 1940, <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/wwii/triparti.htm>

²⁰ Roosevelt to Churchill, November 25, 1942, *FRUS 1942, The Conference at Washington 1941-2 and Casablanca 1943*, p. 489

Roosevelt also suggested a tripartite meeting with Stalin in order to satisfactorily get to the vital strategic conclusions that the military situation required.²¹

Roosevelt entertained the idea of 'Four Policemen' (the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and China) which virtually alone among the nations of the world should have significant military establishments in order to enforce the peace. Stalin appeared to be to enthusiastic about this idea

Roosevelt's statements on preserving peace after the war are absolutely correct. One cannot doubt that without the creation of an association of the armed forces of England, the United States [and] the Soviet Union able to forestall aggression, it will not be possible to preserve peace in the future.²²

Cooperation was consolidated at the Moscow Conference of October 30, 1943 where the Allies issued the Declaration of Four Nations on General Security.²³ Roosevelt entertained the idea of Although the practical association lacked an overall military command involving the Soviet Union, at the Cairo Conference (SEXTANT) on November 1943, the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) agreed that the Chinese and Soviet representatives be invited to attend meetings of the CCS in matters concerning the fronts in which they had a vested interested. Furthermore, it was also agreed that at the forthcoming Teheran Conference (EUREKA), the Soviet representative would attend all meetings.²⁴

²¹ Roosevelt to Churchill, December 2, 1942, *The Conference at Washington 1941-2 and Casablanca 1943* FRUS 1942 *Casablanca*, p. 494

²² Document No. 84, Unsigned cable (but Stalin's) to Molotov, 1 June 1942 ,in Rzheshesky, O. A. (Ed), *Voyna i Diplomatiya: Dokumenty, Kommentarii (1941-1942)* (Moscow: Nauka) (1997) p. 192

²³ Joint Four Power Declaration, Moscow Conference, October, 1943-
<http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1943/431000a.html>

²⁴ Meeting of the CCS, Cairo, November 22, 1943. FRUS, Conferences at Cairo and Teheran 1943, p. 304-7

Of central significance to inter-allied cooperation was the policy of the unconditional surrender of Germany, which had its antecedent in the 'Europe First' policy endorsed by the Roosevelt administration. The President was adamant in his determination to achieve an Allied victory in 'Europe First' (as agreed in the Atlantic Conference of August 1941) and rejected calls for the 'Pacific First' alternative, outlined by Admiral Ernest King and General George Marshall in July 1942, on the grounds that it would engage American troops on islands whose occupation would not change the war situation in favour of the Allies.²⁵ The 'Europe First' policy had profound implications for the political repositioning of the post-war international order. Concentrating on the war effort in Europe ensured that Germany would be the main battleground for the realignment of the post-war international order. The 'Europe First' policy consolidated the framework of practical association because it fulfilled the American commitment to assist her main European Allies. At this stage of the war, the Soviet Union (and Britain) were still bearing the brunt of the fighting and resistance to the Axis forces in Europe, and if Germany were to prevail in their quest to dominate Europe, its potential domination of the Continent would have rendered her capable of extending its sway to Asia and facilitate the collapse of the Allied war effort in the Pacific.

The call for the 'unconditional surrender' of Germany, made at the Casablanca Conference of January-February 1943, exercised a factor of unity amongst the Allies as it reassured the Soviet Union that ideological diversity with the Western Allies would not disrupt the associative framework put in place.

On February 12 the participants stated that

all the United Nations say-that the only terms on which we shall deal with an Axis government or any Axis factions are the terms proclaimed at Casablanca: 'Unconditional Surrender' In our uncompromising policy we mean no harm to the common people of the Axis nations. But we do mean to impose punishment and retribution in full upon their guilty, barbaric leaders... ²⁶

Whenever he was asked for clarification on what the doctrine meant in specific terms, Roosevelt usually responded with an analogy from the American Civil War: 'Lee was made to surrender to Grant unconditionally, but he was then treated fairly and his men were allowed to keep their horses'. In other words, after they surrendered, the German people would receive fair treatment from the Allies. ²⁷

In spite of the initial reticence on the part of Stalin (he formally signed it in Yalta) and some doubts on the part of Churchill, ²⁸ the call for the unconditional surrender of Germany (unprecedented in military terms) established a common goal between the Allies: the main Axis power in Europe, once rid of Nazism, would be the main pawn in the reshaping of the post-war international order and it would be the members of the Alliance which would decide what that political order would look like.

By fighting for the unconditional surrender of Germany, the Allies sought to create a new international order, in which Prussian militarism and Nazism would have no place. It also implied the elimination of the *Grossdeutschland* geopolitical space won by the German forces

²⁵ Stoler M. and Gustafson M. (Ed.), *Major Problems in the History of World War Two*, (Houghton Mifflin Co.: Boston and New York) (2003) p.88-9

²⁶ Casablanca Declaration, February 12, 1943- <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/wwii/casablan.htm>

²⁷ As Casey points out, Roosevelt did make some efforts to reassure the German people that he would only hold Nazi leaders responsible for the war. See Casey, S. *Franklin D. Roosevelt, Ernest 'Putzi' Hanfstaengl and the 'S-Project*, June 1942-June 1944, *Journal of Contemporary History* 35 (July 2000): 339-59.

²⁸ See Balfour, M., *Another Look at 'Unconditional Surrender'*, *International Affairs*, Vol 46, no. 4, October 1970, p. 728

on the battlefield,²⁹ and the organisation of Europe as a racially-based German-dominated political and economic conglomerate capable of being a permanent threat to the Soviet Union, the British Empire and the United States. The effect of the stringent terms of the German surrender was to destroy not just the philosophy which twice disrupted the stability of the international political system during the twentieth century but also to arrest the potential re-emergence of Germany as a centralising force which could propel Europe as a single unified power juxtaposed to the systemic interests of the main Allies.³⁰

The possibility of a separate peace with Germany informed the spectrum of practical association.³¹ A possible peace deal between Britain and Germany would have left Germany as the most powerful nation in Europe, something which would have been potentially detrimental for British interests. It would have also meant a reversal in the British policy of not allowing any dominant power to have control of mainland Europe. Although Britain would have probably remained independent from American influence, the hypothetical

²⁹ The July 1944 Plot against Hitler (Operation Valkyrie) is a significant milestone in the unfolding of the post-war international order. It is highly likely that the plotters would have been able to retain some of the territorial gains made in the East, and/or, that they would have played the Soviet Union and the Western Allies against each other, therefore retaining a degree of political independence. There was very little support from the United States or Britain for the German resistance due to, in no small degree, to the fact that by July 1944 the Big Three had already established the foundations of a post-war international order in which Germany would have a subordinate position. See Hoffman, P., *Stauffenberg: A Family History, 1905-1944* (Cambridge University Press) (1995), Moorhouse R., *Killing Hitler: the plots, the assassins, and the dictator who cheated death* (New York: Bantam Books) (2006), Wheeler-Bennett, J. and Overly, R., *The Nemesis of Power: German Army in Politics, 1918-1945* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan Publishing Company) (1968). Hoffmann, P., *Stauffenberg und der 20. Juli 1944*. (München: C.H.Beck) (1998). Burleigh, M., *The Third Reich: A New History*. (Macmillan: Basingstoke) (2000) and Baigent, M. and Leigh, R., *Secret Germany-Stauffenberg and the mystical crusade against Hitler* (Arrow Books: Random House) (2006)

³⁰ For more on 'unconditional surrender' see Campbell, 'Franklin Roosevelt and Unconditional Surrender' in Langhorne, R., (ed.), *Diplomacy and intelligence during the Second World War: essays in honour of F.H. Hinsley*, Reynolds, D., *Churchill the Appeaser?* in Dockrill, M., and McKercher, B., (ed.) *Diplomacy and world power: studies in British foreign policy, 1890-1950* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press) (1996) and Murphy, R., *Diplomat Among Warriors* (London, 1964)

³¹ An episode that has captivated the imagination of historians is the voyage of Rudolph Hess, the Führer's Deputy, to Britain for a possible armistice between Britain and Germany in 1941. This possible armistice would have included a pledge by Hitler to allow Britain to keep its Empire See Picknett, L., Prince, C. and Prior, S., Brydon, R., *Double Standards-The Rudolph Hess Cover Up* (London: Paperback) (2001)

scenario of a less savagely managed but German-dominated Europe based on the *Geopolitik* concept of Haushoffer,³² would have been largely adverse to British interests in the long run. Moreover, the wave of decolonisation had already swept through the main parts of the British Empire.

Unconditional surrender also provided the Allies with the opportunity to reassure each other that there would not be a repeat of the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact. In September 1942 British intelligence intercepted telegrams containing references to 'a separate peace between Germany and Russia'.³³ In November 1942 Peter Kleist, a personal friend of the German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop, had been sent to Stockholm to broach the possibility of a separate peace between Berlin and Moscow. In addition, the propaganda machinery of Dr Joseph Goebbels had started to refrain from making as many references to the 'Jewish-Bolshevik menace'. As late as April 1943 'well-informed' sources in Sweden were predicting an imminent Russo-German peace.³⁴

Stalin also believed that Britain and America could conclude a separate peace with Germany, a fear which towards the end of the war had inspired a change in Soviet strategy. The most eloquent manifestation of this fear was the Soviet determination to take Berlin first. On March 29, 1945, Stalin showed Marshall Georgii Zhukov, in charge of the final assault into Berlin, a letter from an informant describing clandestine meetings between German agents and Western Allies representatives in Berne, where the Nazis offered a separate peace. The mistrust grew as the Red Army pushed deep into Germany. On April 16, 1945 a captured

³² See Dorpalen, A., *World of General Haushofer: Geopolitics in Action, 1942* (Farrar & Rinehart: New York, Toronto) (1942) Also, Heske, H., *Karl Haushofer: his role in German politics and in Nazi politics*, Political Geography 6 (1987), p. 135-144., Mattern, J., *Geopolitik: Doctrine of National Self-Sufficiency and Empire* (The Johns Hopkins Press: Baltimore) (1942) and Beukema, Col. H. 'Introduction' *The World of General Haushofer* (Farrar & Rinehart, Inc.: New York) (1984)

³³ Bassett, R., *Hitler's Chief Spy-The Wilhelm Canaris Mystery*, (Cassell: London) (2005) p. 251

³⁴ Bassett, R., *Hitler's Chief Spy*, p. 253-4

German soldier claimed that the remnant of the German forces had been instructed 'to open the gates in the West and to stem the tide in the East'.³⁵ Stalin's fears were reinforced when he learned that Churchill had issued instructions to Eisenhower not to destroy captured Nazi weaponry as they would be needed in order to rearm Germany. Moreover, the Soviet Union began to build defensive installations in Austria, including anti-aircraft facilities, at the time when an operative German Air Force had ceased to exist.³⁶

In the latter stages of the war, Allen Dulles, stationed in Berne at the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), was approached by SS Obergruppenführer Karl Wolff about an armistice in Northern Italy. The Soviets were excluded from the meetings with Wolff, alluding to the fear that the Germans might want to withdraw any offer to surrender. Stalin clearly feared a separate peace between Germany and the Western Allies and a possible rearmament of the Wehrmacht. He was also worried about the large numbers of German troops surrendering along the Western front, thus giving rise to the possibility that the Western Allies might reach Berlin before the Red Army.³⁷

The prospect of a separate peace between the Western Allies and Germany seemed illogical rather than impossible. A separate peace would have certainly meant a severe escalation of conflict between the Allies and the Soviet Union. It would have probably led to a fully-fledged alliance between Germany and the Western Allies on an equal status, which would have contradicted the purpose of the involvement of the United States in the European war, centered to a significant extent around its economic interests in the continent. 'Unconditional surrender' had a dimension which extended beyond the military sphere as it

³⁵ Kennedy-Pipe, C., *Stalin's cold war: Soviet strategies in Europe, 1943 to 1956* (Manchester: Manchester University Press) (1995) p. 64-5

³⁶ Kennedy-Pipe, C., *Stalin's Cold War*, p. 65

³⁷ Beevor, A., *Berlin-The Downfall 1945*, (Penguin Books: London) (2004) p. 142

signified the surrender of the German state to the Allies. Because of the confluence of interests between the main Allies in the 'total and unconditional surrender' by the Wehrmacht *and* the Third Reich, the chances of a separate peace seemed very improbable as the two emerging superpowers would benefit enormously from the political emasculation of Germany and Europe.

Unity of purpose in the pursuit of the war was also achieved by the opening of the Mediterranean front and the bombing campaign against Germany, which acted as a 'second front' in the fight against the Axis. The Italian Campaign, operationally responsible for all Allied land forces in the Mediterranean theatre, planned and commanded the invasion of Sicily and the campaign on the Italian mainland until the surrender of German forces in Italy in May 1945, diverting an important number of German forces away from the Eastern Front.³⁸ A pivotal role in the war against Germany was also assigned to the Anglo-American Strategic Air Force, which had the aim of destroying the German war machine and paving the way for a cross channel invasion. Sir Charles Portal, British Air Force Chief, was given the task of coordinating it. On January 21, 1943 the CCS issued the Casablanca Directive which stated that the objective of the Combined Bombing Operations (CBO) was

the destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system and the undermining of the morale of the German people to the point where their capacity for armed

³⁸ It is estimated that between September 1943 and April 1945 some 90,000 Allied and 110,000 German soldiers died in Italy. See Orgill, D., *The Gothic Line*, (The Autumn Campaign in Italy 1944) (London: Heinemann) p. 6. It should be noted that in Blaxland, G., *Alexander's Generals (the Italian Campaign 1944-1945)* (London: William Kimber & Co) (1979), p 11, Blaxland quotes 59,151 Allied deaths between 3 September 1943 and 2 May 1945. For more on the Italian Campaign see Muhm, G., 'La Tattica tedesca nella Campagna d'Italia' in Montemaggi, A., *Linea Gotica avanposto dei Balcani?* (Edizioni Civitas), Carver, *The Imperial War Museum Book of the War in Italy 1943-1945* (London: Sidgwick & Jackson) (2001)

resistance is fatally weakened.³⁹

The Casablanca Directive earmarked for the destruction of German submarine construction yards, aircraft industry, transportation, oil plants and other targets in the German war industry.⁴⁰ The CBO was implemented by the Pointblank Directive, agreed between Roosevelt and Churchill during the Washington Conference of May 11, 1943. The Pointblank Directive resulted in air offensives against Berlin, Hamburg and the Ruhr, and raids on Schweinfurt and Dresden. The strategic bombing of the German homeland dealt a severe blow to civil morale in Germany and the Reich's capacity to sustain the war effort. As Albert Speer, German Minister of Armaments, states in his memoirs, the attack of 935 daylight bombers of the US Eight Air Force upon several fuel plants in central and eastern Germany in May 1944 indicated 'the end of German armaments production'.⁴¹

Although some doubts have been cast on the real usefulness of the CBO,⁴² the air front played a significant role in the defeat of Germany. Allied air attacks forced Germany to dedicate vast amounts of manpower and resources to continental air defense, reducing the Germans' ability to fully support land operations. By 1944 over 800,000 Germans were committed to air defense, including the crews of about 54,000 antiaircraft guns.⁴³ In 1944 more than half of Germany's industrial base was working to satisfy the Luftwaffe's needs.

³⁹ Neumann, W., *Making The Peace 1941-5-The Diplomacy of the Wartime Conferences*, (Washington, D.C: Foundation for Foreign Affairs) (1950) p. 42-3

⁴⁰ Stoler M. and Gustafson M. (Ed.), *Major Problems in the History of World War Two*, p. 115

⁴¹ Speer, A., *Inside the Third Reich*, (Avid Books: New York) (1970) p. 445

⁴² Hastings cites Sir Henry Tizard, chairman of the Aeronautical Research Committee, 'The actual effort expended on bombing Germany, in manpower and resources, was greater than the value in manpower and resources of the damage caused'. Hastings himself is of the view that 'the bomber offensive partly fulfilled 'useful purposes for the Allied effort'. See Hastings, M., *Bomber Command*, (Pan Macmillan: London) (1999), p. 349-352

⁴³ Beaumont, R., 'The Bomber Offensive as a Second Front', *Journal of Contemporary History* 22 (January 1987) , p. 15

Albert Speer estimated that 30 percent of artillery, 20 percent of heavy ammunition, and over 50 percent of electronics production were dedicated to air defense, depriving frontline ground forces of critical antitank munitions and communications equipment.⁴⁴ When asked by Stalin on the destruction caused by the tactical air force, Marshall stated that German oil production had been reduced to approximately 20% of its capacity due to the Allied bombing.⁴⁵ The air bombing campaign had an important reassuring effect on inter-allied relations as it achieved the destruction of German cities and important distribution centres for the Eastern Front like Dresden.

The creation of the Second Front was the most significant element in the spectrum of military cooperation amongst the Allies. Less than a month after Germany invaded the Soviet Union in 1941, Stalin informed Churchill that 'the military position of the Soviet Union, and that of Great Britain, would be significantly improved if the Allies opened fronts against Hitler in the West and in the North'.⁴⁶ The issue of the Second Front had profound political implications for the configuration of the post-war international system as it raised the spectrum of a Soviet Europe as well as a possible permanent American presence in Europe.⁴⁷

In August 1942, conversations between Churchill and Stalin were marked by Soviet bitterness when Churchill broke the news of the cancellation of the European invasion. Stalin insisted on a European invasion and spoke of the failure on the part of Britain and the

⁴⁴ Davis, R., *Carl A. Spaatz and the Air War in Europe* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1993), p. 590

⁴⁵ First Plenary meeting February 4, 1945, FRUS Conferences at Malta and Yalta, p. 577

⁴⁶ Fischer, L., *The Road to Yalta* (New York: Harper & Row) (1972), p. 14

⁴⁷ For more on the issues related on the Second Front see Botting, D., *The Second Front*, (Alexandria, Va.: Time-Life Books, (1978), Young, E., *That Second Front: A Survey of Strategic and Political factors*, (London: W. H. Allen) (1942) and Hastings, M., *Overlord: D-Day and the Battle for Normandy*, (London : Joseph) (1984)

United States to open a second front as detrimental for the Soviet Union. Also, the plans for an American-British air raid on the Caucasus (Operation VELVET), should Soviet resistance to the Germans in Southern Russia collapse, were slow in reaching the practical stage,⁴⁸ and were permanently shelved after the Soviets breached the siege of Stalingrad. At the same time, Britain and the United States were haunted by the fear that the Soviet Union would desert the alliance and make peace with Germany.⁴⁹ These concerns are indicative of the nature of the military alliance which the Allies put in place during the war. Whilst political manoeuvring and technical difficulties slowed the opening of the second front, the Allies were aware of the need to preserve the alliance and to forge ahead for the defeat of the common enemy. At the same time, the delay in the launching of the Second Front strengthened the Soviet position in regards to post-war territorial realignments. By early 1943 the Soviets managed to repel the German attack on Stalingrad without the help of Allied air raid. This gave rise to the self-sufficient attitude of the Soviets and a growing political independence from the Western Allies.

Nevertheless, the North African landings (Operation TORCH), mainly made up of British, American and Free French components, enhanced the unity of purpose amongst the Allies. The situation in North Africa had taken a decisive turn in favour of the Axis after Marshall Erwin Rommel's victories in Libya in April 1941. A North African full scale strategy on the part of Germany would have probably resulted in the Axis taking control of Egypt, the Caucasus, the route to India and the Bulge of Africa, thus destroying Lend Lease convoys and prompting the possibility of an invasion of the Western Hemisphere. This threat was

⁴⁸ Neumann, W., *Making The Peace 1941-5-The Diplomacy of the Wartime Conferences*, p. 39-40

⁴⁹ Armstrong, A., *Unconditional Surrender-The Impact of the Casablanca Policy upon World War II*, (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press) (1961) p. 8

acknowledged by Roosevelt in July 1942, when he approved the invasion of North Africa ⁵⁰

The opening of the North African front was supported by Stalin during his meeting Churchill in Moscow in 1942, adding that it would 'hit Rommel in the back', 'overawe Spain', 'produce fighting between the Germans and Frenchmen in France' and 'expose Italy to the whole brunt of the war'. ⁵¹ The invasion of North Africa established a military foothold within striking distance from the European continent and produced some significant political results. Free France was declared by America and Britain as the legitimate government of France. Hitler invaded Vichy France, which failed to protect such an important strategic theatre. Most importantly, it made the prospect of a second front in Europe more real to the Soviet Union and provided the American and British armies with the first important breakthrough of the conflagration.

The cross channel landing in Normandy on June 6, 1944 (Operation OVERLORD) consolidated the relationship between the Big Three. Long term plans for the cross-channel invasion of France had been drawn up by British Joint Planning staff as early as September 1941 (Operation Roundup) but serious discussion started with the American entry into the war. A combined Anglo-American headquarters (COSSAC) was established in Britain in April 1943 under General Sir Frederick Morgan to co-ordinate planning and deception plans in order to monitor the German response to a cross channel invasion (Operation Jael and

⁵⁰ Roosevelt's Memorandum for Harry Hopkins, General Marshall and Admiral King-July 16, 1942. Quoted in *The Hinge of Fate*, Churchill, W., *The Second World War*, p. 363-5. The failure of Germany to seize control of the Mediterranean theatre has been cited as a main cause for the loss of the war. See Alexander, B., *How Hitler Could Have Won World War II-The Fatal Errors that Led to Nazi Defeat*, (Three Rivers Press: New York) (2000) and Keegan, J., *How Hitler Could Have Won the War* in Cowley, R., (ed.) *What If? Military Historians Imagine What Might Have Been* (Pan Books: London) (2001)

⁵¹ Churchill, W., *The Hinge of Fate*, p. 394. For more on the North African landings see Matloff, M. and Snell, E., *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare 1941-1942 (United States Army in World War II. The War Department)* (Washington, 1953), Sherwood, R., *Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History* (New York: Harper & Brothers (1948); Stimson H. and Bundy, M., *On Active Service in Peace and War* (New York: Harper & Brothers) (1948);

later Bodyguard).

At the Tehran Conference of 1943 the Big Three agreed to a cross-channel invasion of Western Europe by May 1, 1944, as well as a simultaneous military operation in Southern France and a Soviet offensive to prevent the transfer of German troops from the Eastern to the Western front.⁵² The priority of OVERLORD as the core strategy for winning the war was also reiterated at SEXTANT, prior to the meeting with the Soviets in Teheran.⁵³ The planning of OVERLORD was handed over to the newly appointed Supreme Allied Commander, US General Dwight Eisenhower at his headquarters in London. Operational command was given to General Sir Bernard Montgomery. The Allies committed massive strategic and tactical naval and air forces including a fleet of 5,000 ships under the command of Admiral Sir Bertrand Ramsay and 13,000 aircraft under the command of Air Chief Marshal Tedder. Although the political decision on the European Second Front had been taken at EUREKA,⁵⁴ the military execution of OVERLORD was the Alliance's finest hour. A week after the landing, Stalin would state in Pravda that 'the history of wars does not know of an undertaking comparable to it for breadth of conception, grandeur of scale, and mastery of execution'.⁵⁵ Churchill would later comment that at that juncture of the war 'harmony was complete'.⁵⁶

Churchill, W., *The Hinge of Fate* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company) (1950) and Bryant, A., *The Turn of the Tide* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company) (1957)

⁵² Military Conclusions of the Teheran Conference, December 1, 1943. FRUS 1943, the Cairo and Teheran Conferences 1943, p. 652

⁵³ Meeting of the CCS with Roosevelt and Churchill, Cairo, November 24 1943. FRUS, Conferences at Cairo and Teheran 1943, p. 329-34

⁵⁴ Stoler, M., *The Politics of the Second Front-American Military Planning and Diplomacy in Coalition Warfare, 1941-3*, p. 155

⁵⁵ Werth, A., *Russia at War 1941-1945*, (Pan Books Ltd.: London) (1964) p. 766

⁵⁶ Churchill, W., *History of the Second World War*, Vol 6, p. 10

The issue of the 'Second Front' in Europe provided the framework of practical association with a major source of tension. However, the failure to launch an attack on Northern Europe until the execution of OVERLORD in 1944 did not harm the unity of purpose of the Allies. The bombing campaign on Germany, the landings in North Africa and the Italian campaign had a significant role in achieving the ultimate defeat of Germany and providing the association framework with a spirit of cooperation that would contribute to a good working environment for the creation of a post-war international order. The Allies realised in spite of the conflictual aspects of the relationship that maintaining the practical association would be in the interest of all the parties concerned. This realisation enabled them to engage in a process of diplomatic, legal and financial cooperation which facilitated their victory against Axis forces and brought about the emergence of a post-war international order capable of catering to the interests of all its members.

1.3 Legal and diplomatic cooperation

The military alliance was galvanised by a concomitant process of intense inter-Allied diplomatic co-operation. The main medium for the diplomatic intercourse which occurred during this period were the several conferences organised and attended by the main members of the Allied coalition. This diplomatic engagement provided the Allies with the opportunity to develop a legal framework for the discussion of policy concerning the prosecution of the war against Germany and the realignment of the post-war international order.

During the Atlantic Conference of August 1941 the United States and Britain, both with considerable vested interests in the Pacific theatre, agreed on a common diplomatic and military stance in response to the Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere declaration made by the Japanese Empire on July 1941.⁵⁷ The Japanese declaration issued a statement of intent to Britain, America, France and the Netherlands as to Tokyo's geopolitical aspirations in East Asia and made imminent the possibility of military conflict in the Pacific Rim.⁵⁸

The Atlantic Charter established the commitment of America and Britain to fight against the German quest for the domination of Europe and sketched the principles of a new international order which included the prohibition for countries to seek 'aggrandizement, territorial or other', or 'territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned'. Most notably, it indicated 'the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live', guaranteed access 'to the trade and to the raw materials of the world' as well as the freedom to use the 'high seas and oceans without hindrance'.⁵⁹ The principles established by the Atlantic Charter were favourably received by the member-states of the ever expanding alliance. At the Inter-Allied Meeting in London on September 24 1941, the governments of Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia, and representatives of

⁵⁷ The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (announced by Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yosuke on August 1, 1940) was an attempt by Japan to create a self-sufficient bloc of Asian nations led by the Japanese Empire and free from the Western powers. The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere was to be established for the extension of Japanese economic power and the acquisition of an empire based on European models, though ostensibly free from Western imperialism. For more on the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere see Lebra, J., C. (ed.). *Japan's Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in World War II: Selected Readings and Documents*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press) (1975), Morley, J. W. (ed). *Japan's Road to the Pacific War- The Fateful Choice: Japan's Advance into Southeast Asia, 1939-1941*, (New York: Columbia University Press) (1980), McCoy, A. W., *Southeast Asia under Japanese Occupation*, (New Haven, CT: Yale University SE Asian Studies) (1980)

⁵⁸ Wilson, T., *The first summit: Roosevelt and Churchill at Placentia Bay, 1941*, (Kansas City: University Press of Kansas, (1991) p. 82-5

⁵⁹ The Atlantic Charter, August 14, 1941-<http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/facts/democrac/53.htm>

General Charles de Gaulle, leader of the Free French, unanimously adhered to the common principles of policy set forth in the Atlantic Charter.

The Conference of December 1941 (ARCADIA), solidified the Alliance by crafting the United Nations Declaration. It also created the CCS system and placed all Allied war production allocation under the control of the military, establishing the speedy flow of Lend Lease to the Soviet Union and China. Moreover, it propelled the expansion of the industrial and military growth of the United States, which would be crucial for the ultimate victory of the Alliance.⁶⁰ The Declaration of the United Nations of January 1, 1942 was signed by the main Allies, including the United States, the United Kingdom and the Dominions, the Soviet Union and China. It subscribed to the aims of the Atlantic Charter while pledging to 'employ its full resources, military or economic, against those members of the Tripartite Pact and its adherents with which such government is at war' and to 'co-operate with the Governments signatory hereto and not to make a separate armistice or peace with the enemies'. The Declaration was open to 'other nations [...] rendering material assistance and contributions in the struggle for victory over Hitlerism'.⁶¹ The Declaration is highly significant not only because of its content but also in regards to its timing. By 1942 the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union were at war against the Axis and the good run of the enemy's forces in all the theatres of the war prompted the Allies to provide the practical association framework with a well-defined legal structure.

The Declaration also had the purpose of binding the different constituents of the Allies together in common purpose and to create the nucleus for a post-war international society

⁶⁰ Bercuson, D. and Herwig H., *One Christmas at Washington-Churchill and Roosevelt forge the Grand Alliance*, (Phoenix Paperbacks: London) (2006), p. 274

⁶¹ Declaration by the United Nations, January 1, 1942-
civicwebs.com/cwvlib/.../un/e_united_nations_declaration_1942.htm

which would cater to the interests of the members of the Alliance, irrespective of their geographical location or their internal political system. The spirit of the Declaration was described by President Roosevelt, who addressed the US Congress on the following terms

We are fighting on the same side with the British people, who fought alone for long, terrible months and withstood the enemy with fortitude and tenacity and skill...We are fighting on the same side with the Russian people who have seen the Nazi hordes swarm up to the very gates of Moscow and who, with almost superhuman will and courage, have forced the invaders back into retreat...We are fighting on the same side as the brave people of China...We are fighting on the same side as all the other governments in exile...But we of the United Nations are not making all of this sacrifice of human effort and human lives to return to the kind of world we had after the last world war. ⁶²

On September 24, 1942, the Soviet government notified London and Washington that 'a consistent application of those principles will secure the most energetic support on the part of the Government and People of the Soviet Union'. ⁶³

The war against the Axis was undoubtedly won with the support of the gigantic industrial and financial network set up by the United States upon the country's entry into the war. The main instrument of financial co-operation between the Allies was the Lend Lease Act. ⁶⁴

⁶² FDR Annual Message to Congress January 6, 1942, <http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1942/420106a.html>

⁶³ Quoted in Holsti, K., *Peace and War: Armed Conflict and International Order 1648-1989* (Cambridge University Press) (1991), p. 243

⁶⁴ Lend Lease Act March 11, 1941- <http://www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq59-23.htm> . This program is seen as a decisive step away from American isolationism since the end of World War I and towards international involvement. Thomas E. Dewey said that the bill 'would abolish the congress for all practical purposes' and incidentally eliminate free government in the United States. Liberal Senator Hiram Johnson called it 'monstrous'. The CIO opposed the measure because it gave the president power to ban strikes and otherwise ignore labor legislation in the new and converted factories that would produce the weaponry. The Chicago Tribune even called Lend Lease 'the Dictator Bill'. See Fleming, T., *The New Dealers' War: F.D.R. And The War Within World War Two* (Basic Books, 2001). For more on the Lend Lease see Allen, R.G.D., *Mutual Aid between the US and the British Empire, 1941-5*, in *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society* no. 109 :3, 1946. pp 243-77, Clarke, R., *Anglo-American Economic Collaboration in War and Peace, 1942-1949* (Oxford: Oxford University Press) (1982), Dawson, R. H. *The Decision to Aid Russia, 1941: Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics* (1959), Dobson, Alan P. *U.S. Wartime Aid to Britain, 1940-1946* (London: Croom Helm) (1986), Herring, G. *Aid to Russia, 1941-1946: Strategy, Diplomacy, the Origins of the Cold War* (New York: Columbia University Press) (1973), Kimball, W. F., *The*

Prior to its passage into law, Roosevelt traded fifty over-age destroyers in return for bases, diverted to England orders for arms placed for US forces and explored every possible device for circumventing the restrictive provisions of American neutrality legislation.⁶⁵ The US Congress passed the Lend Lease Act on March 11, 1941 enabling Roosevelt access to \$ 7 billion to be designated to any of the 47 countries whose defence he deemed vital for the security of the United States.⁶⁶

Though Lend Lease had been authorised primarily to aid Great Britain, it was extended to China in April 1941, to the Soviet Union in September 1941, and eventually to 35 different countries. Much of the aid, valued at about \$49 billion by the time the program was terminated in August 1945, amounted to outright gifts, although some of the costs were offset by reverse Lend Lease, under which Allied nations gave US troops stationed abroad about \$8 billion worth of aid.

During World War Two Britain received \$ 27 billion worth of Lend Lease aid from the United States (without cash payments), providing in return \$ 6 billion worth of Reverse Lend-Lease. The extension of economic assistance to Britain was qualified by political concerns. The Anglo-American Mutual Aid Agreement of February 28, 1942⁶⁷ was meant to restrain London's political and economic independence in the post-war international order. The Roosevelt administration was adamant in their determination to dismantle the imperial structures that hampered free trade and would have restricted American access to

Most Unsordid Act: Lend-Lease, 1939-1941 (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University) (1969), Reynolds, D., *The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance 1937-1941: A Study on Competitive Cooperation* (London: Europa) (1981) and Weiss, S. L.; *The President's Man: Leo Crowley and Franklin Roosevelt in Peace and War* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press) (1996).

⁶⁵ The Neutrality Act and Johnson Act prohibited loans to countries in default to the United States.

⁶⁶ Martel, Leon, *Lend-lease, loans, and the coming of the Cold War: a study of the implementation of foreign policy*, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press) (1979) p.4

⁶⁷ Anglo-American Mutual Aid Agreement- <http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1942/420223b.html>

new markets. Lend Lease to Britain was subject to not letting Britain trade articles obtained on aid for the recovery of her export trade.⁶⁸

Conversely, American financial aid to the Soviet Union was extended on the knowledge that the Soviet war effort was pivotal to military success in the war and therefore less subject to political considerations. Prevailing uncertainties in Soviet-American relations and the need for Moscow's support in the defeat of the Axis made Roosevelt and his Soviet Protocol Committee determined to continue with its *unconditional aid policy*.⁶⁹ In July 1941, the US administration sent Harry Hopkins to Moscow to report on the Russian front and to discuss the supply of American aid to the Soviet Union. On September 28-30, 1941, Averell Harriman, the American administrator of the Lend Lease to the Soviet Union, accompanied by a number of American officials, arrived in Moscow with a British delegation headed by Lord Beaverbrook and a confidential protocol was signed by Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union for the extension of military aid. A little more than a month later the Soviet Union was formally included in the Lend-Lease program.⁷⁰

Hull and Roosevelt had been committed to the idea that prompt and generous lend-lease deliveries to Russia should be the 'test' of American goodwill toward the Soviet Union.⁷¹ The extent of Allied aid to the Soviet Union during the war was impressive. According to Major General John R. Deane, over 15 million tons were shipped to the Soviet Union between October 1941 and the end of the war, including over 2.6 million tons of petroleum products and over 4.4 million tons of food, which amounted to half a pound of

⁶⁸ Dobson, A. P., *U.S. wartime aid to Britain 1940-1946*, p. 203-5

⁶⁹ Herring Jr, George C., *Aid to Russia, 1941-6-Strategy, Diplomacy and Origins of the Cold War*, (Columbia University Press: London and New York) (1973) p. 104

⁷⁰ Neumann, W., *Making The Peace 1941-5-The Diplomacy of the Wartime Conferences*, p. 18-9

⁷¹ Hull to Roosevelt, February 4, 1942, *FRUS*, 1942, vol. III, p. 504

concentrated food per day for each one of the 12 million servicemen of the Red Army.⁷² The ferocity of the war in the Eastern Front and the vast amount of losses suffered by the Red Army, coupled with the political implications of a hypothetical Soviet debacle, informed Washington's policy in regards to the financial aid granted to its largest ally in the continent of Europe.

Amendments to the Lend Lease program to the Soviet Union were personally approved by Roosevelt. The United States required no justification for requests and made no attempt to find out how the Soviet Union used the Lend Lease funds. All this was carefully kept out of Congress.⁷³ When on January 16, 1944 Averell Harriman and Major General Deane, in charge of the Lend Lease Aid to the Soviet Union in Moscow, proposed that the Soviets provide justification for items in short supply in the United States, the Soviet Protocol Committee (chaired by Harry Hopkins) rejected their arguments.⁷⁴

The Atlantic Charter, the Declaration of the United Nations and the various treaties signed between the members of the Alliance for political and economic cooperation would provide not only with the legal framework for the defeat of Nazi Germany but also with the legal instruments that would shape the post-war society of states. These legal instruments, according to a rationalist interpretation, would identify the political organisation of the post-war society of states and proclaim its supremacy over all competitors (i.e., the Axis), laying down the rules of co-existence amongst the Allies.⁷⁵ The legal framework set out by the

⁷² Werth, A., *Russia at War 1941-1945*, p. 568

⁷³ Herring Jr, G. C., *Aid to Russia, 1941-6*, p. 126. See also Stettinius Jr. E., *Lend Lease: Weapon for Victory (1944)*

⁷⁴ Herring Jr, G. C., *Aid to Russia, 1941-6*, p. 129-30

⁷⁵ Bull, H., *The Anarchical Society*, p. 140-1

Allies regulated their relationships with one another, created international behaviour and set a precedent for the reorganisation of the post-war international political system.

The English school scholarship acknowledges that the setting of general standards in law can have a long lasting effect on behaviour. James explains it as follows: a set of exact rights and duties 'will almost certainly represent a pre-existing intent or willingness on the part of all subject to them to act in the way they indicate'.⁷⁶ The framework of legal, diplomatic and financial cooperation between the Allies would consolidate the subordinate position of Germany during the Cold War and realign the international order according to the criteria set by the major members of the wartime Alliance. The treatment of the German Question during the war would have significant implications for the practical association. The issue of the occupation and possible dismemberment of Germany as well as the subject of economic reparations would have a significant political impact on inter-Allied relations as well as on Germany's position in the Cold War international order.

1.4 The issue of dismemberment

The issue of the possible dismemberment of Germany after the war created enormous political implications for the shape of the international order in the wake of the war. Any reshaping of Germany's role in Europe was directly linked to the geopolitical concerns of the major Allies and their position in the post-war international political system. Dismembering Germany created opportunities as well as risks. The extent of the involvement of the superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, meant that the

⁷⁶ James, A., *Law and Order in International Society* in James A., (ed.), *The Bases of International Order: Essays in Honour of C. A. W. Manning* (London: Oxford University Press) (1973) p. 80

possibility of dismemberment was more logical than the idea of keeping Germany united. Washington and Moscow seem to share a common interest in the possibility of dismemberment. The practical association framework legitimised the idea of pursuing geopolitical interests through the discussion of partition.

The idea of dismembering Germany was favoured by Roosevelt since ARGENTIA. To that effect he instructed the Department of State to study the idea via the Four Committees of the 'Advisory Committee on Post-War Policy' in January 1942. The Advisory Committee analysed the partition of Germany into three, five and seven separate states as well as the political, economic and demographic problems involved, but ultimately rejected the idea of dismemberment. Instead, they favoured the policy of preventing the rearmament of Germany, the promotion of democratic institutions and the reduction or control of German economic preponderance in Europe.⁷⁷

The State Department maintained an anti-dismemberment position throughout the war.⁷⁸ The State Department, along with the War Department and the FEA were unfavourable to partition. This put them at odds with the pro-dismemberment views of the Treasury Department headed by Harry Morgenthau, Jr. On July 27, 1943, the State Department prepared a policy summary of the deliberations of January 1943 labelled 'H24 Germany:

⁷⁷ Mosely, P. E., *The Dismemberment of Germany*, Foreign Affairs (April, 1950) p. 488-9

⁷⁸ The State Department constituted the main brain trust for the creation of US policy over Germany. The principles of the work to be carried out by the State Department included responsibility for the formulation of governmental policy with regard to US participation in the occupation. The War Department was to be responsible for execution and administration of policy with regard to US participation in the occupation, with the cooperation of the State Department. The SWNCC, under the chairmanship of the State Department, was to be in charge of the coordination of US policy with respect to the occupation and the shape of any German government. The SWNCC was to establish a Directorate for Occupied Areas which would coordinate and expedite the work of the State, War and Navy Departments. From Principles and Procedures regarding policy-making and administration of occupied areas- February 14, 1946- Miscellaneous German Files 1943-5 E.1174.E 59 250 49 4 4-5 State Files (Lot) Box 8

Partition' which showed a definite bias in favour of unity.⁷⁹ During 1943-4 an inter-divisional committee of the State Department studied post-war policy towards Germany. The resulting basic memorandum, approved by Hull in July 1944, although welcoming federalism, expressed doubts about partition. The memorandum also warned against a de facto division of Germany through the creation of three zones of occupation. The memorandum predicted that in this manner the individual parts would fall under the control of the great powers, which would 'find themselves bidding for German support by promising to work for the reunification of Germany'.⁸⁰

The final memorandum that the State Department, issued to Roosevelt prior to his departure for the upcoming Québec Conference (OCTAGON) in September 1944, endorsed the demilitarisation and denazification of German society, and recommended harsh treatment of war criminals. The memorandum also insisted that the 'primary objectives' of Allied economic policy should be to hold down the German standard of living to 'subsistence levels' and prevent any reconversion to war production. In addition, it refused to endorse Morgenthau's call for the destruction of heavy industry in the Ruhr and suggested that the issues of dismemberment, deindustrialisation and reparations should not be decided until the 'internal situation' in Germany was clear.⁸¹

The most extreme pro-dismemberment view was the Morgenthau Plan, presented by the Secretary of the Treasury to the President in September 1944. Roosevelt engineered the creation of a special Cabinet Committee on Germany composed of himself, Morgenthau, Hull and Stimson and Hopkins, which was given the task of looking into the German

⁷⁹ Backer, J. H., *The Decision to Divide Germany*, (Duke University Press: Durham, NC) (1978) p. 20-1

⁸⁰ Backer, J. H., *The Decision to Divide Germany*, p. 24-5

⁸¹ Woolner, D., *The Second Quebec Conference revisited: waging war, formulating peace: Canada, Great Britain, and the United States in 1944-1945*, (New York: St. Martin's Press) (1998) p. 79-80

problem in order to make recommendations to the President prior to his departure for the Quebec Conference. The Morgenthau Plan called for the demilitarisation of Germany and the establishment of new boundaries, with Poland and the Soviet Union annexing parts of East Prussia and Silesia and France the Saar. The Plan placed the Ruhr under international jurisdiction. It also called for the partition of Germany into two states: a Northern German state, made up of old Prussia, Saxony, Thuringia and several smaller states, and a Southern German state, including Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden and some smaller areas. The internationalisation of the Ruhr was to be accomplished by dismantling its industrial plants and transporting its equipment to the United Nations as restitution. Military administration in Germany would be carried out toward the eventual partition of Germany. Political decentralisation and the dismissal of all policy making officials of the Reich should be encouraged. The Morgenthau Plan also suggested adequate controls over the German economy for at least twenty years. These included land reform and reparations. Reparations would be extracted by transferring of German territory and German private rights in industrial property, by using forced German labour and by confiscating German assets outside Germany. The plan also envisaged that the policing and civil administration of Germany was to be assumed by Germany's neighbours (including the Soviet Union) and the withdrawal of US troops in a relatively short period of time.⁸² Proponents of the Plan stressed that the Morgenthau Plan would have removed the threat of a German-dominated Europe, capture German markets for the British and provide industrial plants for the victims of Nazi aggression.⁸³

⁸² Morgenthau to Roosevelt, Suggested Post Surrender Program for Germany, September 5, 1944, FRUS, Conference at Quebec 1944, pp. 101-8

⁸³ Dietrich, J., *The Morgenthau Plan: Soviet influence on American postwar policy New York* (Algora Publications) (2002), p. 12. Dietrich argues that the genesis of the Morgenthau Plan reflected a sweep of sympathy towards the Soviet war effort of which US officials and American public opinion were not exempt. In the mind of US

The Morgenthau Plan entailed the economic rehabilitation of the Soviet Union through reparations and the extension of massive economic aid, possibly in the hope that Stalin would not need to block off and exploit Eastern Europe in order to reconstruct the Soviet economy. Morgenthau acknowledged in an unsent memorandum prepared on January 10, 1945, that those who opposed the Plan were moved 'by fear of Russia and Communism' and argued that the idea of a bulwark against Bolshevism was one of the factors that brought the war. He also highlighted that the US position on the German problem could be a make or break factor in engendering trust or distrust between the Soviet Union and the United States.

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The Treasury Department kept pressing for the idea of dismemberment right up until the end of the war. White's memorandum on a long range program for Germany suggested that (a) Germany should be kept weak for years to come and that (b) any program which has as its purpose the building up of Germany as a bulwark against Russia and Communism will inevitably lead to a third World War. The memorandum rejected 'the fallacy that Europe needs a strong industrial Germany', 'the contention that recurring reparations are necessary so that Germany may be made to pay for the destruction she has caused' and 'the belief that the removal or destruction of all German war materials...would in itself prevent Germany from waging another war'.⁸⁵

policy makers, and the State Department in particular, the rehabilitation of Germany would provide the basis for a European economic order conducive to a free market system of exchange that would benefit the US economy. This is one of the reasons why the State Department was weary about the idea of the Treasury Department for the agrarianisation of Germany. If German self-sufficiency was to be eliminated, it was to be done only so it should be dependent on world/US markets. See Kimball, W., *Swords or Ploughshares? The Morgenthau Plan for Defeat Nazi Germany, 1943-1946*, p. 44-5

⁸⁴ LaFeber, W. (Ed.), *The Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947: A Historical Problems with Interpretations and Documents*, (New York and Chichester: Wiley) (1971) p.111-2

⁸⁵ Memorandum January 19, 1945-General Records of the Asst secretary of the Treasury-Records of the Asst Secretary-Monetary and Intl Affairs-Chronological File of HD White November 1934-April 1946 56 450 60 31 7 BOX 12 ENTRY 360P

The view taken by the Treasury Department was at odds with the more comprehensive view endorsed by the State Department. Relations with the Soviet Union were to be decided by the position of Germany in the post-war international order. The degree of intervention of the United States in European affairs and the complex legal and diplomatic framework put in place by Washington for the making of an international order favourable to American interests necessitated a rehabilitative treatment of Germany after the war.

Momentum in favour of partition seemed to wane after OCTAGON. The new political realities dictated by a retreating German Army and uncertainties as to future relations with the Soviet Union created a hiatus in discussions over the dismemberment of Germany. On September 29, 1944 Hull suggested to the President that 'no decision should be taken on the possible partition of Germany without examining what the internal situation is and what is the attitude of the principal Allies on this question'.⁸⁶ In a series of letters sent to Roosevelt before the Quebec Conference, Stimson sought to reverse the trend in favour of the Morgenthau Plan, calling it a 'crime against civilisation itself' and 'an open confession of the bankruptcy of hope'.⁸⁷ Economic considerations seemed to prevail in Roosevelt's thinking. By the beginning of October 1944 it was clear that Roosevelt had decided to withdraw support for the Morgenthau Plan. The Cabinet Committee on Germany was abolished and Roosevelt made clear that the intention of the Quebec Memorandum was not to rid Germany of its industrial potential but to reduce her ability to compete with Britain in the world export markets.⁸⁸

⁸⁶ Backer, J. H., *The Decision to Divide Germany: American Foreign Policy in Transition*, p. 24-5

⁸⁷ Stimson H. and Bundy, M., *On Active Service in Peace and War* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947), pp. 577-78; and Stimson to Roosevelt, September 5, 1944, FRUS, 1944, *Conference at Quebec*, 98-100.

⁸⁸ Woolner, D., *The second Quebec Conference revisited: waging war, formulating peace*, p. 89

Furthermore, the State Department recommended in their Briefing Book Paper on Germany, handed to Truman on June 29, 1945, that Germany should not be dismembered, on the grounds that partition would be injurious to the economic rehabilitation of Europe and that it would be a source of disturbance to Europe.⁸⁹ This view was replicated by Henry Stimson, the US Secretary of War, who argued that a major destruction of Germany's industry and resources would not encourage democratic thinking in Europe. Moreover, Stimson argued that partition would not be conducive to the reestablishment of the German and European economy. He recommended the treatment of Germany as a single economic unit.⁹⁰

With the end of the war in sight Roosevelt's view on dismemberment became more cautious, laying down that the American 'attitude should be one of study and postponement of the final decision'.⁹¹

Towards the end of the war the economic rationale of the State Department prevailed. As we will see in chapter 2, structural interests over Germany subjected the possibility of dismemberment to the 'grand design' for the post-war international order, involving the continued expansion of the American economy by setting the conditions for a non-autarkic economic system in Europe. As the economic engine of Europe, Germany was pivotal in this 'grand design'. Dismembering the country could only be done if the political conditions would allow such a move, and most importantly, from Washington's perspective, if it would serve the purpose of facilitating the set up of a free-market economic space in Europe.

⁸⁹ LaFeber, W. (Ed.), *The Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947: A Historical Problems with Interpretations and Documents*, (New York and Chichester: John Wiley & Sons) (1971), p.117

⁹⁰ LaFeber, W. (Ed.), *The Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947*, p.71

⁹¹ Stettinius to Winant, April 10, 1945 FRUS 1945 Vol III, p. 221

Soviet policy on dismemberment was informed by the overriding concern of protecting the Soviet homeland against a resurgent Germany. The vacillation between dismemberment and unity was linked to security concerns.⁹² Soviet policy towards Germany had two important milestones. The Maisky Memorandum of January 11, 1944 defined the fundamental aim of the post-war period as the creation of 'a situation which will guarantee for a long period the security of the Soviet Union and the maintenance of peace, at least in Europe and Asia'. Maisky proposed the 'breaking up of Germany into a number of more or less independent state formations' as well as insisting on disarmament; reparations and the punishment of war criminals'.⁹³ The Litvinov Commission on Peace Treaties and Post-war Order studied the issue on March 14, 1944, arguing that since disarmament and control presupposed Allied unity after the war, dismemberment was the natural alternative.⁹⁴ By January 1945 Litvinov was proposing to divide Germany into a maximum of seven states: Prussia, Hanover, Westphalia, Württemberg, Baden, Bavaria and Saxony. However, he stated that this could only be achieved in cooperation with Britain and America.⁹⁵

The Soviet Union was concerned about the prospect of dismemberment since the German industrial potential lay in the West (which was to be occupied by the United States and the United Kingdom). German unity (at least for the time being) would be a less disconcerting option for the Soviet Union. Therefore, Stalin wanted to support joint work with his allies and urged German Communists not to confuse any anti-fascist reorganisation of Germany

⁹² Soviet security concerns are referred to in depth in Chapter 2

⁹³ Filitov, A., *Problems of Post-War Construction in Soviet Foreign Policy Conception during World War II* in Gori, F., and Pons S. (Ed.), *The Soviet Union and Europe in the Cold War 1943-53*, (Palgrave MacMillan: Basingstoke and New York) (1996) p. 7-8

⁹⁴ Filitov, A., *Problems of Post-War Construction in Soviet Foreign Policy Conception during World War II* in Gori, F., and Pons S. (Ed.), *The Soviet Union and Europe in the Cold War 1943-53*, p.16

⁹⁵ Roberts, G., *Stalin's Wars-From World War to Cold War 1939-1953*, (Yale University Press: New Haven, CT and London) (2006), p. 229-30

with a socialist revolution. German Communists were instructed to work for the establishment of an anti-fascist, parliamentary democratic republic in Germany.⁹⁶

Filitov argues that the Soviet leadership proceeded with the treatment of the German Question on the basis of maintaining Germany as one state even if there is evidence suggesting the contrary, like Vishinsky's letter of January 1945 supporting Litvinov's argument for dismemberment and Gusev's letter of February 1945 asking for experts to be sent to EAC to work on plans for dismemberment. Filitov argues that these were zigzags which had no consequences on the basic orientation of the Soviet policy, *which was to keep Germany as a single unitary state*.⁹⁷

Soviet thinking on dismemberment was inexorably linked to its own 'grand design' for the post-war international order. Dismembering Germany could only be an option to be pursued if a united German entity was to prove hostile to Moscow's security interests. As we will see in chapters 2 and 3, the Soviet authorities embarked on the process of sovietisation in Germany right from the beginning of the occupation whilst still maintaining the façade of Allied unity. The idea of dismemberment was ultimately underpinned by the growing strength of the Red Army and the certainty of having secured a zone of occupation in Germany. For America and Britain, the opportunities which dismemberment could bring about were much more appealing than the idea of a united Germany gearing towards the Soviet orbit.

⁹⁶ Loth W., *Stalin's unwanted child, the Soviet Union, the German Question and the founding of the GDR*, (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Macmillan Press) (1998) p. 8-12

⁹⁷ Filitov, A., 'Problems of Post-War Construction in Soviet Foreign Policy Conception during World War II' in Gori, F., and Pons S. (Ed.), *The Soviet Union and Europe in the Cold War 1943-53*, p. 19

British wartime policy on dismemberment revolved around the concept of creating a controlled and solvent Germany.⁹⁸ Before leaving for Washington on March 8, 1943, Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Minister, circulated a paper to the War Cabinet on the future of Germany. The paper discussed the possibility of dismembering Germany into three independent, or quasi-independent German states: north Germany (the 'new Prussia' with Saxony), Western Germany (the Rhine-Ruhr area) and South Germany (Baden, Württemberg and Bavaria). The paper also warned against more radical measures of dismemberment.⁹⁹

The memorandum circulated to the War Cabinet by Lord Selborne, Minister of Economic Warfare, on April 8, 1943 concluded that a lasting peace required a prosperous Germany. The memorandum suggested (1) the destruction of 'Ersatz' war industries such as synthetic oil and rubber, (2) the destruction of key war industries such as the machine-tool making industry, (3) the transfer of whole sections of German industrial equipment to other European countries and (4) limiting German stocks of raw materials. Lord Selborne's view was that Britain should insist upon the dismemberment of Germany and try to make British-American opinion realise that such policy (accompanied by measures to secure German prosperity) was morally justifiable and the only means to securing a lasting peace.¹⁰⁰

A second memorandum came from Clement Attlee, the Deputy Prime Minister, on July 19, 1943. His main argument was that the real aggressive element in Germany was the Prussian Junker class, with its strong roots in the Reichswehr and the Civil Service. Attlee suggested that the Junker class had allied itself with the masters of heavy industry in Westphalia and

⁹⁸ Northedge, F.S., *Descent from Power-British Foreign Policy 1945-1973* (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd) (1974), p. 68

⁹⁹ Woodward, E. L., *British foreign policy in the Second World War/ Vol.5*, (London: H.M.S.O.) (1976) p. 27

¹⁰⁰ Woodward, E. L., *British foreign policy in the Second World War/ Vol.5*, p. 44-5

might now liquidate the Nazis and come forward as the only force capable of saving central Europe from anarchy. Attlee pressed for the eradication of the Prussian Junker class and the breaking of the big German economic interests in Central and Southeastern Europe.¹⁰¹

For Britain, detached somewhat from the political realities of mainland Europe and already envisaging a demoted role in the post-war international order, the idea of dismemberment seemed to revolve around the idea of ridding Germany of its most dangerous political elements while endorsing the idea of a fairly prosperous German economy. The conservative elements in the British political establishment were aware of the dangers posed by a revived nationalistic Germany but were quick to defend the rehabilitation of the German economy. This thinking was influenced by the anti-Communist stance of Churchill. When discussing the Morgenthau Plan at Quebec he had called the idea 'Unchristian'. The British were much quicker than the Americans in creating the notion of a threatening Russia. This shifted the consensus against dismemberment. Frank Roberts, the British Minister in Moscow, argued that any dismemberment could only be temporary, as splitting Germany 'is a step that goes contrary to the development of history'.¹⁰² This perspective would inform British policy during the occupation of Germany and influence the bipolar outcome after the end of the war.

As a latecomer to the EAC setting, France would influence any policy on dismemberment only after the war. The aims of the Provisional Government on Germany included the abolition of a centralised Reich, 'international control' of the Ruhr, the use of German

¹⁰¹ Woodward, E. L., *British foreign policy in the Second World War/ Vol.5*, p. 45-6

¹⁰² Frank Roberts quoted in Morgan, R., 'The British View' in Moreton E., *Germany between East and West* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press/RILA) (1987), p. 88

industrial resources to help rebuild France, a permanent occupation of the Rhineland and the furthering of economic ties with the Saar region. 'Wholesale dismemberment' was not adopted as a general policy since the French thought that it would only revive German nationalism.¹⁰³

During the early period of inter-Allied diplomatic negotiations there was a significant brainstorming in regards to the possibility of dismembering Germany. Anthony Eden, British Foreign Minister, and Stalin discussed partition during their meeting on December 1941. Churchill may have suggested the possible dismemberment of Germany at the time of his first visit to Roosevelt in December 1941.¹⁰⁴ When Eden visited Washington in March 1943, the British Foreign Minister and Roosevelt agreed on the necessity of partition, and especially on the separation of Prussia.¹⁰⁵ Eden informed the President of Stalin's views on breaking up Germany into small states. Roosevelt agreed, but thought that the methods urged by Georges Clemanceau in 1919 should be avoided and that more encouragement should be given to separatist movements. If separatism would not flourish, Roosevelt believed that Germany should be arbitrarily divided into several states, one of which would be Prussia. Roosevelt felt that with Germany no longer existing as a nation, neither France nor Poland should have to be armed.¹⁰⁶

At the Quebec Conference of 1943 (QUADRANT) Eden and Hull discussed the possibility of weakening German political and military power by way of decentralisation. Eden

¹⁰³ Young, J. W., *France, the Cold War, and the Western alliance, 1944-49*, (Leicester: Leicester University Press) (1990) p. 26-7

¹⁰⁴ Mosely, P. E., *The Dismemberment of Germany*, p. 488

¹⁰⁵ Backer, J. H., *The Decision to Divide Germany*, p. 20

¹⁰⁶ Neumann, W., *Making The Peace 1941-5*, p. 50

advocated a plan to divide Germany into several small independent states. Hull agreed to a form of decentralisation but opposed forced separation, arguing that compulsory dismemberment would revive nationalist tendencies. Hull suggested an encouragement of voluntary federalism.¹⁰⁷ Eden was now more cautious about the idea of dismembering Germany. Hull stated that economic decentralisation could be accomplished through 'natural forces'. He mentioned the possibility of providing Southern Germany with special access to the Mediterranean ports in order 'to relieve it of dependence on the Northern German ports'.¹⁰⁸

Inter-Allied enthusiasm towards dismemberment towards partition seemed to wane towards the end of 1943. The war had assumed a new political dimension with the breakthrough of the Red Army in the Eastern Front. At the Moscow Conference of October 1943 the preliminary discussion of post-war policy towards Germany was based upon two papers submitted by the United States delegation. Dismemberment was briefly discussed on the October 25 session. Hull noted that dismemberment found favour in 'high quarters' in the United States government but that the experts on German matters were extremely sceptical about its long-range utility. Eden and Molotov expressed a similar view in regards to their own governments.¹⁰⁹

The dismemberment of Germany was also discussed during the Teheran Conference. Having decided that Germany would lose Königsberg and its Eastern territories to Poland, the three leaders agreed tentatively that Germany be dismembered as it was before 1871. Churchill expressed a preference for a two-way division, joining Bavaria to Austria to form a South German state. According to Hopkins' notes, 'Stalin was not enthusiastic about either

¹⁰⁷ Armstrong, A., *Unconditional Surrender-The Impact of the Casablanca Policy upon World War II*, p.63-4

¹⁰⁸ Neumann, W., *Making The Peace 1941-5-The Diplomacy of the Wartime Conferences*, p. 54

proposal...and saw little difference between the people of one part of Germany and another'. The question was then referred to the EAC (established at the Moscow Conference) which was about to begin its work in London. ¹¹⁰

Churchill proposed a harsh treatment of Prussia and the creation of a Danubian confederation of states. Stalin stated that although he liked the idea, he needed to study it in detail before making concrete suggestions. ¹¹¹ During the tripartite political meeting of December 1, 1943, which unfolded within the convivial atmosphere of the conference, Stalin argued the case for dismemberment and Roosevelt suggested a division of Germany into five parts. Stalin seemed more inclined to agree with Roosevelt on the partition of Germany into small pieces, juxtaposing their view to that of Churchill, perhaps more aware of the dangers involved in leaving a vacuum in the middle of Europe. ¹¹² Britain suggested the establishment of a Dismemberment Committee in January 1944, to implement the plans discussed in the Teheran Conference. However, by then the Soviet Union started to express some reluctance on the subject and dismemberment plans were shelved. ¹¹³

Agreeing on the possibility of keeping Germany united would have created unnecessary apprehension amongst the Allies. The idea of dismemberment allowed them to proceed on the safest option. Since the Moscow Conference of 1944, the policy machinery of each of the main Allies started to frown upon dismemberment, as this represented a threat to their interests. This might have responded to a certain apprehension on the part of the Allies

¹⁰⁹ Mosely, P. E., *The Dismemberment of Germany-Ally Negotiations from Yalta to Potsdam*, p. 489

¹¹⁰ Mosely, P. E., *The Dismemberment of Germany*, p. 490

¹¹¹ Smyser, W R, *From Yalta to Berlin: the Cold War struggle over Germany*, (New York: St. Martin's Press) (1999) p. 9

¹¹² Tripartite Political Meeting, December 1, 1943, Teheran. Bohlen minutes. FRUS 1943, Conferences at Cairo and Teheran 1943, pp. 596-604

¹¹³ Loth W., *Stalin's unwanted child: the Soviet Union, the German question and the founding of the GDR*, p.4-5

about the future of inter-Allied relations, a clear spin off from the aura of suspicion that clouded the general context of practical association, as well as to the uncertainty about the outcome of the German Question.

At Moscow in 1944, Molotov indicated that talk of federations reminded him of the Western efforts to build a 'cordon sanitaire' against the Soviet Union after the Bolshevik Revolution. Stalin viewed the possibility of a Balkan confederation as a potential threat to the Soviet Union.¹¹⁴ During OCTAGON, Churchill finally opted to support the Morgenthau Plan as a quid pro quo for the continuation of the Lend Lease during the post-European phase of the war.¹¹⁵ The Quebec Memorandum was vague on the issue of dismemberment since it mentioned nothing on how Germany was to be permanently divided or what territory it was to lose.¹¹⁶

The crucial wartime inter-Allied discussions on Germany took place at the Yalta Conference. During the February 5, 1945 meeting of the three foreign ministers, Eden stated that the British War Cabinet had not discussed partition, though studies had been made at an expert level. Molotov invited his partners to commit to partition while he withheld a Soviet decision for later. At the second plenary session, when asked by Stalin on his position on dismemberment, the Roosevelt replied that although the two were not directly connected, 'the permanent treatment of Germany might grow out of the question of the zones of occupation'. Churchill insisted on the removal of Prussia and added that 'the British government agreed in principle to dismemberment' but he felt that the actual method was 'too complicated' to be undertaken in a short period of time. The Prime Minister also remarked that 'all that was required was a final agreement on the zones of occupation and a

¹¹⁴ Neumann, W., *Making The Peace 1941-5*, p. 67-8

¹¹⁵ Woolner, D., *The second Quebec Conference revisited: waging war, formulating peace*, p. 82

zone for France'.¹¹⁷ Stalin kept pressing the Allies for a decision on dismemberment, suggesting that it could be included in the instrument of surrender. Roosevelt added that 'it would be a great mistake to have any public discussion on the dismemberment of Germany', opting like Churchill to delegate the issue to the EAC.¹¹⁸

During the February 6 meeting, the foreign ministers discussed the insertion of the word 'dismemberment' in the instrument of surrender. The Soviet version committed the Big Three to dismemberment, while the American and British draft constituted a less binding approval of this policy. The three heads of government were now in agreement that the relevant article drafted by the EAC (article 12a) should state that, in the exercise of supreme authority with respect of Germany, the three governments 'will take such steps, including the complete disarmament, demilitarisation *and the dismemberment of Germany* as they deem requisite for future peace and security'.¹¹⁹ During the February 7 meeting, the foreign ministers agreed to allocate a zone of occupation to France and added the word 'dismemberment' to the instrument of surrender. They also delegated the study of the issue of dismemberment to a tripartite commission. Quite conveniently, the foreign ministers emphasised the need to study the 'procedure' for a possible dismemberment of Germany rather than the dismemberment itself.¹²⁰

¹¹⁶ Final Documents of the Conference, FRUS Conference at Quebec 1944, pp. 466-467

¹¹⁷ Second Plenary Meeting, 5 February 1945, FRUS 1945 Yalta, pp. 611-3

¹¹⁸ Second Plenary Meeting, 5 February 1945, FRUS 1945 Yalta, pp. 614

¹¹⁹ Yalta Declaration, February 11, 1945-<http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/wwii/yalta.htm> February 11, 1945

¹²⁰ Foreign ministers meeting, 7 February 1945, FRUS 1945 Yalta, p. 700

The Crimea Conference left the question of dismemberment in an ambiguous situation. With the end of the war beckoning, Churchill and Roosevelt were less sure about the benefits of a dismembered Germany, quite possibly at the mercy of the Red Army. Stalin now talked in public and private about a united Germany, although denazified, demilitarised and democratised. When addressing a Czechoslovak delegation in March 1945 he openly expressed his concerns about Western intentions in Germany. He harangued Slavic unity and indicated that

[W]e must bear in mind that our allies will try to save the Germans and come to an agreement with them. We will be merciless towards the Germans but our allies will treat them with kid gloves.¹²¹

The discussions over the possible dismemberment of Germany responded to the logic of the practical association. It was easier to work on the alternative of dismemberment while the fighting went on. This is another indication of the 'pluralist plus' nature of the practical association. The Allies worked earnestly on the option that would allow them to deal with the German Question without causing the breakdown of the practical association framework before finalising the task of winning the war. Dismemberment was closely link to the question of the political and economic stability of post-war Germany and Europe. The possible dismemberment of Germany was linked to the realignment of world politics after the war. A dismembered Germany would have been the source of a possibly wider confrontation between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union. By shifting their position on dismemberment towards ambiguity, the Allies were able to keep the practical association intact and maintain the spirit of coexistence that would be pivotal for the relatively smooth passage to a bipolar solution in the wake of World War Two.

1.5 The issue of reparations

The issue of reparations was one of the main informative aspects of the German Question. The exacting of reparations had political as well as economic considerations attached to it, as the countries occupied by Germany had suffered enormous economic devastation.

The State Department began to deal with the subject of reparations in November 1943. The Council for Foreign Relations (CFR) study group reports stressed the imperative to prioritise the productivity of the German economy over punitive reparations. The final report of the Interdivisional Committee on Reparations, Restitution and Property Rights included a study conducted under the auspices of the Federal Reserve, which estimated that the total reparations bill would be in the region of 120 billion marks, collected during 12 years.¹²²

A Federal Reserve document asserted that the final amount was 'a realistic and not merely an ideal figure'. The Interdivisional Committee, however, refrained from committing itself to a definite sum.¹²³ A forty page document produced by the OSS was completed by its Research and Analysis Branch on the eve of the Yalta Conference and disseminated under the heading 'Problems of German Reparations'. The OSS reached the conclusion that 'contrary to general belief, experience does not indicate that the payment of large sums by Germany is impossible'.¹²⁴

An earlier study conducted under the auspices of the Council on Foreign Relations and written by the economists Alvin H. Hansen, Jacob Viner, and William Diebold Jr.,

¹²¹ Quoted in Roberts, G., *Stalin's Wars-From World War to Cold War 1939-1953*, p. 243

¹²² See William Diebold, *Reparations Policy in Germany*, War and Peace Studies, Council of Foreign Relations (CFR). See also War-Peace Study, *Reparations Policy Toward Germany*, March 18, 1943, Economic and Financial Group (CFR)

¹²³ Backer, J. H., *The Decision to Divide Germany*, p. 30-1

¹²⁴ Backer, J. H., *The Decision to Divide Germany*, p. 35

recommended that reparations should be imposed only to the extent that they would contribute to strengthening the post-war economic and social order. Another study, conducted by the British Interdepartmental Committee on Reparations and Economic Security under the chairmanship of Sir William Malkin, opposed the complete deindustrialisation of Germany and suggested an elastic formula to be automatically adjusted to the facts of the future.¹²⁵ In July 1944, the State Department presented new papers on German reparations and economic policy, seeking the approval of the Executive Committee of Foreign Economic Policy chaired by Dean Acheson. The papers focused on rehabilitation, stating that reparations should be extracted from production and in accordance with the German contribution to the reconstruction of Europe.¹²⁶

After Yalta, the Informal Policy Committee on Germany went over the final drafts of JSC 1067 and the 'Instructions of the United States Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations', otherwise known as the Pauley Report. The Pauley Report called for the avoidance of the mistakes made in the aftermath of World War One, in which reparations were paid with credits which the United States found difficult to collect because of import barriers. Pauley's instructions called for the elimination of war industries and a reparations plan which would not entail direct or indirect financing by the United States.¹²⁷ Reparations were therefore seen by US officials within the context of security against a revived nationalistic Germany, but most importantly, from the standpoint of hooking the German economy to a free market system of exchange.

¹²⁵ Backer, J. H., *The Decision to Divide Germany*, p. 29-30

¹²⁶ Eisenberg, C. W., *Drawing the line*, p. 29

¹²⁷ Pauley Reparations Mission-State Files 59/250/48/32/5-Box 19-Lot File E1106A-E 1106I-European Mission Subject File 1945-7-Report-Drafts and working papers to shipping (general)

Towards the end of the war, American planners began to examine the reparations problem within the context of US economic interests. The resulting staff papers of an Executive Committee on Foreign Economic Policy, chaired by Dean Acheson and composed of representatives of the Department of State, Treasury, Agriculture, Commerce and Labour, of the US Tariff Commission and of the Foreign Economic Administration, concluded that Germany should contribute to the rehabilitation of other countries. Its economic machinery was therefore to be retained and placed under the control of the occupation authorities. The overriding principle was that reparation policies should conform to the American interests regarding the post-war international order.¹²⁸

In a move to implement the Yalta decisions, on March 12, 1945 Roosevelt had appointed Dr. Isador Lubin to head the US Delegation to the Moscow-based Allied Reparations Commission. Lubin's draft was submitted to the White House on March 22, 1945. The draft stated that reparations should primarily consist of dismantled German plants and equipment, whereas deliveries from current production should include shipments of products such as coal, timber and potash, but should not be made in the form of manufactured goods.¹²⁹ Most of the policy recommendations were based on the recognition that reparations should be paid from current production and that the Allies and neutrals should accept German products. These recommendations represented the majority view of the US administration, which towards the end of the war was openly calling for the rehabilitation of the German economy.

The Soviet view on reparations was informed by the losses incurred in the pursuit of the Great Patriotic War. In November 1943, the Litvinov Commission, composed by academics

¹²⁸ Backer, J. H., *The Decision to Divide Germany*, p. 31

¹²⁹ Backer, J. H., *The Decision to Divide Germany*, p. 88-9

and officials from the Foreign Affairs Commissariat, produced a basic outline for action which revolved around the principle of taking 'from Germany and its Allies everything that can be taken'. The maximum value of the equipment, goods and services to be secured was \$75 billion, 80% of this to be extracted directly from Germany. In negotiations with the Allies, the Soviet Union insisted on a share of 50-80% taken in a one-off payment, procurements from current production over ten years and the rest by employing German labour.¹³⁰

An article written in 1943 by the economist E.S. Varga entitled 'Reparations by Hitler's Germany and its Accomplices' mentioned the sum of \$ 100 billion as the total cost of the economic damage caused by Nazi Germany. Varga suggested that reparations should be distributed according to the damage done in proportion to the national wealth, a formula which would have entitled the Soviet Union to priority treatment. Varga's arguments were the Soviet position at Yalta and at the end of the war.¹³¹ Loth argues that Stalin could not have a different program for Germany after the outcome of the war. Security against future German aggression was not to be gained without the control of the industrial heartland in Western Germany, a line of thinking influenced by Varga's article. Loth posits that this probably compelled Stalin to seek a common allied policy towards Germany, since it became clear to Moscow that America would not aid the reconstruction of the Soviet economy.¹³²

Reparations from current production remained the formula under which the Soviets operated after the end of the war. The motivation to extract reparations from current

¹³⁰ Filitov, A., 'Problems of Post-War Construction in Soviet Foreign Policy Conception during World War II' in Gori, F., and Pons S. (Ed.), *The Soviet Union and Europe in the Cold War 1943-53*, p.6

¹³¹ Backer, J. H., *The Decision to Divide Germany*, p. 66

production had a political connotation which would be one of the main sources of disagreement for the Allies and a crucial factor in the partition of Germany. As we will see in chapters 2 and 3, by pressing for reparations from current production, Moscow made sure that they would have a significant say in the socio-economic system of the Eastern zone of occupation. This went hand in hand with their 'grand design' for the post-war international order as reparations would be linked to the possibility of maintaining a political foothold in the Eastern zone and possibly extending it into the Western-occupied areas. For the Soviet Union, with its abundance of natural resources and manpower and under socialist economic planning, rehabilitation would come in the form of forced savings. Pursuing the issue of reparations would become a political tool to probe the intentions of the Western Allies and ultimately, to secure a political foothold in Germany.

The Allies discussed the issue of reparations at inter-Allied level during the Yalta Conference. During the session of February 5, Ivan Maisky, Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs and former Ambassador to Britain, recommended the removal of heavy industry, including machine tools, plants and rolling stock over a period of two years and annual in-kind payments out of current production to last ten years. Maisky said that 80% of the iron and steel, electrical power and chemical industries would have to be withdrawn in order to restore the Soviet economy and provide for future European security. He recommended a 100% removal of aviation factories, synthetic oil refineries and other specialised industry that the Germans could use for military purposes. Maisky also maintained that if roughly 20% of its industry remained, Germany could adequately meet its domestic needs and still fill their requirements of reparations deliveries in kind over the ten year period. With clear political

¹³² Loth W., *Stalin's Plans for Post-War Germany* in Gori, F., and Pons S. (Ed.), *The Soviet Union and Europe in the*

intentions in mind, he stated that in order to execute the plan and maintain security, tripartite control over the German economy should last beyond the reparation period. He also recommended that the Allies seat on the boards of all industries that could be used for military purposes. The Soviet Union would expect to receive no less than \$10 billion in withdrawals and yearly in kind payments. Churchill, while acknowledging that the Soviet Union suffered more than any country and deserved reparations from Germany, maintained that he did not believe it was possible to extract such large amounts as the Soviets wanted. The Prime Minister also pointed out the enormous reparation problems in the aftermath of World War One.¹³³

Seeking to mediate between Britain and the Soviet Union, Roosevelt offered qualified support to the Soviet position. The President stressed that the United States would not repeat the mistakes of the 1920s, when it financed German reparations through loans. Roosevelt thought it appropriate that Germany should retain enough 'industry and work' to keep it from starving, but that the Soviets should also get as much as they could in manpower and factories. An impasse was reached when the Allies agreed to delegate the matter to an inter-Allied commission for reparations to be set up in Moscow.¹³⁴

On February 9, 1945, during the foreign ministers' session, Stettinius concurred in principle with the Soviet plan but suggested that the final sum should be decided by the reparations commission in Moscow. Molotov demanded that the sum of \$20 billion should be referred to the commission as the basis for negotiations, adding that his figure was based on 1938 prices and that the final amount might be 15-20% higher. Eden took a stand against a

Cold War 1943-53, p. 26

¹³³ Second Plenary Meeting, 5 February 1945, FRUS 1945 Yalta, pp. 620-1. See Buhite, R., *Decisions at Yalta: an appraisal of summit diplomacy*, p. 32-3

¹³⁴ Second Plenary Meeting, 5 February 1945, FRUS 1945 Yalta, pp. 621-3

definite reparations sum and suggested that reparations in the form of labour should be incorporated in the final protocol. He did not accept the Soviet idea that the purpose of reparations was the military and economic disarmament of Germany.¹³⁵

The Yalta Protocol on reparations agreed upon by the Allies established that

Germany must pay in kind for the losses caused by her to the Allied nations in the course of the war. Reparations are to be received in the first instance by those countries which have borne the main burden of the war, have suffered the heaviest losses and have organized victory over the enemy.¹³⁶

Reparations were to be exacted in the following manner

(a) Removals within two years from the surrender of Germany or the cessation of organized resistance from the national wealth of Germany located on the territory of Germany herself as well as outside her territory (equipment, machine tools, ships, rolling stock, German investments abroad, shares of industrial, transport and other enterprises in Germany, etc.), these removals to be carried out chiefly for the purpose of destroying the war potential of Germany. (b) Annual deliveries of goods from current production for a period to be fixed (c) Use of German labour.¹³⁷

The proceedings at Yalta regarding the issue of reparations had been influenced by a shift in the long range objectives of the major Allies. With the war drawing to an end, the question of reparations would be linked to the long range objectives of the Allies in regards to the nature of the socio-economic system of any future German political entity. Although the Allies agreed on the principle of reparations, the divergence of interests in regards to the

¹³⁵ Backer, J. H., *The Decision to Divide Germany*, p. 37-8

¹³⁶ Article V (1), Protocol of Proceedings Crimea Conference February 11, 1945-
<http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/wwii/yalta.htm>

¹³⁷ Article V (2), Protocol of Proceedings Crimea Conference February 11, 1945-
<http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/wwii/yalta.htm>

manner in which these would be extracted marred the spectrum of practical association and would become one of the reasons for its breakdown after the war. Soviet participation in the extracting of reparations, particularly in a single German entity, would have given Moscow a political say in the German economy as a whole, therefore giving rise to the spectrum of a Soviet Germany. The Allies were cautious in not making reparations an issue that would have caused irreparable damage in the practical association framework while the fighting against the Axis and the process of territorial realignment went on.

1.6 The post-war occupation of Germany

Although the evolution of the demarcation of the zones of occupation would be informed by political concerns, as the war was drawing to an end the Allies succeeded, through the EAC, to agree on the zonal division of Germany for the purpose of its occupation. Sharp argues that these negotiations cannot be divorced from their military context as they were affected by the existing and future strategies of the Western and Soviet military forces.¹³⁸

The War Department Occupational Directive JCS 1067, approved by President Harry Truman in May 1945, and heavily influenced by 'Morgenthau Plan thinking', was to remain as the governing document for the US occupation of Germany during the 1945-7 period. JCS 1067 specified that Germany was 'not to be occupied for the purposes of liberation but as a defeated enemy nation'. The country was to be disarmed, decentralised and denazified. Occupation administrators would be 'just, but firm and aloof' and fraternisation between occupiers and occupied would be 'strongly discouraged'. Those who had held membership in any of the Nazi organizations were to be denied employment except as common labourers. Assistance to German political institutions would be limited to preventing civil

¹³⁸ Sharp, T., *The Wartime Alliance and the Zonal Division of Germany*, (Clarendon Press: Oxford) (1975) p. 1

unrest and disease and to lay the foundation for eventual democratic rule. Administrators would do nothing to revive German economic or financial institutions. Key industries were to be strictly controlled or eliminated. German living standards would not be permitted to rise above those of neighbouring nations. It is worth mentioning that JCS 1067 remained secret until October 17, 1945 when much of it had been incorporated into the Potsdam agreement.¹³⁹ It is partly due to bureaucratic infighting that the American occupation authorities would have JCS 1067 as their main instrument for action in Germany. It is also partly due to the Rationalist nature of the practical association framework and adherence to the rules stipulated at the Potsdam Conference that the military authorities would labour under an ambiguous occupational policy during 1945-7. Whilst the policy framework of the 'grand design' had already been set up by the State Department, it would take until 1946-7 for the Truman administration to adopt a more unilateral view on the German Question.

At the Quebec Conference of September 1944, Roosevelt finally agreed to the American occupation of the southern zone. Mac Allister argues that since the President's primary reason for rejecting the southern zone had been his concern about becoming too involved in post-war European affairs, it is worth considering whether his shift in thinking reflected increasing doubts about post-war Soviet intentions and a corresponding acceptance of the need for a long-term presence of American forces in Europe.¹⁴⁰

The Soviets on the other hand, appeared to have a more definite view of how the occupation should unfold at zonal level. By the time that Stalin issued the order to march on Berlin, Ulbricht and his associates had mapped out the Communist tasks in the Soviet zone

¹³⁹ Directive to Commander-in-Chief of United States Forces of Occupation Regarding the Military Government of Germany; April 1945 (JCS 1067)-usa.usembassy.de/etexts/ga3-450426.pdf See also Davidson, B., *Germany: What Now?- Potsdam 1945-Partition 1949* (London: Frederick Muller Ltd: 1950), p. 25

¹⁴⁰ Mac Alister, J., *No Exit*, p. 44

only, rather than in Germany as a whole. Three task forces of exiles were to act as arms of the occupation administration and establish a local administration supervised but not run, by Communists. These developments are indicative of Moscow's intention to make the Soviet zone into a separate political entity should four-power rule in Germany fail.¹⁴¹ Mastny argues that the Soviets tackled the German Question according to the course of military events. The possibility of Britain and the United States entering Germany first prompted the Soviet Union to agree to the zonal division of Germany, the three-power status of Berlin and the tripartite control machinery at the EAC session of November 11, 1944.¹⁴² This is suggestive of the new political reality imposed by the end of the war and demonstrative of the fact that Moscow was more prepared than the other Allies for the task of occupying Germany.

As with the question of dismemberment and reparations, the Allies operated under the framework of legality and diplomacy. The creation of the EAC, the inter-Allied body in charge of making plans for the post-hostilities period, was decided at the Moscow Conference of 1943.¹⁴³ At the Teheran Conference it was decided that Poland should be given a large portion of German territory, with the Oder-Neisse line as the eastern border of post-war Germany. The EAC worked out a number of recommendations during 1944 which included the splitting of Germany into three zones of occupation, each controlled by one power, the creation of the Allied Control Council for Germany (ACC), which could only act in consensus, and the partition of Berlin in three sectors.

¹⁴¹ Mastny, V., *Russia's Road to the Cold War-Diplomacy, Warfare, and the Politics of Communism, 1941-5*, p. 268-9.

¹⁴² Mastny, V., *Russia's Road to the Cold War*, p. 233-4

¹⁴³ Strang, W., *Home and Abroad*, (Andre Deutsch: London (1956), p. 200

The plan for the occupation of Germany devised by the EAC entailed that the Soviet Union would receive the eastern sector. Britain would occupy the northwest of Germany and United States the south-western part. The EAC made provisions for the disarming of Germany and the Allied imposition of firm controls in economic, political and military matters.¹⁴⁴

The question of allocating a zone of occupation for France was discussed at Yalta. Stalin was somewhat apprehensive about France's participation in the occupation machinery.¹⁴⁵ Up until OCTAGON France had played no direct part in the negotiations over the German Question. During his visit to Moscow in October 1944, Churchill, with Roosevelt's agreement, persuaded Stalin that France should be offered a place as the fourth member of the EAC. The inclusion of France as an occupation power had a political reason behind it: Churchill wanted to boost the membership of the Western camp, possibly as a bulwark against Soviet geopolitical intentions west of the Elbe.

The establishment of occupation zones enabled the Allies to avoid a strict commitment to any plans for dismemberment. The commonly agreed policy of dividing Germany for the purpose of its occupation denotes a willingness to accomplish *dismemberment by default*. This is indicative of the Rationalist nature of the alliance. Whereas in Central and Eastern Europe territorial realignments would be susceptible to changes during the early Cold War period; in Germany, the Allies, through the work of the EAC, laid down the foundations of a spheres of influence settlement that would be consolidated with Bizonia, sovietisation and the

¹⁴⁴ Buhite, R., *Decisions at Yalta: an appraisal of summit diplomacy*, (Wilmington, DE.: Scholarly Resources) (1986) p. 21-2

¹⁴⁵ Second Plenary Meeting, 5 February 1945, FRUS 1945 Yalta, p. 617

partition into two states after the end of the war. The Allies would leave considerable space for the internal mechanism of the occupation process to the zonal commanders, as agreed at the Potsdam Conference. It is probably the Allied intervention in the planning and implementation of the zones of occupation what set the background for the orderly partition of the country and the attainment of coexisting spheres of influence in Germany and Europe.

1.7 Conclusion

World War Two was one of the most disruptive wars in the history of the international political system. The devastation caused by the Nazi invasion of Western and Eastern Europe prompted the intervention of the United States and the Soviet Union in order to sustain the war effort financially, militarily and diplomatically. This intervention, on a scale unprecedented in the history of military alliances, created a situation of decisive action in Germany and a permanent involvement of the superpowers in European affairs. As we will see in chapters 4 and 5, the Allies set the foundations for a complete transformation of international society via the treatment of the German Question while at the same time respecting the diverse nature of the practical association framework. They managed to maintain an alliance which did not have the most homogenous background and found agreement in matters which led to the successful culmination of the war and the establishment of a workable post-war international order. The Allies engaged in the treatment of the most fundamental issues concerning the future of Germany in a Rationalist manner. They succeeded in setting a common framework for the study and implementation of policy pertaining to the occupation and possible dismemberment of Germany and to the

discussion of such difficult issues as the extracting of reparations from the main Axis power. The enormity of the task and the commitment to create a permanent engagement on Germany after the war created the conditions for a 'pluralist-plus' international society. The very size of the task involved, the suspicion which informed inter-Allied relations and the prospect of occupying a defeated Germany made the Alliance reliant on the conservative elements outlined by the pluralists. The framework of practical association, the treatment of the German Question and the establishment of the post-war international order rested on a sound legal basis, indicative of the practical association outlined by Nardin, in which international law prevailed and the rules agreed upon rested on its own procedures rather than moralistic considerations.¹⁴⁶ While the post-war international society would not take a definite shape until after the end of the war, the Allies adhered to the legacy of cohabitation in order to manage of the transition into a new society of states. To paraphrase Nardin, 'the precise constitutional shape of an [international] society', particularly during the war, was less important than the fact that it could 'tolerate different beliefs, customs, and ways of life'.¹⁴⁷

The interventionism displayed by the Allies in the shaping of the post-war international order had its origins in the treatment of the German Question. While the practical association operated under a framework which respected the plurality of interests, it would also give rise to substantial solidarist elements which would facilitate the setting of a post-war international order based on co-existence. Solidarism was enshrined in the legal instruments that the Allies established during the war and in the manner in which they bestowed upon themselves the task of radically transforming Germany and the post-war

¹⁴⁶ Nardin, T., *Ethical Tradition in International Affairs* in Mapel, D and Nardin T., (ed) *Traditions of International Ethics-Diverse Ethical Perspectives*, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press) (1998) p. 14

international order. This solidarist streak had its corollary in the creation of the UN Charter, which would provide the legal basis for intervention in the event of gross human rights abuses as well as action ‘necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security’,¹⁴⁸ and the Convention on Genocide, which makes genocide a crime under international law and commits all members to ‘prevent and punish’ it.¹⁴⁹ Solidarists, such as Vincent, Wheeler and Linklater, maintain that the emergence of limited, universal ethical consensus is possible, desirable and even present on some questions, such as moral outrage at genocide.¹⁵⁰ Solidarism focuses on human rights as the quintessential reason for intervention. In spite of the pluralist defense of ‘sovereignty’ as a central institution of international society,¹⁵¹ the example of the wartime practical association shows that intervention can be carried out within the conservative boundaries demarcated by law, diplomacy and balance of power. This combination of pluralist and solidarist elements in the unfolding of the treatment of the German Question, make the practical association framework ‘pluralist plus’ in nature.

The elements of intervention and coexistence would remain the guiding lights in the treatment of the German Question after the war. It would be in the interest of the superpowers to take decisive action in Germany while at the same time adhering to a common legal and diplomatic framework during the transition to a bipolar outcome in Germany and Europe. The conduct of the Allies in matters regarding the pursuit of the war against Germany, marked by an assiduous legal, diplomatic, financial and military

¹⁴⁷ Nardin, T., *Legal Positivism as a Theory of International Society* in Mapel, D. and Nardin, T. (ed), *International Society-Diverse Ethical Perspectives*, p. 32

¹⁴⁸ UN Charter -<http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/>

¹⁴⁹ Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 9 December 1948-<http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/52d68d14de6160e0c12563da005fdb1b/a2ec826e5d083098c125641e0040690d?OpenDocument>

¹⁵⁰ Williams, J., *Pluralism, Solidarism and the Emergence of World Society in English School Theory*, *International Relations*, 19:1, (2005) p. 22

cooperation, would extend to the negotiations regarding the principles that were to guide the occupation of the country after the war. These elements of Rationalist behaviour would inform the creation of the post-war international order. As we will see in chapter 4, superpower intervention and the principle of coexistence, generated by the treatment of the German Question, would become the 'primary institutions' of the post-war international order. While conflictual elements would overlap with this overall Rationalist conduct between the superpowers, the precedent created by the wartime practical association framework would enable the Allies to reach a non-disruptive solution to the German Question and enforce an orderly transition to a bipolar international order.

¹⁵¹ See Mayall, J., *World Politics: Progress and its Limits*, (Cambridge, Polity) (2000)

Chapter 2

The German Question, American and Soviet structural interests, and the origins of the Cold War

2.1 Introduction

In spite of the Rationalist approach adopted by the Allies with regard to the treatment of the German Question and the making of the post-war international order, superpower interaction had conflictual elements that would have a significant impact on the political future of Germany and Europe. The divergence of interests over the German Question had structural aspects which stemmed from the pursuit of the national interest on the part of the superpowers and the ideologies that underwrote it. These were geared towards buttressing the economic, political and military position which the United States and the Soviet Union had attained during the war. From the American perspective, the perception was that Soviet interests and Soviet ideology were at odds with the American 'grand design' for the post-war international order. Washington's main rationale in the pursuit of its national interest in Germany and Europe was of an economic nature. As such, her ideological and policy-making apparatus was intimately linked to the private interests of the American industrial and financial establishment; which perceived the need for a political and economic foothold in the vital strongholds of Germany and Western Europe.

The Soviet 'grand design' for the post-war international order involved the creation of a political and economic foothold in Germany and Eastern Europe. This 'grand design' was

orientated towards preventing the resurgence of Germany as a challenging power, and being encircled by the West, as in the interwar period. Because of Germany's importance in the respective 'grand design' ¹ projects of the superpowers, conflict appeared to have a structural connotation which would play a significant role in the creation of a bipolar Germany, and ultimately a bipolar Europe.

The conflictual aspects of inter-Allied relations over the treatment of the German Question and the making of the post-war international order had attached to it the typical interpretative elements espoused by Realism. Realist scholars postulate that states act according to rational calculations when pursuing their interests. States seek power in order to preserve their security and enhance their standing in the international political system. Its focus on power is justified by human nature and based on the Hobbesian view of the insatiable desire of humans to dominate others. Realism sees state sovereignty and its survival as the supreme national interest in an international political system based on self-help. ² Realists have borrowed methodology from economics in order to establish a distinctive political domain of theory, *explicitly*, as in Waltz's analogy between states and firms, or *implicitly*, as in Morgenthau's parallel between rational actors pursuing 'interest defined as power' and 'utility maximising individuals'. ³

¹ The 'grand design' mentality was first outlined and implemented through The Victory Plan of 1941, which became the blueprint for the general mobilisation of the US Army. The Victory Plan predicted the future organisation for an army that did not yet exist, outlined combat missions for a war not yet declared, and computed war production requirements for industries that were still committed to peacetime needs. See Kirkpatrick, C, *An unknown future and a doubtful present: writing the victory plan of 1941* (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army) (1990)

² Dunne T., *Realism*, in Baylis J. and Smith S. (Ed), *The globalization of world politics : an introduction to international relations*, (Oxford and New York : Oxford University Press) (1997) p. 118-9

³ Buzan B., *The Timeless Wisdom of Realism?* in Smith S., Booth, K., Zalewski M. (Ed.), *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond*, (Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press) (1996) p. 51-2

The pursuit of the superpowers' structural interests was conducive to the creation of conflict and the ultimate breakdown of four-power control over Germany. Structural realism, also known as neorealism, provides with a sound theoretical framework for the analysis of the structural aspects of conflict involved in the treatment of the German Question. Neorealism sees not human nature but the anarchical international system as fostering fear and insecurity among states.⁴ While classical realists argue that states rely on aggression, neorealists maintain that fear is the main informative element of inter-state relations. Both camps share the view that states rely on military force in order to pursue their objectives and put a special emphasis on the balance of military capabilities as one of the main ordering principles of inter-states relations.⁵

Waltz maintains that bipolar systems are more stable than multipolar systems. In a bipolar world, great powers balance each other primarily by 'internal' rather than 'external' means: they rely on their own military capabilities rather than on alliances or the capabilities of allies.

⁶ According to Waltz, internal balancing is a less uncertain and more efficient process than external balancing. Waltz posits that this reduction of uncertainty is a crucial element in explaining why bipolar systems are more stable and less war-prone than multipolar systems.⁷

Clearly, the military and economic capabilities of the United States and the Soviet Union enabled them to intervene in the treatment of the German Question and the making of the post-war international order. The enhancement of their geopolitical and geo-economic standing in the aftermath of World War Two was responsible for ensuring that their

⁴ Dunne T., *Realism*, p. 113. See Waltz, K., *Theory of International Politics* (McGraw Hill) (1979)

⁵ Brooks, S., *Dueling Realisms*, p. 455

⁶ Waltz defines internal balancing efforts as 'moves to increase economic capability, to increase military strength', and external balancing efforts as 'moves to strengthen and enlarge one's own alliance or to weaken and shrink an opposing one'. See Waltz, K., *Theory of International Politics*, 118

⁷ Waltz, K., *Theory of International Politics*, 168-9

interventionist approach would not result in a less stable post-war international order. The smooth passage to a bipolar international order was executed in conditions that, although imbued with conflictual elements, were clearly influenced by the Rationalist principles of diplomacy, law-making and the idea of spheres of influence. In this context, Waltz's schema supplements a 'pluralist plus' interpretation: the overwhelming capabilities of the superpowers would foster the conditions for a post-war international order based on coexistence.

A neorealist interpretation is consistent with a 'pluralist plus' interpretation inasmuch as structural constraints compelled the superpowers to intervene in what they saw as their spheres of influence. This intervention has nonetheless unfolded within Rationalist parameters. The demarcation established by Washington and Moscow had attached to it a strong element of coexistence. Ultimately, American and Soviet interests did not collide to the point of causing a systemic disruption. The legacy of the wartime practical association framework and the overwhelming power accrued by both superpowers during the conflagration established clear boundaries as to the scope of their structural interests. This would facilitate the orderly passage to a bipolar international order.

The mainstream interpretations on the origins of the Cold War (particularly the orthodox and revisionist views) emphasise conflict as the main factor informing inter-Allies relations in the aftermath of World War Two. By doing so, they place themselves close to the Realist framework of interpretation. Critics of the English School argue that the tenets of

international society theory constitute a lighter version of Realism. After all, order and balance of power are concepts associated with the Realist discourse.⁸

However, in the case of the treatment of the German Question and the making of the post-war international order the elements of conflict, legality and transformation overlapped and complemented each other. World War Two had compelled the intervention of the United States and the Soviet Union on a scale unprecedented in the history of military conflict. American intervention was underpinned by structural interests mainly aimed at securing the continuation of the US economic expansion. Amongst the main theories on the origins of the Cold War, 'revisionism' (which opposes the pro-containment stance of the 'orthodox' camp) maintains that the United States and the Soviet Union were economic rivals, making them natural adversaries. LaFeber argues the United States and Imperial Russia were already rivals by 1900 over the development of Manchuria. Russia, unable to compete industrially with America, sought to close off parts of East Asia to trade with other colonial powers.⁹

Williams initiated the revisionist debate on the origins of the Cold War in the late 1950s. He underlined the 'imperialistic' nature of the American political and economic system. Williams argues that particularly after the first successful detonation of the atomic bomb, the attitude of the United States left the Soviets with one real option: either acquiesce to American proposals or be confronted with power and hostility.¹⁰ The binding element of the revisionist camp is what they perceive as the American responsibility for the breakdown of post-war peace. According to Williams and later revisionists, American policymakers shared

⁸ Dunne T., *Inventing international society: a history of the English school*, (New York: St. Martin's Press in association with St. Antony's College, Oxford) (1998) p. 5. Bull argues that institutions like diplomacy, international law, war, the balance of power and great power intervention serve as the ordering principles of the society of states. See Bull, H., *The Anarchical Society* and Wight, M., *Power Politics* (New York: Leicester University Press) (1995)

⁹ See Lafeber, W., *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1992* (New York and London : McGraw-Hill, (1993)

¹⁰ See Williams, W, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (World Publishing Co.: Cleveland and New York) (1959)

an overriding concern with the health of capitalism at home. In order to achieve that objective, they pursued an 'open door' policy abroad, aimed at increasing access to foreign markets for American business and agriculture. From this perspective, a growing economy went hand-in-hand with the consolidation of American power internationally.¹¹

Furthermore, starting with Alperovitz, revisionist scholars have focused on the American decision to use atomic weapons against Hiroshima and Nagasaki during the last days of World War Two as the starting point of the Cold War. According to Alperovitz, the bombs were not used to defeat Imperial Japan, who had been trying to surrender for several months, but to intimidate the Soviets; signaling that the United States would use nuclear weapons to preserve American interests in the post-war international order.¹² The Kolkos argue that US policy was both anticommunist and counterrevolutionary. The United States was not necessarily fighting Soviet influence, but any form of challenge to American economic and political interests.¹³

However, whilst Washington was pursuing its 'grand design', the Soviet Union intervened in the Eastern zone of occupation in Germany as well as in Eastern Europe in order to carve a sphere of influence that would guarantee her security from a revived Germany and from encirclement by the West. Although the involvement of the Soviet Union in the reordering of the international political system created a divergence of interests vis-à-vis the United

¹¹ Nashel, J., 'Cold War (1945–91) 'Changing Interpretations' in Whiteclay Chambers II, J., (ed.), *The Oxford Companion to American Military History* (Oxford University Press: Oxford and New York) (1999)

¹² See Alperovitz, G., *Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam* (London : Pluto) (1994)

¹³ See Kolko G. and J., *The Limits of Power: The World and U.S. Foreign Policy, 1945–1954* (New York: Harper and Row) (1972)

States, Moscow's intervention unfolded within clearly demarcated lines which seldom clashed with the US 'grand design'.

The 'orthodox' school places the responsibility for the Cold War on the Soviet Union and its expansion into Eastern Europe.¹⁴ The 'orthodox' interpretation tends to be seen as the US official stance on the origins of the conflict. Bailey argues that the breakdown of inter-Allied relations following the aftermath of World War Two was the result of Soviet expansionism in the immediate post-war years. Stalin had violated the promises he had made at Yalta, imposing Soviet-dominated regimes on unwilling Eastern European populations, and conspired to spread communism throughout the world. The United States was forced to respond to Soviet aggression with the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, in order to contain communist subversion around the world.¹⁵ Schlesinger identifies Leninism and totalitarianism as the informing factors of a structure of thought and behaviour which made post-war collaboration between both superpowers inherently impossible.¹⁶

'Revisionist' scholars challenged the widely accepted notion that Soviet leaders were committed to postwar 'expansionism'. They cited evidence that the Soviet Union's occupation of Eastern Europe had a defensive rationale, and that Soviet leaders saw themselves as attempting to avoid encirclement by the United States and its allies. According to this view, the Soviet Union was so weak and devastated after the end of the war as to be unable to pose any serious threat to the United States. Moreover, America maintained a nuclear monopoly until the Soviet Union tested its first atomic bomb in August 1949. It has also been suggested that Stalin never fully understood the Western position.

¹⁴ Calhoun, C., (ed.), 'Cold War', *Dictionary of the Social Sciences* (Oxford University Press: Oxford and New York) (2002)

¹⁵ See Bailey, T., *America Faces Russia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press) (1950)

¹⁶ Schlesinger, A., *Origins of the Cold War*, *Foreign Affairs* 46, no. 1 (October 1967) pp. 22-52

An interpretation based on the English School schema downplays any explanation on the origins of conflict based on misunderstanding. Unlike the first Cold War, when US policy-making were informed with the 'Riga axioms', World War Two and superpower involvement in the treatment of the German Question on and off the battlefield forged an associative framework which created a cognitive opening. Both superpowers were aware of each other's intentions and structural interests. This generated clear boundaries as to the superpowers' scope of action, which would evolve into the creation of spheres of influence originating in Germany and creating the division of Europe into two blocs.

As we will see in chapter 4, intervention, prompted by the American and Soviet involvement in the treatment of the German Question, would become one of the most significant factors in the creation of the Cold War international order. Although intervention would be undertaken within the framework of coexistence, which originated in the wartime practical association framework; American and Soviet involvement in the German Question and in the making of the post-war international order would be a source of conflict between the superpowers. Although the Rationalist framework sustained superpower interaction in the making of a post-war international order, the elements of conflict that were attached to it would be significant in the creation of a bipolar outcome in Germany and Europe. These elements of conflict would determine the demarcation lines of the polarisation process and create a specific identity for the United States and the Soviet Union as the two sole great powers in the post-war international order.

2.2 US interests in Western Europe and the revival of Germany

The policies geared towards the accomplishment of long range structural interests on the part of the United States provided the post-war international order with one its main elements of conflict. American economic interests in Western Europe were inextricably linked to the revival of Germany. For the United States, the fate of Western Europe and its industrial resources were vital to its 'grand design' for the post-war international order: the continuation of the wartime economic expansion. This 'grand design' necessitated the opening of Europe to American goods and capital, as well as an international economy based on a free trade system of exchange.

The Nazi New Order called for a German-led 'autarkic, national-economic' system in Europe,¹⁷ permanently secured by military means.¹⁸ The opening of the world economy would prevent the emergence of warring blocs and propel the continual expansion of the US economy. American involvement in World War Two had brought with it a phenomenal economic expansion. The New Deal policies of the 1930s were not fully successful in absorbing the unemployed workforce. Unemployment in the United States in 1940 was at 14.6% from the figure of 3.2% in 1929. The American economy had not fully recovered

¹⁷ See Kemmler, H., *Autarkie in der organischen Wirtschaft*, Dresden, 1940 and Teichert, E., *Autarkie und Grossraumwirtschaft in Deutschland, 1930-1939*, Munich, 1940 (Quoted in Berghahn, V., *The Americanisation of West German Industry, 1945-1973*, p. 27-8

¹⁸ See Gauleiter Gustav Simon, regional chief of the Nazi regime in Luxembourg, September 28, 1940 speech 'The reshaping of Europe' on the Nazi conception of a united Europe. Source 'Neugestaltung Europa', in Luxemburger Wort. 30.09.1940, No 274; 93e année, p.1. Also, Funk, W., *Verein Berliner Kaufleute und Industrieller und Wirtschafts-Hochschule Berlin* (Ed.). *Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft* (Berlin: Haude & Spenersche Verlagsbuchhandlung Max Paschke) 1943, pp. 17-42.

since the beginning of the Depression. In 1940 the gross national product per capita stood at \$916, only a slight increase from the figure of \$857 in 1929.¹⁹

The war created a great expansion of the American industrial base and an inextricable link between government and the private sector. In the first six months of 1942, the US government gave out more than \$100 billion in military contracts, more than the entire national product of 1940. The Ford Motor Company alone was producing more war material than the entire Italian economy.²⁰ The war also solidified the role of government in the overall running of the economy. The United States was able to pay about 45% of the war costs through taxation. By 1946 the national debt had soared to 130% of the GNP (\$269.4 billion).²¹ The expansion of the American economy during the war was impressive. By 1945 the United States produced half of the world's manufactured goods and held \$ 23 billion in gold reserves. As the leading revisionist Kolko argues

as a capitalist nation unable to expand its own internal market by redistributing its national income to absorb the surplus, the United States would soon plunge into the depression that only World War Two brought to an end.²²

This view had been endorsed by Secretary of State Cordell Hull, who observed that 'unhampered trade dovetailed with peace; high tariffs, trade barriers, and unfair economic

¹⁹ Figures from the US Department of Commerce, *Historical Statistics of the United States* (Washington, DC) (US Government Printing Office) (1961) quoted in DiLorenzo T., *How Capitalism saved America: the Untold History of Our Country-From the Pilgrims to the Present*, (Three Rivers Press: New York) (2004), pp. 73 and pp. 139

²⁰ Gordon, J.S., *The Empire of Wealth-The Epic History of the American Economic Power* (Harper Perennial: New York, London, Toronto, Sydney) (2005), p. 353-4

²¹ Gordon, J.S., *The Empire of Wealth*, p. 358

²² See Kolko, G. and J., *The limits of power: the world and United States foreign policy, 1945-1954*, (New York, Harper & Row) (1972)

competition with war'.²³ The American vision for the post-war international economy informed the financial aid scheme granted to Britain. Article VII of the Master Lend Lease Agreement between the United States and Britain of February 23, 1942 called for

the elimination of all forms of discriminatory treatment in international commerce, and to the reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers.²⁴

After the war, Dean Acheson, Assistant Secretary of State, commented that 'the only hope of maintaining world stability, social, political, and economic, was to adopt measures which will lead to an expansion of production, consumption and trade'. William Clayton, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, argued that 'world peace will always be gravely jeopardised by the kind of international economic warfare which was so bitterly waged between the two world wars'.²⁵

This 'grand design' was informed by the experience of the economic depression in the 1930s and the American involvement in World War Two. The reorganisation of the world economy would be based on interventionist policies aimed at preventing a recurrence of the outstanding economic troubles of the interwar period and was in itself an extension of the New Deal. The model of government intervention in the economy at home would be exported to the international economy as a whole. The rationale behind the Bretton Woods agreements of July 1944 was to contain and transpose the threat of war into the realm of

²³ Cordell, H., *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, Volume I (New York: Macmillan.) (1948), p. 81

²⁴ Preliminary Agreement Between the United States and the United Kingdom, February 23, 1942-
<http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/decade/decade04.htm>

²⁵ Kolko, G., *The Politics of War-Allied Diplomacy of the World Crisis of 1943-1945*, (New York: Random House, 1968) p. 485

international commerce. This liberal order would involve the lowering of tariffs, free convertibility of currencies and free trade that relied on fixed monetary exchange rates. An International Monetary Fund was to guard against a repetition of the exchange crisis in 1931-2 by providing funds to tie over temporary balance of payment difficulties. An International Bank of Settlements would be established to regulate international lending. An International Trade Organisation was to create a free trade environment.²⁶

This vision of a free trade economic order was incompatible with Soviet ideology. Berghahn argues that the emergence of two blocs after the war has to be seen in the context of a simplification exercise. Instead of integrating the 'planned' economies of Central and Eastern Europe, America sought to adapt the industrial centres of Western Europe and the Far East to the American model.²⁷ This 'half world' compromise can also be interpreted as a willingness to co-exist with the Soviet Union. The structural interests of the United States in the post-war international order were of an economic nature. The Communist economic system of the Soviet Union ensured that Moscow, unlike an autarkic European bloc and the British Empire, *would not be in direct competition with American interests*. Pursuing a liberal economic order in the vital strongholds of Germany and Western Europe would not put American interests irretrievably at odds with the Soviet Union. Superpower conflict would be restricted to specific boundaries, allowing Washington and Moscow to pursue their objectives within their respective spheres of influence.

The 'internationalist' camp in the United States wanted to bring Germany back into the community of nations through its integration into a free market economic system. In order

²⁶ Penrose, E.F., *Economic Planning for the Peace*, (Princeton, Princeton University Press) (1953) p. 351

to attain that, the German economy (whose industrial potential increased exponentially during the war) would have to retain a significant role in the rehabilitation of the European economy. The occupation of Germany would give the 'internationalists' an opportunity to strengthen links with German industrialists.²⁸ The 'grand design' had as its most pivotal element the reconstruction of Germany as the engine of a free market capitalist system in Western Europe.

This thinking stemmed back to wartime policy. In the early months of 1942, a set of intra-divisional committees of the State Department concluded that German industry and markets were essential to the revival of Europe and the establishment of a free enterprise economy. Curtailing German economic power would deprive the Continent of an economic system of exchange and create pressure for socialist state planning.²⁹ A report by William Diebold Jr., of the Council on Foreign Relations, suggested that nothing should be done 'to damage the efficiency of Germany's productive plants, which should play an important role in West European prosperity'. Diebold had in mind the maintenance of the industrial network that could produce reparation goods for Europe. The State Department planners stressed the virtues of economic integration and the dependence of Germany upon the markets and resources of Western Europe.³⁰

The state of war had not deterred the business community in the United States from continuing their trade with Nazi Germany. By late 1941, the size of American investments in Nazi Germany amounted to \$475 million. Main American firms like Standard Oil, Ford and ITT as well as the banking community, continued to do business with Nazi Germany during

²⁷ Berghahn, V., *The Americanisation of West German Industry, 1945-1973*, (Leamington Spa : Berg) (1986) p. 72-3

²⁸ Berghahn, V., *The Americanisation of West German Industry, 1945-1973*, p. 36-7

²⁹ Eisenberg, C. W., *Drawing the line: the American decision to divide Germany, 1944-1949*, (New York: Cambridge University Press) (1996) p. 18

³⁰ Eisenberg, C. W., *Drawing the line*, p. 20

the war.³¹ The contribution made by American capitalism before 1940 was crucial in the construction of the German war machine. For instance, in 1934 Germany produced domestically only 300,000 tons of natural petroleum products and less than 800,000 tons of synthetic gasoline. By 1944, after the transfer of Standard Oil of New Jersey hydrogenation patents and technology to I. G. Farben (used to produce synthetic gasoline from coal), Germany produced about 6 1/2 million tons of oil, of which 85% was synthetic oil. Furthermore, the control of synthetic oil output in Germany was held by the I. G. Farben subsidiary, Braunkohle-Benzin A. G. The I. G. Farben cartel itself was created in 1926 with Wall Street financial assistance.³²

In late 1946 the Council of Foreign Relations (CFR) established a study group on Germany headed by Allan Dulles, which included John McCloy, John Galbraith, De Witt Poole and representatives of private companies who did business with Germany. Dulles emphasised the need to restore German industrial production. He also argued that 'satisfying Soviet security needs and [integrating] the West German industry into Western Europe' would be a source of conflict between the superpowers. The idea of rehabilitating Germany was also endorsed by the American Association of the International Chamber of Commerce. Its study group recommended that the Soviet Union should be included in an all-German unit if it gave up demanding reparations from current production and agree to a free market economic system and free elections. It also emphasised the need to incorporate the Western

³¹ See Higham, C, *Trading with the Enemy-An Exposé of the Nazi-American Money Plot, 1933-1949*, (Robert Hale: London) (1983). Also, Wallace, M., *American Axis: Henry Ford, Charles Lindbergh, and the rise of the Third Reich* (New York: St. Martin's Press) (2003)

³² Kilgore to Howard K. Ambruster, February 29, 1944, Harley M. Kilgore Papers, West Virginia and Regional History Collection, West Virginia University, Morgantown

zones of occupation into the Western European economic system. The study group frowned upon the idea of excessive decartelisation and denazification.³³

There was a close link between the American business community, General Lucius Clay's advisers, his successor John Mc Cloy and certain German industrialists.³⁴ During 1946-7 American businessmen traveled throughout the Western zones of occupation. Berghahn maintains that it was due to the mediation of private Americans that directors of German firms were able to remain in their posts or reinstated. These included representatives of the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM), which visited the American zone in June 1946 and had been given a briefing by the OMGUS Economic Division on questions of reconstruction. James Martin, a member of the OMGUS Economic Division, surveyed the situation in Germany and published a report in 1947, calling for the reinstatement of board members of German companies. Martin also argued that German industry should be turned into a bulwark against Communism.³⁵

Fearing another economic depression, the American business community deemed the reconstruction of Germany and a prosperous Western Europe as essential for the US economy. Leading businessmen like Alfred P. Sloan, chairman of the board of General Motors Corporation, indicated the need for an industrial Germany.³⁶ The link between American private economic interests and the German cartels was exposed in a report by the Army Industrial College. The Report emphasised the significance of cartel activity for the

³³ Eisenberg, C. W., *Drawing the line*, p. 282-4

³⁴ Clay was the military governor of the US occupation zone. See Bird, K., *The Chairman: John J. McCloy-The Making of the American Establishment*, (New York: Simon & Schuster) (1992)

³⁵ Berghahn, V., *The Americanisation of West German Industry, 1945-1973*, p. 82-4.

‘defense and security of the United States’, underlining the fact that several American firms were tied to the cartels in fields most important for the war effort.³⁷ Brigadier General William Draper, the head of the US Economic division at the ACC, was the vice president of Dillon, Read and Company, a company that had floated large amounts of German securities in the United States in the 1920s, including those from the Vereinigte Stahlwerke. A confidential report to the Special Senate Committee investigating the National Defense Program suggested that ‘individuals with Wall Street connections and philosophy would not naturally be inclined to advocate forcibly and effectively a program of decartelisation’.³⁸

The US Congress earmarked the failure of the United States in enforcing the decartelisation of Germany. US Senator Harley M Kilgore, chair of the Subcommittee on War Mobilisation of the Military Affairs Committee and chairman of the Kilgore Committee, repeatedly warned during 1945 and 1946 that the German cartel apparatus, instead of being destroyed as required under the Quebec, Yalta and Potsdam agreements, was being deliberately protected. However, in spite of the dedicated efforts of Senator Kilgore, the connections between American, British and French capitalists and their German, Swedish, Swiss and other supposedly ‘neutral’ counterparts would ensure that the search for Nazi assets and Nazi business interests would in the long term be largely unproductive.

The Kilgore Committee heard detailed evidence from government officials, who revealed that when the Nazis came to power in 1933, they found that significant efforts had been

³⁶ LaFeber, W. (Ed.), *The Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947*, p. 38

³⁷ The Army Industrial College, Office of the Commandant, Washington DC, Report on Cartels, in Interdepartmental & Intradepartmental Committee (State Dept)-SWNCC-Decimal file 1944-49 Box 65 Entry 504

³⁸ Confidential report to the Special Senate Committee investigating the National Defense Program on the preliminary investigation of military government in the occupied areas of Europe, November 22, 1946.

made since 1918 in preparing the German industrial network for war.³⁹ The Committee devoted great attention to the impact of cartels in the development of the German military machine.⁴⁰ A special West Virginia edition of *Labor* magazine highlighted that 'Kilgore revealed that monopolies and cartels sabotaged Uncle Sam's preparations for war, and strengthened his enemies'.⁴¹

The Ferguson Committee found that of the 500 enterprises that should have been investigated under the decartelisation law introduced in the US zone in February 1947, only sixty-one were ever checked. From these sixty-one, decartelisation proceedings had started in only a handful of cases. At the Henschel enterprise, the greatest armament factory in Germany, proceedings were stopped on the direct orders of Clay in March 1948.⁴²

The intricacies of the four-power occupation arrangement and the overall spectrum of inter-Allied relations prevented the implementation of economic recovery in Germany. As late as January 1946 the State Department was in favour of a balance of 'punitive and constructive' policies in regards to the German level of industry.⁴³ However, by March 1946 the idea of a Western German entity was gaining ground, as the four-power setting was not permitting the enforcement of US structural interests. George Kennan (chargé d'affaires in Moscow and soon to become head of the Policy Planning Staff at the US State Department) was hinting

³⁹ United States Congress. Senate. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Military Affairs. *Elimination of German Resources for War*. Report pursuant to S. Res. 107 and 146, July 2, 1945, Part 7, (78th Congress and 79th Congress), (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1945), hereafter cited as *Elimination of German Resources*. See Kolko, G., 'American Business and Germany, 1930-1941', *The Western Political Quarterly*, Volume XV, 1962.

⁴⁰ See Borkin, J., *The Crime and Punishment of I. G. Farben* (New York: The Free Press, 1978) and Maddox, Robert F. Maddox, *The Senatorial Career of Harley Martin Kilgore* (New York: Garland Publishing Company, 1981), 174-82

⁴¹ *Labor*, October 12, 1946

⁴² Burchett, W., *Cold War in Germany* (World Unity Publications: Melbourne) (1950), p. 145-6

⁴³ Acheson to Murphy, January 23, 1946-FRUS, 1946, Vol. V, *The British Commonwealth; Western and Central Europe*, p. 491

at walling the Western zones against Soviet penetration and integrating them into a Western European bloc.⁴⁴ Kennan perceived that the Soviet policy on Germany was to create 'a People's Republic' along the lines of Poland or Yugoslavia'. He advocated an American policy 'independent from Potsdam' and pressed on the 'organisation of Western Germany'.

⁴⁵

The course of events in the occupation zones and the economic crisis of 1946 prompted the US policy-making machinery into action. Rostow refers to a meeting which probably took place on April 20, 1946, shortly before Byrnes left for Paris to participate in treaty negotiations. The meeting was attended by Secretary of State James Byrnes, Dean Acheson and Will Clayton. Rostow surmises that Acheson and Clayton argued that a division of Europe was being configured along the Elbe. They maintained that potentially divisive forces operated in the ACC. Acheson and Clayton devised a plan which had as its basic rationale a permanent American concern in regards to Europe and a general European settlement. They thought that Soviet, British and French officials considered the American foothold in Europe to be permanent. This would entail the formation of a Soviet bloc and possibly a Western European bloc once the Americans left.⁴⁶

Economic considerations were pivotal in the formulation of US policy. The revisionist school emphasise the importance of economic factors in American foreign policy during the Cold War. As Pollard argues, US policy makers had learned that American prosperity

⁴⁴ Kennan to Byrnes, March 6, 1946-FRUS, 1946, Vol. V, *The British Commonwealth; Western and Central Europe*, p, 519

⁴⁵ Kennan to Carmel Offie, May 10, 1946-FRUS, 1946, Vol. V, *The British Commonwealth; Western and Central Europe*, p, 555-6

depended ‘upon a thriving international economy’.⁴⁷ The prevalent view of the American establishment was that United States, faced with a massive surplus of goods and capital, needed the reconstitution of Germany as a viable economic unit.⁴⁸

According to Beschloss, President Truman, informed by the mistakes of World War One, perceived the need to reform Germany in order to avoid a drift towards Communism due to chaos and starvation.⁴⁹ As we will see in chapter 3, the failure of the Moscow CFM to keep Germany united gave George Marshall, Secretary of State after 1947, the impetus to launch the European Recovery Plan (ERP), also known as the Marshall Plan.⁵⁰ European reconstruction required products manufactured in the United States. In the immediate aftermath of World War Two, Europe did not have the dollars to buy these supplies. The United States had a sizeable trade surplus and its reserves were large and increasing.

According to Hogan, the Marshall Plan was designed to promote Europe’s financial, fiscal and political stability; to stimulate world trade and to forestall an economic depression through the expansion of markets for the US economy. The rationale behind the ERP was the creation of an integrated large internal European market with the ultimate result of creating a prosperous and stable European community, secure against the dangers of Communist subversion and able to join the United States in a multilateral system of trade. It also envisaged a sustained political and military involvement of the United States in

⁴⁶ Rostow, W.W., *The Division of Europe After World War II: 1946*, (Austin: University of Texas Press) (1981) p. 3-5

⁴⁷ Pollard, R., *Economic Security and the Origins of the Cold War, 1945-1950*, p. 37-41

⁴⁸ See Wala, M., *The Council on the Foreign Relations and American Foreign Policy in the Early Cold War*, (Berghahn Books: Providence) (1994)

⁴⁹ Beschloss, M., *The Conquerors, Roosevelt, Truman, and the destruction of Hitler’s Germany, 1941-1945* (New York and London : Simon & Schuster) (2003), p. 290

⁵⁰ Trachtenberg, M., *Constructed Peace: the making of the European settlement, 1945-1963* (Princeton: Princeton University Press) (1999) p. 56

European affairs since even an all-European union would be too vulnerable to Soviet attack.

⁵¹ The economic revival of Germany was undertaken in accordance with the American 'grand design' for the post-war international order. Seen from this perspective, the policy to revive the Western zones of occupation through the implementation of Bizonia and the ERP, constituted a demarcation line in the distribution of spheres of influence. Policy-makers in Washington acted according to a Rationalist pursuit of the American national interest. By pushing for the revival of Germany within specific boundaries, they minimised conflict and contributed to the formation of a workable balance of power for the post-war international order.

The decision to revive Germany was taken in order to rectify the reparations problem and the shortage of German coal being supplied to Western Europe as well as to minimise the costs of the Anglo-American occupation. The State Department was aware of the fact that if Germany was to be revived, France and the neighbouring countries would demand compensation for the loss of reparations and cheap coal. ⁵² In the Netherlands, the Bakker-Schut Plan called for large sums of money to be paid in terms of compensation and even the annexation of a part of Germany which would have doubled the country's size. The Monnet Plan of 1946 proposed that France should be given control over the German coal areas of the Ruhr and Saar. The utilisation of these resources would bring France to 150% of prewar industrial production. The revival of Germany would therefore have to be undertaken within the context of an overall rehabilitation and integration of the Western European economies.

⁵¹ Hogan M., *The Marshall Plan- America, Britain, and the reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) (1987) p. 427-30

On May 8, 1947, Dean Acheson made a speech in Cleveland, Mississippi in which he stated that 'without outside aid, the process of recovery in many countries would take as long as to give rise to hopelessness and despair.' Acheson highlighted the fact that while before the war US exports circulated at a rate of \$ 4 billion, they now totaled \$ 16 billion, with imports standing at \$8 billion. Acheson concluded that the United States should 'push ahead with the reconstruction of those two great workshops of Europe and Asia-Germany and Japan' and that 'on the grounds of self interest and humanitarianism' the United States must take 'as large a volume of imports as possible from abroad in order that the financial gap between what the world needs and it can borrowed can be narrowed.'⁵³ As Acheson pointed out, the US State Department realised that a weak German economy was leading to 'economic misery' in Western Europe, which resulted in strengthening Communism parties and movements in those countries. By punishing Germany economically, the United States was inadvertently helping in the rise of Communism in Europe.⁵⁴

The most important studies which gave shape to the ERP were made by the State War Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) and the Policy Planning Staff (PPS). The SWNCC and PPS studies, Clayton's memoranda and Marshall's speech offered a set of principles and an invitation for Europeans to participate in a joint program. The SWNCC report supported increased foreign aid for the ailing European economies and listed among the countries in need of particular help as Austria, France and Italy. It also argued in favour of German recovery and a coordinated coal program. The PPS reports were written by Kennan, who

⁵² Hogan M., *The Marshall Plan*, p.87-8

⁵³ Speech by Under Secretary Dean Acheson at the Delta Council, Cleveland, Mississippi, May 18, 1947- From www.trumanlibrary.org

⁵⁴ Acheson, D., *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department*, (NY: Norton) (1969) p. 241-4

argued that an aid program would have to be large enough and last long enough to convince the Europeans that it would work. The report also concluded that the program should be organised by the Europeans themselves, acting collectively and including Germany and Austria. Eastern Europe should be invited to join. The long term aim would be to make Europe prosperous so that communism would have no attraction.⁵⁵

On June 5, 1947 Marshall made his famous announcement at Harvard University, in which he stated that the preparation for war and the conflagration itself affected 'the entire fabric of European economy'. He also stated that under the Nazis '[L]ong-standing commercial ties, private institutions, banks, insurance companies, and shipping companies disappeared, through loss of capital, absorption through nationalisation, or by simple destruction'. He added that 'Europe's requirements for the next three or four years of foreign food and other essential products (principally from America) are so much greater than her present ability to pay that she must have substantial additional help or face economic, social, and political deterioration of a very grave character'. The undertone was for bloc-formation, as Marshall stated that 'it would be neither fitting nor efficacious for this Government to undertake to draw up unilaterally a program designed to place Europe on its feet economically. Marshall also stated that 'any government that is willing to assist in the task of recovery will find full co-operation...on the part of the United States Government'. However, he warned that any government manoeuvring to block the recovery of other countries could not expect help from the United States.⁵⁶

⁵⁵ Hogan M., *The Marshall Plan*, p.81-2

⁵⁶ Extracts from Marshall Speech at Harvard University June 5, 1947-
http://www.oecd.org/document/10/0,2340,en_2649_201185_1876938_1_1_1_1,00.html

The Secretary of State's speech marked an important milestone along the road to a bipolar settlement. MacAllister argues that the early post-war international order should be viewed as a latent 'tripolar system'. He also maintains that 'the belief that Germany represented a potential third power whose defection or allegiance would determine the overall balance of power, as well as the closely related belief that a united Western Europe could eventually emerge as a third centre of power' exerted a dominant influence on American foreign policy after the failure to achieve a four-power solution at the Moscow CFM in 1947.⁵⁷ Clearly, the ERP enforced a bipolar outcome by marrying the 'grand design' thinking to the economic recovery of Western Europe.

The reconstruction plan was developed at a meeting of the participating European states in Paris in July 1947. The Marshall Plan offered the same aid to the Soviet Union and its allies, if they would make political reforms and accept certain outside controls. The plan was to be operational for four fiscal years beginning in July 1947. The Europeans sent a reconstruction plan to Washington asking for \$22 billion in aid. Truman cut this to \$17 billion in the bill he put to Congress. The plan met sharp opposition in the US Congress, mostly from the portion of the Republican Party (led by Senator Robert Taft) that advocated a more isolationist policy and was weary of massive government spending. The plan also had opponents on the left. Henry Wallace, former US vice-president, saw the plan as a subsidy for American exporters and sure to polarise the world between East and West. Opposition to the ERP waned with the overthrow of the democratic government of Czechoslovakia by the Communists in February 1948. Soon after, a bill granting an initial \$5 billion was passed

⁵⁷ MacAllister, J., *No Exit*, p. 11

into law by the US Congress, with strong bipartisan support. The US Congress would eventually donate \$12.4 billion in aid over the four years of the plan.⁵⁸

The political aspects of the ERP were intimately linked to the rehabilitation mindset. In the 1980s, a new school was developed with some historians like Milward arguing that the Marshall Plan might not have played as decisive a role in Europe's recovery as was previously believed.⁵⁹ Such critics have pointed out that economic growth in many European countries revived before the large scale arrival of US aid, and was fastest amongst some of the lesser recipients. While aid from the Marshall Plan eased immediate difficulties and contributed to the recovery of some key sectors, growth from the post-war nadir was largely an independent process. Arkes reveals that the actual financial impact of the Marshall Plan aid was quite small, at no time exceeding 5% of the recipient nations GNP.⁶⁰ The genuine investment value of the Marshall Plan assistance was not remarkable either. The largest portion of ERP money was used to cover imports of agricultural products, raw

⁵⁸ Grogin R., *Natural Enemies-the United States and the Soviet Union in the Cold War, 1917-1991* (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books) (2000), p. 118

⁵⁹ According to Milward, who argues that the recovery of the European economy originated in the post-war determination to succeed, it was the very strength of the recovery, sucking in huge volumes of American resources and causing severe balance of payment deficits, that created short term tensions. He also maintains that the ERP, although being responsible for the prevention of economic restrictions, did not make a substantial significance to the recovery except for maybe one or two years of economic growth. See Milward, A.S., *The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-1951* (Methuen: London) (1984), pp. 1-55, 91-113 This view is supported by Eichengreen and DeLong who argue that the Marshall Plan significantly sped Western European growth by altering the environment in which economic policy was made. The Marshall Plan era saw a rapid dismantling of controls over product and factor markets in Western Europe and the restoration of price and exchange rate stability. This came about because to some degree the governments in power believed that the 'mixed economies' they were building should have a strong pro-market orientation. The Marshall Plan 'conditionality' pushed governments toward versions of the 'mixed economy' that had more market orientation and less directive planning in the mix. The Marshall Plan should thus be thought of as a large and highly successful structural adjustment program. See De Long B. and J. and Eichengreen B., *The Marshall Plan: History's Most Successful Structural Adjustment Program* in Dornbusch R., Nöbling W., and Layard R. (ed), *Postwar Economic Reconstruction and Lessons for the East Today* (Cambridge, MA and London: The MIT Press) (1993)

⁶⁰ Arkes, H., *Bureaucracy, the Marshall Plan, and the National Interest*. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton UP 1972) p. 3 quoted. In Cowen, Tyler: *The Marshall Plan: Myths and Realities* in Bandow, D. (Ed.): *U.S. Aid to the Developing World: A Free Market Agenda*. (Washington: Heritage Found. 1985); pp. 61-74 at p. 63.

materials and semi-finished products. Used as credits for specific investment, mostly state projects, 'these funds supplemented domestic sources of capital, made it easier for governments to direct resources into politically desired uses and thus...strengthened state control over Western Europe's economies'.⁶¹ Distributed in such a way, the Marshall Plan aid did not serve as an incentive for European governments to change their economic policies in order to attract private capital inflows, but instead encouraged them to continue with their internal policies of 'planification', demand expansion and premature redistribution'.⁶²

The ERP would create a permanent involvement by the United States in the political and economic affairs of Western Europe. Leffler highlights the political nature of the ERP by claiming that the Marshall Plan was essentially designed to stabilise the socio-political situation in Western Europe, to speed the incorporation of western Germany into the Western bloc, and to reduce Soviet influence in Eastern Europe.⁶³ The ERP was also designed to centre the European economic system around the revival of the western zones of occupation in Germany, a process which started with the creation of Bizonia. The creation and implementation of the ERP had profound implications for the post-war international order. The ERP finalised the process of bloc-formation. The French managed to clinch a deal with Britain and America during the Moscow CFM on April 19, 1947 for an

⁶¹ Food, fertilizers, and feed constituted 32,1% of all ERP shipments, raw materials and semi-finished products 48,3%; only 14,3% was used for machinery and vehicles. Cf. Kostrzewa, W., *A Marshall Plan for Middle and Eastern Europe*. In: *World Economy 13* (Cowen, T., *The Marshall Plan: Myths and Realities* in Bandow, D. (Ed.): *U.S. Aid to the Developing World: A Free Market Agenda*. (Washington: Heritage Found. 1985); pp. 61-74 at p. 63. March 1990), pp. 27-49 at p. 31

⁶² Kostrzewa, W., *A Marshall Plan for Middle and Eastern Europe*. In: *World Economy 13* (March 1990), pp. 27-49 at p. 33

⁶³ See Leffler, M., *The Struggle for Germany and the Origins of the Cold War*, Occasional Paper No. 16, German Historical Institute (Washington, DC)

increased amount of coal to be exported to France, subject to revision by the end of 1947. The tripartite agreements signed in London on August 28, 1947 and in Berlin on December 1947-January 1948 ensured the integration of the coal production region of Saar to France and the supply of coke for the rehabilitation of the French steel industry.⁶⁴ Furthermore, the Accord of the Six in December 1948 created the International Authority of the Ruhr, in charge of the distribution of coal, coke and steel.⁶⁵

On June 28, 1948, on the eve of the currency reform in the Western zones, Bevin announced that 'the Six [Western European] Powers came to the conclusion that if this situation was to be remedied and conditions created in which Germany could profit from the ERP and reorganise her economy, it was necessary for a responsible German Government to be established as soon as possible'. In regards to the Ruhr, Bevin insisted on its potential 'contribution to European rehabilitation as a whole'.⁶⁶ On July 14, 1948 the United States of America and the US and British occupied areas in Germany signed an economic co-operation agreement, consistent with the Convention for European Economic Co-operation signed at Paris on April 16, 1948. The aims of the agreement were to achieve a 'joint recovery program...in Europe'. Under that principle, the military governors would ensure 'the promotion of industrial and agricultural production on a sound economic basis along healthy non-aggressive lines' and 'the stabilisation of currency, the establishment and maintenance of a valid rate of exchange, and the balancing of government budgets'. Most importantly, for the purposes of bloc-formation, the agreement envisaged 'cooperation with

⁶⁴ Poidevin, R., *La France et le Charbon allemande au lendemain de la deuxième guerre mondiale*, p. 371-2 Relations Internationales, no. 44, hiver 1985, pp. 365-77

⁶⁵ Poidevin, R., *La France et le Charbon allemande au lendemain de la deuxième guerre mondiale*, p. 373-4

⁶⁶ From Bevin speech at the House of Common, June 30, 1948-From von Oppen, B. R. (ed), *Documents of Germany under Occupation 1945-1954*. Issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs (London, New York, Toronto: OUP) (1955), p. 308-14

other participating countries in facilitating and stimulating an increasing interchange of goods and services'.⁶⁷

The presence of the Red Army in Central and Eastern Europe entailed the threat of a Soviet advance into Western Europe. This threat compelled the United States to push for the integration of the Western zones of occupation with the neighbouring countries. This intervention recreated the principle of a liberal economic order in the Western half of Europe. The Western zones of occupation were by the end of 1946 on their way to greater economic and political interdependence with Western Europe. A politically emasculated Germany facilitated the possibility of true cooperation within the framework of European integration. In this context, the 'revisionist' interpretation should be seen in conjunction with the transformative implications brought about by the integrationist process in Western Europe. As we will see in chapters 5 and 6, these transformative elements will play a significant part in ending the internal balance of power in Western Europe.

American interests were implemented according to the demarcation lines imposed by the involvement of the Soviet Union in the war. Washington put into practice its containment policy in a 'defensive' rather than 'offensive' way. Cold War historians have argued that the 'containment policy' of the Truman administration was basically an offensive threat to the expansion of the Soviet Union. It threatened to use force should Moscow attempt to expand its influence in areas that were not under Soviet control. Yet, it could also be considered defensive, because it let the Soviets know that the United States would protect its interests in

⁶⁷ Economic Co-Operation Agreement between the United States and the US and British Occupied Areas in Germany, July 14, 1948-*Documents on Germany under Occupation 1945-54*, p. 318-22

Europe and Asia, but not make the first military move.⁶⁸ The notion of 'vital strongholds' was not detached from the criteria imposed by the spheres of influence thinking, pervasive in the superpower interaction over the German Question. As we will see in chapter 3, this thinking would socialise conflict in a 'pluralist plus' direction and therefore restrain it through the elements of diplomatic interaction and the formation of a balance of power in Germany and Europe.

While the United States was prepared to let Eastern Europe join the Soviet bloc, the need to incorporate Western Europe into its sphere of influence necessitated an interventionist approach. This selfish interventionism did not provoke an offensive response by Moscow. The Soviet Union refrained from actively supporting left-wing insurgency in Western Europe or properly endorsing the local Communist parties, ever so eager to respond to Moscow's diktat, as they did during the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact impasse. The unfolding of the treatment of the German Question contributed to the creation the 'West', as it was vital for the United States to protect its sphere of influence. The creation of a Western sphere of influence originated in the efforts to achieve a 'peace of sorts' in Germany. A permanent involvement in continental affairs would be the natural implication of the economic rationale behind Bizonia and the ERP.⁶⁹ In the long run, any desire to pull out of the Continent could

⁶⁸ See Lucas, S., *Freedom's War: the US crusade against the Soviet Union, 1945-56* (Manchester: Manchester University Press) (1999) and Deibel, T., and Gaddis, J.L., *Containing the Soviet Union : a critique of U.S. policy* (Washington (D.C. and London : Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense) (1987)

⁶⁹ Ireland points out that 'until the creation of the NATO structure and the assignment of US ground forces to that organisation, none of the American policies for Europe, as revolutionary as they were, implied permanent American involvement in continental affairs'. Ireland, T., *Creating the Entangling Alliance* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press) (1981), p. 183. The idea of a 'third independent centre of power' in order to correct the 'geopolitical disbalance' was also mentioned by Kennan. See Kennan, G., *Memoirs, 1925-50* (New York: Atlantic, Little, Brown, 1967), p. 463.

not be compatible with maintaining a sphere of influence in Western Europe.⁷⁰ Intervention in Western Germany and Europe adhered to the fundamental principles guiding US policy. As such, it became one of the two prongs of the demarcation line that created the spheres of influence. No other stronghold was more important than Germany in this demarcation process. The bipolar outcome in Germany created policy for the rest of Western Europe and conditioned the interaction with the Soviet bloc.

2.3 Ideology and the enforcement of US structural interests

As we will see in chapter 6, ideology was one of the main transformative elements of the post-war society of states. Ideological concerns had informed the Western response to the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917. Western European and American forces aided the White side during the Russian Civil War (1917-20) and occupied parts of Russia. The Western European powers had turned a blind eye to Mussolini, Franco and the assortment of dictatorships that sprawled across Europe during the 1920s and 1930s. They had also built a *cordon sanitaire* against the Soviet Union through a series of military treaties.

The Soviet Union had a highly authoritarian political system under the leadership of a brutal dictator and an economic system that was diametrically opposed to that of the Western Allies. In the late 1920s, the Soviet Union embarked upon a process of war-orientated industrialisation. Stalin signed a non-aggression pact with Hitler in 1939, sharing the spoils of

⁷⁰ Leffler and Lundestad have argued that America was intent on preventing the emergence of a 'third force' or an independent center of power on the continent. According to Leffler 'neither an integrated Europe nor a united Germany nor an independent Japan must be permitted to emerge as a third force or a neutral bloc'. See Leffler, M., *A Preponderance of Power*, p. 17 and Lundestad, G., *"Empire" by Integration: The United States and European Integration, 1945-1997* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 4, 54-57.

Poland with the Führer and, to an extent, facilitating the Reich's march into Western Europe in 1940. This general context of suspicion clouded the spectrum of inter-Allied relations and spilled over to the issues pertaining to Germany where the Allies had diverging interests. Adding an alternative dimension to the view espoused by the orthodox and revisionist camps, one could argue that both superpowers had structural interests in regards to Germany and the post-war international order. Conflict unfolded because of the enormous amount of power which the United States and the Soviet Union accrued during the war. The American stance had from the very beginning an economic consideration. The ideology of the United States was in fact, the protection of its economic interests. Following from this principle, it is possible to conclude that ideology became a tool for the planning and execution of the split in Germany and Europe.

America's most important ideological tool in regards to the German Question and the post-war international order was the policy of 'containment'. The notion of containment stemmed from wartime policy and it was informed by the rationale behind Washington's involvement in World War Two: the expansion of American economic interests. Containment responded to the political situation that arose in Germany and Europe after the end of the war. In January 1946, the Joint War Plans Committee projected that instead of seeking buffer zones along its borders, the Soviet Union would attempt to dominate 'the Eurasian landmass' and all of its approaches. In February 1946, the War Department advised Truman that the United States should provide help to nations threatened by Soviet expansion.⁷¹ Furthermore, James V. Forrestal, Secretary of the Navy, who commissioned a

⁷¹ Gormly, J., *From Potsdam to the Cold War: Big Three diplomacy, 1945-1947* (Wilmington, Del : SR Books)(1990), p. 115

private study of Soviet policy in late 1945, concluded that the Soviets were committed to 'global, violent proletarian revolution' and posed a real threat to world peace.⁷²

'Containment' thinking arose through the work carried out by the Policy Planning Staff of the US State Department, headed by George Kennan. The doctrine of 'containment' systematically outlined Soviet foreign policy intentions as directed 'to reduce strength and influence, collectively as well as individually, of capitalist powers' and 'toward deepening and exploiting...conflicts between capitalist powers'. It also stated that if conflict would ensue, the Soviet Union would make sure that war turned into 'revolutionary upheavals within the various capitalist countries'.⁷³ Kennan's strategy gyrated in its first stage around the principle of 'containment'. At its core, containment had as its basic tenets the restoration of the balance of power, left unstable by the demise of Germany and Japan, and the Soviet encroachment on Eastern Europe. Kennan's 'strongpoint defense' rationale entailed the strategic defense of five vital industrial and war-making capacity centres. Priority was to be given to the economic instruments of containment as opposed to military build-ups. The ERP is a perfect example of the implementation of this tactic. The strategy also entailed the configuration of independent and self-confident centres rather than spheres of influence subservient to Washington.

The second stage of Kennan's strategy involved the fragmentation of the international Communist movement. The recognition of Tito's Yugoslavia is an eloquent example of this theory being put into practice. In addition to this, NSC 48/2 and NSC 58/2 were set up to encourage a rift between Mao's China and the Soviet Union and to encourage dissidence

⁷² Forrestal, J., *The Forrestal Diaries* (ed.) Walter Millis and Duffield E.S. (New York: 1951) , p. 127-32, 137-140

⁷³ Kennan, G., Telegram to the Secretary of State, February 22, 1946-
<http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/coldwar/documents/episode-1/kennan.htm>

among Soviet satellite countries. A third stage of this strategy entailed the transformation of Soviet thinking by the acceptance on the part of Moscow of the diversity of the international political order.⁷⁴

Containment was aimed at advancing US interests rather than arresting an elusive Soviet advance into the West. By the time containment was formulated as doctrine, the vital points pinpointed by Kennan were secured from Soviet influence. The nature of the Soviet system made it incumbent upon Washington to formulate a policy which would demarcate the sphere of influence in which to operate. At the same time, Kennan's third stage of containment mentioned the 'diversity of the international political order' as a transformative element in superpowers' relations. By the time containment thinking was operational, the Soviet Union had proved capable of respecting the boundaries imposed by the spheres of influence system.

The policy of containment became the official US stance on inter-Allied relations in March 12, 1947, when the Truman Doctrine laid out the need to aid all countries threatened by Communism. The message of President Truman to the US Congress referred to the Greek government's inability to cope with the Communist insurgency and established that the United States would assist Greece as well as Turkey in their fight against Communism. But Truman went beyond, proclaiming that the world faced a choice between two different alternatives in the post-war era

⁷⁴ Gaddis Lewis, J., *Strategies of Containment-A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy*, p.55-74

One way of life is based upon the will of the majority, and is distinguished by free institutions, representative government, free elections, guarantees of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion, and freedom from political oppression [and] the second way of life is based upon the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio; fixed elections, and the suppression of personal freedoms.⁷⁵

These developments culminated in the establishment of the National Security Act 1947, which realigned and reorganised the US armed forces, foreign policy, and the intelligence community apparatus. The Act merged the Department of War and the Department of the Navy into the National Military Establishment (NME), headed by a Secretary of Defense, and created a separate Department of the Air Force from the existing US Army Air Force. It also established the National Security Council, a central place of coordination for national security policy in the Executive Branch, and the Central Intelligence Agency, the United States' first peacetime intelligence agency.

The outcome of the Truman Doctrine and the ERP was the constitution of a Western bloc capable of arresting any possible Soviet expansionist aspirations east of the Elbe. Western cooperation amongst France, the United States, Britain and the Benelux countries was furthered by the conference held in London on February 23, 1948. The London conference established a close cooperation framework in matters arising from the ERP and the economic rehabilitation of Western Germany. In March 1948, France, Britain and the Benelux countries established the Brussels Treaty Organisation in order to assist each other

⁷⁵ President Truman Address before the Joint Session of the Senate and the House of Representatives- March 12, 1947
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/doctrine/large/documents/index.php?documentdate=1947-03-12&documentid=31&studycollectionid=TDctrine&pagenumber=1

in the event of an attack towards any of them. On June 11, 1948 the US Senate passed Resolution 239, which stated the idea of giving the Brussels Pact military support.

The ideological underpinning of the US national interest contributed to the breakdown of inter-Allied relations over Germany and the post-war international order but not to the creation of disruptive conflict. The protection of the vital strongholds in Germany, Europe and Asia entailed the creation of a military and intelligence establishment which would ensure the enforcement of American economic interests. This would have an enormous significance for the post-war international order as intervention for the enforcement of American vital interests would be a feature of the Cold War international political system. This kind of selfish interventionism was manifested in the toppling of Mossadeqh in Iran (1953), Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala (1954) and Salvador Allende in Chile (1973), all of them responsible for threatening US business interests in their respective countries. America's involvement in the German Question originated this line of thinking. At the same time, as we will see in the following chapters, the Soviet leadership was equally keen to enforce its own 'grand design' on Germany and the international order as a whole.

The ideological overtones of the United States revolved around considerations stemming from the pursuit of her national interest. However, these ideological considerations served to uphold the enforcement of structural interests within a clearly defined sphere of influence. The intervention of the Soviet Union in the treatment of the German Question served as a balancing element in the nascent international order and therefore restricted the scope of

conflict through the Rationalist boundaries imposed by continual diplomatic and legal interaction.

2.4 Soviet security interests in Eastern Europe

The second prong in the creation of conflict in inter-Allied relations was the pursuit of Soviet security interests in Germany and Eastern Europe. The orthodox perspective underlines Soviet expansionism as one of the main factors causing the breakdown of inter-Allied relations after the war. However, the Soviet Union enforced their security interests only in the areas where the Red Army had a significance presence. This indicates a Rationalist element in the structuralisation of conflict: Moscow did *not* attempt to discipline Tito's Yugoslavia with an outright invasion or to directly intervene in the Greek Civil War. In this security 'grand design', securing a foothold in Germany was pivotal to holding on to Eastern Europe. Quadripartite agreement in Germany would have probably forced a retreat of the Red Army from Eastern Europe, as it occurred at the end of the Cold War.

The region's emergent pattern was the setting of coalitions of national unity and the establishment of 'people's democracies'. This pattern was guaranteed by the presence of the Red Army, which precluded Western scenarios of conservative restoration. On the other hand, Soviet security interests were narrow and indifferent to socialism per se.⁷⁶ The 'national roads to socialism' strategy already characterised Communist policy in Western Europe in 1945, and from the summer of 1946 until late 1947 it also applied in the East. The

⁷⁶ For more on the National Front strategy see Mark, E., *Revolution By Degrees: Stalin's National-Front Strategy For Europe, 1941-1947*, *The Cold War International History Project Working Paper no. 31*

actual development of the 'national roads' strategy varied. Elections ranged from thoroughly corrupt in Poland to genuinely free in Czechoslovakia.⁷⁷

There was no significant Red Army presence in either Albania or Yugoslavia when the communists took over. The process of sovietisation in these countries would therefore evolve with a degree of political independence amongst local Communists not seen anywhere else in Eastern Europe. When the Germans withdrew from Albania in the autumn of 1944, the Communists under Enver Hoxha were already well established as the dominant political force. In May 1944 the National Liberation Movement had transformed itself into the National Liberation Front and deposed King Zog. In October 1944 a congress at Berat established a provisional government, nine of whose eleven members were Communists. There were few obstacles to this rapid Communist takeover. The Allies had never recognised an Albanian government in exile so there was no one to intervene on behalf of former politicians. All other political factions in the country were disorganised and when opposition manifested itself later in the Catholic areas of the north, the well-armed Communist army and security forces had no difficulty in suppressing it.⁷⁸

The communists in Yugoslavia were aided by the fact that Yugoslavia was considered a victor power and therefore had neither an occupation force nor an allied control commission. During the war Stalin had persistently advised the Yugoslav Communists to tread cautiously. Stalin joined with Churchill to urge Tito to come to an agreement in June 1944 with Ivan Šubašić, Prime Minister of the Royal Government, which provided for a

⁷⁷ See Coutouvidis, J. and Reynolds, J., *Poland 1939-1947* (Leicester: Leicester University Press) (1986). Also Polonsky A. and Drukier, B (eds.), *The beginnings of communist rule in Poland* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul) (1980), pp. 1-139.

post-war coalition of royalist and partisan forces. On November 1944 a republic was proclaimed and the constituent assembly declared itself to be the people's assembly. The new constitution which was adopted on 31 January 1946 created the Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia. The constitution provided for the socialisation of the economy and it enabled the Communist party to exercise a leading role in society. After the takeover the communists continued their campaign against their enemies. Draža Mihajlović, the Četnik leader, was executed in July 17, 1946. In September 1946 leading members of the Croatian Ustaša were placed in the dock in a trial which also led to the imprisonment, albeit in relative comfort, of archbishop Stepinac. In 1947 the leader of the radical wing of the agrarians, Dragoljub Jovanović, was arrested together with a number of other non-communist party leaders.⁷⁹

In spite of the existence of tripartite Allied Commissions, the situation in Central and Eastern Europe developed in the direction of sovietisation. Hitchins argues that the Soviet Union moved to secure its position in Romania sooner than elsewhere in Eastern Europe because Romania was the gateway to the Balkans and the Straits.⁸⁰ By February 1945 Andrei Vishinskii, deputy Commisar for Foreign Affairs, demanded the resignation of the right-wing Prime Minister Nicolae Rădescu. The National Assembly opened on December 1, 1946 with no members of the opposition in the Cabinet.⁸¹ In June 1947, the government secured the passage of a law giving the Minister of National Economy the power to control domestic and foreign industry. Currency reform was pursued and all foreign currency and

⁷⁸ Crampton, R. J., *Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century and after* (Routledge: London) (1997), p. 215

⁷⁹ Crampton, R. J., *Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century and after*, p. 215-7

⁸⁰ Hitchins, K., *Rumania, 1866-1947* (Oxford: Clarendon Press) (1994), p. 515

⁸¹ Tappe E.D., *Roumania* in Betts R.R. (Ed), *Central and South East Europe 1945-1948*, (London and New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs) (1950), p. 11

most of the gold was declared government property. In October 1947 the Communist and Social Democratic Parties announced their merging in a 'United Workers' Party' and members of the Cabinet from other parties were dismissed and replaced by Communists.⁸²

There was a similar pattern of Communist takeover in Bulgaria, where on October 27, 1946 a second election was held for a Constitutional Assembly. Both Britain and the United States decided that election conditions had not been satisfactory. Georgi Dimitrov, a Communist, became Prime Minister. His government consisted of nine Communists, five Agrarians, two Socialists and two Zveno Ministers.⁸³ The elimination of opposition leaders was completed by 1947. The Fatherland Front government consolidated its position throughout the country and passed a new constitution in December 1947, which protected private property but gave the state wide powers of public economic organisation. Industry was nationalised in 1947; private banks, foreign and domestic wholesale trade and large-scale real estate in the towns were nationalised in 1948.⁸⁴ Bulgaria was 'probably the only voluntary client state in Eastern Europe' and was typical of the Balkans in that, as Geoffrey and Nigel Swain put it, the Communists 'could have won Western style elections in 1945 had they chosen to do so'.⁸⁵

Poland remained the most important foothold in Eastern Europe for the Soviet Union. According to Raack, the 'sovietisation' of Eastern Poland in 1943 can be seen as an attempt to coerce the Poles into agreeing to Soviet demands on other issues. Raack also maintains that Stalin attempted to distance himself from the London Poles at an early stage, planning a

⁸² Betts R.R. (Ed), *Central and South East Europe 1945-1948*, p. 13-6

⁸³ Auty, P, *Bulgaria* in Betts R.R. (Ed), *Central and South East Europe 1945-1948*, p. 37

⁸⁴ Betts R.R. (Ed), *Central and South East Europe 1945-1948*, p.46-9

Polish 'conquest' from 1943.⁸⁶ The advancing Red Army had not intervened during the Warsaw Uprising of 1944 because of the Soviet interest in having a friendly government in Poland. Stalin had broken relations with the London Poles and recognised the Communist orientated leaders based in Lublin as the legitimate rulers of post-war Poland in January 1945. Moscow pressed for the incorporation of Eastern Prussia and Silesia into Polish territory, which made Poland a *de facto* occupation power in Germany.⁸⁷ As such, it was paramount for the Soviet Union to ensure Warsaw's acquiescence to Moscow's diktat. By January 1946 Poland started to nationalise its economy. Meanwhile, on 10 May, 1946 the United States had suspended deliveries against credit of \$40 million and \$50 million granted a month earlier, on the grounds that the Polish Government was not keeping its election pledges, especially in regard to freedom of the press. A referendum was held on June 30 with an overwhelming victory in favour of the abolition of the Senate, the nationalisation of industry, land and economic reform and for the Western frontiers to become permanent. The Polish State took over the key sectors of industry and all enterprises, including former German and Danzig Free City firms which employed more than fifty workers a shift. Certain manufacturing industries, especially food industries, were turned into co-operatives.⁸⁸ By 1948 the Soviet Union was Poland's biggest trading partner and, in the words of President Bolesław Bierut, it was moving from a 'people's democracy to Socialism'. Finance and transport were nationalised. Co-operative industries accounted for 85% of industrial output and employed three-quarters of the industrial labour force.⁸⁹ Biskupski argues that the Communist takeover can be explained by the combination of a powerful Soviet military

⁸⁵ Cited in Thody, P., *Europe since 1945* (Routledge: London) (2000), p.101

⁸⁶ Raack, R.C., *Stalin's Drive to the West, 1938-1945* (Stanford: Stanford University Press) (1995), p. 79-81

⁸⁷ The Western powers seemed willing to allow the sovietisation of Poland. See Mykołayczyk, S., *The Rape of Poland: pattern of Soviet aggression* (New York: Whittlesey House) (1948)

⁸⁸ See Ireland, B., *Poland in Central and South East Europe 1945-1948*.

⁸⁹ Betts R.R. (Ed), *Central and South East Europe 1945-1948*, p. 152-8

force menacingly stationed in the country (300,000 in late 1946) and the abandonment by the West of democratic elements in Poland.⁹⁰

The takeover pattern appeared to be slower in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. In January 1946 Hungary had been declared a Republic and a three-year plan was implemented in August 1947. Although Socialist and Small Holder Party members remained in government, they carried little weight. The New Chamber, elected in August 1947, had 271 Government members and 140 opposition leaders.⁹¹ Bohri argues that any 'semblance of restraint' belied the fact that the Communists acted in the spirit of Stalin's exhortation.⁹² According to Bohri, the evidence suggests that sovietisation had been intended from as early as 1945, and it proceeded more rapidly and effectively than previously imagined.⁹³

In Czechoslovakia, on May 23, 1946, in free elections, the Communists obtained 35% of the vote, which denoted a genuine pro-Soviet sentiment after the Red Army liberated the country.⁹⁴ By February 1948 the Communists, in view of the prospect of a defeat in the upcoming elections, staged an outright takeover. The Communists campaigned for the parliamentary elections to be based on a single ticket list, composed of National Front party members and then ratified by the electorate in a plebiscite. The Communist Minister of the Interior also purged the police of its few remaining non-Communist elements. The reluctance of the Minister to reverse the purges prompted a series of resignations by non-

⁹⁰ Biskupski, M. B., *The History of Poland* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press) (2000), p. 127

⁹¹ Betts R.R. (Ed), *Central and South East Europe 1945-1948*, p. 114-9

⁹² Bohri, L., *Hungary in the Cold War, 1945-1956 : between the United States and the Soviet Union*, (Budapest and New York: Central European University Press) (2004) p. 5

⁹³ Borhi, L., *The Merchants of the Kremlin: The Economic Roots of Soviet Expansion in Hungary* Working Paper No. 28 Cold War International History Project Washington, DC, June 2000, p. 1

⁹⁴ Halle L., *The Cold War as History*, (New York: Harper and Row) (1967) p. 73-4

Communist Ministers who left Klement Gottwald in virtual charge of the government. Anti-Communist purges ensued at universities, the press, professional bodies, the military and the civil services.⁹⁵

The spectrum of Soviet economic domination in Eastern Europe was the subject of a Foreign Office memorandum, which stated that

Russia's policy...[was] ruthlessly despoiling the countries occupied by the Red Army. Simultaneously, they are using their puppets to gear the economics of these countries to the Soviet machine... [T]hey are making exclusive commercial treaties and securing a predominant share in the control of basic industries from Germany and the Adriatic right across to Manchuria.⁹⁶

Davies argues that Moscow ruthlessly enforced all the main features of Stalinism where they did not exist. Soviet 'advisers' and specialists were incorporated into the local apparatus to ensure standardisation and obedience.⁹⁷ As to the question of whether the People's Democracies were formally integrated into the Soviet structures, Davies maintains that the main clues are to be found in the fact that the International Department of the Soviet Communist Party 'could control the affairs of the fraternal parties, who in turn controlled the republics for which they were responsible'.⁹⁸

⁹⁵ Rothschild, J., *Return to Diversity-A Political History of East Central Europe*, (OUP: New York and Oxford) (1993) p. 94-5

⁹⁶ Memorandum by Mr. Warner, Foreign Office, April 2, 1946- *Documents on British Policy Overseas*, (London: HMSO) (Series I, Vol I) (1991)-Eastern Europe, August 1945-April 1946 p. 346-7. Lukacs argues that perhaps even after 1945 a more forceful American foreign policy could have change the political takeover in Eastern Europe. He cites American protests in Bulgaria, which delayed a rigged election in 1945, as an example. See Lukacs, J., *The Great Powers and Eastern Europe* (American Book Co.) (1953)

⁹⁷ Davies, N., *Europe: A History*, (London: Pimlico) (1997), p. 1100

⁹⁸ Davies, N., *Europe: A History*, p. 1101

Eley argues that post-war circumstances were favourable to a Communist takeover. The destructive force of Nazism and the mobility of massed populations created a vacuum that would be promptly filled by Communist forces.⁹⁹ Unlike the Eastern zone of occupation in Germany, which underwent a full-blown process of sovietisation since 1945; until 1947, the political future of Eastern Europe remained relatively open. In some cases, strategic security needs and weak local Communist Parties led to direct Soviet control, concentrating power quickly around the Communist Party, as in the case of Poland, Romania and Bulgaria. Elsewhere, like Hungary and Czechoslovakia, Communists took key ministries but proved more cautious on economic matters than their socialist rivals. Before the spring of 1947, the 'national front' strategy (parliamentary democracy, national autonomy, and gradual transition) was still a viable option. However, a relentless sequence of events in 1947 (the Truman Doctrine, the expulsion of the French and Italian Communist Parties from the national government and the Marshall Plan) irretrievably changed the political situation in Eastern Europe towards sovietisation.

As we will see in chapter 4, the process of balance of power making entailed that the spheres of influence would be carved according to the criteria imposed by the 'grand design' thinking. Adhering to the 'grand design' meant securing a foothold *only* in the geopolitical spaces deemed vital to the enforcement of structural interests. Lundestad argues that domestic economic radicalism (land reform, socialisation of the economy, etc) played little part in American attitudes towards Central and Eastern Europe. What counted primarily was Soviet economic domination, which came in the form of exclusive trade agreements between the Eastern European countries and the Soviet Union. Joint Soviet-local companies

⁹⁹ Eley, G., *Forging Democracy: The History of the Left in Europe, 1850-2000* (Oxford and New York: Oxford

discriminated against other investors. In addition to this, heavy reparations to the Soviet Union, direct confiscations in the form of war booty and a general political climate of conflict and suspicion, strongly discouraged US investments.¹⁰⁰

During the war, the Anglo-Americans appeared to be willing to allow the Soviet Union dominate Eastern Europe. From March 1942, when Roosevelt explained to the Soviet ambassador that he would not oppose the Soviet demands for the reestablishment of its western borders of June 1941 through Autumn of 1944, when the United States and Great Britain accepted Soviet draft armistice agreements for Germany's satellites, the Western Allies deferred to the Soviets in Eastern Europe and the Balkans.¹⁰¹ Nevertheless, Stalin was keen to expand the Soviet area of influence in Eastern Europe at all costs. Just before the signing of the Anglo-Soviet treaty, which did not deal explicitly with territorial issues, he had told Molotov that on '[t]he question of borders . . . we will decide by force'.¹⁰²

One of the salient features of the process of sovietisation in Eastern Europe was the lack of effective support for the opposition parties on the part of the Western Allies. This lack of support coincides with the overall structuralisation of conflict. Western support would have intensified conflict over parts of Europe which were not vital to the American 'grand design'. This denotes a 'selfish interventionist' policy on the part of the United States. While direct intervention was needed in the industrial core of Western Europe in order to prevent a left-wing takeover, Eastern Europe did not merit the same interventionist policy. At the same time, the Soviet Union was not willing to aid Communist and left-wing elements that

University Press) (2002), p. 305

¹⁰⁰ Lundestad, G., *The American Non-Policy Towards Eastern Europe 1943-1947*, p. 318-9

¹⁰¹ Cable, M. Litvinov to V. M. Molotov, 12 March 1942, *Soyetsko-amerikanskiye Otnosheniya vo Vremya Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voiny*, Vol. 1 p155-57

¹⁰² Document 39, cable, Stalin to Molotov, 24 May 1942, in O. A. Rzheshhevsky, *Voina i Diplomatiya*, p. 118

could have overtaken the political system in Italy and France. The Tito break probably reassured the Western Allies as to Soviet intentions in the post-war international order: although Moscow isolated Yugoslavia, it did not attempt to invade the country in order to enforce adherence to Soviet diktat.

The Soviet Union was able to influence the political process in countries where the Red Army was stationed. However, Moscow did not show interest in supporting Communist and left-wing takeovers in Western Europe. Lack of support for these movements went back to the appeasing stance of the Soviet Union in regards to Hitler's takeover in 1933 and the relatively weak support for Republican Spain during the Spanish Civil War. This *modus operandi* would ensure the basis of coexistence in the post-war international order.

The sovietisation of the Eastern zone put the German lands east of the Elbe in direct contact with the Soviet experiment. The spectrum of Communism would have a bearing on the socio-economic system put in place in Eastern Germany and Europe, as it introduced Soviet planning and state intervention in the economy. This helped the process of bloc-formation, established according to a convivialist criterion. Bloc-formation would prevent the revival of Germany as a disruptive power. Both Germanys would be emasculated by the presence of Western and Soviet forces in their territories.

The sovietisation of the Eastern zone went hand in hand with the 'wait and see' policy of the Soviet Union in regards to German unity. But this 'wait and see' policy did *not* preclude the Soviet Union from entrenching their interests in its zone of occupation in Germany and in Eastern Europe. Securing a foothold in Germany was the minimum aim of Soviet policy. The process of sovietisation in Germany was a test tube for the establishment of Moscow-

orientated regimes in Eastern Europe. The very notion of a political foothold in Eastern Europe depended on holding on to a piece of Germany. As we will see in chapter 3, the reconstruction of political life and the swift rehabilitation of the economy in the Eastern zone was vital for accomplishing this objective.

Loth derives from Wilhelm Pieck's notes about his talks with Stalin and the heads of the Soviet military occupation in Germany, that the preservation of a united Germany was a declared aim of Soviet policy as Stalin wanted to avoid a division between East and West.¹⁰³ Stalin thought that a united Germany would not be Communist or even Socialist (at least initially). At the same time, German Communist cadres were told in March-April 1945 that the objective was not to 'realise Socialism in Germany but...a completion of the 1848 bourgeois-democratic revolution'. The appeal of the German Communist Party (KPD) of June 11, 1945 echoed Moscow's exhortation, as it called for the 'setting up of an anti-Fascist ...democratic parliamentary republic'.¹⁰⁴

In June 1945, the KPD announced 'that a policy which should force Germany into the Soviet system would be false, for such policy does not tie in with the conditions of development in Germany today'. Their aim was 'to raise an anti-fascist democratic regime, a parliamentary democratic republic, with all rights and freedoms for the people'.¹⁰⁵ This gives the impression that ideological considerations gave way to the goal of safeguarding long range Soviet interests. A Red Army invasion of Western Germany would have probably been successful, as the battle-hardened Soviets were more motivated than the Anglo-Americans in exacting revenge on its former enemy. However, an outright invasion of the

¹⁰³ Loth, W., *Stalin's Plan for Post-War Germany*, in Gori, F., and Pons S. (Ed.), *The Soviet Union and Europe in the Cold War 1943-53*, p. 24

¹⁰⁴ Loth, W., *Stalin's Plan for Post-War Germany*, p. 25

Western zones would have not been conducive to the accomplishment of the Soviet aims for the post-war international order and would have created an unnecessary overstretching of resources.

The Soviet refusal to accept ERP aid was another milestone in the path towards bipolarity in Germany and Europe. Stalin saw the Marshall Plan as a significant threat to Soviet control of Eastern Europe and believed that economic integration with the West would allow these countries to escape Soviet domination. The Czechoslovak and Polish delegations were prevented from attending the Paris meeting. Jan Masaryk, the Czechoslovak foreign minister, was summoned to Moscow and berated by Stalin for thinking of receiving ERP aid. The other Eastern European states immediately rejected the offer. Finland also declined to attend in order to avoid antagonising the Soviets.¹⁰⁶

Moscow was aware of the political conditions attached to the ERP. In his memoirs, Molotov recalled

At the beginning we in the foreign ministry wanted to propose that all socialist countries participate [in the Marshall Plan]. But we quickly realized that such a decision would be incorrect. They [the United States] hoped to attract us into their coalition, but it would have been a subordinated coalition. We would have become dependent on them, but we wouldn't really have received anything...This [dependence] would have been even more serious for the Czechs and Poles, who were in a very difficult position.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁵ Davidson, B., *Germany: What Now?- Potsdam 1945-Partition 1949*, (London: Frederick Muller Ltd.) (1950), p. 27

¹⁰⁶ The Soviet Union's 'alternative' to the Marshall plan, which involved Soviet subsidies and trade with Eastern Europe, became known as the Molotov Plan, and later, the COMECON.

¹⁰⁷ Chuyev, F., *Sto sorok besed s Molotovym* (140 Conversations with Molotov) (Moscow: Terra) (1991), p. 88-

The Soviet delegation to the Paris talks was told by the Kremlin to 'object to terms of assistance, which could entail any limitation on countries' sovereignty, or violation of their economic independence.' Moscow was aware of the fact that American and British policy included the economic rehabilitation of Germany, a refusal to pay reparations from current production and most importantly, that the Marshall Plan would operate outside the UNRRA framework.¹⁰⁸

An analysis of the Soviet stance on the Marshall Plan allows us to conclude that Moscow prioritised the establishment and consolidation of Soviet control over Eastern Europe. Stalin considered the Soviet zone of influence to be the most important legacy of World War Two and was not going to make any concessions to the Western Allies in this area, for at that time the Soviet government regarded control over that sphere of influence as most essential for geopolitical and ideological considerations. The Soviet leadership saw the United States of America as its main rival in the international arena and was determined to prevent the United States from expanding its influence in Europe. Narinsky argues that 'the unbending and unconstructive stand taken by the Soviet delegation in Paris was largely attributable to the desire to prevent the West from gaining a foothold in Eastern Europe, which Moscow regarded as its sphere of influence'.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁸ Parrish S. D. and Narinsky M., *New Evidence on the Soviet Rejection of the Marshall Plan*, p. 40-1

¹⁰⁹ Parrish S. D. and Narinsky M., *New Evidence on the Soviet Rejection of the Marshall Plan*, p. 41

The Soviet 'grand design' for the post-war international order could only be accomplished by holding on to a part of Germany. The Soviet Union was eager to prevent the revival of an independent, militaristic Germany. The occupation of the Eastern zone provided the Soviets with a test tube for the sovietisation of the countries occupied by the Red Army. The occupation of a part of Germany gave the Soviet Union superpower status, as it gave Moscow the chance to make decisions on the fate of the most industrial country in the continent of Europe.

2.5 Soviet ideology in the making of structural conflict

The main long range aim of the Soviet Union in the treatment of the German Question and the making of the post-war international order would be to secure a political foothold in Germany and the areas occupied by the Red Army. The 'percentages agreement' agreed by Stalin and Churchill in 1944 (with the tacit agreement of Roosevelt) corroborate the fact that the split in Europe would evolve according to the logical pursuit of the national interest and within the framework of cohabitation,¹¹⁰ instead of being the result to blind ideological calculations.

Soviet thinking on Germany and the international order evolved with national interests concerns in mind and therefore unfolded in a cautious and highly rationalistic way. Ivan Maisky, Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, in charge of the reparation

¹¹⁰ Mark has stated the fact that the US State Department accepted the view of 'open' and 'limited' influence of the Soviet Union in key areas of Eastern Europe. See Mark, E., *'Charles E. Bohlen and the Limits of Soviet Hegemony in Eastern Europe'*, *Diplomatic History* 3:2 (Spring 1979) pp. 201-213 and *'American Policy Toward Eastern Europe and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1946': An Alternative Explanation*, *Journal of American History* 68 (September 1981), pp. 313-336

program, submitted a memorandum on January 11, 1944. Maisky earmarked as the fundamental aim in the post-war period the creation of 'a situation which will guarantee for a long period the security of the Soviet Union and the maintenance of peace, at least in Europe and Asia'. The concept of 'a long period' was explained as meaning 'a period long enough for (a) the Soviet Union to become sufficiently strong to fear no aggression in Europe and Asia, and so that no power or combination of powers in Europe and Asia could even think of such aggression, and for (b) Europe, or at least continental Europe, to become socialist, thereby excluding the possibility of wars occurring in this part of the world.' The second section set out the primary conditions for realising this fundamental aim. Maisky stressed the need for the Soviet Union 'to emerge from [the] war with favourable strategic frontiers'.¹¹¹

In mid-December 1944 Maxim Litvinov, chairman of the Foreign Ministry's Commission for the preparation of peace treaties and on post-war order, advocated the creation of regional groupings within the framework of the United Nations but under the aegis of the great powers with interests in the respective regions. He took pains to emphasise that he was not calling for the establishment of spheres of influence. However, he did mention that the setting of 'security zones' would only entail mutually beneficial military arrangements between the great and the small powers.¹¹²

Andrei Gromyko, Ambassador to Washington, led the Soviet team at the United Nations preparatory talks. He wrote a report personally addressed to Molotov on July 14, 1944

¹¹¹ Filitov A., *Problems of Post-War Construction of Soviet Foreign Policy Conceptions During world War Two* in Gori, F., and Pons S. (Ed.), *The Soviet Union and Europe in the Cold War 1943-53*, p. 7

entitled 'On the question of Soviet-American relations'. He began his forecast with an audacious basic presumption: in all likelihood, after the war the United States 'would be interested in economic and political cooperation with the Soviet Union,' and such cooperation would 'greatly determine the nature of post-war international relations.' In support of this scenario, Gromyko adduced that the United States had 'broken away from isolationism and will remain actively involved with the world at large'. He predicted that cooperation with the Soviet Union would survive in the longer run because of 'US essential interests in cooperation'. Presciently, he highlighted that the 'industrial-financial bourgeoisie of the United States...would be interested in the prevention of Germany's re-emergence as a serious economic competitor after the end of the war in Europe'. Gromyko concluded that conditions of peace in the international political system would allow America 'the maximum utilisation of the gains and advantages already achieved and those still to be achieved before the war is over'. He also predicted that 'the US would be sympathetic to and facilitating in establishing bourgeois-democratic political (as opposed to fascist-type) regimes in Western Europe, and first of all in Germany''

However, Gromyko underlined the 'possible difficulties' in Soviet-American relations, including possible disagreements over the post-war treatment of Germany: the United States was likely to be considerably softer on Germany (especially on reparations) than the Soviet Union. Gromyko also pointed out the 'the general ideological hostility of the American ruling class toward the Soviet Union'. He also highlighted Eastern Europe (including the Baltic states) as a potential troublespot because of the concern amongst 'American government and business circles regarding the prospects of social change and of establishing Soviet-type regimes in some of those countries'. Gromyko also pointed out that 'the

¹¹² Mastny, V., *Russia's Road to the Cold War*, p. 231-2

American aspiration to increase its influence in the Near and Middle East (particularly in Iran)... would not be in the interest of the Soviet Union'. Yet, despite this fairly impressive inventory of potential problems Gromyko remained quite optimistic about the future, stating that 'the necessary conditions are clearly present for a continuation of cooperation between our two countries in the post-war period'. He also added that 'to a great degree, these future relations would be determined by the very nature of the relationship which has already been shaped and is still being shaped during the war.'¹¹³ The key issue then became the nature of such post-war cooperation with the United States. There are no serious disagreements amongst Litvinov, Maisky and Gromyko: they all saw it largely in terms of *a great power concert based upon some kind of a division of the world into spheres of influence*.¹¹⁴

In his November 6, 1944 speech, Stalin gave his own estimate of the alliance's prospects, which happened to be quite in tune with Maisky-Gromyko-Litvinov line: at the basis of the Alliance, he said, were not 'accidental or transitory motives, but vitally important and long-lasting interests', above of all 'preventing new aggression or a new war, if not forever, then at least for an extended period of time.'¹¹⁵ This speech is particularly significant because it denotes the idea that Stalin wanted to create the conditions for coexistence between the Soviet Union and the Western Allies after the war.

By April-May 1945 Soviet strategy had two aims: (1) to consolidate Soviet influence throughout Eastern Europe and to exclude British and American interference, and (2) to

¹¹³ Perlmutter, A., *FDR and Stalin: A Not So Grand Alliance*, 1943-1945 (Columbia & London: University of Missouri Press) (1993), pp. 259-278.

¹¹⁴ Pechatnov, V., *The Big Three after World War Two: New Documents about post-war Soviet relations with the United States and Great Britain* (Washington, DC: Cold War International History Project) (1995), p. 21

¹¹⁵ Stalin, I.V. , *Sochineniya* (Stanford: Hoover Institute, 1967), vol. 2, p. 164-170.

take 'territory which if necessary could be used for 'bargaining' with the West'.¹¹⁶ Stalin was not only pushing westward but also trying to hamper the Allied advance eastward. The Vozhd informed Harriman on April 15, 1945 that a major Soviet offensive was about to begin, but stated that its target was Dresden rather than Berlin. A week later, after the Red Army had already encircled the capital, Antonov sent a message to Eisenhower in which he claimed additional territory as supposedly belonging to the Soviet area of operations. He stated the Red Army's intention to occupy the entire eastern bank of Elbe, along with the Vltava valley in Bohemia.¹¹⁷ Pechatnov asks the question of whether this line of thinking, espousing clearly-defined spheres of interests, examined in conjunction with the 'half-world' thinking prevailing in Washington and London could have given rise to 'a better post-war accommodation between the Soviet and Anglo-American 'orbits', instead of the rigid balance of power which emerged in the early Cold War years.¹¹⁸

This possibility gives rise to a reconsideration of the orthodox/revisionist debate. The interaction which arose regarding the treatment of the German Question and long range superpowers' objectives at large, could have been geared toward the formation of a less conflictual international order. However, an examination of the political implications of American and Soviet structural interests, seem to confirm the view that conflict itself was an important factor in the creation of policy. The war mentality that industrialised the Soviet Union and expanded the American economy during the 1930s and 1940s respectively, was partially responsible for setting in motion the establishment of spheres of influence.

¹¹⁶ Kennedy-Pipe, C., *Stalin's cold war*, p. 66

¹¹⁷ Mastny, V., *Russia's Road to the Cold War-Diplomacy, Warfare, and the Politics of Communism, 1941-5*, p. 269

¹¹⁸ Pechatnov, V., *The Big Three after World War Two*, p. 24

Indeed, Stalin's election speech of February 9, 1946 amounted to a condemnation of the capitalist system. The Soviet leader argued that

the war broke out as the inevitable result of the development of world economic and political forces on the basis of present-day monopolistic capitalism...the development of world capitalism in our times does not proceed smoothly and evenly, but through crises and catastrophic wars. Perhaps catastrophic wars could be avoided if it were possible periodically to redistribute raw materials and markets among the respective countries in conformity with their economic weight by means of concerted and peaceful decisions. But this is impossible under the present capitalist conditions of world economic development.¹¹⁹

The 'war mentality', geared towards fostering a more forceful implementation of Soviet interests in Germany and Europe was outlined by Nikolai Novikov, Soviet Ambassador to the United States. Novikov's telegram hinted at the possibility of a split in the Alliance with the formation of an 'Anglo-Saxon' bloc hostile to the Soviet Union.

The 'hard-line' policy with regard to the Soviet Union announced by Byrnes...is at present the main obstacle on the road to cooperation of the Great Powers. It consists mainly of the fact that in the postwar period the United States no longer follows a policy of strengthening cooperation among the Big Three (or four) but rather has strived to undermine the unity of these countries. The objective has been to impose the will of other countries on the Soviet Union. This is precisely the tenor of the policy of certain countries, which is being carried out with the blessing of the United States, to undermine or completely abolish the principle of the veto in the Security Council of the United Nations. This would give the United States opportunities to form among the Great Powers narrow

¹¹⁹ Speech delivered by Joseph Stalin at a meeting of the Stalin electoral district, Moscow, February 9, 1946, From the Pamphlet Collection, J. Stalin, *Speeches Delivered at Meetings of Voters of the Stalin Electoral District*,

groupings and blocs directed primarily against the Soviet Union, and thus to split the United Nations. Rejection of the veto by the Great Powers would transform the United Nations into an Anglo-Saxon domain in which the United States would play the leading role.¹²⁰

As we will see in chapter 3, the sovietisation of the Eastern zone and the breakdown of four power control in Germany would contribute to the formation of a Soviet-led bloc in Eastern Europe. In September 1947, the Soviets set up COMINFORM (Communist Information Bureau), an information agency composed by the Communist parties of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, France, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Romania, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia (but not the German SED). COMINFORM re-established information exchanges amongst the European Communist parties that had lapsed since the dissolution of COMINTER in 1943. Stalin called the conference in Szklarska Poręba (Poland) in response to divergences amongst the Eastern European governments on whether or not to attend the Paris Conference on Marshall Aid in July 1947. The intended purpose of the COMINFORM was to coordinate actions between Communist parties under Soviet direction. As a result, the COMINFORM acted as a tool of Soviet foreign policy.

The Soviet response to the Truman Doctrine was initially cautious and some policy analysts suggested a possible participation of the Soviet Union in the ERP. After all, the Soviet Union accepted lend-lease aid from the United States during the war. However, Moscow quickly realised that an 'open-door' policy in Eastern Europe would find them in no position to compete with the United States. Therefore, on July 2, 1947 Molotov announced that the Soviet Union would not participate in further discussions over the ERP and advised the

(Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow) (1950)

Eastern European countries to do likewise. Zhdanov had by then advanced his 'two camps' theory and the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party spelled out the criteria for building Soviet-style socialism in Eastern Europe: a significant degree of Communist political and administrative control, nationalisation of industrial, transport and financial systems, land reform and a pro-Soviet foreign policy.

COMINFORM's contrast with COMINTERN starkly defined the nature of the post-war international Communist movement. The meeting was small, with two delegates each from Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Italy, and France. The Soviet spokesmen, Andrei Zhdanov and Georgii Malenkov, presided. Key notables (Tito, Togliatti, Thorez, Dimitrov, Gottwald, Rákosi and all general secretaries of their parties) were missing. The East Germans and Albanians were also absent. Neither the Greek, Spanish nor the Finnish Communist Party were invited, which denotes that Moscow did not want to pursue a revolutionary path outside their immediate sphere of influence.¹²¹ The purpose of COMINFORM was to instil loyalty to Soviet foreign policy amongst the member states of the newly-established Soviet bloc.

The Tito split began Stalinisation's final phase, from the summer of 1948 to Stalin's death in 1953. Stalin was furious at the revolutionary independence of the Yugoslav Communist

¹²⁰ Nikolai Novikov, Soviet Ambassador in Washington, Telegram, September 1946-www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/novikov.htm

¹²¹ See Thompson E. P., *Beyond the Cold War* (London: Merlin Press and END) (1982) Moscow's bloc building tactics did however expand into Asia. In return for Soviet material and technical support during the Chinese Civil War, and in deference to the established Soviet leadership of international communism, by late 1947 Mao had completely accepted Soviet bloc leadership in the Cold War. Soviet strategic probes in Asia commenced following the COMINFORM's call in late 1947 for revolutionary uprisings. At the famous Calcutta Conference of communist and revolutionary parties of the East in early 1948, the Soviets gave a green light to communist parties in Asia who were inclined to revolt. In the ensuing months of 1948, communist insurgencies and revolts of varying intensity flared in Malaya, Burma, Thailand, the federated states of Indochina, Indonesia, and the Philippines. The Indian Communist Party also attempted to take over a province in this period. See Macdonald, D. J., *Communist Bloc Expansion in the Early Cold War-Challenging Realism, Refuting Revisionism*, International Security, Vol. 20, no. 3 (Winter 1995), p. 169

Party (KPJ). After 1945, whilst Stalin was abiding by his wartime agreement with Churchill for non-interference outside the 'percentages' areas, the KPJ championed dictatorship of the proletariat against parliamentary roads, affirming international revolution and backing the Greek Communists. Tensions crackled at a consultation of Soviet, Yugoslav, and Bulgarian parties in Moscow in February 1948, when Stalin accused Tito of creating an alternative Communist centre. Stalin recalled Soviet advisers in March, denouncing Yugoslav deviations. When the KPJ defended itself, Stalin expelled Tito's party from COMINFORM. COMINFORM, tightened the grip of Moscow over Eastern Europe and devised policy to use Western European Communists to destabilise ERP deliveries.¹²²

The break with Yugoslavia demonstrated that the Soviet Union could not gain lasting control over any country in which the revolutionary forces came to power as a result of their own strength. Moreover, the highest priority in Soviet thinking about revolutions abroad was not the survival and stabilisation of revolutionary power but rather Soviet control over the new revolutionary government.¹²³

After COMINFORM, the Soviet bloc's international line had shifted to promoting a disruption of the delivery of the Marshall Plan aid by transportation unions and open confrontation with local governments. The French and Italian Communists stepped into line and returned home to lead demonstrations and strikes that led to a sharp decline in their popularity.¹²⁴ The rebuttal of Titoism also marked a shift in Moscow's direction of bloc policy. Tito was charged by the Soviets with the crime of nationalism because he would not

¹²² Pechatnov V. and Earl Edmonson C., *Debating the Origins of the Cold War: American and Russian Perspectives*, p. 126-33

¹²³ Bialer, S., *The Soviet Paradox: external expansion, internal decline* (New York: Knopf) (1986) p. 185

¹²⁴ Macdonald, D. J., *Communist Bloc Expansion in the Early Cold War: Challenging Realism, Refuting Revisionism*, p. 164

allow Stalinist agents to roam freely in Yugoslavia. All ruling and non-ruling Communist parties, including the Chinese Communist Party, stepped into line in condemning what should have been seen as relatively minor challenges to Soviet leadership on the part of Yugoslavia.¹²⁵

Moscow viewed interventionism as a mechanism to enforce specific bottom line security interests. According to Zubok and Pleshakov, Stalin 'wanted to avoid confrontation with the West. He was even ready to see cooperation with the Western powers as a preferable way of building his influence and solving contentious international issues'.¹²⁶ Leffler argues that Soviet policies were merely 'reactive' to US policy, particularly the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan.¹²⁷ The Soviet Union operated cautiously and with strict regard to the norms of behaviour forged through the diplomatic interaction with the Western Allies. The evolution of Soviet ideology unfolded according to the circumstances imposed by superpower interaction in Germany and beyond. The Soviet Union adhered to its own 'grand design', aimed at preventing encirclement by the West. The notion of vital areas of interest and the 'two camps' theory endorsed by Zhdanov, entailed an underlying idea of coexistence in the post-war international order. The ideological machinery which informed Cold War diplomacy was geared towards sustaining the structural interests of the superpowers. In this context, the Cold War should not be seen exclusively as the unfolding of conflictual interaction between the superpowers but also as the informing element for the establishment of norms of behaviour for the post-war international order.

¹²⁵ Macdonald, D. J., *Communist Bloc Expansion in the Early Cold War*, 165

¹²⁶ Zubok, V. and Pleshakov, C., *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press) (1996), pp. 276-7

¹²⁷ Leffler, M., *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration and the Cold War* (Stanford: Stanford University Press) (1992), p. 512

2.6 Conclusion

American and Soviet structural interests in Germany and Europe revolved around strong interventionist elements. The pursuit of US long-term interests called for the creation of an international economic system based on the free exchange of goods and capital. Political intervention in the industrial heartland of Western Europe, starting with the Western zones in Germany, would crank up this process. At the same time, security motivations compelled Moscow to hold on to Germany, whether united *or* divided, and to a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. This structural arrangement necessitated the element of coexistence in order to prevent the possibility of a new systemic conflagration.

Ideology served to attain national interest goals within the boundaries of coexistence. Law and diplomacy had a decisive influence in restricting conflict to Rationalist parameters. The intense diplomatic intercourse between the superpowers created a political opening which did not exist during the first Cold War (1917-1933). The 'grand design' policies set down by Moscow and Washington during the war provided with the ideological driving force in the treatment of the German Question. Having to manage a conflictual situation with the Soviet Union called for decisive action on the part of the United States. Action came about in the form of 'containment', with the implementation of the Truman Doctrine and the ERP. Containment enforced the demarcation of the spheres of influence and had an obvious economic rationale behind it. The first experiment in containment would be in Germany, where a bipolar outcome was enforced through the establishment of Bizonia. In the case of Germany, containment manifested itself in a mixture of defensive and offensive responses. On one hand, the United States and its Western Allies allowed Moscow to proceed with the implementation of its sphere of influence east of the Elbe. At the same time, the Anglo-

American bloc realised the importance of establishing Bizonia in order to safeguard vital interests in the industrial heartland of Germany.

The intervention of the United States in the treatment of the German Question created a situation of conflict, which stemmed from the need to ideologically prop up the 'grand design' for the post-war international order. The volatile situation in Western Europe had reached a climax by 1946. Italy and France were of paramount importance because of the size of the left-wing constituency and the politicised nature of the resistance movement in both countries. These developments required action on the part of the United States in order to secure these countries as strategic switchpoints within the 'grand design' for Western Europe. The Italian and French Communist Parties had a significant political strength and the post-war cabinets in those countries included several ministers of that affiliation, a situation that was potentially inflammatory for the post-war international order. Former Resistance elements had taken a vested interest in the political process. France and Italy had an important geopolitical dimension. Both had imperial possessions and a substantial industrial base. The potential sovietisation of countries with a substantial industrial base could have affected US interests. Action was needed in order to prevent them from joining the Soviet camp: the French election of 1946 and the 1948 Italian general election were heavily influenced by the United States as part of their ongoing effort to contain communism.

The structural aspects of conflict provided the treatment of the German Question with strict demarcation lines which would ultimately ensure a relatively smooth passage to a bipolar solution based on co-existence between the two camps. The perceptions which informed inter-Allied relations represented a 'security dilemma' which manifested itself in two ways.

America feared the prospect of either a disruptive war *or* four-power agreement in Germany, as any of those options would have hindered their 'grand design' project. At the same time, security concerns prompted the Moscow to sovietise the Eastern zone of occupation and work towards the establishment of Moscow-orientated regimes in Eastern Europe.

From Moscow's perspective, Washington's encroachment on the western parts of Germany and Europe evoked past fears. Stalin construed the Iron Curtain's speech made by Churchill at Fulton, Missouri in 1946 as a 'call to war' and within three weeks the Soviet Union rejected membership of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), announcing a five year plan designed to make the Soviet Union self-sufficient in the event of another war.¹²⁸ At the COMINFORM Conference of 1947 Zhdanov stated that 'the more the war recedes into the past, the more distinct becomes two major trends in post-war international policy, corresponding to the division of the political forces operating on the international arena into two major camps: the imperialist and anti-democratic camp, on the one hand, and the anti-imperialist and democratic camp, on the other'.¹²⁹ Zhdanov argued for the thorough communisation of Eastern Europe, including East Germany, relying on the mobilising skills of the Party to carry it out and emphasised the strategic value of Communist fifth columnists in the West.¹³⁰ The superpowers' respective bottom lines became the ordering principle of policy over Germany and inter-Allied relations in the international political system at large.

¹²⁸ Ambrose S. and Brinkley D., *Rise to Globalism: American foreign policy since 1938*, p. 116-7

¹²⁹ Andrei Zhdanov speech September 22, 1947-
www.uncg.edu/~jwjones/world/readings/zhdanovspeech.html

Neorealism provides with a sound theoretical framework for interpreting the structuralisation of conflict during the 1943-8 period. While classical realism uses 'human nature'¹³¹ in order to explain international politics Neorealism privileges a interpretation based on structural constraints over agents' strategies and motivations, assuming that the international structure is decentralised and anarchic, with states acting as sovereign political units. Their driving force for survival is the primary factor influencing their behaviour. The structure limits cooperation among states through fears of relative gains made by other states, and the possibility of dependence on other states.¹³² Waltz defines the international political structure according to its ordering principles, the character of the units and the distribution of capabilities. Structures are defined, first, according to the principle by which a system is ordered. Systems are transformed if one ordering principle replaces another. Second, structures are defined by the specifications of functions of differentiated units. Hierarchic systems change if functions are differently defined and allotted. For anarchic systems, the criterion of systems change derived from the second part of the definitions drop out since the system is composed of like units. Third, structures are defined by the distribution of capabilities among units.¹³³

A Neorealist interpretation puts a different perspective on the orthodox/revisionist debate. By examining the systemic conditions of superpower interaction over Germany in the 1943-8 period, we can arrive at the conclusion that structural interests made incumbent upon the superpowers to establish the conditions for the breakdown of four power control over

¹³⁰ Snyder, J., *Myth of Empire : domestic politics and international ambition* (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press) (1991), p. 244

¹³¹ See Morgenthau, H., *Politics among nations: the struggle for power and peace* (New York: Knopf) (1955) and Niebuhr, R., *The nature and destiny of man : a Christian interpretation* (London, 1941-3)

¹³² Buzan and Little introduced three elements of change in neorealism: disaggregation of power, the functional differentiation tier of structure within anarchy and interaction capacity. See Buzan, B., Little, R. and Jones, C., *The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism* (Columbia University Press: New York) (1993), p. 236-7

Germany. American economic interests and Soviet security concerns became the ordering principle of the treatment of the German Question, creating the conditions for a bipolar post-war international order. At the same time ideology, as the enforcing mechanism of these structural elements, gave the nascent international order the 'specification of functions' which Waltz earmarks as defining elements of the international political system.

The political realities imposed by the vacuum of power created in Europe with the demise of Nazi Germany accelerated the process of polarisation. As we will see in chapter 3, the superpowers viewed the unfolding of the bipolar process as the most logical way to implement their respective 'grand designs' for the post-war international order. Avoiding partition would have entailed a complete rethink of long term interests precisely when the need of the hour called for decisive action. As I will further explore in chapter 4, the role of the superpowers in the process of the partition of Germany would entail the creation of a 'pluralist plus' international order in which intervention and coexistence would dictate the implementation of structural interests within the spheres of influence system.

Chapter 3

The German Question, the social construction of conflict and the origins of the Cold War

3.1 Introduction

As we have seen in chapter 2, the treatment of the German Question structural elements of conflict that shaped superpower relations in the direction of a bipolar post-war international order. From a Neorealist perspective both the United States and the Soviet Union had a 'grand design' which would give the nascent post-war international order its ultimate structuring force. However, as it will be further explored in this chapter, the conflictual elements of the superpowers' relations regarding the German Question had a socially-constructed dimension given by the elements of international law and diplomacy, and the creation of a balance of power system. The bipolar outcome was shaped by the way the Allies dealt with the occupation and the diplomacy of the German Question. The divergence of interests which resulted in the onset of the Cold War was initially *socialised* as the result of the superpowers' interests in Germany. This socialisation of conflict was influenced by the strong interventionist input of the superpowers, resulting in the creation of a post-war international order based on coexistence. Waltz emphasises geopolitical redistribution as a determinant factor in the creation of a post-war international order based on competition. However, this notion has to be parried against the historical evidence which supports the idea of a socially-constructed process as pivotal in the transformation of the superpowers' interests and identity. Paraphrasing Wendt's argument on the social construction of power politics, *the competitive nature of the post-war international order and the influence that the treatment of the*

German Question had on it was what the main Allies made of it.¹ The social theory of international politics espoused by Wendt, which juxtaposes the Neorealist credo, maintains that social kinds, like the international political system, are ideas authored by human beings.² Wendt argues that 'if self-help is not a constitutive feature of anarchy, it must emerge causally from processes in which anarchy plays only a permissive role'. Furthermore, he sustains the view that 'the meanings in terms of which action is organised arise out of interaction.'³ Wendt also states that anarchy has this meaning only in virtue of collective, insecurity-producing practices, but if those practices are relatively stable, they do constitute a system that may resist change'.⁴

The constructivist notion espoused by Wendt can be linked to the English School of thinking.⁵ In the case of the superpowers, intervention and coexistence socialised conflict to the extent that the disagreements over the German Question and its ultimate bipolar outcome would not disrupt the formation of a post-war international order in which the United States and the Soviet Union would be able to enforce their structural interests. This process of socialisation of conflict was aided by the significant role that diplomatic and legal interaction had in the treatment of the German Question and the reconfiguration of the international political system as a whole.

¹ Wendt, A., *Anarchy is what the states make of it: the social construction of power politics*, International Organization 46, 2, Spring 1992, pp. 391-425

² Wendt, A., *Social Theory of International Politics*, (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge and New York) (1999), p. 374

³ Wendt, A., *Anarchy is what the states make of it*, p. 403

⁴ Wendt, A., *Anarchy is what the states make of it*, p. 410-1

⁵ For parallels between English School theory and constructivism see Alderson, K., and Hurrell A., (eds.), *Hedley Bull on International Society*, (London: Macmillan) (2000), Dunne, T., 'The Social Construction of International Society', European Journal of International Relations, 1:3, (1995), pp. 367-89, Buzan B. and Little R., 'Reconceptualizing Anarchy: Structural Realism Meets World History', European Journal of International Relations, 2:4, (1996) pp. 403-38 and Wæver, O., 'Does the English School's Via Media equal the Contemporary Constructivist Middle Ground?' Manchester, BISA Conference Paper, (1999) pp. 17

A constructivist interpretation on the socialisation of conflict over Germany adds to the debate on the origins of the Cold War by espousing the idea of *superpower interaction as a medium for the creation of a post-war international order based on the premise of non-disruptive conflict*. The post-revisionist accounts on the origins of the Cold War espouse the idea of superpower interaction as the originating factor in the creation of conflict. These accounts attempt to strike a balance between the orthodox and revisionist camps, identifying areas of responsibility for the origins of the conflict on both sides. Paterson, for instance, views Soviet hostility and American efforts to dominate the post-war world as equally responsible for the Cold War.⁶ Gaddis maintains that 'neither side can bear sole responsibility for the onset of the Cold War'. Gaddis highlights the constraints imposed on American policymakers due to the complications of domestic politics. He also criticises some revisionist scholars, particularly Williams, for failing to understand the role of Soviet policy in the origins of the Cold War.⁷

Out of the post-revisionist literature emerged a new area of inquiry that attempted to offer an insight into American and Soviet actions and perspectives.⁸ From this standpoint, the Cold War was not so much the responsibility of either side, but rather the result of

⁶ See Paterson, T., *Soviet-American confrontation: postwar reconstruction and the origins of the Cold War* (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press) (1973)

⁷ See Gaddis, J. L., *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947* (New York: Columbia University Press) (1972). While Gaddis does not hold either side entirely responsible for the onset of the conflict, he argues that the Soviets should be held more accountable for the ensuing problems. According to Gaddis, Stalin was in a much better position to compromise than his Western counterparts, given his much broader power within his own regime than Truman, who was often undermined by vociferous political opposition at home. See Gaddis, J. L., *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (New York: Oxford University Press) (1997)

⁸ See Calhoun, C., (ed.), 'Cold War', *Dictionary of the Social Sciences* (Oxford University Press: Oxford and New York) (2002)

predictable tensions between two world powers that had been suspicious of one another for nearly a century. As Ernest May wrote in a 1984 essay

After the Second World War, the United States and the Soviet Union were doomed to be antagonists.... There probably was never any real possibility that the post-1945 relationship could be anything but hostility verging on conflict... Traditions, belief systems, propinquity, and convenience ... all combined to stimulate antagonism, and almost no factor operated in either country to hold it back.⁹

Although systemic constraints (in the form of structural interests and ideology) created the possibility of conflict, both superpowers were in a position to make concessions aimed at preventing a bipolar outcome in Germany and Europe. This adds a new dimension to the interpretation of the origins of the Cold War. The unfolding of conflict can be seen from the perspective of superpower interaction over Germany. However, conflict was socialised through the functioning of the legal and diplomatic framework put in place in order to deal with the German Question, therefore restricting its scope and avoiding a systemic disruption. This chapter explores how the treatment of the German Question contributed to the socialisation of conflict between the superpowers, paying particular attention to the zonal occupation and the diplomatic breakdown at the Moscow and London CFM.

3.2 The zonal occupation and the spectrum of conflict

The division of Germany into zones of occupation created a situation which had the potential to create conflict between the Allies. While the decision-making over the

fundamental principles guiding the occupation of Germany were to be taken at ACC level, the zonal commanders were able to implement policies unilaterally. The dire economic situation in the Anglo-American zones would compel Britain and America to launch the creation of Bizonia. At the same time, the economic rehabilitation of the Eastern zone according to a Communist criterion generated the conditions for the breakdown of inter-Allied relations and the push towards bipolarity.

The British zone (which had the highest industrial and population density in Germany) could not feed itself and was dependent on food exports, with the aggravating factor that the Soviets refused to ship food from the Eastern zone and Poland.¹⁰ By 1945-6, the British zone had become a drain on London's resources, just when Britain was facing a grave financial situation at home. During 1946-7, in the midst of the British dollar crisis, Britain was contributing some £100 million, mostly for supplies of food, in order to financially sustain its zone of occupation in Germany. The British zone had 19 million inhabitants and had to absorb the influx of German refugees from Poland, Czechoslovakia and the Eastern zone of occupation. Its industrial capacity was either stalled or destroyed. The excess food required could not be purchased with exports, as the inter-Allied agreement of March 28, 1946 placed great restrictions on the level of industry.¹¹

In 1946, the actual industrial production of the British zone (only 10% of pre-war output) fell far below the level of industry standard due to shortages of food, accommodation and fuel. During 1946, a fifth of the meager supply of Ruhr coal went to France as reparations.

⁹ Quoted from Brinkley, A., *American History: A Survey*. (New York: McGraw-Hill) (1986), p 799

¹⁰ Smyser, W R, *From Yalta to Berlin*, (New York: St. Martin's Press) (1999) p. 46

¹¹ Northedge, F.S., *Descent from Power-British Foreign Policy 1945-1973*, p. 74

Industrial plants and machinery were being shipped to Russia in accordance with the Potsdam agreement (amounting to a quarter of the zonal industrial equipment not deemed to be necessary for Germany's peacetime economy), a practice which was continued until October 1946. The British zone of occupation was not making a contribution to the economic recovery of Western Europe.¹²

This situation compelled the British Cabinet to come up with the 'Bevin Plan', which envisaged freeing the economies of all the zones of occupation so they could send their surplus production to each other. In March 1946 a memorandum produced by Bevin summarised British aims in Germany. There were five main points: first, security from a revival of German aggression; second, reasonable economic well-being in Germany and Europe; third, a reduction of the British costs of occupation of Germany; fourth, the creation of a democratic and Western-minded Germany; and fifth, the restriction of Soviet influence as far to the east as possible.¹³

In the American zone, the food situation presented a more difficult problem because of the loss of the breadbasket provinces of East Germany and the increase of the West German population by more than 20 % through the influx of ethnic Germans expelled from Eastern Europe. Well into 1946, Germany had no regular mail service with other countries as security considerations prevented contractual communications. The US Trading with the Enemy Act supplemented these obstacles. The key problem was the absence of sound currency. The Reichmark had lost its usefulness as a medium of exchange, which made the

¹² Northedge, F.S., *Descent from Power-British Foreign Policy 1945-1973*, p. 75

¹³ 'The Future of Germany and the Ruhr', Ernest Bevin, 11 March 1946, PRO: CAB 129/9, CP (46) 156, Gen 121/1

conditions ripe for a thriving black market. Two main factors of wartime price stability, adequate supplies and draconian controls, no longer existed. A gradual thaw of the frozen prices set in, with the result that prices for consumer goods during May 1945 and July 1947 rose by 97%.¹⁴

The situation in the Anglo-American zones prompted the United States and Britain into action. On 27 April 1946, Britain decided that priority should be given to funding British imports to Germany rather than transporting German capital equipment to the Soviet Union. On 4 May 1946, Britain announced that the dismantling of plants for delivery as reparations would be suspended until the British zone was self-sufficient. In addition, reparations from current production ended completely. Besides the fact that current production was dismally low in immediate post-war Germany, the British believed that 'reparations from current production could only be reparations at the expense of the British and American taxpayers'.¹⁵

In May 20, 1946 an OMGUS Special Report called for a new plan for the liquidation of war finances and the financial rehabilitation of Germany, advocating currency reform at a rate of 10:1 and the abolition of new debt allocated to foreign institutions on pre-war terms.¹⁶ The 'Plan for the Liquidation of War Finance and the Financial Rehabilitation of Germany', produced by Gerhard Colm, Joseph Dodge and Raymond Goldsmith of the US State Department was submitted to Clay on May 20, 1946. The Plan highlighted the fact that the

¹⁴ Backer, J. H., *The Decision to Divide Germany*, p. 113-4

¹⁵ 'Statement by the Control Commission for Germany (British Element) Regarding Reparations from the Western Zones, Dismantling, and ERP' (24 September 1948)-From *Documents of Germany under occupation*, p. 331

¹⁶ Clay to the Chief of Civil Affairs Division, War Department (Echols), May 23, 1946- *FRUS, 1946, Vol. V, The British Commonwealth, Western and Central Europe*, p. 557

Reichmark faced repudiation by its own people and the economy was disintegrating into a barter economy.¹⁷

The stop to reparations deliveries made by Clay gave impetus to the organisation of the Western zones. By May 1946 the Stated Department was of the view that the Soviets had to be warned that if Germany could not be run as a unit, then Washington would have no alternative but to treat western Germany 'as an economic unit and integrating this unit closely' with the Western European economies.¹⁸ Soon after, Clay announced that the United States would have no choice but to merge its zone of occupation with any zone where the occupying power was willing to agree with the multizonal policy he had in mind.¹⁹ This offer was quickly accepted by Britain.

The implementation of the rehabilitation of the Western zones gained ground amongst the Anglo-Americans because of the dire financial situation in their respective zones of occupation and the potential political ramifications of the sovietisation of the Eastern zone. Polarisation was encouraged through the economic reconstitution of the Eastern zone of occupation under the Moscow diktat. As we will see in chapter 6, Bizonia and the sovietisation of the Eastern zone of occupation would lead to a radical transformation in the post-war society of states, for the ideological split which originated in Germany would create a bipolar outcome in Europe and inform the Cold War international order as a whole. The sovietisation of the Eastern zone contributed to the social construction of conflict as it

¹⁷ Kuklick, B., *American Policy and the Division of Germany: the clash with Russia over Reparations* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press) (1972) p. 118-9

¹⁸ Acheson to Byrnes, May 9, 1946, FRUS 1946 Vol V, pp. 551-554

¹⁹ Clay press conference, May 27, 1946, *Clay Papers*, I: 221

would be the first testing ground of Communism in Europe outside the Soviet Union and trigger the process of rehabilitation in the Anglo-American zones.

The Soviet occupation authorities worked towards the establishment of an East German administration from the very onset of the occupation.²⁰ The importance of the process of sovietisation in the Eastern zone in the bipolar outcome in Germany lies in the fact that by gearing the East German economic system towards Communism, the Soviet authorities created a geopolitical space meant to be kept free from Western influence. In September 1945 the Soviet Military Administration established German administrations in the areas of transport, post and telegraphs, fuel and power, trade and supply, industrial matters, agriculture, financial affairs, labour and social welfare, popular education, and justice and health.²¹ On October 22, 1945 Marshall Zhukov granted the provincial and Länder administrations in the Russian zone the right to issue laws and decrees having legal force. The measure ensured that the 'administration of the Provinces and of the Federal 'Länder' [were] entitled to issue, in the legislative, judicial, and executive fields, laws and decrees which shall have legal force, provided that they conflict neither with the laws and orders issued by the Control Council, nor with the orders of the Soviet Military Administration'.²²

In September 1945, the Soviet military administration announced a massive land reform which broke the vast estates that constituted the stronghold of the Prussian Junker military

²⁰ For accounts on the political organisation of the Eastern zone see Phillips, A. L. *Soviet Policy toward East Germany Reconsidered: The Postwar Decade* (Greenwood Press. Place of Publication: Westport, CT. Publication Year) (1986), Krisch, H., *German Politics under Soviet Occupation* (Columbia University Press: New York) (1974) and Naimark, N., *The Russians in Germany-A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945-1949* (The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA and London)

²¹ Announcement of the Soviet Military Administration of the establishment of German Administrations in the Soviet Zone, September 13, 1945-From *Documents on Germany under Occupation*, p. 64-6

and political elite. In spite of the adverse effects on production, half a million German farmers now owned their land. The lower limits for land holdings were set by Stalin at 100 hectares, to avoid complete incompatibility with the Western zones.²³ The aims of the land reform were to 'create new independent farms of landless peasants, agricultural labourers, and small tenants', to 'give land to resettlers and refugees who were deprived of their goods and chattels by Hitler's predatory war policy', to 'create farms in the vicinity of the towns and under the town administrations which can supply workers, employees, and artisans with meat and dairy products, and to put small allotments at the disposal of workers and employees where they can grow vegetables'. Farmers who received land through the Land Reform paid a sum equivalent to the value of one year's crop.²⁴ Nettl points out that by turning labourers into owners, the Soviets instilled allegiance to the authorities.²⁵

The Soviet authorities earmarked the nationalisation of industry as a main priority. The Soviets themselves assumed ownership of about 25% of industry in the form of Soviet stock companies (SAG) and nationalised much of the remainder. By mid 1946 they had ended private ownership of any significant industrial holdings.²⁶ At the very beginning of the occupation the Soviet authorities ordered all banks closed and all deposits blocked. Later, municipal savings banks and agricultural credit cooperatives were reopened, but only payments of RM 300 were allowed. All financial claims and liabilities of financial institutions were made void, along with the Reich's debt, which served as their main backing. The

²² Order by Marshall Zhukov granting the Provincial and Lander Administrations in the Russian Zone the right to issue laws and decrees having legal force, October 22, 1945-From *Documents on Germany under Occupation*, p. 82

²³ Smyser, W R, *From Yalta to Berlin*, p. 34

²⁴ Decree on Land Reform in Saxony, September 10, 1945-From *Documents on Germany under Occupation*, p. 59-64. Loewenthal describes the land reform scheme as the first important step towards the separation of the Eastern zone from the rest of Germany. See Loewenthal, F., *News from Soviet Germany*, (London: Gollancz)(1950). p. 291

²⁵ Nettl, J.P., *Eastern Zone and Soviet Policy in Germany 1945-50*, p. 87

banking system was replaced by five big state banks, which took over the available assets of the former without consideration of existing liabilities. As a result of these measures, the Soviet zone was drained of nearly four-fifths of its monetary assets.²⁷ By July 1945 private activity in the insurance field was eliminated and all existing companies were merged into five public (Land) insurance corporations.²⁸

From the beginning of 1946 the Administration for Labour had been a special instrument in Soviet labour policy. One of its most important tasks was the provision of skilled and unskilled labour for transfer to the Soviet Union. The eastward movement of labour, compensated only by the return of sick or incapable war prisoners to Germany, culminated in the removal of over 100,000 Germans in May-June 1947 under the code-name *Ossawakim*. Commerce was centralised through the elimination of provincial import-export organisations and the establishment of a Central Administration for Foreign and Inter-Zonal Trade.²⁹

Both Bizonia and the sovietisation of the Eastern Zone had the immediate effect of socialising conflict and accomplishing a 'peace of sorts'. The political and economic reconstitution of the Eastern zone socialised conflict by creating a demarcation of interests which prompted the rehabilitation of the Western zones. As we have seen in chapter 2, any possible interference by the Soviet Union in the economic process in the western zones was clearly against the American 'grand design' of reconstituting Germany as the engine of a free-market orientated Western Europe. A debacle in the Western zones would have resulted in the American withdrawal from Western Europe or in a war with the Soviet Union.

²⁶ Smyser, W R, *From Yalta to Berlin*, p. 35

²⁷ Kuklick, B., *American Policy and the Division of Germany: the clash with Russia over Reparations*, p. 117-8

²⁸ Hardach, K., *The Political Economy of Germany in the Twentieth Century* (University of California Press: Berkeley, Los Angeles, London) (1980), p. 116

²⁹ Nettl, J.P., *Eastern Zone and Soviet Policy in Germany 1945-50*, p. 134-42

Bizonia and the sovietisation of the Eastern zone were signs of irretrievable conflict towards partition. However, polarisation was also a Rationalist response to the divergence of interests as it established specific spheres of superpower influence.

The situation which unfolded at zonal level created the conditions for a bipolar outcome in Germany and Europe. However, the re-organisation of Germany into spheres of influence meant that conflict unfolded within Rationalist parameters, as the rehabilitation process in Bizonia and the Eastern zone enforced a balancing mechanism that prompted a bipolar outcome. Diplomacy, the legal framework in operation at the ACC and CFM and the creation of a bipolar balance of power constructed conflict within restricted, non-disruptive parameters. The seemingly anarchical situation which arose after the war with the demise of Nazi Germany was contained by the 'pluralist plus' construction of a post-war order in Germany and Europe. The intervention of the superpowers in the treatment of the German Question led to the construction of a bipolar order which adhered to the principles of coexistence that bound superpower interaction during the war and would continue to do so after the partition of Germany into two states. Seen from this perspective, superpower interaction in Germany was not responsible for constructing a 'Cold War'.³⁰ Instead, it created a 'peace of sorts' which was informed by the elements of legality and transformation as well as a restrained spectrum of conflict.

³⁰ The term 'Cold War' was coined by George Orwell in an essay titled 'You and the Atomic Bomb', published on October 19, 1945 in the London Tribune. Orwell argued that '...We may be heading not for general breakdown but for an epoch as horribly stable as the slave empires of antiquity... the kind of world-view, the kind of beliefs, and the social structure that would probably prevail in a state which was at once unconquerable and in a permanent state of 'Cold War' with its neighbours. From <http://www.orwelltoday.com/orwellcoldwar.shtml> The Cassell Companion to Quotations cites a speech by Bernard Baruch, delivered in South Carolina, April 16, 1947 in which he stated, 'let us not be deceived: we are today in the midst of a Cold War'. The American columnist Walter Lippmann gave wide circulation to the term.

3.3 The issue of economic principles and the breakdown of four-power control

Lack of agreement on the economic principles guiding the occupation of Germany as well as on its post-war political and economic system became the main source of conflict between the Allies. The rehabilitation thinking espoused by the United States fitted into their 'grand design' project for the post-war international order. This thinking clashed with the Soviet insistence on taking reparations from Germany. The taking of reparations entailed that the Anglo-American zones could not operate under the economic principles upheld by the Western occupying powers, as Soviet financial demands took priority over rehabilitation.

At Potsdam, the issue of the economic principles that were to guide the occupation of Germany was a source of tension between the Allies. The final agreement emerged at the eleventh plenary session when the Byrnes 'deal' ensured that Soviet reparations would be met by 'removals from the zone of Germany occupied by the Soviet Union, and from appropriate German external assets'. Additionally, the Soviet Union was to receive from the Western zones

15 per cent of such usable and complete industrial capital equipment, in the first place from the metallurgical, chemical and machine manufacturing industries as is unnecessary for the German peace economy and should be removed from the Western Zones of Germany, in exchange for an equivalent value of food, coal, potash, zinc, timber, clay products, petroleum products, and such other commodities as may be agreed upon.³¹

³¹ Section III 4 (a), Protocol of the Proceedings-Potsdam Conference, August 1, 1945-
<http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/decade/decade17.htm>

10 per cent of such industrial capital equipment as is unnecessary for the German peace economy and should be removed from the Western Zones, to be transferred to the Soviet Government on reparations account without payment or exchange of any kind in return.³²

In addition to the Potsdam reparations agreement, several of the 'Economic Principles' of the Potsdam Protocol also affected the reparations issue. Paragraph 14 stipulated that Germany was to be treated as a single economic unit and accordingly, common policies were to be established with regard to concerns such as industrial production, reparations and foreign trade. Paragraph 15 established the basis for the dismantlement process and paragraph 19, stated the critical 'first charge' principle.³³

Prior to the Moscow and London CFM, the Allies had expressed their disagreements on economic principles at ACC level. The Coordinating Committee meetings reflected the divergence of views and interests of each of the Allies. When common import/export policy was discussed, Britain argued that a separate administration contradicted the spirit of Potsdam. France pressed for the formula of economic unity without central administrative bodies. The Soviet Union put an emphasis on reparations and on the importance of the zonal policies whilst the United States was concerned about the occupation costs burden on US taxpayers.³⁴

From the very outset, France was against the establishment of central German institutions. On July 10, 1945 the Political Department of the French Foreign Ministry produced a

³² Section III 4 (b), Protocol of the Proceedings-Potsdam Conference, August 1, 1945-
<http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/decade/decade17.htm>

³³ Section II B (14-15), Protocol of the Proceedings-Potsdam Conference, August 1, 1945-
<http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/decade/decade17.htm>

memorandum, concluding that no consideration of economic nature ought to supersede political (and more specifically, security) considerations in regards to the possible dismemberment of Germany. The Memorandum recommended a permanent French presence in Germany, de facto zonal laissez-faire ('politique de zone'), de-prussianisation, a French presence in the Rhine and a special regime for the Ruhr.³⁵

On September 28, 1945 the American, British and Soviet representatives to the ACC had agreed on a central German transport department under Allied control. France rejected the proposal, arguing that a centralised railways system would recreate the German war potential. The highways system would permit Germany to reorganise a paramilitary system of mobilisation. Furthermore, they suggested that the navigation of German rivers and canals should be placed under international control.³⁶ During the seventh ACC meeting General Pierre Koenig, head of the French occupation forces in Germany, deferred any agreements on transport on the grounds that the issue was linked to the question of the Ruhr and the Rhineland, to be decided at the London CFM.³⁷ In addition to this, France wanted to annex the Saar region, which was bound to cause a disruption in inter-zonal trade and reparations deliveries. France would agree to a German administration Department for zonal trade in order to encourage commerce, but not to a German-controlled administration agency.³⁸

³⁴ Murphy to Byrnes, May 2, 1946-FRUS, 1946, Vol. V, *The British Commonwealth; Western and Central Europe*, p. 546-7

³⁵ Note from the Political Department to Bidault, July 10, 1945-*Documents Diplomatiques Français 1945, Tome II (1er Juillet-31 Decembre)* p. 62-9

³⁶ Paper submitted by the Allied Secretariat to the ACC, September 28, 1945-FRUS, 1945, Vol. III, *European Advisory commission; Austria; Germany*, p. 841-2

³⁷ Murphy to Byrnes, October 2, 1945-FRUS, 1945, Vol. III, *European Advisory commission; Austria; Germany*, p. 842-5

³⁸ Murphy to Byrnes, April 14, 1946-FRUS, 1946, Vol. V, *The British Commonwealth; Western and Central Europe*, p. 536-7

During the first two years of occupation the French zone achieved a trade surplus. The fact that the French zone was economically reconstituted faster than the other zones, explains the lack of willingness on the part of Paris to merge it with the other Western zones. The French stance socialised conflict to the extent that it provided the other Allies with an incentive for unilateral action. However, even a more conciliatory attitude on the part of the French would have not been able to restrain the enforcement of the superpowers' structural interests in their zones of occupation.

The issue of economic unity was tackled at diplomatic level during the London CFM of September 1945 when Molotov reiterated Stalin's call for four-power control over the Ruhr, which the Western participants rejected. Equally, Molotov rejected the Western request for open access to the Soviet zone.³⁹ France expressed its reservations regarding a central German government on security grounds. The French also reinstated the view that, should a German central administration be constituted, the Ruhr region should be detached from its jurisdiction.⁴⁰

At the Paris CFM of July 1946, James Byrnes, US Secretary of State, hinted at a 'Western Option', by promising the Saar region to the French and by threatening to re-organise the Western zones if four-power agreement could not be achieved. The Soviet Union rejected Byrnes proposal for a four-power treaty to keep Germany disarmed for 25 years, something which hints, according to Shlaim, at a Soviet refusal to acquiesce to US involvement in a

³⁹ Smyser, W.R., *From Yalta to Berlin: the Cold War Struggle over Germany*, p. 28

⁴⁰ French memorandum submitted to the London CFM September-October 1945, September 14, 1945-From *Documents on Germany under Occupation*, p. 66-8

European security structure.⁴¹ Conversely, Ernest Bevin, the British Foreign Secretary, expressed his delight at the American proposal, stating that the treaty was ‘something which would give us peace in Europe, and allow for normal development over a sufficient period to eradicate the warlike spirit of Nazism in Germany’.⁴² Bevin and Byrnes rejected Molotov’s proposals for four-power control over the Ruhr. Bevin believed that Stalin would use its role in the Ruhr to control the economy of the British/Western zones. Bevin and Byrnes also proposed to unite the whole German economy in accordance with the Potsdam agreement. Molotov rejected it, not without emphasising support for German unity. The issue of reparations was also discussed, with Bevin and Byrnes arguing that the two countries were paying \$520 million a year in order to feed the Germans because the Soviet zone withheld the food they produced.⁴³ Byrnes maintained that there would be no reparation deliveries until imports into the American zone were paid for. Meanwhile, Molotov confessed to Soviet removals in the Eastern zone and suggested a reduction of the reparations figures, subject to a fixed amount from equipment in the Ruhr. Byrnes was afraid that quarrels might develop if the Allies accepted this plan.⁴⁴

Molotov stated that it would be ‘incorrect to adopt the line of annihilating Germany as a state, or of agrarianising her, with the destruction of her main industrial centres’. He also expressed the Soviet refusal to ‘federalise’ Germany. Molotov stated that the Soviet Union

⁴¹ Shlaim, A., *The Partition of Germany and the origins of the Cold War*, p. 123-135. See also *From Yalta to Berlin: the Cold War Struggle over Germany*, p. 68

⁴² Extract from Bevin report before the House of Commons on the Paris CFM (April-July 1946), June 4, 1946-*Documents on Germany under Occupation*, p. 139-41

⁴³ Smyser, W.R., *From Yalta to Berlin: the Cold War Struggle over Germany*, p. 29

⁴⁴ Kuklick, B., *American Policy and the Division of Germany*, p. 152

did not intend to hinder the increase of industrial production provided the main industrial centres, like the Ruhr, would remain under inter-Allied supervision.⁴⁵

Trachtenberg argues that the dispute over Iran and Turkey had influenced the American stance over the German Question.⁴⁶ Undoubtedly, by 1946 the spectrum of conflict was not limited to the treatment of the German Question. However, in order to secure a favourable reconfiguration of the post-war international order the superpowers needed to secure a foothold in Germany. Both 'grand designs' ultimately hinged upon the superpowers' ability to enforce certain economic principles guiding the reconstitution of Germany.

By 1946 Britain was in favour of a Western strategy, entailing the economic rehabilitation of Germany and an American presence in Europe. On March 15, 1946, the Cabinet Committee summarised British interests in Europe according to the following criteria: 'security from German aggression', 'reasonable economic well-being for Germany and Europe', 'restriction of Soviet influence as far East as possible' and 'the recovery of France'.⁴⁷ The German Control Office was also in favour of the regeneration of German industry and a more independent attitude in the British zone of occupation pending a possible quadripartite agreement.⁴⁸ The Cabinet paper of May 3, 1946 established the policy of containment of Soviet influence in Germany as it hinted at the possibility of working 'towards a Western German State or States which would be more amenable to [British] influence'.⁴⁹

⁴⁵ Extract from Molotov's statement to the Soviet press on the Paris CFM (April-July 1946)- May 27, 1946- From *Documents on Germany under Occupation*, p. 138-9

⁴⁶ Trachtenberg, M., *Constructed Peace*, p. 35. See also Kuniholm, *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: great power conflict and diplomacy in Iran, Turkey, and Greece* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press) (1980) pp. 270-286, 304-342

⁴⁷ GEN 121/1, March 11, 1946, CAB 130/9

⁴⁸ Interdepartmental Meeting, April 3, 1946, FO 945/16

⁴⁹ CP (46) 186, May 3, 1946, CAB 129/9

In a statement before the House of Commons on October 22, 1946, Bevin argued that Britain regarded a united effort by the four Powers 'as being the most likely to produce the greatest stability' for Germany and that 'whatever difference of opinion there might be as to the final settlement in Germany, the four Powers in occupation of Germany are joined by their determination to prevent any future German aggression'. Bevin also emphasised that Britain wanted to ensure that Germany would not become a 'permanent distressed area in the centre of Europe, and that the Germans should have a proper and reasonable standard of living'.⁵⁰

The Paris CFM meetings culminated in a decision by the United States and Britain to devise the 'Western Option', whilst publicly proclaiming four-power unity over the German problem.⁵¹ This volte face was further entrenched by Byrnes speech in Stuttgart on September 1946, where he stated in no ambiguous terms that the United States favoured the 'economic unification of Germany'. If that would falter, the United States would move 'to secure the maximum possible unification'.⁵² America and Britain, while at odds with France on the question of central institutions and the removal of goods from their zone by way of reparations,⁵³ believed that the French left the door open for future agreement.⁵⁴ The Anglo-Americans look favourably on French claims to the Saar and engaged with Paris in negotiations regarding matters which extended beyond the German Question, like the

⁵⁰ Extract from a statement by Bevin concerning British policy on Germany, October 22, 1946-From *Documents on Germany under Occupation*, p. 180-6

⁵¹ Deighton, A., *The Impossible Peace: Britain, the Division of Germany and the Origins of the Cold War*, p. 81

⁵² Speech by US Secretary of State James Byrnes, Restatement of Policy on Germany, Stuttgart (Germany), September 6, 1946- <http://usa.usembassy.de/etexts/ga4-460906.htm>

⁵³ Acheson to the Secretary, June 20, 1946-FRUS, 1946, Vol. V, *The British Commonwealth; Western and Central Europe*, p, 570

Middle East. By August 1946, Bidault admitted that French policy on Germany had been a mistake, blaming it on De Gaulle and internal political reasons. Bidault hinted at a possible turning point after the upcoming elections.⁵⁵ However, as late as October 1946 France was still blocking uniform treatment of trade unions and political parties, giving the Soviet Union the chance to withhold approval at the ACC.⁵⁶ The French would adopt a Western-orientated approach from 1947 onwards, as the issues regarding the German Question were now considered within the context of a European system. American aid to France (agreed upon through the Blum-Byrnes Accord of 1946), the Marshall Plan and the establishment of common European institutions conducive to solving the economic crisis secured French bandwagoning into the 'Western option'.

Meanwhile, no progress was being made at ACC level on the issue of economic principles. On April 1946 the Economic Directorate of the ACC discussed a paper on common import-export policy, which involved the question of reparations. The Soviet member argued that the 'zonal problem' was not to be discussed until the stabilisation of the trade balance or until the reparations plan was completed.⁵⁷ By September 1946 the Soviet Union was justifying the lack of information on the dismantling of plants in its zone of occupation on the grounds that at the time of dismantling, the Soviet authorities did not have information regarding the presence of foreign interests in given enterprises.⁵⁸

⁵⁴ Murphy to the Secretary of State, July 20, 1946-FRUS, 1946, Vol. V, *The British Commonwealth; Western and Central Europe*, p. 580

⁵⁵ Caffery to the Secretary of State, August 30, 1946-FRUS, 1946, Vol. V, *The British Commonwealth; Western and Central Europe*, p. 596

⁵⁶ Murphy to the Secretary of State, October 25, 1946-FRUS, 1946, Vol. V, *The British Commonwealth; Western and Central Europe*, p. 629-30

⁵⁷ Murphy to Byrnes FRUS, 1946, Vol. V, *The British Commonwealth; Western and Central Europe*, p. 538

⁵⁸ Dubrow (Chargé in Moscow) to Byrnes, FRUS, 1946, Vol. V, *The British Commonwealth; Western and Central Europe*, p. 600-2

Clay suggested an increase on the amount of reparations to be taken from current production in order to stop the dismantling of plants. However, the official view of the American authorities was that if reparations from current production were to be increased, in ten years the Soviets would end up extracting more.⁵⁹ American officials were aware of the fact that if reparations were to be taken from current production, German industry could run the risk of being under Soviet control, as in the case in Finland, Central Europe and the Balkans.⁶⁰

At Clay's request, former US president Herbert Hoover was sent to Germany in 1946 to review the food situation. Hoover, in agreement with Clay, ordered larger food shipments to the occupation zones. However, even those proved inadequate during the bitter winter of 1946-7, as railroads and canals froze and storage bins collapsed. The German ration sank to starvation levels with food riots taking place throughout the country. On February 28, 1947 Hoover delivered a report on German agriculture and food requirements, concluding that the United States would face 'large expenditures of food to Germany for some years'. The Report concluded that the situation was not going to improve unless 'the export industries of Germany can be sufficiently revived to pay for their own food'.⁶¹

Clay warned Washington about the political fallout which could have been caused as the result of the food shortages. He convinced Truman to send Hoover to Germany again in March 1947. Hoover returned with a grim report and with a set of recommendations that fully supported Clay's views. On March 3, 1947, he produced a third report on the necessary steps for the revival of German exports. Hoover outlined that export recovery was needed

⁵⁹ Caffery to Byrnes, *FRUS, 1946, Vol. V, The British Commonwealth; Western and Central Europe*, p. 593-4

⁶⁰ Dubrow to Byrnes, *FRUS, 1946, Vol. V, The British Commonwealth; Western and Central Europe*, p. 602-3

not only for economic purposes but also 'as the first necessity of peace'. Hoover also stated that 'the whole economy of Europe is interlinked with the German economy through the exchange of raw materials and manufactured goods' and that 'the productivity of Europe cannot be restored without the restoration of Germany as a contributor to that productivity'. Hoover thought that the economic rehabilitation of Germany was the difference between the regeneration and degeneration of Europe. He also recommended halting the removals and destruction of plants, the industrial autonomy of Germany (in order to keep the Soviets away) and frowned upon a different regime for the Rhineland and the Ruhr.⁶²

American thinking on Germany and Europe shifted decisively in the aftermath of the Moscow CFM. Marshall endorsed Hoover's proposals and supported a new and more generous US occupation doctrine, JCS 1179, which replaced JCS 1067 on July 11, 1947.⁶³

During the meetings between Clayton and British Cabinet members, Bevin and Hugh Dalton, the British Chancellor of the Exchequer, emphasised the difficult situation of Britain. They also highlighted that money from the US loan were used in order to subsidise the German occupation. Bevin observed that the troubles in Germany stemmed from the unsettled level of industry and the dismantling of industrial plants.⁶⁴ During the second meeting Bevin asked for a more concise statement on the US attitude towards Europe and

⁶¹ Herbert Hoover, The President's Economic Mission to Germany and Austria-Report no.1-German Agriculture and Food Requirements-From the Truman Presidential Library files www.trumanlibrary.org

⁶² Herbert Hoover, The President's Economic Mission to Germany and Austria-Report no.3 -The Necessary Steps for Promotion of German Exports, so as to relieve American taxpayers of the burdens of relief and for economic recovery of Europe-From Truman Library. From the Truman Presidential Library files-www.trumanlibrary.org

⁶³ Smyser, W R, *From Yalta to Berlin: the Cold War struggle over Germany.*, p. 50-1.

⁶⁴ Summary of the meeting between Clayton, the US Ambassador and members of the British Cabinet, June 24, 1947. Deighton insists on the importance of the British influence in the shift of the American stance towards the German Question. Bevin and his officials knew that the Americans needed British leadership in Germany and Europe. The British were able to capitalise on the divisions in the American camp and solidified an

the Marshall Plan. Clayton replied that 'Europe should explain why more progress has not thus far been made...[and that] European countries should set forth a statement...of what they propose to do to help themselves'.⁶⁵

The foreign ministers met in Moscow in March-April 1947 in order to discuss the work done by the ACC on demilitarisation, denazification, democratisation, economic principles and reparations and the establishment of central administrations. The main purpose of the Moscow CFM was to conclude a peace treaty with Germany. However, by 1947 the demarcation lines had already been drawn. Bizonia was already operational and sovietisation was proceeding at full speed in the Eastern zone. Therefore, the main framework of action for the enforcement of the superpowers' structural interests was already setting the tone for polarisation in Germany and Europe.

In the eve of the Moscow CFM, containment thinking prevailed amongst the US delegation. The impetus for the political amalgamation of the Western zones came from the military government, which was setting down stringent conditions for cooperation with the Soviets. Many of the policy-makers in charge of preparing the Moscow CFM were converting to the Kennan line and therefore deemed the possibility of a united Germany as undesirable.⁶⁶ Trachtenberg argues that Marshall may have wanted to reach an agreement with the Soviets on the question of reparations from current production but the key point was that agreement should not increase the cost of financing essential exports to Germany. In the

understanding with the US in spite of disagreements over Japan, China, Greece and dollar gap. See Deighton, A., *The Impossible Peace*, p. 163

⁶⁵ Summary of Second Meeting between Clayton, the US Ambassador and members of the British Cabinet, June 24, 1947

⁶⁶ Eisenberg, C. W., *Drawing the line*, p. 280

view of the State Department (and the British Foreign Office) as long as the German economy was in deficit, and as long as the Western powers had to bear the biggest share of this deficit, any increased production had to be sold abroad in order to pay for imports, cut the deficit and relieve the British and American taxpayers. Any arrangement that allowed goods to be sent to the Soviet zone before the trade account was balanced would mean that the economic burden of the western powers would be greater and Britain and the United States would be paying reparations for the Soviet Union.⁶⁷ Eisenberg maintains that the Anglo-American bloc wanted to set prohibitive conditions for Soviet cooperation and to proceed with bizonal arrangements.⁶⁸ The rationale against economic unity prevailing in the US camp seems to be in accordance with a Rationalist mindset. The demarcation of boundaries that the consolidation of polarisation offered was more attractive than the prospect of working on the possibility of quadripartite agreement. The possibility of four-power agreement could have been detrimental for the structural interests of the United States, which hinged upon the rehabilitation of Germany in order to secure a free-trade system of exchange in Europe.

On February 1, 1947, in preparation for the Moscow CFM, the French Government sent a memorandum to the Allied capitals, abandoning the idea of the separation of the Ruhr but putting forward a proposal to establish an international authority for the Ruhr and to limit their heavy production as well as supervise the distribution of energy resources. At the Moscow CFM Bidault justified this formula on security grounds, reparations and a balanced German budget. He argued that Germany should be forced to export a substantial part of its coal and steel production, which should not exceed the levels imposed by the March 1946

⁶⁷ Trachtenberg, M., *Constructed Peace*, p. 57-8

ACC Plan. Bidault also insisted on the establishment of inter-Allied agencies, the integration of the Saar into France and an inter-Allied regime for the Ruhr. The Anglo-Americans conceded on the Saar and on issues related to coal distribution. However, the implementation of the Marshall Plan would throw any French ambitions on German disarmament out of the window.⁶⁹

During the eighth meeting of the Moscow CFM, Molotov stated that the Soviet Union 'made no secret of the fact that it wanted reparation, or of the figure of reparation which it demanded, but it seemed that the Western powers were not interested'. He also stressed that the United States and Britain 'received gold captured in the Western zone of Germany' and that 'they had received almost all German external assets, her commercial fleet, and valuable patents and inventions worth about 10 billion dollars' which constituted 'reparation'. Molotov remarked that the French had received 'reparation from current production in the form of coal and timber'. While Bidault seemed to acquiesce to Molotov's request, both Bevin and Marshall appeared to be dismissive of comments made by the Commissar for Foreign Affairs and refused to hear comments by the IARA representative.⁷⁰

During the ninth meeting, Marshall reinstated the American position on the Yalta agreement on reparations, refusing to budge on reparation from current production on the grounds that it would reconstitute 'German war potential'.⁷¹ During the eighteenth meeting, the representatives tackled the treatment of Germany as an economic unit, reparations, level of industry and the demilitarisation of industry. Bidault stated that these issues could not be

⁶⁸ Eisenberg, C.W., *Drawing the line*, p. 295

⁶⁹ Bitsch, M.T., *Un Rêve français: le désarmement économique de l'Allemagne (1944-1947)*, p. 328-9

⁷⁰ Eight meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, March 18, 1947- FO 371/64206, p. 54

discussed without settling the future of the Saar and the supply of German coal. Bevin read a statement outlining the British position, which basically revolved around the requirements of 'freedom of movement in Germany for people, trade and ideas', 'that the proceeds of all exports from current production and stocks should be devoted in the first place to defray the costs of German imports', 'an equitable sharing....of the financial burden already incurred' and the 'establishment of central administrations'. Bevin also reminded the representatives of the Soviet conditions for economic unity, which he found unacceptable: the annulment of Bizonia, four power control of the Ruhr and reparations from current production. At the same time, Molotov reinstated the case for the Potsdam provision to grant the Soviet Union \$10 billion in reparations. However, he underlined that the Soviet delegation wished for 'an agreement suitable to all'.⁷²

During an informal meeting, Marshall reminded the delegations that neither Potsdam nor the level of industry agreement of March 1946 had provided for reparations from current production. Molotov stated that the Soviet delegation could agree to the British proposal on reparations in the form of steel production of up to 10 tons per annum. However, when asked by Marshall, he reiterated that on top of reparations from current production the Soviet Union desired reparations in the form of removal of plants. Meanwhile, Bidault reiterated the French case for a compensatory mechanism between an increase in the level of industry and the question of the Saar and coal supply.⁷³

⁷¹ Ninth meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, March 18, 1947- FO 371/64206, p. 57

⁷² Eighteenth meeting of the CFM, March 31, 1947- FO 371/64206, p. 78-84

⁷³ Informal meeting of the CFM, April 1, 1947- FO 371/64206, p. 84-6

On the 21st meeting of the Moscow CFM the Allies agreed on the setting of German central administrative agencies and a German Advisory Council. The French however, made agreement on these matters provisional until the Allies could determine the definite borders of Germany and the permanent status of the Saar, the Ruhr and the Rhineland.⁷⁴

The Allies seemed to agree on the establishment of a provisional government. Molotov pressed for representatives of political parties, trade unions and anti-Fascist organisations to be included in the provisional government. Bevin commented that there was general agreement on the issue of the provisional government but that the issue was subject to agreement on economic principles.⁷⁵ On the twenty-third meeting Molotov argued that the Länder could not possibly be left in charge of administering issues such as state security and reparations. Bidault remarked that the question of reparations should be decided by the ACC and that France would not agree to a German state security service.⁷⁶

On the twenty-fifth meeting Bidault reiterated the French position on a special regime for the Ruhr and the Rhineland in view of its 'unique concentration of mining and industrial resources'. Bevin disagreed, arguing that such a regime would involve the dismemberment of Germany.⁷⁷ On the twenty-sixth session Marshall stressed that although the United States favoured quadripartite control over the whole of Germany, they did not agree on granting a special regime to the Ruhr.⁷⁸

⁷⁴ Proceedings of the fourth plenary session of the CFM, March 10-April 24, 1947-FO 371/64206, p. 23

⁷⁵ Nineteenth meeting of the CFM, April 2, 1947, FO 371/64206, pp. 87-93

⁷⁶ Twenty-third meeting of the CFM, April 8, 1947, FO 371/64206, p. 110-1

⁷⁷ Twenty-fifth meeting of the CFM, April 10, 1947, FO 371/64206, pp. 119-120

⁷⁸ Twenty-sixth meeting of the CFM, April 11, 1947, FO 371/64206, pp. 122-

Trachtenberg argues a unified Germany was not a particularly attractive proposition for the Western powers, for if that entity was weak it would be prone to be influenced by the Soviet Union. If strong, it could play east against west and be a threat to peace. Trachtenberg also maintains that the Western powers did not seek to sabotage the Moscow CFM but they did not want to pay too much of a price for the success of the conference.⁷⁹

In mid-April Marshall told Stalin that the United States wanted economic unity and not a centralised government which would endanger the international order. Marshall assured Stalin that America did not want to convert the Soviet Union to the capitalist credo. Washington's intention was to rehabilitate the European countries ravaged by the war. Stalin pressed Marshall on the issue of reparations (arguing that only \$ 2 billion had been received so far) but remained 'optimistic' on the possibility of four power agreement.⁸⁰ In a broadcast made in the aftermath of the Moscow CFM on April 24, 1947 Marshall maintained 'no reparations from current production were contemplated by the Potsdam agreement'. The Secretary of State stated that

the United States has indicated that it would be willing to study the possibility of a limited amount of reparations from current production to compensate for plants previously scheduled to be removed ...it being understood that deliveries from current production are not to increase the financial burden of the occupying powers or to retard the repayment to them of the advances they have made to keep the German economy from collapsing. The Soviet government has made no response to this suggestion.⁸¹

⁷⁹ Trachtenberg, M., *Constructed Peace*, p. 60

⁸⁰ Eisenberg, C.W., *Drawing the line*, p. 306

Eisenberg argues that once the Americans had decided not to compromise on the issue of reparations from current production, there was no prospect of a four power deal. The failure to achieve a consensus was conducive to the partition of Germany.⁸² The 'grand design' rationale prevailed in Marshall's thinking. In his report to the American people on the outcome of the Moscow CFM, Marshall referred to Germany as the 'vital centre', to be rehabilitated by the ERP. In an address of November 18, 1947 Marshall was unequivocal: 'the restoration of Europe involves the restoration of Germany. Without revival of Germany's economy there can be no revival of Europe's economy'.⁸³

The failure on the part of the Allies to achieve unity on economic principles at the Moscow CFM would trigger more unilateral action at zonal level. The Allies agreed on a revised plan for the level of industry in the Anglo-American Zones on August 29, 1947 in order 'to retain sufficient capacity in the bizonal area to approximate the level of industry prevailing in Germany in 1936'. The plan established that 'the bizonal area must be prepared to exchange in foreign trade proportionately larger quantities of industrial products in return for necessary food and raw material imports'. It also provided that 'sufficient capacity will be retained to produce RM 500 million, which is about 80% of pre-war production' leaving '35% of the present capacity to be removed as reparations as against 60% under the previous plan'. The Anglo-Americans estimated the capacity in the bizonal area to be about RM 1,195 million. The revised plan established that capacity was to be retained to produce RM 916

⁸¹ General Marshall broadcast of April 24, 1947-From *Documents on Germany under Occupation 1945-54*, p. 219-227

⁸² Eisenberg, C.W., *Drawing the line*, p. 302

⁸³ Shlaim A., *The partition of Germany and the origins of the Cold War*, p.131

million (119% of pre-war production), leaving 23% of present estimated capacity available for reparations, as compared with 33% under the old plan'.⁸⁴

The Moscow CFM was influential in consolidating the transition to a bipolar solution for the German Question. The lack of progress at the Moscow CFM and the simultaneous process of polarisation taking place in the occupation zones rendered impossible the continuation of the illusion of unity. Success at the Moscow CFM would have been more daunting for the United States and the Soviet Union than the actual failure to achieve an agreement on economic issues. A modicum of success would have reversed Bizonia, delayed the implementation of the ERP and therefore put further constraints on the rehabilitation of Germany and Europe according to the 'grand design' rationale. At the same time, agreement would have left Moscow with less leeway to pursue their objectives in Eastern Europe, as a united Germany could have resulted in the reversal of polarisation in the Continent. This would have entailed a retreat from the political foothold created by the Red Army's march into Central Europe.

In any case, nothing fortuitous occurred at the Moscow CFM. The diplomacy of the German Question followed a logical and Rationalist path. The United States ensured that there would be no agreement on economic principles, therefore acting on the premises imposed by the 'grand design' thinking. For the Soviet Union, reparations became the political tool for the continuation of the sovietisation of the Eastern zone and the creation of a Moscow-orientated bloc in Eastern Europe. The breakdown at the Moscow CFM marked the grand entrance of the United States and the Soviet Union in the political, economic and

⁸⁴ Revised Plan for the Level of Industry in the Bizonia, August 29, 1947-From *Documents on Germany under*

military affairs of the continent of Europe for the next 40 years. This influence, which began with their involvement in the treatment of the German Question, would have an important milestone in the breakdown of inter-Allied negotiations at Moscow for it would prompt the consolidation of polarisation and bloc-formation in Germany and Europe. At the Moscow CFM, the Allies were faced with the prospect of a permanent marriage over Germany. The dangers inherent in such a marriage were more clear and present than the possibility of future gains offered by economic unity.

During the London CFM, which took place between November 25 and December 15 1947, the issue of German unity was again at the forefront of the discussion. During the tenth meeting of the London CFM on December 5, 1947, the question of economic principles was tackled. Marshall pressed on the need to create the necessary conditions for the economic unity of Germany. Molotov understood that the American proposal consisted in the abolition of the zones of occupation in Germany and the free flow of goods before any central government could be established. Molotov pointed out that the Harriman Report indicated that a German government could be started in the Western zones. Molotov stressed that the US delegation was not interested in an all German government and any interest they were displaying at the conference 'was only for the sake of formality and convenience'. He also pointed out that the other occupying powers had rejected his proposal that no government should be set up in any of the four zones.⁸⁵

Molotov concluded that 'economic unity could only be expected if the provisions of the Potsdam Agreement were fulfilled and the German people were permitted to participate in

Occupation 1945-54, p. 239-45

[the] rehabilitation [of Germany]'. Molotov also stated that the German people should be given a say in the economic rehabilitation of Germany, whose industrial production was 35% of what it was in 1938. ⁸⁶ Marshall retorted by saying that there were no differences between his views and those of the Harriman Report: the United States insisted that there could be no German Government without economic unity. Marshall also said that the reason behind the lack of economic unity was the steady resistance of the Soviet representative each time. ⁸⁷ Bevin reminded Molotov that since the London CFM of 1945 Britain had expressed the view that Germany 'should be made to pay its way, and not be a burden upon the Allies'. He also mentioned, in regards to reparations, that German industry should not be allowed to develop in a way to threaten security, as it occurred following the aftermath of World War One. ⁸⁸

During the eleventh meeting of London CFM Molotov proposed the establishment of central German Departments, the free flow of goods (linked to the dissolution of fusion agreements) and pressed on the question of reparations and the removal of zonal barriers. ⁸⁹ In addition, the Soviets also put forward a proposal for the quadripartite control of the Ruhr, financial reform, the expansion of German exports, decartelisation and the end of fusion agreements. The Soviet delegation still insisted on the sum of \$10 billion in terms of reparations (to be taken from current production). They also proposed that removals from the Western zones should be completed by the end of 1948 and asked for the re-establishment of IARA. The Soviets did however agree to an upward revision to the level of

⁸⁵ Minutes of the tenth meeting of the London CFM, December 5, 1947- FO 371/64646

⁸⁶ Molotov statement at the 10th meeting of the London CFM 1947- FO371/64646 pp. 3-4 and p. 6

⁸⁷ Marshall statement at the 10th meeting of the London CFM 1947- FO371/64646 p. 4

⁸⁸ Bevin statement at the 10th meeting of the London CFM 1947- FO371/64646 p. 5

⁸⁹ Minutes of the 11th meeting of the London CFM 1947- FO371/64646

industry as soon as reparations deliveries were fulfilled. The Soviets also produced a statement denouncing the Frankfurt set-up and Western Germany, especially the Ruhr, as a base for the domination of Europe.⁹⁰

Meanwhile, Marshall, Bevin and Bidault agreed on the fact that the reconstruction of Germany would not take precedence over the reconstruction of the 'democratic countries of Europe'.⁹¹ In the final session, Molotov voiced a request by the 'People's Congress' in Berlin for a hearing. This request was duly rejected by the other members.⁹²

Marshall's statement (proposing the adjournment of the London session of the CFM), concluded that the ministers have been 'unable to agree on what [they] mean by Germany'. He cited Soviet insistence on the issue of reparations, reluctance to furnish information about reparations removal and how these practices in the Soviet Zone 'prevented Germany from playing its part in the recovery of Europe'. Marshall also stated that 'true political and economic unity would require a free movement of goods, persons and ideas throughout Germany and the establishment of a rule of law and political freedom which the occupying powers themselves would respect'.⁹³

The lack of agreement over the economic principles involved in a peace treaty with Germany is an example of how conflict was socialised through diplomatic interaction. By adapting to the evolving political circumstances, which resulted from superpower interaction in Germany, Moscow and Washington created the conditions for partition. While structural interests created certain norms of behaviour on the part of the superpowers, they did not

⁹⁰ Minutes of the 12th meeting of the London CFM 1947- FO371/64646

⁹¹ Minutes of the 15th meeting of the London CFM 1947- FO371/64646

specifically prescribe the division of Germany. The road to polarisation in Germany and Europe was paved through the constant probing of each other's intentions at occupation and diplomatic level. The issue of economic principles had profound political implications. Failure to achieve agreement would signal the dismemberment of Germany according to the demarcation lines imposed by the zones of occupation. Quadripartite agreement at the Moscow and London CFM would have produced unknown effects on the stability of the post-war international order. Allowing the Soviet Union to have access to the Ruhr and to take reparations from current production from the Western zones would have created a situation capable of disrupting the American 'grand design' for Germany and Europe. Making concessions on the terms of economic unity would have left the Soviet Union in a position of disadvantage vis-à-vis the United States and ultimately deprive Moscow of its foothold in Germany, which could have meant a withdrawal from Eastern Europe and a reversal of its own 'grand design'.

A quadripartite solution to the German Question would have created the illusion of peace in Europe. This would have resulted in a potentially devastating conflict between the two superpowers. For the Soviet Union, the issue of reparations became the interactive element which would determine how its structural interests would be accomplished. Ultimately, the taking of reparations from the individual zones of occupation helped to establish clear boundaries and determine an expeditious and effective course of action. The Soviet demands on reparations put the question of German unity in serious doubt from the very beginning. Nevertheless, agreement would have prolonged and exacerbated a very tense situation that was taken the course of partition at zonal level. From the American perspective, an

⁹² Foreign Office minutes of the 17th meeting of the London CFM 1947- FO371/64646

agreement on economic unity would have entailed the possibility of a Soviet foothold in the whole of Germany. Accordingly, lack of agreement on economic principles provided the United States with the perfect excuse to pursue the rehabilitation of Western Germany and Western Europe. For the Soviets, four-power agreement on the German Question would have meant the possibility of losing their security foothold not only in Germany but also in Central and Eastern Europe. It is generally recognised that next to the establishment of four zones of occupation, the setting of a zonal reparations plan was the most important step on the road to the division of Germany.⁹⁴ From this perspective, conflict between the superpowers was to a great extent restrained by the legal framework provided by the occupation zones. Failure to achieve agreement on economic principles provided the Allies with the opportunity to enforce an orderly divorce. This would allow the superpowers to work within clearly-demarcated boundaries and impose a balance of power system based on coexisting spheres of influence.

3.4 Conclusion

The political and economic organisation of the zones of occupation was implemented according to the national interest of the occupying powers. This selfish solidarism created the conditions for the establishment of a post-war international order socialised to a great extent by the treatment of the German Question. This socialisation unfolded within the boundaries established by superpower intervention but nevertheless, in adherence to the principle of coexistence. Intervention was exercised by the United States and the Soviet Union in order to enforce bottom line interests, but within the self-imposed Rationalist

⁹³Marshall statement, December 15, 1947- From *Documents on Germany under Occupation 1945-54*, p. 261-3

elements of legality and diplomacy. The gradual breakdown of the practical association prompted the organisation of the Eastern zone according to the diktat of Moscow; and a growing interaction between London and Washington in order to achieve the rehabilitation of the Anglo-American zones. Whilst Moscow was sovietising the Eastern zone of occupation (as well as creating a political foothold in Central and Eastern Europe) the United States worked on the establishment of Bizonia and forged ahead with the creation of free-market economic order in Western Europe.

The dissolution of the practical association in the aftermath of the Moscow and London CFMs stemmed from the organisation of the zones of occupation according to the national interest of the superpowers and would serve as a catalyst for the creation of the post-war international order. The sovietisation of Central and Eastern Europe was by no means complete during 1945-6. Meanwhile, the foundations of a 'sphere of influence' in the Continent were created in the zone occupied by the Soviet Union in Germany. The sovietisation of one third of Germany was completed *before* the consolidation of the Soviet foothold in Central and Eastern Europe. Simultaneously, Bizonia paved the way for the creation of a 'Western policy' for Germany, the economic rehabilitation of the Anglo-American zones, and the configuration of a 'Western bloc' in Europe.

While these developments created a nascent international order based on confrontation and mutual distrust between the superpowers, they also became *a Rationalist response to the resolution of the German problem*. While the sovietisation of the Eastern Zone and the setting of Bizonia contributed to the division of the continent and to the polarisation between the West and

⁹⁴ Backer, J. H., *The Decision to Divide Germany: American Foreign Policy in Transition*, p. 90-1

the Soviet Union during the Cold War, it also avoided an all out war over Germany. The Neorealist account on the structuralisation of conflict does not necessarily contradict the Wendtian perspective applied to the conflictual aspects of the treatment of the German Question. Conflict over the treatment of the German Question and the making of the post-war international order was socialised through the implementation of the superpowers' structural interests. However, the careful orchestration and the enforcement of these interests unfolded within the same parameters that sustained the wartime associative framework. The legal provisions endorsed by the Allies at Potsdam enabled the parties involved in the treatment of the German Question to enforce their interests in non-disruptive manner. The political and economic rehabilitation of the zones of occupation, well under way when the Allies met at the Moscow CFM, provided with a carefully constructed setting for a neat breakdown of four-power control over Germany.

The bipolar solution to the treatment of the German Question and the establishment of the post-war international order socialised the conflictual elements of superpower interaction. The political and economic organisation of occupied Germany dealt the final blow to four-power agreement over Germany and paved the way for its partition into two states: West Germany, modeled along capitalist and liberal democratic lines and East Germany, organised along the political and economic lines imposed by Moscow. Two socio-economic systems confronted each other on the question of the political and economic organisation of Germany. However, this confrontation would entail the formation of two blocs that would gradually give meaning and order not only to the German Question but to the nascent post-war international order as a whole. The conflict that stemmed from the treatment of the

German Question had the consequence of creating a balance of power system based on coexisting spheres of influence.

The interaction between the pursuit of the national interest and the respect for the Rationalist rules of superpower engagement escapes the interpretative framework imposed by classical Realism, with its view of politics in terms of the pursuit of power and self-interest and its lack of identification with moral aspirations.⁹⁵ The enormity of the task undertaken by the two emerging superpowers during World War Two and the relative inexperience of the United States and the Soviet Union in the management of the international system, coupled with the Rationalist constraints imposed by superpower interaction, restrained their capacity to act exclusively out of national interest concerns and qualified the anarchic condition of the nascent post-war international order. Superpower interaction unfolded within 'pluralist plus' parameters. Superpower intervention over the German Question resulted in the enforcement of bottom line interests. However, this interventionist drive would be restrained by the configuration of a post-war international order based on coexistence.

Waltz argues that the rules of behaviour create 'sameness' in the international order, as states have to conform to these rules by simple involvement in the system. This in turn produces a tendency to balance and a socialisation in the system.⁹⁶ In addition, the social theory of conflict espoused by Wendt brings an added dimension to the debate on how the treatment of the German Question influence the breakdown of relations between the superpowers, not necessarily divorced from the structural perspective. In fact, in response to Wendt's

⁹⁵ Morgenthau, H., *Politics Among Nations-The Struggle for Power and Peace* (McGraw Hill: 1993), p. 4-13

⁹⁶ Waltz, K., *Theory of International Politics* (McGraw Hill) (1979), p. 128

arguments, Suganami has argued that states and system cultures are two descriptions of the same thing.⁹⁷

The socially-constructed dimension of conflict over Germany can be linked to the post-revisionist view on the origins of the Cold War. An examination of the socialisation of conflict can be useful in order to arrive at a more comprehensive explanation on the outcome of the German Question and the origins of the Cold War, inasmuch as it allows us to determine the way in which contingent elements interacted in order to help Moscow and Washington accomplish of their structural goals. The issue of German economic unity was exploited by the superpowers in order to enforce a specific outcome and create a definite identity in the post-war international order. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union could have been satisfied with keeping Germany united. A united Germany would have meant the possibility of superpower intervention beyond the respective areas of interest and the subsequent end to an international order based on coexistence. This would have also entailed the possibility of failing to achieve their structural interests in Germany and Europe.

The fact that conflict evolved as a social construction can explain why the breakdown of four-power control over Germany did not result in disruptive conflict. Wendt treats states as intentional actors or 'people' and see the international system as anarchic, with its structure defined in cultural rather than material terms. The culture of the international system can take at least three different forms (Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian) depending on whether states constitute each other as enemies, rivals, or friends.⁹⁸ This fits an English School interpretation inasmuch as the elements of legality and diplomacy tempered the blind pursuit

⁹⁷ See Forum on Social Theory, *Review of International Studies* (2000)

of the national interest by the superpowers in the enforcement of their structural interests in the treatment of the German Question. Conflict was socialised in such way that the ordering principles of the process of polarisation served to re-shape the international political system according to the primary institutions of intervention and coexistence.

Wight defines diplomacy 'as the system and the art of communication between powers'. Wight also argued that the diplomatic system is 'the master-institution of international relations'.⁹⁹ Der Derian describes diplomatic culture as 'the mediation of estrangement by symbolic power and social constraints'.¹⁰⁰ He also states that 'what gives definition to a diplomatic system...is not the structure itself, but the conflicting relations which maintain, reproduce, and sometimes transform it.'¹⁰¹ The restraining factor in the unfolding of conflict and ultimate breakdown of relations over the treatment of the German Question was the diplomatic and legal interaction between the superpowers¹⁰² and the construction of a balance of power system based on coexistence.

The basic principle involved in a balancing of political power, as David Hume highlighted, 'is no more than a precept of commonsense, born of experience and the instinct of self-preservation'.¹⁰³ Oppenheim describes it as the equilibrium between the various powers which form the family of nations and 'essential to the very existence of any international

⁹⁸ See Wendt, A., *Social Theory of International Politics*

⁹⁹ In the chapter on international society, he writes that 'The institutions of international society are according to its nature. We may enumerate them as diplomacy, alliances, guarantees, war and neutrality'. See Wight, W., *Power Politics* (1979) p. 111

¹⁰⁰ Der Derian, James *On Diplomacy*, p 42

¹⁰¹ Der Derian, James, *On Diplomacy. A Genealogy of Western Estrangement* (Oxford: Blackwell)(1987), p 106

¹⁰² Somewhat ironically, the works on the history of diplomacy in the thirty years since the original series of English School works appeared, have *not* been written by members of the English School, but by scholars who do not refer to it or who have been openly critical to it. See Berridge, G., *Diplomacy-Theory and Practice* (London: Prentice Hall) (1995), Anderson, M. S., *The Rise of Modern Diplomacy 1450-1919* (London: Longman and Hamilton) (1993) Langhorne, K. and R., *The Practice of Diplomacy: Its Evolution, Theory and Administration* (London: Routledge) (1995)

¹⁰³ Hume, D., *Essay on the Balance of Power*, lib. i. cap. 83

law'. In the absence of a central authority, the only sanction behind the code of rules established by custom or defined in treaties, known as 'international law', is the capacity of the powers to hold each other in check.¹⁰⁴ To Butterfield, the growth of human insight into the workings of the balance of power are closely linked to the workings of diplomatic interaction as 'an international order is not a thing bestowed upon by nature, but is a matter of refined thought, careful contrivance and elaborate artifice'¹⁰⁵

By examining the diplomacy over the German Question, we are able to put the interpretative emphasis back on superpower interaction and add a different dimension on the orthodox/revisionist debate on the origins of the Cold War. The diplomatic and legal interaction that arose from the treatment of the German Question created a particular type of balance of power. The balance of power created through the lack of agreement on economic principles and the reorganisation of the occupation zones had the ultimate effect of managing conflict and restraining it to the strict enforcing of structural interests. As we will see in chapter 4, this balance of power system would have a significant impact on the creation of an international political system sustained through the institutions of intervention and coexistence.

¹⁰⁴ Oppenheim, L., *International Law; a treatise*, (London, 1920-21), p. 73-
<http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k93562g>

¹⁰⁵ Butterfield H., 'The Balance of Power' in Wight M. and Butterfield H., (eds.) *Diplomatic Investigations. Essays in the Theory of International Politics* (London: Unwin) (1966), pp. 132-148

Chapter 4

The German Question and the 'primary institutions' of the post-war international order

4.1 The English School's concept of 'primary institutions' and the German Question

The interaction between conflict, cooperation and legality in the treatment of the German Question assisted the formation of the 'primary institutions' which sustained the post-war society of states. The concept of 'primary institutions' constitutes a central element in the English School of thinking. Wight postulates that 'the institutions of international society are according to its nature', ¹ which implies that these institutions will be different from one type of international society to another. Wight enumerates the primary institutions of the international society of the first half of the twentieth century, as 'diplomacy, alliances, guarantees, war and neutrality'. ² Bull updated and expanded the concept with his set of five institutions of international society, consisting of diplomacy, international law, the balance of power, war, and the role of great powers. ³ The malleability of the concept is exposed by Buzan, who states that 'primary institutions' are durable and recognised practises structured around 'shared values ...held by members of international societies, and embodying a mix of norms, rules and principles'. Buzan also argues that 'primary institutions' are neither permanent nor fixed and that they will typically undergo 'a historical pattern of rise,

¹ Wight M., *Power Politics*, p. 111

² Wight M., *Power Politics*, p. 111-2

³ Bull H., *The Anarchical Society*, pp. 101-229

evolution and decline'.⁴ Mayall highlights the historical context of the development of primary institutions. Mayall states that some of these institutions (sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-intervention) have been around since the beginning of the modern states-system, with others (self-determination, human rights etc) having been added more recently.

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The general context of inter-Allied relations was conducive to the transformation of the international political system and the fostering of coexistence. Pivotal to this process was the high level of legal and diplomatic cooperation between the superpowers which, as seen in chapter 1, stemmed from the wartime practical association.⁶ World War Two produced an extension of international society, as manifested in the expansion of international regimes and the ever-increasing role of the United Nations.

During the war, there was an intense debate on international and European organisation. In 1943, the State Department set up the Political Committee for the study of the future peace, which consisted of up to 40 members, including international relations experts as well as senators and House representatives. The 'Committee' was subdivided into sections, including the Political Sub-Committee, headed by Hull and Welles, the Security Sub-Committee, headed by Norman Davies, the Territorial Problems Sub-Committee chaired by Isaiah Bowman, the International Organisation Sub-Committee, headed by Welles, the Legal Sub-Committee headed by Green Hackworth, and the European Federation Sub-

⁴ Buzan, B., *From International Society to World Society? English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) (2004), p. 181

⁵ Mayall, J., *World Politics: Progress and its Limits*. (2000) p. 149-50

⁶ See pp. 36-43

Committee, headed by Hamilton Fish Armstrong.⁷ During 1942-3, the State Department's Political Committee drafted plans for international organisation and by March 1943, a preliminary draft on a United Nations charter was sketched by Clark Eichelberger. The draft called for international organisation based on 'international law and morality'.⁸

The post-war policy machinery set up by the US State Department tackled the issue of colonialism. By 1942, Secretary of State Cordell Hull was pressing for the setting of timetables to increase self-government in all dependent territories and outright independence for the most advanced colonies. On March 9, 1943, the Far Eastern Division of the US State Department headed by Stanley Hornbeck produced a draft known as the 'Declaration of National Independence', formulating what appeared to be a Pacific Charter/World Charter.⁹ By October 1942, the Sub-Committee on International Organisation produced a full draft on international trusteeship for non-self governing peoples.¹⁰

The Atlantic Charter declared that the signatories would 'respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live'. Churchill subsequently claimed that this would apply only to those countries under Nazi occupation, rather than the British Empire. However, the Indian legislative assembly passed a resolution stating that the Atlantic Charter should also apply to Britain's most important colony.

The UN Charter would include a statement on equal rights and self-determination. The process of decolonisation would gain new impetus following the aftermath of the war,

⁷ Eichelberger, C., *Organizing for Peace. a personal history of the founding of the United Nations*, p. 199

⁸ Eichelberger, C., *Organizing for Peace*, p. 201-2

⁹ Roger, W.L., *Imperialism at bay, 1941-1945: the United States and the decolonization of the British Empire.*, p. 176-8

¹⁰ Roger, W.L., *Imperialism at bay*, p. 183

beginning with the independence of Pakistan and India from Britain in 1947 and the First Indochina War.

The economic and political dislocation brought about by the war prompted the setting of European federation schemes. Just before the German invasion of France, the British Cabinet proposed the establishment of a Franco-British Union. The London Inter-Allied Conference of September 24, 1941, established the framework for the setting of federative schemes, including the Czechoslovak-Polish Confederation Agreement of January 25, 1941 and the Greek-Yugoslav agreement for a Balkan Union of January 15, 1942. Article 5 of the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of May 26, 1942 provided with the framework for political and economic cooperation on a pan-European level. After the war, the process of integration on both sides of the Iron Curtain would unfold in accordance with the spheres of influence system. In this process, both the elements of intervention and coexistence collided in the formation of the post-war international order.

The Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM), established at the Potsdam Conference, also contributed to the resolution of important issues regarding the post-war international order. The Moscow CFM of December 1945 tackled issues like the establishment of an Allied Far Eastern Commission Council for Japan, the situation in Korea, China, Romania, Bulgaria, and the possibility of setting a UN commission for the control of atomic energy.

The Far Eastern Commission (FEC) formulated policies for Japan, to be fulfilled under the terms of surrender. The FEC consisted of thirteen members. Decisions were taken by a majority vote, but the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union and China retained the power

of veto. Between July 10, 1947 and December 23, 1948 the FEC made thirteen policy decisions which fell into three categories: disarmament, democratisation and economic recovery.

At the New York CFM of December 1946 the Allies drafted preliminary plans for a peace settlement with Austria and Germany. At the Paris and New York CFM the Allies completed peace treaties with Italy, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Finland. The treaties (signed in Paris on February 10, 1947) enabled the former Axis powers to reassume their responsibilities as sovereign states and to qualify for membership in the United Nations. The settlement elaborated in the peace treaties included payment of war reparations, commitment to minority rights and territorial adjustments, including the end of the Italian colonial empire in Africa and changes to the Italian-Yugoslav, Hungarian-Slovak, Romanian-Hungarian, Soviet-Romanian, Bulgarian-Romanian, French-Italian and Soviet-Finnish frontiers.

The setting of the United Nations gave new impetus to the idea of world organisation. The stated aims of the United Nations were 'to maintain international peace and security, to safeguard human rights, to provide a mechanism for international law [and] to promote social and economic progress.'¹¹

This framework of coexistence helped to transform the international political system. Although these developments unfolded independently from the treatment of the German Question, the need to achieve an international framework of coexistence stemmed from the cataclysm brought upon the international political system by the Nazi revisionist challenge.

¹¹ See UN Charter <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter>

The revisionist challenge launched by Nazi Germany created an overhaul in the structure of international society. The superpowers' influence regarding the treatment of the German Question and the reconfiguration of international society gave a new dimension to the role of 'primary institutions'. The transformative nature of the involvement of the United States and the Soviet Union in World War Two generated a renewed concept of behaviour in the international political system. The disruption to inter-state relations caused by the Nazi invasion of Western and Eastern Europe prompted the intervention of the United States and the Soviet Union in the war effort and the realignment of the international order. Washington sustained the war effort financially, militarily and diplomatically on a scale unprecedented in the history of military alliances. This intervention created a situation of decisive action in Germany and a permanent involvement of the United States in European affairs, which would entail the political emasculation of Germany and Europe and the creation of a Western bloc. At the same time, the Soviet intervention in the war was crucial in the defeat of Nazi Germany, as no other major ally engaged Germany in the same magnitude as the Red Army.¹² The enormity of this enterprise created a new political mindset amongst the Soviet leadership. The devastation caused by the Nazi invasion would be the main informant of Soviet policy following the aftermath of World War Two. This prompted Moscow's encroachment into Germany as well as Central and Eastern Europe.

¹² Overy describes the Soviet war effort as 'an incomparable achievement, world-historical in a very real sense'. See Overy, R, *Russia's War*, p. 327. Russian deaths in the Great Patriotic War exceed 27 million (40% of all the people killed during World War Two). These included at least 7 million civilians and 3.25 million soldiers who died in captivity. The Soviet military effort accounts for most of the 3.25 million German military fatalities during the war. A further 3 million German troops were captured by the Soviets. German losses in the Eastern Front accounted for 10 million killed, missing, wounded or captured and the loss of equipment to 48,000 tanks, 167,000 artillery pieces and nearly 77,000 aircraft. See Duffy, C., *Red Storm on the Reich-The Soviet March on Germany, 1945* (Routledge: London) (1991), p. 3. See also, Merridale, C., *Ivan's War: the Red Army 1939-1945* (Faber and Faber: London) (2005)

It is through the treatment of the German Question that both intervention and coexistence became the primary institutions of the Cold War international order. The German Question affected the diplomatic interaction of the Allies as well as the legal principles that derived from it, compelling the superpowers to search for an equilibrium in which the pursuit of the national interest would not preclude the recognition of spheres of influence. In this context, the typical notions attached to the concept of 'primary institutions' by the English School scholarship cannot fully explain the main informative aspects of the Cold War. While diplomacy, international law and the balance of power became instruments of transformation, it would be the elements of intervention and coexistence what would give the Cold War international order its ultimate shape.

World War Two prompted the reconstitution of international society. This reconstitution was based on a stronger emphasis on intervention and the coexistence of diverse ideologies sharing the aim of preserving the international order. It has been argued that war derives its legitimacy from the service it renders to the society of states.¹³ When World War Two became global and therefore affected the international political system as a whole, it took the significance of an 'epochal war'.¹⁴ World War Two propelled the Allies to create a *new* international order based on a *new* legal framework aimed not only at quashing the Axis' revisionist drive but also at filling the legal and political vacuum of the interwar period. This created the conditions for the intervention of the United States and the Soviet Union in the remaking of the society of states. The bipolar reality of the post-war international order compelled them to achieve a balance of power based on the coexistence of ideologies. This

¹³ Anderson K, and Hurrell A., *Hedley Bull on international society* (Basingstoke: Macmillan) (1999), p. 101

chapter now expands on how the treatment of the German Question contributed to create these 'primary institutions' and the effect that they would both have in the unfolding of the Cold War international order.

4.2 Intervention as a primary institution of the post-war international order

Intervention became a primary institution of the post-war international order because of the decisive input that the Allies had in achieving a bipolar solution for the German Question and the way that this affected the formation of spheres of influence. The policy of unconditional surrender, agreed upon by the Allies at the Casablanca Conference in January-February 1943, meant that the political future of Germany would be the pivotal element in the shaping of the post-war international society. The occupation of a defeated nation had little precedent in the modern history of the international political system. This kind of intervention indicated the commitment of the victors to transform Germany, and in the process, to a radically changed international order.¹⁵ Although the Allies had different interests in regards to Germany, in order to attain them, they were compelled to maintain the ethical and functional cohabitation of the wartime years. A more integrated world and the emergence of two blocs meant the possibility of intervention like never before in international history.

¹⁴ Bobbit defines an 'epochal war' as 'a war that challenges and ultimately changes the basic constitutional structure of the State, by linking strategic to constitutional innovations'. Bobbitt, P., *The shield of Achilles: war, peace and the course of history* (London: Allen Lane) (2002), p. 907 and pp. 21-3

¹⁵ France was occupied by Alliance forces in 1815 in order to enforce the settlement imposed by the Congress of Vienna. See McGuigan, R, *The Allied Occupation Army In Post-Waterloo France* (Napoleon Series). Also, Veve,

The treatment of the German Question during the 1943-8 period produced a change of attitude reflected in the renewed dimension of the role of ethics in the international political system. The experience of the Nuremberg trials enshrined in international law the view that intervention was justified in the case of gross violation of human rights. International law was institutionalised through the creation of the United Nations organisation, the expansion of the concept of human rights, as well as the enlargement of the legitimacy and authority of international organisations and regimes.¹⁶

The Atlantic Charter of 1941 laid down the foundations for the political, military and economic involvement of the United States on a global scale. The Teheran Conference of 1943 consolidated a workable rapport between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union. The Yalta and Potsdam Conferences (1945) created the framework needed for the discussion of complex issues involved in the treatment of the German Question and the post-war international political system. The CFMs would become a useful instrument for the realignment of the post-war international order by acting as a forum for the discussion and implementation of the peace treaties with the former Axis powers. This legal and diplomatic machinery solidified the practical association framework during the war and contributed to shape the configuration of the post-war international order. The creation of the legal and diplomatic framework which established the post-war constitutional settlement responded to the need to address the German Question. It primarily responded to the need to win the war and ensure that the Allies would be bound together in a commonly agreed framework of action for the purposes of delineating the post-war international order. After the war,

T. D., *The Duke of Wellington and the British Army of Occupation in France, 1815-1818* (Westport, CT and London: Greenwood Press) (1992)

¹⁶ Luard, E., *Types of International Society*, p. 305-8

international law ensured that the breakdown of the practical association would not result in a disruptive situation for the nascent international order.

Intervention as a primary institution of the post-war international order entailed the transformation of Germany from top to bottom. This approach differed from the Versailles settlement of 1919, when the German Question was tackled through diplomatic and financial pressure and military restrictions, but without directly intervening in the regeneration of the German political system. The Treaty of Versailles included occupation clauses. The Rhineland was occupied by France and Belgium from 1923-1936 as a result of Germany defaulting on her reparations obligations.¹⁷ However, the Allied occupation of Germany in the aftermath of World War Two was undertaken with the determination to transform the nation.

The Allies employed a comprehensive approach to the treatment of the former Axis powers through the instrument of the Allied Commissions, consisting of representatives of the major Allied Powers. However, none of those institutions were as significant in the reconfiguration of the international order as the Allied Control Commission for Germany (ACC). The ACC was established on June 5, 1945 and supplemented by the agreement of September 20 of the same year.¹⁸ The Instrument of Surrender issued by the major Allies on May 8, 1945 honoured the principle of unconditional surrender established by the Allies

¹⁷ Articles 428-432, Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919
<http://history.acusd.edu/gen/text/versaillestreaty/vercontents.html>

¹⁸ Cooperation by the ACC broke down as the Soviet representative withdrew on March 20, 1948. The ACC convened again in 1971, leading to agreement on transit arrangements in Berlin and during the talks for unification of Germany in late 1989. The disbanding of the ACC was officially announced by the Two Plus Four Agreement of September 12, 1990, effective as of March 15, 1991.

in Casablanca.¹⁹ The Declaration on Germany of June 5, 1945, reiterated the principle of unconditional surrender. This meant that the main Allies, the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union and France (in the form of its Provisional Government) would assume 'supreme authority with respect to Germany, including all the powers possessed by the German Government, the High Command and any state, municipal, or local authority'. The Declaration contemplated the demilitarisation of Germany (articles 1-5, 7, 10, 13), denazification and Allied control of Germany (article 12).²⁰

The Allies stipulated that authority in Germany would be exercised (on the instructions from their Governments) by the British, American, Soviet and French Commanders-in-chief, each in his own zone of occupation, and also jointly, in matters affecting Germany as a whole. The ACC decisions were to be unanimous in order to ensure appropriate uniformity of action by the Commanders-in-Chief in their respective zones of occupation.²¹ The ACC was supported by a Coordinating Committee and Control Staff. The Coordinating Committee was composed of Military, Naval, Air, Transport, Economic, Finance, Reparations, Deliveries and Restitutions, Internal Affairs and Communications, Legal, Prisoners of War and Displaced Persons and Manpower Directorates. There were four heads for each division, one for each occupying power. Its staff included military and civil personnel.

The Coordinating Committee carried out the Council's decisions, communicated them to the appropriate German bodies and supervised the day-to-day activities of the latter. United

¹⁹ German Instrument of Surrender, May 8, 1945- [http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/German Instrument of Surrender %288 May 1945%29](http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/German_Instrument_of_Surrender_%288_May_1945%29)

²⁰ Declaration on Germany June 5, 1945- From *Documents on Germany under Occupation*, p. 29

²¹ Statement by the governments of the United Kingdom, the United States, the Soviet Union and the Provisional Government of the French Republic on Control Machinery, June 5, 1945- From *Documents on Germany under Occupation*, p. 36

Nations organisations, if admitted by the Control Council to operate in Germany, were to be subordinate to the Allied control machinery and answerable to it.

Although this *modus operandi* would create the difficulties that brought about the bipolar outcome for Germany, the determination of the Allies to work together in matters pertaining to the reconstitution of the German political and social system is indicative of their willingness to apply intervention in the same manner as they employed it during the war. The ACC contributed to the transformation of Germany *because* the Allies were eager to apply the notions of intervention and coexistence.

Intervention extended to the control of the German economy. On September, 20 1945 Proclamation no. 2 of the ACC established that the Allies would 'exercise such control as they deem necessary over all or any part or aspect of German finance, agriculture, production and mining, public utilities, industry, trade...and over all related or ancillary matters, including the direction or prohibition of the manufacture, production, construction, treatment, use and disposal of any building, establishments, installations, public or private works, plant, equipment, products, materials, stock and resources'.²²

The Control Council agreed on a number of measures that would be pivotal for the political, legal and administrative organisation of post-war Germany. On November 6, 1945, through Directive no. 16, the Allies agreed to rearm the German police after the removal of personnel hostile to the occupation authorities.²³ The ACC also deliberated on the transfer of ethnic Germans from Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland into the four zones

²² Control Council Proclamation no. 2: Certain additional requirements imposed on Germany, September 20, 1945-From *Documents on Germany under Occupation*, p. 68-79

of occupation. On November 20, 1945 the ACC agreed that 'the entire German population from Poland (three and a half million persons) will be admitted to the Soviet and British zones of occupation in Germany' and that 'the entire German population from Czechoslovakia, Austria and Hungary (3,150,000 persons) will be admitted to the American, French, and the Soviet zones of occupation in Germany'.²⁴ This kind of intervention was particularly important because it reversed the historical trend of German expansion into Eastern Europe. Historically, the presence of *Volksdeutsche* in the East constituted a significant factor in the extension of the German borders well beyond the Oder-Neisse line. The transfer of ethnic Germans was probably undertaken in the belief that the measure would have confined the future German set up to a less extended geopolitical space. The significance of this undertaking still lingers on, as after reunification in 1989 Germany kept the same borders demarcated by the four occupation powers in 1945.

Further measures were carried out in order to prevent a militaristic resurgence of Germany. On May 13, 1946 Order no. 4 called for the confiscation of literature and material of a Nazi and militarist nature.²⁵ On August 20, 1946 Law no. 34 dissolved the German Armed Forces, including the 'Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW), Oberkommando des Heeres (OKH), Reichsluftfahrtministerium (RLM), and Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine (OKM), all German land, naval and air forces, with all their organisations, staffs and institutions, including the general staff, the officers corps, reserve corps, military schools, war veteran organisations, and all other military and quasi-military organisations, together

²³ Control Council Directive no. 16: Arming of the German Police, November 6, 1945-From *Documents on Germany under Occupation*, p. 88-9

²⁴ Control Council Plans for the transfer of the German population to be moved from Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland into the four occupied zones of Germany, November 20, 1945-From *Documents on Germany under Occupation*, p. 89-90

with all clubs and associations which serve to keep alive the military tradition in Germany'.²⁶

On October 12, 1946 Directive no. 40 established the policy to be followed by German politicians and the press. The Directive prohibited politicians and journalists from contributing 'towards the spreading of nationalistic, pan-Germanic, militarist, fascist or anti-democratic ideas' and from criticising Allied decisions made at CFM and ACC level.²⁷

The elements described above point out to intervention within the context of commonly agreed rules and institutions, a legacy of the wartime practical association framework. Intervention geared to the transformation of Germany was implemented within the framework of coexistence. This model of direct intervention would be applied in other locales during the Cold War.²⁸ Both Moscow and Washington would apply direct intervention in their spheres of influence in order to enforce adherence to the policy guidelines that sustained the superpowers' long range political and economic objectives. The United States would intervene in Latin America to enforce compliance with the system which sustained Washington's political and economic interests, as in Guatemala (1953), Brazil (1964) and Chile (1973). The Soviet Union would operate in a similar manner in Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968). It would be precisely when direct intervention failed, as in the case of the events which unfolded in the aftermath of the Cuban Revolution, that the boundaries established by the spheres of influence system ran the risk of becoming

²⁵ Control Council Order no. 4: Confiscation of literature and material of Nazi and militarist nature, May 13, 1946-From *Documents on Germany under Occupation*, p. 134-5

²⁶ Control Council Law no. 34: Dissolution of the Wehrmacht, August 20, 1946-From *Documents on Germany under Occupation*, p. 151-2

²⁷ Control Council Directive no. 38: the arrest and punishment of war criminals, Nazis and militarists and the internment, control and surveillance of potentially dangerous Germans, October 12, 1946- From *Documents on Germany under Occupation*, p. 168-79

²⁸ The United States would be responsible for redesigning the political framework of post-war Japan through the promulgation of a new constitution. The 1947 Constitution included provisions that transformed Japanese

blurred and prompted the risk of a systemic war. At the end of the Cold War, the concept of intervention would gain a new momentum. The Fukuyaman idea of the 'end of history', which echoes the Marxian notion of 'historical imperatives', was enshrined in the liberal credo of a 'new world order'. Intervention would also be influential in the reshaping of the post-Cold War international order according to the Washington Consensus and direct military and political involvement, as in the case of the Balkans and the Persian Gulf in the 1990s.

The intervention of the superpowers in the treatment of the German Question was crucial in the formation of a balance of power in Germany and Europe. The sphere of influence system which emerged after the war originated as the result of the pursuit of the national interest on the part of Moscow and Washington. This balance of power was primarily and decisively shaped in Germany before it became *fait accompli* in the rest of Europe.²⁹ During the war, the territorial division of Europe according to spheres of influence was discussed at length at inter-Allied level. During the early stages of the war, the Soviets did not want to press the Western Allies too hard on territorial issues. During the Anglo-Soviet Treaty discussions in London in May 1942, the Soviets agreed to a compromise proposal for the withdrawal from the Baltic region. In place of a secret agreement by which the British were to support Soviet claims to Romanian annexations, the Soviets asked only that Britain recognise the special interests of the Soviet Union in Romania and Finland. With Germany still ravaging the Soviet Union, the war effort took priority over territorial concerns and

society and the country's position in the international order; notably, article 9, which to this day states that the 'Japanese people renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation'.

²⁹ Interestingly, the concept of spheres of influence was mentioned in the Ribbentrop-Molotov Treaty of 1939.

Stalin instructed Molotov to sign the Anglo-Soviet Treaty, which omitted all references to territorial boundaries.³⁰

At the Teheran Conference, with the German Army already in retreat in the Eastern Front, Stalin reversed his position on the Baltic region. The Western powers tacitly acknowledged the legitimacy of Soviet territorial claims over Poland.³¹ In October 1944 Churchill met Stalin in Moscow. Both leaders agreed that Bulgaria and Romania were to be areas largely under Soviet influence and that Greece would fall into the British sphere of influence. Britain and the Soviet Union were to equally share control in Yugoslavia and Hungary. In spite of Churchill's assurances to Hull that this was only applicable to war conditions, both statesmen understood that it represented a political division of the Balkans.³² With both the Anglo-American military forces and the Red Army deep into Europe (from Normandy to Poland) the new political reality, enshrined in the 'Percentages Agreement' and confirmed at the Yalta Conference, laid down the prospect of a Soviet Eastern Europe and the possibility of US interventionism in Western Europe.

After the war, the Allies operated on the premise of a spheres of influence system. During 1945-6 the situation in Central and Eastern Europe was evolving toward sovietisation. However, Washington refrained from making any concerted efforts to prevent the imposition of Communist rule in Eastern Europe. The spheres of influence system in Germany (demarcated by the zones of occupation) became a 'peace of sorts' which informed inter-Allied relations in the international political system at large. The United States was

³⁰ Neumann, W., *Making The Peace*, p. 34

³¹ Neumann, W., *Making The Peace*, p. 67-8

³² Neumann, W., *Making The Peace*, p. 76

prepared to let Central and Eastern Europe be a part of the Soviet sphere and focused its efforts on reconstituting Western Europe.³³

Developments in Germany, where the Allies undertook an assiduous diplomatic and legal engagement, reassured all parties concerned of each other's aims and intentions in a tangible manner. The occupation of Germany created demarcation lines for the enforcement of the superpowers' national interest. A successful enforcement of those interests in Germany would provide the superpowers with the opportunity to expand and maintain their spheres of influence elsewhere in Europe.

The balance of power created during the 1943-8 period differed from previous attempts by great powers to organise the international political system. The spheres of influence system was sustained by two superpowers which had overwhelming capabilities to marshal the international political system without the need to engage in delicate multipolar alliances. Unlike the great powers of the Concert of Europe in the nineteenth century, the superpowers had the capacity to act unilaterally in their sphere of interests. Therefore, the emerging balance of power was more likely to fall apart because of internal rather than systemic causes.³⁴ The war in Europe created an opening for the permanent involvement of the United States in European affairs. In the space of 24 months after the end of the war, the United States succeeded in the task of politically emasculating Germany and in the creation of a non-autarkic Western European bloc. Western Germany, Western Europe, Britain and Japan became politically, economically and militarily integrated with the United

³³ See Lundestad, G., *The American Non-Policy Towards Eastern Europe 1943-1947*, (Tromsø, Oslo, Bergen: Universitetsforlaget) (1978)

³⁴ See Waltz, K., *Theory of International Relations*.

States during the Cold War. This placed the United States in a position of advantage in relation to the Soviet Union. Both the United States and its Allies in the stronghold parts of the world benefited from this relationship. Conversely, the Soviet Union, forced to fight a war of national survival against Nazi Germany, was compelled to create a defensive sphere of influence almost exclusively in the heartland of Europe relying on the political and military coercion of the relatively poor countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

The failure of the Moscow CFM of 1947 in achieving economic unity for occupied Germany would be the catalyst in the consolidation of a Western policy, centered around the economic recovery of the Anglo-American zones. This policy would have a significant impact on the fate of Western Europe. Any success in the economic recovery of Bizonia was linked to the implementation of the ERP and the supply of German mineral resources to its neighbours. The Soviet Union, fearing encirclement by the West, construed the failure to achieve an agreement on German economic unity at the Moscow CFM as an opportunity to consolidate its own bloc.

The diplomatic breakdown at the Moscow CFM in 1947 enabled the Allies to pursue their long range objectives in Germany and Europe without constraints. Allied agreement at Moscow would have restored German unity. A united Germany would have enabled the possible emergence of a tripolar world, and the retreat of the United States and the Soviet Union into a less prominent position in the international political system. This would have signified a reversal of the 'grand design' envisaged by both superpowers. The Moscow CFM is another example of direct intervention by the superpowers in the making of the post-war international order. In this context, the policy of diplomatic breakdown *was* the policy of bloc-formation. By the time the Allies met at Moscow, the containment mindset prevailed in

the US delegation. The Red Army was making sure that the area under its control adopted the political and economic policies dictated by Moscow. More importantly, Bizonia and the sovietisation of the Eastern zone ensured that the German Question could not be divorced from developments elsewhere in Europe. By accomplishing a diplomatic breakdown, the United States attained its goal of expanding the free market system of exchange through political and economic intervention. At the same time, a divided Germany reassured the Soviet Union that the former foe would not be able to exert any political influence in Central and Eastern Europe.

This balance of power system enjoyed a great deal of stability during the Cold War due to the bandwagoning of the former Western European powers into the Washington-led political and economic transnational structures.³⁵ The German Question also affected the role of the minor Western Allies, Britain and France. Faced with the loss of political and economic autonomy, the Western parts of Germany and Europe had little choice but to bandwagon into the Atlantic system of collective security imposed by the United States.

In March 1946 a memorandum produced by Ernest Bevin, British Foreign Minister, summarised Britain's aims in Germany. There were five main points: first, security from a revival of German aggression; second, reasonable economic well-being in Germany and

³⁵ Bandwagoning was coined by Quincy Wright in *A Study of War* (1942) and popularised by Kenneth Waltz in *Theory of International Politics* (1979). In the bandwagoning process, the political system of Washington's allies took second place to the economic priority attached to the 'grand design'. Spain was politically and economically isolated until 1955, when it became strategically important for the United States to foment a military presence on the Iberian peninsula, next to the Mediterranean Sea and the Strait of Gibraltar. Salazar's Portugal was the only non-democracy among the founding members of NATO in 1949, which reflected Portugal's role as an ally against communism during the Cold War. After liberation from Nazi Germany, Greece experienced an equally bitter civil war, caused by the differences that emerged between left-wing and right-wing resistance forces. Civil war began between the Democratic Army of Greece and right-wing forces which had the support of the Hellenic Army. During the 1950s and 1960s, Greece experienced a gradual and significant economic growth, aided by grants and loans by the United States through the Marshall Plan. After

Europe; third, a reduction of the British occupation costs in Germany; fourth, the creation of a democratic and Western-minded Germany; and fifth, the restriction of Soviet influence as far to the east as possible.³⁶ Disagreements with France and the Soviet Union over Germany, a dire financial situation at home and the occupation costs in Germany (which the British paid for with the money from the \$ 3.75 billion US loan) prompted Bevin, the Foreign Office and the Cabinet to press Washington for the formation of a US-led bloc, a US permanent presence in Europe and the rehabilitation of the Western zones of occupation in Germany.

French policy over Germany also contributed to the process of bandwagoning. France influenced the bloc-formation process by preventing the setting of central administrative bodies in Germany, therefore giving the other Allies leeway to pursue the organisation of Bizonia and the sovietisation of the Eastern zone. French policy on Germany during the 1944-7 period rotated around their desire for a guarantee against future German aggression. French policy was underpinned by political as well as economic considerations. Paris wanted to avoid a resurgence of the German nationalism which had prompted three invasions of its territory since 1870. France demanded that the Ruhr be severed politically and economically from the rest of Germany and placed under the control of those states that could make use of its coal, going as far as using its power of veto in the ACC and CFM to reject any proposal for German unification.³⁷ Paris' stringent policy on Germany began to shift in 1947, when the Soviet threat began to assume a more peremptory character and the German

participating with United Nations forces in the Korean conflict, Turkey, another non-democracy, joined the NATO in 1952, becoming a bulwark against Soviet expansion into the Mediterranean.

³⁶ PRO: CAB 129/9, CP (46) 156, Gen 121/1, 'The Future of Germany and the Ruhr', Ernest Bevin, 11 March 1946.

³⁷ Smyser, W.R., *From Yalta to Berlin: the Cold War Struggle over Germany*, p. 48

problem changed in nature and urgency.³⁸ By 1947 the French demand on access to German coal was met by the Western Allies, prompting the creation of the trizonal arrangement and the co-opting of France into the Washington-led bloc. The French bandwagoning signaled the end of the rivalry which plagued the international order since the late nineteenth century. With France unable to muster the political leverage to influence the international political system and Germany having surrendered its state to the Allies, the way was paved for a new order of things in Europe.

Although the process of bandwagoning meant a partial constraint on independent manoeuvring by London and Paris, the input of the minor occupation powers in the treatment of the German Question is indicative of the significance of intervention as one of the primary institutions of the Cold war international order. French policy on Germany would be crucial for the accomplishment of European integration and the Europeanisation of the German Question, as epitomised in the creation of the Common Market in 1957 and the Franco-German Treaty in 1959. The legacy of the French influence in the shaping of the role of Germany in the post-war international order would become evident in the wake of the Cold War, when the French President François Mitterrand pressed for further economic integration and the creation of a common European currency as part of the German reunification process.

The 1943-1990 system had a significant effect in the consolidation of political and economic integration in Europe. Western Europe would become more politically and economically integrated than ever before in history. This integration (sponsored and assisted by

³⁸ Schuman, R., *French Policy Towards Germany Since the War*, Lecture delivered on October 29, 1953 at the Royal

Washington) would also abolish the balance of power system within Western Europe which operated regularly since 1648. The 1943-8 period profoundly altered intra-European relations. The foreseeable demise of the British Empire led to the idea of closer economic links between Britain and Europe. The United States, fearful of the onset of another economic depression, was interested in creating the conditions for a liberal system of exchange. This provided Washington with the impetus to give political and economic sponsorship to the process of Western European integration. Fears of another encirclement by the West compelled Moscow to carve a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe and marshal a simultaneous integration process with her satellites.

With Germany deprived of any say in the realignment of the post-war international system, the integration process in Western Europe would assume the characteristics desired by Washington. A similar process would unfold beyond the Iron Curtain, with Moscow dictating the modality of Eastern European integration. The experience of the war and the possibility of military conflict between the two Europes gave meaning to the process of integration. The experience of the United States, with the tenfold expansion of state intervention in the economy since the Great Depression ³⁹ was mirrored in Western Europe, where the Welfare States were introduced and major industries nationalised. The incentive for integration in Western Europe stemmed from the political sponsorship provided by the Marshall Plan and the relative decline of France and Britain vis-à-vis the superpowers. France, Germany, Italy and the Low Countries had complex industrial networks and a geo-economic potential which facilitated their absorption into a common

Institute of International Affairs (Oxford University Press), p. 7

³⁹ See DiLorenzo, T.J., *How Capitalism Saved America-The Untold History of our Country. From the Pilgrims to the Present*, (Three Rivers Press: New York) (2004)

economic space. Integration was facilitated by the subordination of Germany to supranational institutions, the creation of an Atlantic linkage (which placed the ultimate responsibility for the security of Western Europe in the hands of Washington) and the threat posed by the Soviet Union. This transformation proved to have a lasting effect. The political and economic integration of Western Europe in the aftermath of World War Two revolved on the premises that would inform the process of absorption of East Germany and the former Soviet bloc after 1989-90. The outcome of the German Question produced a situation in which preying upon regional neighbours had become irrational. Western European civil societies would be empowered to constrain state-action. Sub-national and supranational institutions and networks became an important element in this process. The depoliticisation of Western European nationalisms, the creation of a supranational European community and, to an extent never seen before, the setting of regional interdependence as the prime source of Western European wealth, aided the process of integration.⁴⁰

The political and economic integration of Western Europe unfolded as the immediate result of the treatment of the German Question. The outcome of the German Question transcended the conflictual aspects of the Cold War, as it established a successful framework for inter-state cooperation through the transformation of Germany's position in Europe and the role of the former imperial powers in the post-war international order.

The doctrine of 'correlation of forces' informed Moscow's intervention in the formation of the balance of power. For the Soviet Union, intervention became a Rationalist tool for the attainment of vital interests. Intervention was applied in the sovietisation of Eastern Europe,

⁴⁰ Puchala, D., *Western Europe* in Jackson, R.H. and James, A., *States in a Changing World- A Contemporary Analysis*

by forcing the countries beyond the Iron Curtain to reject ERP aid, and in the isolation of Tito's Yugoslavia. The concept of 'correlation of forces' (*sootnoshenie sil*) conveys the idea of a relationship or distribution of power.⁴¹ In practical terms it entailed that if the calculation was favourable, then the appropriate tactical action would be that of advancing the Soviet cause without generating undue strategic risk.⁴² The doctrine of 'correlation of forces' played a significant part in the development of post-war Soviet strategic thought. World War Two had forced the Soviet Union to reassess her long-term strategic weaknesses. This reassessment forced the Soviet leadership to carve a sphere of influence in Germany and Europe, catapulting the country into superpower status and ensuring the accomplishment of its security goals. The Soviets worked on two different strategies simultaneously. On one hand they proclaimed the unity of Germany at the ACC and during the CFM negotiations. At the same time, they prompted the emergence of a bipolar situation in Germany by sovietising their zone of occupation, and impeding the rehabilitation of Germany as a single unit by insisting on the extraction of reparations from the Western zones. This responded to long-dated (and rather justified) fears of an anti-Soviet bloc which would include Germany.

The intervention of the superpowers in the treatment of the German Question secured the creation of a bipolar international order. The only entity strategically capable of becoming a 'third force' in the post-war international order (balancing against the Soviet Union and the United States) would have been an independent and neutral Germany. The idea of a 'third force' was toyed with in Britain and France. However, the political and economic dislocation

(Clarendon Press: Oxford) (1993), p. 76-7

⁴¹ Garthoff, R., *The Concept of the Balance of Power in Soviet Policy Making*, World Politics, October 1951, p. 88

⁴² Garthoff, R., *Soviet Military Doctrine* (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press) (1953), p. 91. For the concept of 'correlation of forces' see Hansen, J., *Correlation of Forces: Four Decades of Soviet Military Development* (Praeger

caused by the war and the looming conflict between the superpowers rendered impossible the emergence of a neutral Germany and an independent Europe.

Germany managed to integrate the economic resources of Western Europe during the Nazi period. The Nazi leaders also worked towards establishing the foundations of an autarkic and self-sufficient socio-economic system in Europe. The reconstitution of Germany as a unified autonomous unit would have entailed the withdrawal of the United States from Western Europe after the war and the possible absorption of the Central and Eastern European economies on the part of the Germans. The idea of an independent Germany was pervasive in the Soviet leadership in the 1943-8 period. Furthermore, an independent Germany would have found a rapprochement with the Soviet Union easier and more productive, as Moscow would have probably placed fewer constraints on German sovereignty, provided her security requirements were met. The Stalin Note of 1952 and Lavrentii Beria's suggestion for the reunification of Germany in 1953 are eloquent examples of the ambivalent position of the Soviet Union on the German Question.⁴³ For the superpowers, intervention in Germany became the medium by which they enforced their national interests in the wider spectrum of the post-war international order. By doing so, intervention, the instrument that facilitated the successful culmination of the war, became one of the primary institutions of the Cold War international order.

Publishers) (1987). Also, Lider, J., *Correlation of forces: an analysis of Marxist-Leninist concepts* (Gower: Aldershot) (1986)

⁴³ Soviet terms for reunification included the reestablishment of Germany as a united state within the boundaries established by the provisions of the Potsdam Conference, a single united German government to play a role in the negotiations of the peace treaty and the withdrawal of all occupation forces within one year. Following the date on which treaty came into effect, political parties and organisations were to have 'free' activity. Germany was to have its own national armed forces and would be allowed to manufacture munitions for these forces. Germany would also be given access to world markets and former members of the German armed forces and of the Nazi Party, except for convicted war criminals, could join in establishing a peaceful and democratic Germany. For an account of the Stalin Note see Steninger, R. *The German Question: The Stalin Note of 1952 and the Problem of Reunification*. (New York: Columbia University) (1990). Also, see Walko, John W..

4.3 Coexistence as a primary institution of the post-war international order

Coexistence would become the second most prominent institution of the Cold War international order. This development was brought about by the formation of a spheres of influence system, shaped through the intervention of the superpowers. The practical association formed for the purposes of the prosecution of the war against Germany, left the main Allies with the responsibility of creating an international order diametrically opposed to the ideology of the Axis and one in which Communism and Western democracy would be able to co-exist.

The duration and nature of the wartime practical association, as well as the responsibility of realigning the international political system after the war, created a situation of coexistence between the superpowers. In spite of the gradual and irreversible breakdown of the practical association framework after the war, there was no 'cognitive closure' between the Allies⁴⁴ as they were fully aware of each other's intentions and needs. The possibility of conflict was restrained by the same instruments on which the practical association framework rested during the war: international law, diplomacy and the acceptance of the spheres of influence system. Ideological diversity required the operation of a legal framework that would enable the establishment of a post-war international order based on coexistence. The nascent post-

The Balance of Empires: United States' Rejection of German Reunification and Stalin's March Note of 1952. (Universal Publishers) (2003)

⁴⁴ See Lebow, R.N. , *Between Peace and War-The Nature of International Crisis*, (The John Hopkins University Press: Baltimore) (1981)

war society of states acknowledged the need to cooperate and marshal the international order.

The ACC was the main diplomatic forum in the discussion of the issues regarding the German Question and reflected not just the divergence of interests, but also the legal and ethical dimension of the responsibilities that burdened the superpowers. The spirit of cooperation and the willingness on the part of the Allies to achieve transformation in Germany would extend to the management of the international political system. Achieving a 'peace of sorts' in regards to the most crucial element in the realignment of the post-war international order would serve to create strict demarcation lines in Europe and therefore maintain a non-disruptive international order during the Cold War.

Through the medium of the ACC, the Allies were able to debate the issues regarding the German Question on a continual basis. Notwithstanding the conflict of interests that arose out of political developments in the zones of occupation and the international political system at large, during the early period of the occupation (1945-6), the ACC accomplished the task of laying down the foundations for the social and political reorganisation of Germany by eliminating all the vestiges of the Nazi political system. As Germany underwent a process of full-blown polarisation during the 1947-8 period, the ACC passed into law a considerable number of measures which ensured the transformation of Germany. This was indicative of the spirit of cooperation between the superpowers. Measures included the repeal of Nazi legislation concerning hereditary farms, the termination of German insurance operations abroad, exchange of parcels between Berlin and the zones of occupation, a law to combat venereal disease, the liquidation of the Krupp steelworks, the abrogation of certain

provisions in the German penal law, and a law providing for interzonal exchange of printed material.⁴⁵

The ACC became the medium which facilitated an orderly passage into a bipolar arrangement for Germany before it became fully operational in Europe. The superpowers' diplomatic engagement in the management of the occupation contributed to generate a spirit of coexistence that would inform the Cold War international order. Because the Allies did not discuss the issue of a peace treaty with Germany until the Moscow CFM of 1947, the ACC took on the main diplomatic role on the German Question. The diplomatic and legal framework of the ACC had liberal aspects that would inform the shape of things to come not just in Germany but in the international order at large. It is partly due to the work done by the Allies at the ACC that a convivial spheres of influence system unfolded in Europe. The ACC represented the nucleus of an international society, for it constituted the main medium of inter-Allied diplomacy, negotiations and law-making in regards to Germany. It solidified the Rationalist legacy of the wartime period as the Allies continued to engage in the legal and diplomatic process in spite of their ideological diversity. This pattern would continue to inform the order of things in Germany and Europe, inasmuch as it would put restraints on unilateral action by the superpowers. The legal structure guiding the occupation of Germany was informed by the practical association framework established during the war. The ACC would have a transformative effect in the international order for it reduced Germany to a subordinate position and propelled a continuous show of strength between two emerging camps in a magnitude not seen elsewhere in the international political system. The Red Army established a position of dominance in the Eastern Europe countries and

⁴⁵ Clay, L., *Decision in Germany*, p. 155-6

served as a catalyst for their gradual transition into a Soviet-led bloc. Conversely, in Germany the Allies were forced, to an extent unseen elsewhere, to engage in permanent diplomacy and negotiation, because of the significance of the outcome of the German Question in the configuration of the post-war international order.

The Allied Control Council and its Coordinating Committee provided the inter-Allied occupational structure with a forum to discuss and shape policy. The ACC served as the main forum of inter-Allied occupation policy and gave a Rationalist framework to the treatment of the German Question, not only through the making of inter-Allied policy but also by creating a common cause façade which would enable the practical association to unravel within the principle of ethical cohabitation. The nature and extent of the occupation structure put in place by the Allies in Germany had no precedent in history. It denoted the Allies' willingness to work together in order to achieve a workable settlement in Germany. The complexity of the occupation structure is indicative of the importance of the German Question in the configuration of the post-war international order. The Tripartite Commissions in the liberated countries operated without the convivialism of the ACC. Unlike Germany, no other former Axis power could tip the balance of power towards any of the superpowers. The Allies agreed on the measures that would become influential in securing a permanent inter-Allied dialogue and presence in Germany. This convivialism resulted in a stalemate which would become a 'peace of sorts'.

Coexistence manifested itself in the creation of a bipolar solution for Germany and Europe. The failure of the Moscow and London CFMs served as catalysts for the consolidation of bipolar diplomacy over Germany and bloc-formation instead of a motive for all-out

confrontation. The division of Germany became a distinct possibility from the moment the war ended. Remarkably though, after the implementation of Bizonia and the gradual sovietisation of the Eastern Zone, the road to partition was paved without disruptive conflict. The unfolding of the Berlin Blockade shows how much the Western powers and the Soviet Union valued the convenience of a Rationalist unraveling of four power control in Germany. The probing by both sides was highly calculated and both preferred the embarrassment of making concessions instead of risking a full-blown conflagration. On June 25, 1948 Clay gave the order to launch a massive airlift (ultimately lasting 462 days) that flew supplies into the Western-held sectors of Berlin during 1948-1949. By the time the blockade ended on May 11, 1948, 278,228 flights were made and 2,326,406 tons of food and supplies were delivered to Berlin. Tipton points to the 'legalistic distinctions' made by both the Soviet Union and the United States in order to prevent the situation from escalating into an all-out war. The United States refused to acquiesce to Clay's request for an American military breach into Berlin. At the same time, the Soviet Union did not challenge the passage of aircraft to feed the Western sector of the city or the transfer of Berlin's legislature into the Western sector.⁴⁶ According to Shlaim, the Soviets had minimum and maximum goals in imposing the blockade; the maximum aim was to halt the formation of a West German government while the minimum aim was to carry the division of Germany to its logical conclusion by liquidating the Western enclave in Berlin. Shlaim also argues that Soviet behaviour during the crisis was very cautious as at no point did Moscow intend to replace political pressure with military action.⁴⁷ The Berlin Blockade, the hottest confrontation

⁴⁶ Tipton, F. B., *A History of Modern Germany Since 1815*, (University of California Press: Berkeley and Los Angeles) (2003) p. 505

⁴⁷ Shlaim A., *The partition of Germany and the origins of the Cold War*, p.134-5. For an account of the Berlin Blockade see Miller R. G., *To save a city: the Berlin airlift, 1948-1949* (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press) (2000), Shlaim, A., *The United States and the Berlin Blockade, 1948-1949: a study in crisis decision-making*, (Berkeley:

between the Allies over Germany thus far, is an example of political brinkmanship which allows us to conclude that while the superpowers were willing to enforce their national interest with regard to the German Question, they were extremely cautious in avoiding a systemic conflict.

The process of polarisation occurred within the context of continued diplomatic engagement. The bipolar outcome reached in Germany did not stop the process of diplomatic engagement on the issues pertaining to the international political system at large. This differed significantly from the attitude taken by the Allies at Casablanca regarding the Nazi regime. When the conflict intensified, as during the Berlin Blockade, none of the superpowers called for 'unconditional surrender'. This implied a principle of recognition and convivialism which provided legitimacy to the nascent international political system. Soviet ambitions of a foothold in Germany and Eastern Europe did not completely contradict the American objective of a liberal economic order and the creation of a sphere of influence responsive to the pursuit of its national interest in Germany and Western Europe. The creation of Bizonia and the Western bloc were not designed to prevent the Soviet Union from establishing an East German state or securing a foothold in Eastern Europe but rather to solidify the continuation of the policies that created the wartime expansion of the American economy.

Superpower interaction concocted a stalemate in the epicenter and shifted the flash points to the periphery. As the possibility of disruptive conflict was seen as 'irrational', the Cold War

University of California Press)(1982), Gottlieb., M., *The German peace settlement and the Berlin crisis*, (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Inc) (1960) and Davison, W. P., *The Berlin blockade: a study in Cold War politics*, (Princeton: University Press) (1958)

would be mostly fought with a symbolic perspective in mind and restrained by the same instruments on which the practical association framework was laid down in 1943-5: law, diplomacy and the acceptance of the balance of power system.

4.4 Conclusion

The establishment of intervention and coexistence as primary institutions of the Cold War emerged as the result of the interaction between rationality, conflict and cooperation. These institutions were responsible for shaping post-war international society in a 'pluralist plus' manner. The nature of the systemic cataclysm that descended upon Europe and Asia during 1939-1945 resulted in the interventionist drive of the two superpowers and the subsequent need to co-exist in order to marshal their respective spheres of influence effectively. This interpretation constitutes a *via media* between the centrality given to intervention by the solidarists and its rejection by the pluralist camp. In effect, the interventionism exercised by the superpowers in the treatment of the German Question and the creation of the post-war international order constituted a 'selfish solidarism' which responded to their national interest, but also to the need to achieve a significant modicum of co-existence.

The English School acknowledges the input of the great powers as one of the central elements of equilibrium in the international political system.⁴⁸ For the superpowers, Germany became the test tube for the realignment of the post-war international order. The complexity of the issues involved in the German Question compelled them to engage in an intense diplomatic intercourse and created the overriding need to co-operate in order to

reconstitute the society of states.⁴⁹ Their overwhelmingly powerful position enabled them to steer the course of events after the war in an interventionist manner. The post-war international order would have taken a different shape if France, Germany and Britain would have emerged from the war in a more solid political and financial position. The United States and the Soviet Union, by exploiting their preponderance as great powers, gave direction to the German Question by organising Western unity and consolidating a Soviet bloc.⁵⁰ Their massive capabilities made possible the subordination of Germany and Europe to their long range objectives and prevented the possibility of a system-disrupting war. The formation of Bizonia, the establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany and the creation of Western/Atlantic institutions came about as the result of the overwhelming power of the United States, which succoured the frail European powers, reorganised the Western zone of occupation in Germany and bound Western Europe together under common institutions. At the same time, the intervention of the Soviet Union in the war effort as well as the organisation of the Eastern zone of occupation consolidated the bipolar outcome.

Bull argues that diplomacy can play no role where foreign policy is conceived as the enforcement of a claim to universal authority or as the pursuit of self-regarding interests that take no account of the interests of others.⁵¹ In this context, the primary institutions of intervention and coexistence were influential in determining the outcome of the German Question and in the creation of a new constitutional arrangement for the society of states. The overlapping between intervention and coexistence became the characteristic feature of

⁴⁸ See Bull, *The Anarchical Society*. Also Wight, M., *Power Politics*.

⁴⁹ See Fox, W. T.R., *The Super-Powers: The United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union-their responsibility for peace*, (Harcourt, Brace & Co.: New York) (1944)

⁵⁰ Bull H., *The Anarchical Society*, p. 205-7

⁵¹ Bull, H., *The Anarchical Society*, p. 170-1

the Cold War international order. The Cold War was informed by the principle of 'selfish intervention', which meant the possibility of superpower involvement in specific areas of interests. This created a scope for coexistence and hindered the likelihood of systemic disruption. Intervention and coexistence would survive as 'primary institutions' of the society of states following the aftermath of the Cold War. Intervention remains a solid institution of the post-Cold War international order, as seen in the case of the US-led invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq following the aftermath of 9/11. At the same time, the principle of coexistence which unfolded after the collapse of the Berlin Wall seems to have a 'Cold War' element attached to it. The United States and its European allies are willing to co-exist with other political systems that do not threaten their economic and political interests, as seen in the case of China. The assessment of the role of primary institutions from the perspective of the treatment of the German Question therefore gives us the chance to better understand how these operate according to particular historical trends. It is in this dimension that the English School scholarship enhances the debate on the origins of the Cold War.

Chapter 5

The treatment of the German Question: the Revolutionist context

5.1 The concept of 'revolutionism' in the treatment of the German Question

The legacy of the wartime practical association provided the framework for the transformation of Germany and the international order. World War Two had confronted different ideologies in the quest to reconfigure the international order. In this struggle, the Soviet Union and the Western Allies forged an associative framework based on the tolerance of ideological diversity. This entailed the prospect of a post-war international order which would have to accommodate Soviet and American aspirations and therefore be based on a system of co-existence. The Axis had launched a systemic war under the pretences of organising Europe and East Asia into a self-sufficient bloc. This idea attracted the support of European political parties willing to collaborate with the Nazis, as in the case of the Rexist movement in Belgium and Mussert's Holland, as well as many ordinary Europeans disillusioned with the drawbacks of liberal democracy during the interwar years. However, the Nazi New Order was at its best politically and economically vague and at its worst a program based on racial domination and extermination, and the economic exploitation and political subjugation of the occupied states.¹ The very nature of the quest for the mastery of the international order propelled the Allies to think about world governance and international organisation in an unprecedented manner in the history of the society of states.

¹ See Mazower, M., *Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Century*, (London: Allen Lane) (1998) ch. 5

As I have outlined in chapter 1, the Rationalist framework of the Atlantic Charter and the Declaration of the United Nations provided with the legal instruments to carry forward political, economic and social reform. It also conveyed the Allies' intention to implement it after the war. During the war, the Allies discussed the issue of international organisation at length. At the Quebec Conference of August 1943, a draft four power declaration on post-war organisation established the legal foundations for an international organisation open to membership for every nation. The Quebec declaration provided that until the establishment of such organisation, consultation would be used to deal with all problems, including the surrender, disarmament and occupation of the enemy countries.² In Moscow, on October 1943, the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union and China agreed on the establishment of a 'general international organisation, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states... for the maintenance of international peace and security'.³

Great power intervention would become one of the main institutions of the post-war international order. At the Yalta Conference, the Allies agreed on the establishment of a Security Council and an international organisation for the maintenance of international peace and security. The San Francisco Conference of 1945 established a sophisticated system of organisation for the society of states. In addition to this, the CFM system provided the Allies with the opportunity to discuss matters pertaining to the reconfiguration of the international order.

² Neumann, W., *Making The Peace*, p. 55

³ Snell, J. (Ed), *The Meaning of Yalta*, p. 16

Claude argues that international organisation may be looked upon as a process of initiating steps in the direction of world government.⁴ International organisation is the typical expression of liberalism in the realm of international relations, based upon the assumption of the harmonisation of the interests of states.⁵ Although the superpowers had divergent interests regarding the post-war international order, the nature of the German Question demanded the establishment of institutions aimed at preventing a repeat of the disruption that unfolded in the international political system in the 1930s and 1940s. The institutionalisation of post-war international society was facilitated by the increasing number of international organisations and regimes established in the post-war period such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (1957), the World Meteorological Organisation (1950), the International Maritime Organisation (1948), the World Health Organisation (1948) and the Food and Agriculture Organisation (1945).

In addition, the experience of World War Two entailed the construction of an international order based on an ethical and socially-minded paradigm.⁶ The Cold War international political system had as one of its main characteristics the entrenchment of economic planning. The emergence of government intervention in the economy arose as a result of the depression of the 1930s, war dislocation and the Soviet experience of successful economic planning. Polanyi argues that 'the conflict between the market and the elementary requirements of an organised social life provided the [twentieth] century with its dynamics and produced the typical strains... which ultimately destroyed that society'.⁷ Polanyi highlights the 'disruptive strains' of unemployment, tension of classes, pressure on exchanges and imperialist rivalries as the instruments which brought about the authoritarian

⁴ Claude I., *Swords into Ploughshares*, p. 8-11

⁵ Claude I., *Swords into Ploughshares*, p. 13

⁶ Freedman, M., *The New Liberalism : an ideology of social reform*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press) (1978), p. 39-40

‘impasse’ that put an end to laissez-faire capitalism.⁸ The Great Depression had brought devastating consequences for the American economy. Gross national product had fallen by 1933 to half of its 1929 level. US Businesses invested only \$ 3 billion in 1933, compared to \$ 24 billion in 1929. Unemployment reached 25% of the American workforce in 1933. To aggravate matters, during the 1930s, 100,000 Americans applied for jobs in the burgeoning economy of the Soviet Union.⁹ The American policies in regards to the reorganisation of the international economy were imbued by the experience of the New Deal. Government intervention at home signified government intervention abroad. This would be reflected in the sponsoring of the economic reconstruction of Western Europe and in the creation of the financial institutions aimed at regulating multilateral trade.

The social liberalism which had taken root in America and Britain in the 1930s and 1940s brought the West closer to the Communist ideals of the Soviet Union through the adoption of economic planning and the participation of government in the overall running of the economy. Britain, caught in a process precipitated by the hardships brought by the war, had also taken the road to a more centralised economy and the setting of a Welfare State. With the antecedent of the New Liberalism of Herbert Asquith and Lloyd George, Britain started to implement the recommendations proposed by Sir William Beveridge in his ‘Social Insurance and Allied Services Report’, published in 1942.

The treatment of the German Question brought an extra dimension to this process of transformation. The extent of the influence of Nazism on German society has been

⁷ Polanyi, K., *The Great Transformation* (Beacon Press: Boston, MA) (1957), p. 249

⁸ Polanyi, K., *The Great Transformation*, p. 209

⁹ Kennedy, D., *Freedom from Want-The American People in Depression and War 1929-1945* (Oxford University Press: Oxford and New York) (1999), p. 163-4

discussed at length by various historians, leading to a spectrum of opinions ranging from Marxist perspectives, which emphasise a strengthening of class structures within German society, to that of liberal historians who claim that the modernisation which took place in Nazi Germany, along with a change in 'subjective social reality', attests to the fact that a revolution of class and status occurred during the 1930s and 1940s. Although there is evidence of social continuation throughout the regime, general historiographical consensus leans towards the latter of these two arguments.¹⁰ This revolution at home had profound implications for the international order. The revisionist drive imposed on German society by the Hitlerite regime had its apogee in the mobilisation of the German nation for 'total war'.

¹¹ The task which fell upon the Allies in the transformation of Germany was therefore of a revolutionist nature. Although the revolutionism that informed the treatment of the German Question adhered to the pursuit of the national interest on the part of the United States and the Soviet Union, the need to transform the international political system necessitated a revolution in the German political system. The economic 'grand design' which guided US policy, along with the security concerns of the Soviet Union, dictated the elimination of the doctrine that disrupted the international order in the 1930s and 1940s. In that context, denazification would entail not only the punishment of the main leaders of the Nazi regime, but most importantly; a reorientation of German society that would facilitate the creation of an international order conducive to attainment of the goals set down by Moscow and

¹⁰ See Burleigh, Michael, *The Third Reich: A New History*, (New York: 2000), Childers, T. and J Caplan (eds.), *Re-evaluating the Third Reich*, (New York: 1993), Frei, N., *National Socialist Rule in Germany: The Fuhrer State 1933-1945*, (Oxford, 1993), Kershaw, I., *The Hitler Myth: Image and reality in the Third Reich* in Crew, D., (ed.) *Nazism and German Society 1933-1945*, (London) (1994), Kershaw, I., *The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation*, (London) (2000), Lambert, P. 'German Historians and Nazi ideology: The Parameters of the Volksgemeinschaft and the Problems of Historical Legitimation', *European History Quarterly* 25, 1995. pp. 555-82, Overy, R.J. 'Class and Community in the Third Reich', *Historical Journal* 22, 1979, pp.493-503 and Peukert, D J K., *Inside Nazi Germany: Conformity, Opposition and Racism in Everyday Life*, (London) (1987)

Washington. In this chapter I will look at the denazification of Germany and its influence on the post-war international order, paying particular attention to the work of the ACC in the process of political transformation, the legal precedent set by the International Military Tribunal (IMT) and the policies implemented at zonal level on political, educational and cultural reform.

5.2 The denazification of Germany

The Nazi period in Germany represented a cataclysm which engulfed the whole international political system. Nazism revolved around the concept of the *Volk* as a political idea which superseded that of the State. Hitler had peculiar ideas as to what constituted a *Volk*.¹² He understood the German Volk not as a Race, but as a medley of 'racial kernels'.¹³ Hitler's dream of a master race (*Herrenvolk*) dominated his geopolitical vision. The conduct of Germany during the war derived to a considerable extent from the Führer's racist thought. Racism was not restricted to Nazi Germany. The United States and Britain had the experience of an Empire based on racial exceptionalism. Both nations had fought the war with segregated armies.

¹¹ In his speech of February 18, 1943, Joseph Goebbels, Reich's Minister for Propaganda, stated that 'the world no longer has the choice between falling back into its old fragmentation or accepting a new order for Europe under Axis leadership. The only choice now is between living under Axis protection or in a Bolshevist Europe'.

¹² The background of Hitler's anti-Jewish stance is abundantly documented. In his letter to Herr Gemlich of September 16, 1919 he states that 'Rational anti-semitism, by contrast, must lead to a systematic and legal struggle against, and eradication of, the privileges the Jews enjoy over the other foreigners living among us (Alien Laws). Its final objective, however, must be the total removal of all Jews from our midst'. Point 4 of the Programme of the NSDAP, drafted by Hitler, and Anton Drexler on February 24, 1920 stated that 'only members of the nation may be citizens of the State. Only those of German blood, whatever be their creed, may be members of the nation. Accordingly, no Jew may be a member of the nation'. In his *Political Testament* he states that 'It is untrue that I or anyone else in Germany wanted war in 1939. It was wanted and provoked solely by international statesmen either of Jewish origin or working for Jewish interests'. These documents were accessed at www.hitler.org

¹³ Lukacs, J., *The Hitler of History-Hitler's Biographers on Trial*, p. 123

Nevertheless, Nazism was informed by race to the extent of making it impossible to achieve political accommodation with the national communities conquered through the campaign in the Eastern Front or to work together with them on a legal and diplomatic framework for the creation of a Nazi-orientated post-war international order. The assault on the international order by the Nazi regime was informed by a strong racialist view. Fischer points out that according to Hitler, the German Volk had to reproduce itself more rapidly than the 'lesser races'. This required the search for vital space (*Lebensraum*).¹⁴

During the 1930s Nazi Germany had marched into the demilitarised Rhineland, occupied by French and Belgian forces, and embarked on an irredentist crusade by invading Austria, the Sudetenland and the whole of Czechoslovakia, before launching a war of aggression on Western and Eastern Europe. In chapter 2, I have outlined the possible implications of an autarkic economic system in Europe and its potential danger for the United States and the British Empire. Although American private interests contributed to the buttressing of the Nazi war economy in the 1930s, the long term interests of the Allies would have been severely affected by the continuation of the Third Reich. In this context, denazification meant transforming Germany from its irredentist and challenging nature in order to ensure the establishment of a non-disruptive post-war society of states.

The denazification of Germany entailed the creation of an environment conducive to securing the long range interests of the superpowers. These interests, while divergent from an economic perspective, found common ground on political aspects. Germany had to be subordinated politically in order to enforce the 'grand design' schemes that the United States and the Soviet Union had in mind for the post-war international order. The superpowers

¹⁴ Fischer, K., *Storia della Germania Nazista-Nascita e decadenza del Terzo Reich* (Newton and Compton: Rome)

achieved a discontinuity with Nazism by applying interventionist elements. This process unfolded within the diplomatic and legal framework that sustained the wartime alliance. It was due to this *modus operandi* that the transformation of Germany through denazification was successfully implemented and impacted positively on the post-war international order. The common aim of the Allies was to eliminate the Nazi ideology in order to prevent the disruptive resurgence of a politically independent Germany. According to Leffler, there were close similarities between Soviet and US policy regarding Germany. For the United States, a unified Germany was only imaginable if it were to be integrated into the Western system. A neutralised Germany, exposed to Soviet influence, was unthinkable in 1945 because the reconstruction of Europe, one of America's prominent aims, depended on access to the German market and raw materials. Soviet policy rested on the vision that a united Germany could only be possible if the Soviet Union maintained a decisive influence through the issue of reparations, co-determination of Ruhr affairs and Communist representation in all institutions.¹⁵ As we will see in chapter 6, the pursuit of these interests would have a transformative effect on the post-war international order, as they entailed the political subjugation of Germany to the long range policies of the superpowers.

For the Allies, discontinuity with Nazism ensured that Germany would be rid of the ideology that subverted the international order since the 1930s. The process of denazification was geared towards eliminating Nazism as a legitimate political movement and as a doctrine representing the aspirations of Germany in the society of states.

The reformation of the German political system had been something that the Allies fully agreed on since the Declaration of Unconditional Surrender at Casablanca in 1943. At Yalta,

(2001), p. 454-5

the Allies decided to provide safeguards against a potential military revival of Germany, to eradicate German militarism and the Nazi general staff, to bring about the denazification of Germany, to punish the war criminals and to disarm and demilitarise Germany.¹⁶ The provisions agreed upon at Potsdam implied great changes in German society as well as its political system. The number of Germans who belonged to the Nazi Party had reached 13 million by the end of the war. Resistance to Hitlerism lacked concrete support. Unlike 1918, when the Russians hoped for a revolution in Germany and the Entente Powers acted in defence of German society as they had found it,¹⁷ the superpowers agreed on the need to bring about profound changes in Germany. The Potsdam Agreement called for 'the complete disarmament and demilitarisation of Germany and the elimination or control of all German industry that could be used for military production', the destruction of the 'National Socialist Party and its affiliated and supervised organisations' and 'the eventual reconstruction of German political life'.¹⁸

The legal framework established during the war stated the unanimous and unambiguous will of the Allies to reform what they perceived as the militaristic, warlike disposition of Germany, and its potential to disrupt the international political system. It was in the Allies' interest to demilitarise the character of German society and make it receptive to the kind of international order desired by the superpowers. The Western Allies achieved this aim by setting up political and economic foundations akin to liberal democracy and free market economics. The Soviets accomplished the objective of denazifying Germany by implementing socialistic measures that were directed against the big landowners and captains

¹⁵ Leffler, M., *The Struggle for Germany and the Origins of the Cold War*, p. 5-6

¹⁶ Proektor, D., 'The Yalta Conference and the German Problem' in Iakovlev, A. N., *The Yalta Conference 1945: lessons of history* (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency) (1985), p. 129

¹⁷ Davidson, B., *Germany: What Now ?- Potsdam 1945-Partition 1949*, p. 19-20

of industry who supported Hitler's rise to power and its war of aggression on the international order.

The first instrument of denazification was the work done by the ACC. The ACC was responsible for the passage of measures that facilitated the denazification of German society. On September, 20 1945 the ACC abolished 'all German land, naval and air forces, the SS, SA, SD, Gestapo... and associations which serve to keep alive the military tradition in Germany'. Furthermore, the proclamation established that 'the National Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP) would be 'abolished and declared to be illegal'.¹⁹ On October 10, 1945 the ACC liquidated the 'National Socialist German Labour Party, its formations, affiliated associations and supervised agencies, including paramilitary organisations and all other Nazi institutions established as instruments of party domination'.²⁰ ACC Proclamation no. 3 of October 20, 1945 established the fundamental principles of judicial reform, stipulating equality before the law, regardless of 'race, nationality or religion', that 'no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law', the liquidation of the extraordinary Hitler Courts and the independence of the judiciary. Law no. 4 provided for the reorganisation of the German judicial system. This reorganisation included the reintroduction of the Weimar legal system and the dismissal of judges and prosecutors who had taken part in the punitive practices of the Hitlerite regime.²¹ On November 30, 1945, the Allies agreed on the elimination and prohibition of military training

¹⁸ Section II (a), Protocol of the Proceedings-Postdam Conference, August 1, 1945-<http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/decade/decade17.htm>

¹⁹ Control Council proclamation no. 2: certain additional requirements imposed on Germany, September 20, 1945-From *Documents on Germany under Occupation*, p. 68-79

²⁰ Control Council Law no.2: providing for the termination and liquidation of the Nazi organizations, October 10, 1945-From *Documents on Germany under Occupation*, p. 79-81

²¹ Control Council Proclamation no. 3: fundamental principles of judicial reform, October 10, 1945-From *Documents on Germany under Occupation*, p. 81-2

as well as 'all military educational institutions'.²² On December 20, 1945, the ACC established the guidelines to be applied for the punishment of people guilty of war crimes. In the same vein, ACC Directive no. 24 of January 12, 1946 ordered the removal from office and from positions of responsibility of Nazis and persons hostile to Allied purposes. Persons were to be treated as 'more than nominal participants in Party Activities' and as 'hostile to Allied purposes' in cases when they 'authorised or participated affirmatively in any Nazi crimes, racial persecutions or discriminations', 'been avowed believers in Nazism or racial and militaristic creeds', or 'voluntarily given substantial moral or material support or political assistance of any kind to the Nazi Party or Nazi officials and leaders'.²³

ACC Directive no. 32 of June 26, 1946 stated that any 'member of the administrative or teaching staff of any educational institution who in any way whatsoever spreads or assists in spreading or connives at spreading militaristic, Nazi or anti-democratic doctrines will be dismissed from such institutions.' ACC Directive no. 38 ordered the arrest and punishment of war criminals, Nazis and militarists, and the internment, control and surveillance of potentially dangerous Germans, with explicit reference to the Potsdam Agreement and supplementary ACC directives.²⁴ On February 25, 1947 Control Council Law no. 46 abolished the State of Prussia, a decision confirmed during the Moscow CFM of 1947. The Allies established the principle that the symbolism enshrined in the survival of the Prussian state had no place in a reconstituted Germany. The British representative in the ACC stated that

²² Control Council Law no. 8: elimination and prohibition of military training, November 30, 1945-From *Documents on Germany under Occupation*, p. 90-3

²³ Control Council Law no. 10: Punishment of persons guilty of war crimes, crimes against peace and against humanity, December 20, 1945-From *Documents on Germany under Occupation*, p. 97-107

The survival of the Prussian state...would provide the basis for any irredentist claims which the German people may later seek to put forward, would strengthen the German militarist ambitions, and would encourage the revival of the authoritarian, centralised Germany. ²⁵

Directive no. 54 of 25 June 1947 established the basic Principles for the Democratisation of Education in Germany, which included 'equal education opportunity for all' and free of charge provision of 'tuition, textbooks and other necessary scholastic material...for pupils of compulsory school age'. This assistance was extended to pupils of other educational institutions, including universities. The directive also established that 'compulsory full-time school attendance should be required for all [children] between the ages of six and at least fifteen'. It also set the foundations for a clear path to tertiary education, emphasising the need for 'education for civic responsibility and a democratic way of life' and 'understanding of and respect for other nations'. ²⁶

The work of the ACC was undertaken within a strong liberal framework. ²⁷ The passing and enforcement of legislation outlawing Nazism from German political life would have a transformative effect on the post-war international order as both the Federal and Democratic German republics adopted similar measures in regards to the safeguard of basic

²⁴ Control Council Directive no. 32: Disciplinary measures against managing and administrative staffs of educational institutions, teaching staff, and students guilty of militaristic, nazi, or anti-democratic propaganda, June 26, 1946-From *Documents on Germany under Occupation*, p. 142

²⁵ ACC Coordinating Committee-Abolition of the State of Prussia-Memorandum of the British member, August 8, 1946-FO 631/2454, p. 1

²⁶ From ACC Directive no. 54, June 25, 1947- *Documents on Germany under Occupation 1945-54*, p. 233-4

²⁷ Kant states that 'the only constitution...on which all juridical legislation of a people must be based, is the republican. This constitution is established, firstly, by principles of the freedom of the members of a society (as men); secondly, by principles of dependence of all upon a single common legislation (as subjects); and, thirdly, by the law of their equality (as citizens).' See Kant, I., *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch*, section 2-<http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/kant/kant1.htm>

civil liberties.²⁸ Moreover, the two Germanys adopted a bandwagoning position vis-à-vis the superpowers rather than reconstructing themselves as revisionist forces. This position would entail that up until the 1970s, changes in the status quo leading up to the rapprochement between the two Germanys were discussed in adherence to the rules established by the occupying powers.

The second instrument of denazification was the work done at zonal level by the Allies on educational and cultural reform and the implementation of the denazification tribunals. The need to accomplish a discontinuity with Nazism in Germany propelled the Allies to ensure that the occupied country would be rid of the ideology that subverted the international political system since the 1930s.

US policy on educational and cultural reform evolved from reeducation to reorientation. Reorientation brought with it a new emphasis to end denazification. At the same time, the American occupation authorities established cultural and educational interchange networks and reopened the Free University of Berlin. There are a number of important measures which aided this process of reorientation. SWNCC 269/8, which received official acceptance on October 24, 1946, permitted the exchange of persons between Germany and the United States. In February 1947 SWNCC 269/10 was issued in order to regulate the interchange of cultural and educational material between the two countries. In July 1947 it was modified by SWNCC 269/11, to allow exchange between Germans in the US Zone with other countries.

²⁸ The Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Germany provided for the protection of the 'inalienable rights to its citizens' (articles 6-49). The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany included similar provisions (Articles 1-21)

Re-education was undertaken with the view to prevent a recurrence of aggression rather than to remould the German consciousness.³⁰ Cultural reform was undertaken through the broadcasting of the American way of life in Youth Centres and the *Amerika Haus* network, also known as US Information Centres.³¹ The Psychological Warfare Division of SHAEF and the Information Control Division of the US Zone of occupation resorted to informational and educational means such as the press, radio, books, pictures, schools and the churches.³² Willett opines that re-education was not as potent as the method of 'ideological reproduction taking place as a consequence of the free market economy, and the unrestricted operation of American business and the mass media'.³³

The Education Branch of the US zone was pivotal in restoring school buildings, selecting educators and textbooks, and removing Nazis from the teaching staff. By the end of 1945 1,849,206 children were in school. A revival of pre-1933 youth organisations took place. As rapidly as faculties were screened, high schools and universities, which received US technical assistance, were built.³⁴

On July 1945 the US occupation authorities licensed the first German newspaper, the *Frankfurter Rundschau*, with a circulation of 741,500, published three times a week by refugees of the Hitler regime. During 1945, information libraries were created in Frankfurt, Munich and Berlin, supplying the German people with books and periodicals and portraying the American way of life. In October 1946 DANA (later renamed DENA), the news service

²⁹ Trent, J., *Mission on the Rhine*, p. 258

³⁰ Willett, R., *The Americanization of Germany 1945-1949*, p. 16

³¹ Willett, R., *The Americanization of Germany 1945-1949*, p. 17-20

³² Clay, L., *Decision in Germany* (William Heinemann Ltd.: Melbourne, London, Toronto) (1950), p. 281-2

³³ Willett, R., *The Americanization of Germany 1945-1949*, p. 27

³⁴ Clay, L., *Decision in Germany*, p. 299

of the American zone, was created by the Military Government and modelled by Associated Press. In April 1946 a second newspaper was licensed in Frankfurt, re-establishing a competitive press in the US Zone for the first time.³⁵

The US Zone issued a denazification directive on July 7, 1945 establishing that all high-level civil servants who joined the Nazi party before May 1, 1937 were to be removed from office. In addition, the Handbook for the Military Government in Germany contained a list of 136 'mandatory removal and exclusion categories'. OMGUS Law no. 8, issued on September 6, 1945 and ACC Directive no. 24 of January 12, 1946, signed by all four Allied powers, expanded the categories of persons subject to the denazification program.³⁶

In August 1945, the US Military governor granted an amnesty from all denazification proceedings to persons born after January 1, 1919. On November 5, 1945, during the fourteenth meeting of the Länderrat in Stuttgart, Clay expressed satisfaction with the German denazification tribunals. On Christmas Day, an amnesty was granted to all those with incomes of less than RM 3,600 during the Nazi era and taxable property valued below RM 20,000.³⁷

The Law for Liberation from National Socialism and Militarism was finally passed on March 5, 1946, in response to the need to expedite matters in the context of the new political realities of the nascent international order. The law established a distinction between major and minor offenders, followers and those exonerated. All persons over the age of eighteen were required to fill out questionnaires (*Fragebogen*) to determine their classification. 545 tribunals (*Spruchkammer*) and appeal courts employing 22,000 people implemented these

³⁵ Clay, L., *Decision in Germany*, p. 282-4

³⁶ Merrit, *Democracy Imposed*, p. 181-2

directives. On July 11, 1947, JCS directive 1779 took effect, marking a change in US policy on Germany. US policy goals thus shifted from a punitive occupation of Germany to a 'more liberal' policy, allowing the occupied zone to create 'a self-sustaining economy' and providing Germans with the opportunity to express greater political initiative. The amendment of JCS 1067 meant that denazification had to be terminated, as German cooperation was needed in order to implement the ERP. In October 1947 OMGUS asked the German Länder to amend the Law for Liberation from National Socialism and Militarism for the sake of accomplishing a more expeditious treatment of the subject.³⁸ The Länderrat passed a new amendment on March 25, 1948. OMGUS reported 28,065 'hard-core' cases to be tried but the Länderrat amendments pushed the issue to the margins.³⁹

The aims of British occupational policy in Germany were to induce 'responsible government, federation of Germany and European partnership' and for Germany never to be able to launch another war of aggression. The initial aims of the military government were for re-education to go hand in hand with the prevention of an economic collapse and the de-prussianisation of Germany.⁴⁰ Marshall argues that the British approach to the occupation was 'technical' rather than political when it came to the establishment of political life. The occupation authorities did not believe in democracy from the bottom upwards without political content.⁴¹

The British approach to educational reform was to seek early personal contacts with German teachers and to encourage exchange programmes. Like the US occupation authorities,

³⁷ Merrit, *Democracy Imposed*, p. 183

³⁸ Eisenberg, C.W., *Drawing the line: the American decision to divide Germany, 1944-1949*, p. 373

³⁹ Eisenberg, C.W., *Drawing the line*, p. 374

⁴⁰ Turner, I. (Ed.), *Reconstruction in Post-War Germany*, p. 4-6

Britain attempted to restrict church control over schools, to expand primary education and to oppose any reintroduction of school fees. Their efforts were largely unsuccessful, since the reactionary elements within their zones soon gained political influence in the shape of the newly founded Christian Democratic Union (CDU).⁴² Initially, teachers were dismissed in the most obvious cases of Nazi affiliation.⁴³ A British report on 'German Textbook Literature' describes how every effort was made to eliminate nationalism, racism, militarism, violence and cruelty, as well as hostility towards international world organisations reminiscent of attitudes prevalent in the Wilhelmine period.⁴⁴

By the late 1946 the British authorities had used the categorisation process as a means to rehabilitate many of the less serious offenders.⁴⁵ The British employed a 'legal' approach towards denazification and refused to cooperate with German anti-fascist organisations. The British denazification panels functioned under the advisement of German anti-Nazis. On October 1, 1947 the British Military Government decreed that the Land governments would be in charge of the denazification process, including the right to 'alter or revoke existing zonal instruction'.⁴⁶ Demotions occurred until 1948-9, when many former offenders climbed back towards their old positions.⁴⁷ Turner argues that the greatest impact of

⁴¹ Marshall, B., *The Origins of Post-War German Politics* (Croom Helm: London, New York, Sydney) (1988), p. 198-200

⁴² Hahn, H.J., *Education and Society in Germany* (Berg Publishers: Oxford and Providence, RI) (1998), p. 95

⁴³ Samuel R., and Thomas R., *Education and Society in Modern Germany* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul) (1949), p.175

⁴⁴ Davis, K. S., 'The Problem of Textbooks', in Hearnden (ed.), *The British in Germany*, p. 115

⁴⁵ Turner, I., *Denazification in the British Zone* in Turner, I. (ed), *Reconstruction in Post-War Germany-British Occupation Policy and the Western Zones, 1945-55* (Berg Publishers Limited: Oxford and Providence, RI) (1989), p. 239

⁴⁶ British Military Government Ordinance no.110, October 1, 1947-*Documents on Germany under Occupation 1945-54*, p. 247-50

⁴⁷ Ebsworth, R., *Restoring Democracy in Germany-The British Contribution* (Stevens and sons Ltd: London) (1960), p. 11-3

denazification in the British zone was amongst the political elites, with the civil service being less affected and the industrial elite barely touched.⁴⁸

In the French zone, the military commanders gave the people responsible for the different aspects of the occupation a large degree of autonomy. The Director of Education, Raymond Schmittlein, a Germanist by profession, defined the goals of the occupation as to 'free the German youth of the yoke of discipline which kills his judgement, the Wagnerian nightmares that poison its imagination...to make her understand that nationalism was imposed on her artificially... [and] to show her that the philosophy of the 'Superman'...can only lead to catastrophe'.⁴⁹

The French employed the American concept of re-education, which was geared to bring about a change in the political and institutional mindset.⁵⁰ Textbooks published in the French zone downplayed the Prussian influence on the history of Germany, stressing instead the ties that bound Germany with the rest of Europe, especially France. They also depicted Prussia as a reactionary power that thwarted the effects of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution.⁵¹ Denazification was stringent in the teaching profession, with less than 50% of elementary and secondary teachers being retained. Notably though, a much less

⁴⁸ Turner, I., *Denazification in the British Zone* in Turner, I. (ed), *Reconstruction in Post-War Germany-British Occupation Policy and the Western Zones, 1945-55* (Berg Publishers Limited: Oxford and Providence, RI) (1989), p. 266

⁴⁹ Ruge-Schatz, A., *Le Revers de la médaille-Contradictions et limites de l'apport culturel du gouvernement militaire français en Allemagne* in Vaillant, J. (ed.), *La Denazification par les Vainqueurs-La Politique Culturelle des Occupants en Allemagne 1945-1949*, p. 107

⁵⁰ Ruge-Schatz, A., *Le Revers de la médaille-Contradictions et limites de l'apport culturel du gouvernement militaire français en Allemagne* in Vaillant, J. (ed.), *La Denazification par les Vainqueurs-La Politique Culturelle des Occupants en Allemagne 1945-1949*, p. 106

⁵¹ For a close examination of the aspects involving re-education in the Western zones see Torriani, R., *Nazis into Germans: Re-education and democratisation in the British and French Zones of Occupation, 1945-1949*-PhD Thesis (Cambridge) (2005)

severe process was implemented in the field of industry.⁵²

Although the educational and cultural reform faced resistance from local circles, education policy in the French zone was very comprehensive. The occupation authorities had the aims of reforming the teaching profession, publishing new textbooks and reforming the secondary and higher education systems.⁵³ The occupation authorities created nine teaching schools in Rhineland-Pfalz and Baden-Württemberg, which in 1947 provided 500 teachers to the education system.⁵⁴ Educational reform began in primary schools, which reopened in September 1945. Sixteen teacher-training colleges patterned after the French *écoles normales* were founded. All textbooks published after 1933 were banned. By 1947, the French zone published more textbooks per child than the British and American zones.⁵⁵ Secondary education was reformed in June 1946. Reform included the unification of schools, the mixing of boys and girls and more choice in regards to the curriculum.⁵⁶ French culture and history were taught in French as were teacher-training courses. German culture was de-emphasised and American textbooks were kept out of the French Zone.⁵⁷ The *Abitur* (secondary education leaving certificate), modelled on the French *baccalauréat*, introduced a clearly defined path from secondary to higher education.⁵⁸ As for the university system, the French introduced curriculum reform and reopened the universities of Tübingen and Freiburg. Libraries were provided with 1,340,650 'syllabaires' and books for primary

⁵² Willis, F.R., *France, Germany and the New Europe, 1945-1963*, p. 42-3

⁵³ Ruge-Schatz, A., *Le Revers de la médaille-Contradictions et limites de l'apport culturel du gouvernement militaire français en Allemagne* in Vaillant, J. (ed.), *La Denazification par les Vainqueurs-La Politique Culturelle des Occupants en Allemagne 1945-1949*, p. 108

⁵⁴ Guth, S., *Les Forces Françaises en Allemagne-La Citadelle Utopique*, p. 29-30

⁵⁵ Willis, F.R., *France, Germany and the New Europe, 1945-1963*, p. 44-5

⁵⁶ Ruge-Schatz, A., *Le Revers de la médaille-Contradictions et limites de l'apport culturel du gouvernement militaire français en Allemagne* in Vaillant, J. (ed.), *La Denazification par les Vainqueurs-La Politique Culturelle des Occupants en Allemagne 1945-1949*, p. 109

⁵⁷ See Zauner, S., *Erziehung und Kulturmission: Frankreichs Bildungs-Politik in Deutschland, 1945-1949*

education, 574,820 German classics, translations of French and English books, 868,280 dictionaries and manuals in French, 630,000 French literary texts and 240,000 history books.

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Cultural policy was actively pursued and served as a transformative element within the occupational structure as well as to mitigate the psychological impact of economic exploitation.⁶² The absence of coordination between the military administration in Baden-Baden and at Land and Kreis level created the conditions for several cultural initiatives in the zone. Cultural activity was revitalised through theatre and cinema, with performances by French actors in Baden. The old University of Mainz was reopened. The *École d'Administration* in Spire, the Institute of Translators in Gemersheim and a number of pedagogic academies were set up in order to root the French influence.⁶³ The Institute of European History at Mainz was established and eight popular universities (*Volksuniversität*)

⁵⁸ Guth, S., *Les Forces Françaises en Allemagne-La Citadelle Utopique*, p. 31-2

⁵⁹ Guth, S., *Les Forces Françaises en Allemagne-La Citadelle Utopique*, p. 32-3

⁶⁰ Ruge-Schatz, A., *Le Revers de la médaille-Contradictions et limites de l'apport culturel du gouvernement militaire français en Allemagne* in Vaillant, J. (ed.), *La Denazification par les Vainqueurs-La Politique Culturelle des Occupants en Allemagne 1945-1949*, p. 109

⁶¹ See Zauner, S., *Erziehung und Kulturmission: Frankreichs Bildungs-Politik in Deutschland, 1945-1949*

⁶² Willis, F.R., *France, Germany and the New Europe, 1945-1963*, p. 46

⁶³ Moreau, J., *Les Aspects Particuliers de la Politique d'Occupation Française dans les domaines de la jeunesse et de l'éducation populaire* in Vaillant, J. (ed.), *La Denazification par les Vainqueurs-La Politique Culturelle des Occupants en Allemagne 1945-1949*, p. 21

were opened, offering evening instruction and college degrees.⁶⁴

France revitalised the press and on September 8, 1945 *Südkurier*, the first approved newspaper was published. The press introduced the subject of denazification and grouped all anti-Nazi organisations (Antifa groups) like *Das Neue Deutschland*.⁶⁵ There was a revitalisation of pre-Hitler youth movements such as *Bund der Katholischen Jugend*, *Evangelische Jugend* and *Naturfreunde*.⁶⁶ There was an assiduous Franco-German cultural collaboration at the level of youth organisations like the *Peuple et Culture* movement, the *Centre d'Echanges Internationaux* and *Service Jeunesse et Education Populaire*.⁶⁷ French teachers (*Lecteurs d'education populaire*) taught in the popular schools (*Volkshochschulen*), portraying France's social and cultural values.⁶⁸

In the French zone, the denazification process entailed not just the removal of the Nazis from civil service but also administrative reform.⁶⁹ A General Directorate of Justice under Charles Furby was put in charge of judicial reform. Separate courts were created in each Land as well as a High Court in Rastatt.⁷⁰ German Denazification Committees were set up by the French First Army and the military government and a purge of those holding office was well under way in October 1945.⁷¹ By 1946 each Land in the French zone had developed its own denazification system, with Württemberg having the most developed of

⁶⁴ Willis, F.R., *France, Germany and the New Europe, 1945-1963*, p. 4-5

⁶⁵ Ferber, G., *Vicissitudes ou les débuts de la presse à Constance en 1945-1946* in Vaillant, J. (ed.), *La Denazification par les Vainqueurs-La Politique Culturelle des Occupants en Allemagne 1945-1949*, p. 78-9

⁶⁶ Moreau, J., *Les Aspects Particuliers de la Politique d'Occupation Française dans les domaines de la jeunesse et de l'éducation populaire*, p. 27

⁶⁷ Moreau, J., *Les Aspects Particuliers de la Politique d'Occupation Française dans les domaines de la jeunesse et de l'éducation populaire*, p. 24-5

⁶⁸ Moreau, J., *Les Aspects Particuliers de la Politique d'Occupation Française dans les domaines de la jeunesse et de l'éducation populaire*, p. 29

⁶⁹ Hillel, M., *L'Occupation Française en Allemagne*, p. 160-2

them all. Nevertheless, denazification was not given a high priority by the occupation authorities as it was seen to have little political utility. As France's main interest in the occupation of Germany was of an economic nature, any approach to denazification that conflicted with that aim had little chance of being adopted.⁷²

In the Eastern zone, educational and cultural reform was intended to foster peaceful co-operation among nations. The September 1, 1946 the law of democratisation of German schools introduced twelve years of compulsory education as well as state control of the school system. Teaching courses were imbued with an emphasis on Marxist indoctrination and political 'progressiveness', while the selection of candidates was almost entirely in the hands of the SED.⁷³ The emphasis on cultural reform hinged upon the establishment of a 'popular front', accommodating people not necessarily associated with the SED, and the entrenchment of the anti-fascist struggle for the democratic renewal of Germany. Cultural and educational policy revolved around this notion, particularly under the chairmanship of Johannes R. Becher, a KPD Moscow exile during the war, and president of the Cultural Association for the Democratic Renewal of Germany from July 1945.⁷⁴ The antifascist education in the Eastern zone sought to unify the German nation in political terms and to create a cultural base akin to the socialist ideals. At the heart of these concepts was the uniform schooling of citizens in the *Einheitschule*, so as to erase the notion of class and

⁷⁰ Willis, F.R., *The French in Germany 1945-9*, p. 153-4

⁷¹ Willis, F.R., *The French in Germany 1945-9*, p. 155

⁷² Vollnhals (1991: 35-6)

⁷³ Samuel R.H. and R. Hinton Thomas, *Education and Society in Modern Germany*, p. 172-3

⁷⁴ McCauley, M., *The German Democratic Republic since 1945* (The Macmillan Press: London and Basingstoke) (1983), p. 40-1. Johannes R. Becher became the first Minister of Culture of the GDR. His literary work is indicative of a trend that would carry on until the 1953 crisis and is concerned with the idea of communication with non-proletarian writing and keeping the channels open with the West. See Davies, P., *Ein schönes, ungetrenntes Ganzes: Johannes R. Becher and the Kulturation* in Flanagan, C., and Taberner, S., *1949/1989-Cultural*

confessional and gender divisions. Blessing argues that the antifascist education practiced in schools did not replicate the state ideology dictated by Moscow for controlling its satellites. The educational reformers consciously fostered the German nature of the reforms.⁷⁵ The Soviets integrated the school system with the socialist method of production. Seventh grade students had to work in factories one day a week. Those who refused or opposed Communism were not allowed to go to high school and had to undertake apprenticeships instead.⁷⁶ The Soviet authorities integrated the school system with the socialist method of production. Seventh grade students had to work in factories one day a week. Those who refused or opposed Communism were not allowed to go to high school and had to undertake apprenticeships instead.⁷⁷

In the Eastern zone, denazification brought about the complete overhaul of the socio-economic system, with the purge of the social and economic elites from their pre-1945 positions. While this was probably done in the hope of generating popular support amongst the rest of the population, the purges forced an exodus of East Germans into the Western zones. Communists or Social Democrats took up prominent positions in the civil service, local government, the education system and the judiciary.⁷⁸ On May 25, 1946 the Soviet Commanders nationalised the entire 'property of the Nazi Party and its affiliated bodies and the works and enterprises of war criminals, leaders, and active protagonists of the Nazi Party and the Nazi state, as well as the works and enterprises which have actively served the crime

Perspectives on Division and Unity in East and West (German Monitor no. 50, Editions Rodopi B.V., Amsterdam and Atlanta, GA) (1994)

⁷⁵ Blessing, B., *The Antifascist classroom-Denazification in Soviet-occupied Germany, 1945-1949* (Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke and New York) (2006), p. 188-9

⁷⁶ Behncke, M., *Democratization or Sovietization? The Development of the Soviet Zone of Occupation in Germany 1945-1950 in the light of recent findings* (PhD thesis, Pacific Western University, 1983), p. 77

⁷⁷ Behncke, M., *Democratization or Sovietization? The Development of the Soviet Zone of Occupation in Germany 1945-1950 in the light of recent findings* (PhD thesis, Pacific Western University, 1983), p. 77

of war'.⁷⁹ Denazification tribunals were largely staffed and under the control of reliable SPD and KPD members. This extended to the appointment of Burgermeister, police chiefs and senior officials, all in charge of purging their departments.⁸⁰

Order no. 201 of 16 August 1947 established the guidelines for the execution of ACC Directives no. 24 and 38 on denazification. Order no. 201 executed the confiscation of 'landed property of the Junkers, fascists, and war criminals' as well as credit and banking institutes, and private enterprises formerly belonging to active fascists and militarists. The Order also provided that 'former members of the Nazi party who have not themselves committed crimes against peace and against the security of other peoples or crimes against the German people [were] to be granted not only the right to vote, but also the right to stand for election'. The Order established that German administrative bodies and Denazification Commissions were to take the 'necessary measures for the acceleration of the execution and completion of denazification in the Soviet zone of occupation'.⁸¹

The implementation of cultural and educational reform varied in each of the occupation zones. However, the Allies had a common purpose: to transform Germany by achieving a discontinuity with Nazism. According to Doyle, Liberalism revolves around the idea of 'juridical equality and fundamental human rights'.⁸² The process of cultural and educational reform as well as the implementation of denazification at zonal level had drawbacks on both sides of the Elbe. In order to accomplish their structural interests, the Western Allies were

⁷⁸ Pritchard, G., *The Making of the GDR 1945-53*, p. 86

⁷⁹ Draft Law on the Transfer of the Enterprises of War Criminals and Nazi Criminals and Land Saxony, May 25, 1946-From *Documents on Germany under Occupation*, p. 136

⁸⁰ Pritchard, G., *The Making of the GDR 1945-53-From Antifascism to Stalinism* (Manchester University Press: Manchester and New York) (2000), p. 83-4

⁸¹ ACC Order no. 201, August 16, 1947- *Documents on Germany under Occupation 1945-54*, p. 234-6.

quick to expedite the process of cultural and educational rehabilitation, and reinstate the captains of industry who had helped the rise of Hitler. In the Eastern zone, the Soviet authorities implemented their cultural and educational reforms in order to bring about the sovietisation of the political system. The Liberal aspects attached to the elements of transformation in Germany would create a reorientation of the mindset of ordinary Germans. However, Peterson argues that the major change was psychological and indigenous. Germany was in large part denazified by Hitler because Nazism was based on success and Hitler failed. Germans might have been more dissuaded from fascism and communism than persuaded to democracy,⁸³ as seen in the flight of the German soldiers and ordinary Germans towards the zones occupied by the Western armies upon the end of the war. Moreover, the imposition of Communist rule in the Eastern zone brought with it the brutality of the Red Army towards civilians, particularly women, during the early stages of the occupation.

The most transformative outcome of the treatment of the German Question was the reconciliation between German aspirations in the international political system (particularly in the case of West Germany) and the structural interests of the superpowers. Since the unification of German polity within the framework of the nation-state, the great European powers (particularly Britain and France) perceived Germany as a threat. As a latecomer to the imperial race and unified as a single state many centuries later than England and France, Germany was perceived as a challenger to the international order since the late nineteenth century. By the turn of the twentieth century Germany had become a mighty economic power, with the size of its economy surpassing that of France and achieving parity with that

⁸² Doyle, *Ways of war and peace*, p. 207

of Britain. Overseas investments grew exponentially. In 1914, the pursuit of *Weltpolitik* had caused a major disruption of the international order. The Nazi period magnified the potential threat of Germany. In 1945, Richter stated that the 'way of purification' should lie ahead in a European community of freedom, equality, and brotherhood which could inspire and control nations.⁸⁴ The surrender of the German state to the Allies in the aftermath of World War Two would produce a reorientation of the German political character towards Europeanisation. Undoubtedly, the work done by the Allies on denazification (understood as the reconstitution of the German political character) would be the main factor in this reorientation. The Allies succeeded in eradicating Nazism as a viable political alternative for Germany. Muhlen mentions that by the time of the 1952 elections, the nationwide conventions of the CDU, the SPD, the German Federation of Trade Unions as well as assemblies of university students, physicians, booksellers and book publishers representing millions of Germans assailed Nazism and pledged never to let it grow again.⁸⁵

The third instrument in the denazification of Germany was the implementation of the International Military Tribunals (IMT). At Nuremberg, war crimes perpetrators and the main leaders of the Third Reich were tried by judges representing the four occupation powers. The unprecedented nature of the crimes committed by Nazi Germany, the dislocation and devastation caused by the war and the level of superpower interventionism, prompted the trial of the ideology that disrupted the international order. Nuremberg had the antecedent of the Leipzig trials after the end of World War One, when the Germans tried the Kaiser and other former soldiers and generals. Wilhelm II was charged on moral and political grounds,

⁸³ Peterson, E.N., *The American Occupation of Germany*, p. 341-2

⁸⁴ Richter, W., *Re-educating Germany* (University of Chicago Press: Chicago, IL) (1945), p. 214

⁸⁵ Muhlen, N., *The Return of Germany-A Tale of Two Countries* (The Bodley Head: London) (1953), p. 5

not on crimes against humanity. Moreover, the victors of the Great War did not seek to extradite the Kaiser.⁸⁶

The London Charter of the International Military Tribunal, drafted by Robert H. Jackson, Robert Falco, and Iona Nikitchenko, was instituted on August 8, 1945. The Charter set down the laws and procedures by which the Nuremberg trials were to be conducted. The Charter established that only crimes committed by the European Axis could be tried. Three categories of crimes were defined: war crimes, crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity. The Charter also stated that the official's position was not a valid defense against war crime charges. Between October 18, 1945, and October 1, 1946, the IMT tried twenty-two 'major' war criminals on charges of conspiracy, crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.⁸⁷ The IMT defined crimes against humanity as 'murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation...or persecutions on political, racial, or religious grounds'.⁸⁸ Twelve of those convicted were sentenced to death, amongst them Hans Frank, Hermann Göring, Alfred Rosenberg, and Julius Streicher, masterminders and executioners of the policies which stemmed from the ideology in trial.

Under the aegis of the IMT, American military tribunals conducted 12 further trials of high-ranking German officials at Nuremberg, referred to collectively as the Subsequent Nuremberg Proceedings. Gestapo and SS members, as well as German industrialists, were tried for their roles in implementing the Nuremberg Laws, 'Aryanisation', mass shootings of Jews in concentration camps, shootings by Einsatzgruppen (mobile killing units), deportations, forced labor, sale of Zyklon B, and medical experiments.

⁸⁶ Woetzel, R., *The Nuremberg Trials in International Law (with a postlude on the Eichmann case)* (Stevens & Sons Ltd) (1962), p. 35

⁸⁷ For an account of the proceedings see Owen, J, *The Nuremberg Trials*

⁸⁸ London Charter, August 8, 1945- www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/proc/imtchart.htm

Nuremberg introduced a liberal concept of international law; namely, the principle that professional soldiers cannot escape punishment for waging aggressive wars and permitting crimes against humanity with the claim they were dutifully carrying out orders issued by their superiors. Nuremberg is an example of effective international law being implemented and, adding a clear interventionist dimension, of sovereignty and territoriality being by-passed as responsibility was devolved down to the individual.⁸⁹ Persico argues that the legacy of Nuremberg, although contradictory, documented beyond question the atrocities committed by the Nazi regime and contributed to the establishment of a democratic system in Germany, as the German population became fully aware of the worst aspects of Nazism.⁹⁰ Although Nuremberg could not root out all the elements involved with the Nazi regime, it contributed to the denazification of German society. The Nuremberg trials also provided the German people with a clean slate and solidified the process of discontinuity with Nazism. The Nuremberg trials were an eloquent example of the interventionist approach of the superpowers. Nuremberg would have a lasting transformative effect on the Cold War international order as it created an important interventionist precedent for situations involving the disruption of the international order and gross violation of human rights, as in the case of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda in the 1990s and the trial of dictatorial leaders in South America.⁹¹

⁸⁹ Calvocoressi, P., *Nuremberg-The facts, the law and the consequences*, (Chatto and Windus: London) (1947), p.118-9

⁹⁰ Persico, J., *Nuremberg-Infamy on Trial*, p. 441

⁹¹ Despite his release on grounds of ill health, the unprecedented detention of General Augusto Pinochet in the United Kingdom in 2000 for crimes against humanity committed in his own country, without a warrant or request for extradition from Chile, marks a watershed in international law. Some scholars consider it one of the most important events in judicial history since the Nuremberg trials of Nazi war criminals. Spanish judge Baltasar Garzón's case was largely founded on the principle of universal jurisdiction; that certain crimes are so egregious that they constitute crimes against humanity and can therefore be prosecuted in any court in the world. The British House of Lords ruled that Pinochet had no right to immunity from prosecution as a former head of state, and could be put on trial. This interventionist principle is undoubtedly one of the legacies of the work of IMT during 1945-6.

5.3 Conclusion

The political transformation of Germany undertaken by the Allies established a clear discontinuity with Nazism. This discontinuity was meant to prevent the resurgence of Germany as a challenger to the international political system through the creation of post-war political institutions (in both the Western and Eastern zones) orientated towards the creation of an international order based on co-existence. This discontinuity was not, for practical purposes, conducive to the elimination of all vestiges of Nazism. The process of denazification is seen from a variety of standpoints and its main criticism is that the eradication of former Nazis from public life did not go far enough.⁹² Fitzgibbon argues that denazification as punishment was not an unqualified success. As Clay himself acknowledged, too many 'little' Nazis were punished while too many 'big' Nazis were let loose.⁹³ Denazification as moral reformation also had a mixed legacy. Denazification did not eradicate all the elements that participated in the Nazi regime or the economic networks that supported Nazi Germany, particularly in the Western zones. The Adenauer government included prominent Nazi members like Dr. Hans Maria Globke, which drafted the Nuremberg Laws of 1935, Dr. Günther Bergmann, which oversaw the plunder of Serbia during the war and Rudolf Senteck, responsible for 'aryanising' Germany during the war.⁹⁴ Astonishingly, Kurt-George Kiesinger, future Chancellor of West Germany, entered the radio propaganda division at the German Ministry for Foreign Affairs in the 1930s and

⁹² See Bower, T., *The Pledge Betrayed-America and Britain and the Denazification of Post-War Germany*, (Doubleday and Company Inc: Garden City, New York) (1982)

⁹³ Fitz Gibbon, C., *Denazification*, p. 171

⁹⁴ Bower, T., *The Pledge Betrayed-America and Britain and the Denazification of Post-War Germany*, p. 355-6

directed a world-wide radio propaganda apparatus, coordinating his department's work with that of Propaganda Minister Dr Joseph Goebbels.

According to Liberal theory, peace can be perpetuated by establishing legitimate/democratic domestic orders throughout the world. ⁹⁵ The process of denazification, although tainted by political bickering and expedited due to the evolving realities of the nascent international order, had the ultimate effect of ridding German society of the ideology that had caused the disruption of the international political system in the 1930s and 1940s. Denazification succeeded in getting rid of Nazism as a political alternative for Germany. Through this process the superpowers ensured the compliance of the two Germanys to the international political system established by the Allies.

The process of denazification would be influenced by the creation of the German 'economic miracle' and the Europeanisation of the two Germanys. ⁹⁶ This rehabilitative policy can be interpreted using a Schumpeterian interpretation. Liberal commercial pacifism maintains that when citizens become rational and materialistic they 'eschew psychological militarism and chauvinism'. ⁹⁷ This is particularly true in the case of the rehabilitation of the Western zones; a phenomenon that would bring about the reconciliation between social welfare and sound economics through the rise of the Social Market paradigm in West Germany and the integration of Western Europe. ⁹⁸

⁹⁵ Burchill S., *Liberal Internationalism*, in Burchill S., Linklater A., Devetak R., Paterson M. and True J. (Ed.) *Theories of international relations*, p. 31-2

⁹⁶ Griffith, W., *Denazification Revisited* in Ermarth, M., *America and the Shaping of German Society 1945-55*, p. 160-1

⁹⁷ Doyle, M., *Ways of war and peace: realism, liberalism, and socialism*, p. 245. See also Rosencrance, R., *The Rise of the Trading State*, Mueller, J., *Retreat from Doomsday*, Haas, M., *International Conflict*

⁹⁸ For more on the rise of social liberalism after World War Two see Simhony, A. (ed), *The new liberalism: reconciling liberty and community*, (2001)

The process of West European integration would give the transformation of Germany a distinct Liberal element. The development of a European sense of community in which Germany would also participate was the presupposition for cultural reconstruction.⁹⁹ The integrationist impetus brought about by the superpowers can be explained using a functionalist approach, linked to the liberal ideas of Kant and going back to President Wilson's 'Fourteen Points'.¹⁰⁰ According to functionalism, 'material interdependence' unfolds within the assumption that states will not sabotage a process of integration taking place within the framework of human freedom.¹⁰¹ This is particularly true of the process of integration in Western Europe, undertaken through the intervention of the United States in the German Question and the process of bandwagoning that went with it.

The increased level of international organisation envisaged by the Allies during the making of the post-war international order entailed a more interventionist approach to inter-state relations and the erosion of sovereignty in the society of states.¹⁰² The overwhelming political and military power which the United States and the Soviet Union mustered during the war would enable them to use military intervention as and when needed and most importantly, to influence the political and economic process in their respective spheres of influence.

⁹⁹ Richter, W., *Re-educating Germany*, p. 127-8

¹⁰⁰ Speech delivered by US President Woodrow Wilson to a joint session of the United States Congress on January 8, 1918.-<http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/facts/democrac/51.htm>

¹⁰¹ Mitrany, D., *The Progress of International Government* (New Haven: Yale University Press) (1933), p. 101

¹⁰² The need for international organisation was discussed at length during the war. In 1940, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace published *The New World Order*, a pamphlet which contained a select list of references on regional and world federation, together with some special plans for world order after the war. In 1942, the Institute of Pacific Relations published *Post War Worlds* by P.E. Corbett, which outlined that 'world government [as an] ultimate aim' and for the law of nations to 'take precedence over national law'. Also, see Orson Welles, *The Federation of Man*, Coudenhove's *Pan Europa*, Streit, C., *Union Now* (Jonathan Cape: London) (1939), Emery Reves *The Anatomy of Peace* (1945), Wilkie, W., *One World* (1943), Culbertson, E., *Total Peace* and Orwell, G., *Toward European Unity* Partisan Review July-August 1947.

The occupation powers (both at zonal and ACC level) had a significant input in changing the German character.¹⁰³ Denazification and demilitarisation helped to remove Germany as a threat to the international order. The Europeanisation of the German Question (through economic integration on both sides of the Elbe) and the tutelage of the occupation powers provided the opportunity for this Revolutionist overhaul. The Allies rehabilitated and reconstituted the political and institutional culture of Germany. As far as Germany's position in the international political system is concerned, by 1947-8 the United States, as the leader of the Western bloc, was committed to the reconstruction of German power in Western Europe *under the ethos of the West*. In the words of A J P Taylor, the occupying powers managed to 'discover the true problem which Germany presented to Europe-not how to resist German strength, but how to promote in Germany a sensible balanced way of life'.¹⁰⁴ Roseman highlights an important difference between the 1918 and 1945 settlements, signaling that the 'hegemonic myths' of the post-1945 era were more constructive than those of the interwar period. The diluted denazification that allowed the old elites to remain in power involved an acceptance of the post-war settlement.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰³ The Allies were also responsible for forcing the Germans to deal with the *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* (coming to terms with the past). Theodor Adorno's dealt with the question in a lecture entitled *Was bedeutet die Aufarbeitung der Vergangenheit?* ('What is meant by the working through the past?'), a subject related to his thinking of 'after Auschwitz' in his later work. This work is often seen as consisting in part of a variably implicit and explicit critique of the work of Martin Heidegger, whose formal ties to the Nazi party are well known. Heidegger, attempted to provide a historical conception of *Germania* as a philosophical thought of German origin and destiny (later he would speak of 'the West'). Alexander Garcia Düttman's *Das Gedächtnis des Denkens: Versuch über Heidegger und Adorno* (The Memory of Thought: an Essay on Heidegger and Adorno, translated by Nicholas Walker) attempts to treat the philosophical value of these seemingly opposed and certainly incompatible terms ('Auschwitz' and 'Germania') in the philosophy of both writers.

¹⁰⁴ Taylor, A J P., *The Course of German History* (London: Methuen & Co: 1978), p. 263

¹⁰⁵ Roseman, M., *Defeat and Stability: 1918, 1945 and 1989 in Germany* in Levy, C. and Roseman, M. (eds), *Three Postwar Eras in Comparison-Western Europe 1918-1945-1989* (Palgrave: Basingstoke and New York) (2002), p. 272

Doyle posits that liberalism 'is not inherently 'peace-loving'; nor it is consistently restrained or peaceful in intent.¹⁰⁶ Furthermore, Doyle points out the failings of liberal policy in their diplomatic relations with non-liberal powerful states, which he attributes to the fact that they are caught in an 'international state of war'.¹⁰⁷ As we have seen in chapter 2, the process of transformation in Germany was informed by the Realist elements that underpinned superpower relations as well as the legal/Rationalist framework of reference.

As seen from the standpoint of Liberal theory, interventionism would facilitate the conditions for the end to the balance of power in Western Europe, a development which linked economic integration with the end of the warring feuds between the main European powers. Interventionism meant the Europeanisation of Germany and the gradual erosion of disruptive nationalism as an informative element of the European political system. Although the nation-state still remains the most immediate reality of the international political system, intervention created a legacy which would radically transform Germany and Europe. Distinct features of that intervention, like free market economics and the Atlantic military alliance under the banner of NATO, remain intact. Although the experience of integration in Eastern Europe under the aegis of the Moscow would unfold under the threat of Soviet intervention, it would facilitate the process of industrialisation and economic cooperation which served as a stepping stone towards the absorption of the former Communist countries into the European Union in 2004-7. The Eastern bloc lacked the liberal elements typical of Western European societies. However, the Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe contributed in a significant way to the formation of a balance of power system based on co-

¹⁰⁶ Doyle, M., *Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs* in in Brown, M. (with Lynn-Jones, S. and Miller, S.) (ed.) *Debating the democratic peace* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press) (1996), p. 4

¹⁰⁷ Doyle, M., *Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs*, p. 31

existence, which unfolded peacefully until its demise in 1989-90. Whilst the balance of power achieved during the long nineteenth century was based around the ideology of conservatism, the system of coexistence achieved during the early years of the Cold War allowed for the toleration of ideological diversity and the peaceful unfolding of the superpowers' national interest.

The Allies attempted to transform Germany through the primary institutions of intervention and coexistence. In spite of the conflictual nature of superpower relations regarding the treatment of the German Question, the development of these primary institutions, discussed at length in chapter 4, is compatible with the notion of Liberal peace espoused by Kant. As we will see in chapter 6, the Liberal aspects involved in the treatment of the German Question would have a significant effect on the transformation of the society of states. The Allies had as their main priority the transformation of Germany. They undertook the work of denazification in order to prevent a militaristic re-emergence of the former foe and therefore secure a smooth and peaceful transition to the post-war international order. In addition, the willingness of the Allies to cooperate on international organisation denotes their determination to establish a post-war international order based on toleration and diversity.

Chapter 6

The German Question and the transformation of international society

6.1 The English School's concept of 'international society' and the German Question

The treatment of the German Question during the 1943-8 period was the most relevant factor in the transformation of international society. The English School endorses an overall pluralist view of international society. Bull maintains that a society of states comes into being 'when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society...to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions'.¹ James posits that international society is 'a body of rules which define 'proper behaviour' for its members and a channel of diplomatic communication between them'.² Bellamy adds to the debate by stating that the English School addresses the question of what represents 'international society' via the debate between pluralists and solidarists, and by mapping the interaction of the three main traditions of international relations theory outlined by Wight: realism and revolutionism, with rationalism as the middle way between the two.³

The pluralist conception of international society leans towards the realist side of rationalism, with its emphasis on positive law, state sovereignty and the preservation of the political and cultural differences between members. According to Mayall 'states, like individuals, can and do have differing interests and values, and consequently...international society is limited to

¹ Bull, H., *The Anarchical Society*, p. 13

² James, A., 'International Society' *British Journal of International Studies* (July 1978), p.91-106

³ Bellamy, A., *Conclusion: Whither international society?* In Bellamy, A. *International Society and its Critics*, p. 283-4.

the creation of a framework that will allow them to coexist in relative harmony'.⁴ Conversely, solidarists root their thinking in the view that 'humanity is one, and that the task of diplomacy is to translate this latent or immanent solidarity of interests and values into reality.'⁵ The theoretical implication of the solidarist view is an elementary universalism which 'underpins the society of states and contributes to the survival of international order.'⁶

The political emasculation of Germany and Europe, ideological polarisation and the expansion and institutionalisation of international society undertaken by the Allies, transformed the international order in a 'pluralist plus' manner. The treatment of the German Question created an evolution in the shape of the society of states. This evolution was created by the interaction between conflict and cooperation. The transformation of international society was also influenced by the elements of intervention and coexistence, hence generating a middle way between pluralism and solidarism. The ideological divide remained a permanent obstacle to a fully-fledged solidarist society of states. However, the enormity of the task involved in winning the war and laying the foundations of an international political system less susceptible to disruption and challenges by revisionist powers entailed an interventionist approach on the part of the superpowers. At the same time, the notion of transformation in Germany and the post-war international society is linked to the Revolutionist elements described in chapter 5.

I will now expand on the elements that brought the transformation in Germany and the international political system at large by tackling the political emasculation of Germany

⁴ Mayall, J., *World Politics: Progress and its Limits*, (Cambridge, Polity) (2000), p. 14

⁵ Mayall, J., *World Politics: Progress and its Limits*, (Cambridge, Polity) (2000), p. 14

⁶ Linklater, A., *The Transformation of Political Community*, (Cambridge, Polity Press) (1998), p. 24

undertaken by the Allies during the 1943-8 period, the nature of the ideological divide that informed the Cold-War international order and the expansion and institutionalisation of international society.

6.2 The political emasculation of Germany

The political emasculation of Germany, established by the Allies by the declaration of unconditional surrender issued at the Casablanca Conference in 1943, would become the main transformative element of international society. The surrender of the German state to the Allies would be the triggering element in the creation of an ideologically-driven spheres of influence system. The political enfeeblement of Germany created an end to the political and economic autonomy of Europe and produced an expansion in the scope of international society. The loss of political autonomy of the Western part of Germany facilitated its integration into a free-market orientated Western European bloc which would facilitate the continuation of the American economic expansion of the war years. US policy over Germany revolved around the premise of the rehabilitation of the German economy within the context of a free system of exchange which could serve as a tool for stability in the post-war international order. The threat of the Soviet Union, fear of another economic depression and the very nature of the American political and economic system compelled the Truman administration to put the policy of rehabilitation into practice with the implementation of Bizonia and the Marshall Plan.

At the same time, the Soviet Union was interested in the political emasculation of Germany, principally because of security concerns. Its abundance of natural resources and manpower

made economic recovery almost exclusively dependant on indigenous efforts, provided Moscow did not have to fight another protracted war. In this context, constraining the revival of an independent Germany entailed sovietising the Eastern zone of occupation and pressing for reparations from the Western zones, developments which forced Washington and London to undertake the implementation of Bizonia. Moscow would also contribute to the emasculation of Germany by facilitating the transfer of German territory beyond the Oder-Neisse to Poland, the expulsion of 6 million ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe and the consolidation of an Eastern European bloc via COMINFORM.

The political emasculation of Germany was undertaken in the context of the pursuit of the national interest on the part of the superpowers. Polarisation had an inherent 'pluralist plus' principle: intervention was confined to achieving the common aim of preventing the re-emergence of a German regime capable of threatening long-term US economic objectives and Soviet security interests. This process of *emasculation through intervention* waters down the notion of sovereignty as one of the central institutions of international society. The political emasculation of Germany had the immediate consequence of depriving Europe of its political and economic autonomy. Germany's geographical and historical position had been a driving force in the European political system at least since the middle of the nineteenth century. The disruption caused by the failure of the Hitlerite quest for the domination of the continent resulted in a breakdown of the traditional relations between Germany and her European partners. The European system based on economic autarkic principles and imperial expansion which had operated in Europe in the 1930s would be scrapped and replaced by two coexisting geopolitical blocs, one marshaled by the United States and the other one by the Soviet Union. The surrender of the German state to the Allies meant that

Europe, deprived from its traditional economic ties with the richest country in the continent, would also surrender to the diktat of Washington and Moscow. This created a situation unprecedented in the history of the international political system. For the first time since the formation of the society of states, Europe would lose its political autonomy to an extra-European power. The political enfeeblement of Germany created another unprecedented development in the form of the end to the internal balance of power that had operated in Western Europe since the Peace of Westphalia. This political emasculation would also create the conditions for co-existence between the superpowers. The elimination of a possible tripolar international order ensured the non-disruptive passage into the formation of two blocs, originating in the split that unfolded in Germany and ultimately encompassed the whole of Europe.

6.3 The German Question and the ideological divide of the post-war international society

No other factor in the course of inter-Allied relations contributed more to the setting of two spheres of influence in Europe along ideological lines than the treatment of the German Question. The originating factor of an ideologically-split post-war international society was the polarisation of Germany via the gradual sovietisation of the Eastern zone during the 1945-6 period and the setting of the Anglo-American zone of occupation (Bizonia). This process was decisive in generating the subsequent diplomatic breakdown at the Moscow Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM) of 1947. When the Allies met at the Moscow CFM to discuss the peace treaty with Germany, they failed to reach an agreement on the economic unity of the vanquished nation. Indeed, the vital questions of economic unity and the

extracting of reparations, crucial elements in the accomplishment of a four-power solution had already been decided through the occupation process.

The ideological divide created in Germany had profound implications for the configuration of the post-war international order. The main rationale behind Soviet post-war policy was to prevent the emergence of a resurgent Germany and encirclement by the West. As such, the Soviet military authorities and Moscow-trained cadres began to sovietise the Eastern zone of right after the beginning of the occupation through the nationalisation of industry, land reform and the merging of the Socialist and Communist parties. The Soviets kept taking reparations from the Western zones, at a time when the German economy operated under restrictions in its level of industry. This situation effectively meant that while the economy of the Soviet zone of occupation was recovering, the Western zones were descending into economic chaos, creating the possibility of a Communist takeover west of the Elbe.

Political life was reconstituted in the Eastern zone before anywhere else in occupied Germany. The KPD (the German Communist Party) and the FDGB (the Free German Trade Union) were given permission to start functioning as early as May 1945. Walter Ulbricht and the Soviet military administrators made sure that German personnel directors at all levels were KPD members who had lived and served in the Soviet Union during the war. On July 14, 1945, Ulbricht and Marshall Georgii Zhukov, the head of the Soviet Military Government, set up eleven central organisations to manage the governance of the Soviet zone and potentially serve as the basis for an all-German administration.⁷ In early 1946 Stalin called Ulbricht to Moscow and instructed him to form a unity party before May Day. Meanwhile, Vasili Sokolovsky, the new Soviet occupation commander, pushed the SPD

⁷ Smyser, W R, *From Yalta to Berlin*, p. 33

(Socialist Party of Germany) toward a union with the KPD (Communist Party of Germany) by means of deportations, arrests, imprisonment or death. The merger was created on April 21-22, 1946 with KPD members taking full and direct control of the Socialist Unity Party (SED).⁸ At the beginning of 1947 the occupation authorities constituted the Administration of Internal Affairs. By the end of the year they announced the formation of a 'People's Police', with the view to establish the 'democratic means of crushing secret reactionary elements'.⁹ By 1948 the SED dominated the political life of the Soviet zone to an extent out of proportion to its size and strength. Members of the SED occupied the greatest majority of positions in the central administration, and the most important posts in the provincial government structures.¹⁰

The occupation authorities were keen to create a socio-economic system in the Eastern zone which would operate under the premises of the Communist credo. The Soviet military authorities in charge of the occupation acted with remarkable speed in order to achieve the economic rehabilitation of the Eastern zone. On January 15, 1947 the Central Secretariat of the Socialist Unity Party announced the decision of the occupation authorities to curtail rationing, the termination of industrial dismantling and the transformation of two hundred industries originally earmarked for dismantling into Soviet Joint Stock Companies (*Sowjet-Aktiengesellschaften*), with 74 of those returning to German Land governments. Other measures included the reduction of quotas for reparations in kind and for more raw materials and tools to be put at the disposal of farmers, artisans and small tradesmen. The Soviet authorities wanted the production level in the Eastern zone to be 2-3 times higher

⁸ Smyser, W R, *From Yalta to Berlin*, p. 36-7

⁹ Nettl, J.P., *Eastern Zone and Soviet Policy in Germany 1945-50*, p. 125-7

¹⁰ Nettl, J.P., *Eastern Zone and Soviet Policy in Germany 1945-50*, p. 105-6

than that envisaged by the ACC Plan of March 1946.¹¹ Sokolovsky also gave the SED a greater role in the administration of the Soviet zone by devolving some of the authority held by the Soviets. On June 4, 1947, he ordered the establishment of the German Economic Council (DWK) under SED control as the civilian administration for the Soviet zone. Ulbricht used the DWK to complete SED control over the civilian administration of the Soviet zone and intended to use the DWK to replace the Soviet authorities and to establish a separate East German civilian administration.¹² By 1948, the share of private industry had shrunk to 39% of the total industrial production and the state-owned trading organisation established by the newly-appointed German Economic Commission rapidly gained control of trading activities. The land reform of the early post-war period gave way to the beginning of collectivisation and the central command of the economy, established with the Two Year Plan 1949-50.¹³

The Soviet input in the polarisation process has a distinct revolutionist trait. By sovietising the Eastern zone, the Soviets created the basis for the political rehabilitation of the German territory under their command. Moreover, by linking sovietisation in Germany to the creation of a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, the Soviets ensured the configuration of a permanent foothold in Germany and the integration of the Eastern zone into the nascent Communist bloc. This would significantly contribute to the creation of a bipolar situation in the international political system in which Germany would lack the capabilities or the inclination to seek the destruction of the society of states.

¹¹ Communiqué issued by the SED, January 11, 1947- *Documents on Germany under Occupation 1945-54*, p. 202-3

¹² Smyser, W R, *From Yalta to Berlin: the Cold War struggle over Germany*, p. 37

¹³ Berghahn, V R., *Modern Germany: society, economy and politics in the twentieth century*, p. 196-7

The merging of the American and British zones of occupation, implemented on January 1, 1947, represented another important milestone in the path towards the partition of Germany and Europe. The evolution toward Bizonia stemmed from the 'grand design' scheme of a free-market international economic system, as envisaged by influential elements in the American establishment. This 'grand design' involved the reconstitution of Germany as the engine of a liberal economic system in Europe, capable of absorbing American capital and goods and preventing a return to an autarkic economic system in Europe.¹⁴ Although the ACC kept operating and passing legislation affecting the whole of occupied Germany, Bizonia effectively put an end to the possibility of four power control and economic unity under a central government and set the tone for the division of Europe into two ideologically-orientated blocs.

The diplomatic stalemate of the Moscow CFM of 1947 precipitated the partition of Germany. A revised plan for level of industry in Bizonia became operational on August 29, 1947. The revised plan provided for the retention of an industrial capacity approximate to 'the level of industry prevailing in Germany in 1936'. The plan established that the bizonal area had to be prepared 'to exchange [...] proportionately larger quantities of industrial products in return for necessary food and raw material imports'.¹⁵ The setting of Bizonia brought the French into a trizonal agreement for the Western zones. The Coal Conference at Washington in August 1947 had recommended the transfer of coal production to German

¹⁴ The influence of the Council on Foreign Relations in the post-war thinking of the State Department, particularly in regards to the rehabilitation of Germany, is well documented. The 'grand design' consisted in the creation of an international system which would provide an 'elbow room' for the development of the US economy along free-market lines. See Shoup, L and Minter, W., *Imperial Brain Trust-The Council on Foreign Relations and the United States Foreign Policy* (Author Choice Press: New York, Lincoln, NE and Shanghai) (1977), Smith, N., *American Empire: Roosevelt's Geographer and the Prelude to Globalization* (Berkeley, CA and London : University of California Press) (2003)

hands and supply to Western Europe. On August 22-27, 1947 British, American and French Governments representatives met in London to discuss matters relating to the level of industry in Bizonia and the management and control of the Ruhr mines and German economic resources, establishing a bipartite coal control group and the formation of a German coal management board on November 19, 1947. ¹⁶

In a politically orientated move, in January 1948 Clay and Robertson summoned the German Minister Presidents and leaders of Bizonal Economic Council and recommended the doubling of the size of the Economic Council, the creation of a second chamber (made up of representatives of the Länder), a new Executive Committee under a single Chair, the formation of a High Court, the development of a central bank and the fiscal reorganisation of Bizonia.. ¹⁷ The Bizonal Economic Council set up a Department of the Bizonal Economic Administrations to deal with matters including the 'problems of finance and subsidies connected with the coal industry as may concern the Economic Council', 'labour matters in the coal industry which are the concern of the Economic Council' and 'local allocations within the Bizonal area'. A German Coal Management (*Deutsche Bergbau Leitung*) was set up in Essen and became responsible for the direction of production and distribution of coal. ¹⁸

On February 9, 1948 the Bizonal Economic Administration was reconstituted, consisting of an Economic Council, a Länderrat; an Executive Committee and certain additional agencies.

¹⁵ Revised Plan for the Level of Industry in the Bizonia, August 29, 1947-*Documents on Germany under Occupation 1945-54*, p. 239-45

¹⁶ Communiqué on discussions between representatives of the United Kingdom, the United States and France in London, August 28, 1947-*Documents on Germany under Occupation 1945-54*, p. 238-9

¹⁷ Eisenberg, C.W., *Drawing the line: the American decision to divide Germany, 1944-1949*, p. 366

¹⁸ From the Anglo-American Announcement of the establishment of the Bipartite Coal Control Group and the German Coal Management Board-*Documents on Germany under Occupation 1945-54*, p. 259-60

The Economic Council had the powers to adopt and enact ordinances on the administration of railways, maritime ports and coastal shipping, inland water transport, inter-Land inland waterways, intellectual property, communications and postal services, customs and the management of Bizonal Civil Service. The Länderrat, composed of two representatives from each Land, was put in charge of passing legislation on matters within the competence of the Economic Council other than in respect of taxation or the appropriation of funds. The Executive Committee would be in charge of the administration of their respective functions, including the issue of implementing regulations under existing and future Bizonal legislation.

¹⁹ Also on February 9, 1948 a German High Court for the Combined Economic Area (*Obergericht für das vereinigte Wirtschaftsgebiet*) was established in Cologne. ²⁰ The final decisive act towards partition was provided by the currency reform introduced in the Western zones on 20 June 1948 with the Deutsche Mark replacing the Reichsmark at one tenth of the value of the currency circulating in the Western Zones at the time, a move replicated by the Soviet Union in the Eastern zone. ²¹

The failure of the Allies to agree on common guidelines for a united Germany at the Moscow and London CFM in 1947 prompted Washington to proceed with their plans to rehabilitate the Western zones and create a political foothold via the Marshall Plan and the consolidation of a Western European political and military bloc. In a simultaneous approach, the Soviet Union consolidated its own bloc by sovietising the Eastern zone and solidifying the rapprochement of the Eastern European countries to Moscow.

¹⁹ British Military Government Ordinance no.126, February 9, 1948-*Documents on Germany under Occupation 1945-54*, p. 268-75

²⁰ British Military Government Ordinance no. 127, February 9, 1948- *Documents on Germany under Occupation 1945-54*, p. 275-79

However, the clash of ideologies did not prevent the emergence of an international order capable of accommodating the two blocs. The United States and its Allies found it impossible to isolate the Soviet bloc from the post-war international order because of the increased level of institutionalisation of the international society, the management of the spheres of influence system and their ongoing interest over the German Question. The polarisation of the post-war international society created during the occupation of Germany was achieved through an unprecedented level of great power interventionism, which was tempered by the existence of an international political system based on the tolerance for the diversity of interests. The common interests of the superpowers in the management of their respective spheres of influence entailed that both the Soviet Union and the Western bloc shared the civilisational requirements necessary for co-existence.²²

Interventionism, informed by the ideological pursuit of the national interest, unfolded within the framework of coexistence. The superpowers proceeded to apply this *modus operandi* in their zones of occupation in Germany and ultimately in their spheres of influence. The interaction of conflict, cooperation and legality in the evolution towards German partition provided the superpowers with an example that would inform their actions during the next 40 years: *ideologically-driven competition would not lead to a situation of hot conflict*. The confrontation over Germany informed ideological competition in the post-war international order. The Cold War seldom, if ever, got hot enough to disrupt an international order beneficial to the superpowers.

²¹ British Military Government Law no.61, June 20, 1948- *Documents on Germany under Occupation 1945-54*, p. 292-4

²² Gong argues that the concept of standard of 'civilisation' remains an integral part of international society. He defines this standard as the state in which a 'civilised' constituent of international society guarantees basic rights, exists as an organised political bureaucracy, has some self-defence capacity and adheres to general

6.4 The institutionalisation of the post-war international society

Another important transformation brought about by the treatment of the German Question during the 1943-8 period was the increasing institutionalisation of international society. The revisionist challenge launched by Nazi Germany necessitated a kind of interventionism on the part of the superpowers which was aimed at preventing a new, and potentially catastrophic, destruction of the society of states.

The legal constitution of the post-war international society had its origins in the Allied interest of preventing a repeat of the disruption caused by the Hitlerite assault on the international order. Because of the diversity of interests among the Allies, the wartime practical association framework required a strong legal and institutional framework in order to operate successfully. The Lend-Lease articles, the Atlantic Charter, the United Nations Declaration of 1942, the declaration of unconditional surrender made at the Casablanca Conference in 1943 and the intense summit diplomacy in which the Allies engaged upon, would have a significant impact in the institutionalisation of the post-war international order. The intense diplomatic intercourse and the law-making process that originated from the treatment of the German Question created the conditions for the institutionalisation of the post-war international society. This institutionalisation had its corollary in the establishment of the United Nations organisation and its subsidiary institutions, the economic institutions set up in Bretton Woods conference and the extension of international regimes after the war.

It is however the formation of the spheres of influence system what gave the institutionalisation of post-war international society its ultimate shape. The spheres of

principles of international law and the international system. See Gong, G., *The Standard of 'Civilization' in*

influence imposed through the superpowers' role in the treatment of the German Question set up the boundaries for intervention and restricted the possibility of disruptive conflict. This balance of power, already envisaged in the 'percentages agreement' between Churchill and Stalin in 1944, was primarily and decisively shaped in Germany before it became fait accompli in the rest of Europe. Whilst during 1945-6 the political situation in Central and Eastern Europe was evolving toward an increasing Soviet influence (especially in Romania and Bulgaria), the situation was less clear in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland, where the non-Communist leadership had hoped for more resolute support by the Western Allies. It appears however, that the United States was prepared to let Central and Eastern Europe into the Soviet sphere and focus its efforts on reconstituting Western Europe, choosing to replace their 'one world' vision with a 'half world' option.²³ In that context, the rehabilitation of Western Germany and Western Europe would benefit the United States because of the degree of development of the Western European economies and industrial networks. The economic crisis of 1946, the breakdown of four power control at ACC level and the possibility of a single reconstituted Germany tipping toward Moscow prompted Byrnes' invitation to the other occupation powers to merge their zones of occupation with the American zone in September 1946. The intervention of the superpowers created a split in Germany which arrested and reversed a situation of 'latent tripolarity'.²⁴ The setting of an independent Germany was clearly against the 'grand design' objectives of the superpowers. An independent Germany would have made the attainment of a free market reorganisation of the world economy on the American model more difficult, if not impossible. The Nazi regime had aimed for the creation of a pan-European autarkic bloc since the 1930s. During

International Society, (Clarendon Press: Oxford) (1984), p. 14-5

²³ See Lundestad, G., *The American Non-Policy Towards Eastern Europe 1943-1947*, (Tromsø, Oslo, Bergen: Universitetsforlaget) (1978)

the war, there was a great deal of industrial and transport integration between Germany, the Low Countries and France. An independent Germany would have been more prone to establish an autarkic bloc in Europe, therefore excluding the goods and capital that the United States needed to export in order to avoid another economic depression. Moreover, the establishment of a reconstituted single German political unit would have created enormous apprehension in Moscow, for the Soviet Union would have seen its security compromised by a potential revival of nationalism in Germany.

The 'pluralist plus' elements in the institutionalisation of the post-war international society are manifested in the way both superpowers adhered to a strict recognition of the spheres of influence in Europe. The Western powers refrained from intervening during the East German crisis (1953), and the uprisings in Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968). The Soviet Union did little to profit from the politically volatile situation in the United States in the 1960s and Italy and Germany in the 1970s.²⁵ The superpowers seldom intervened outside of their respective spheres of influence.²⁶ Intervention on the part of the United States and the Soviet Union helped to establish a post-war international society based on institutionalised co-existence. This institutionalisation process had its apogee with the signing of the Helsinki Accords of 1975, which legalised the division of Germany and Europe into spheres of influence.²⁷

²⁴ See McAllister, J., *No Exit: America and the German Problem, 1943-1954*, (Cornell University Press) (2002)

²⁵ The Italian Communist Party (PCI) distanced itself from the Red Brigades movement in the 1970s. See Alexander, Y. and Pluchinsky, D. A., *Europe's Red Terrorists: The Fighting Communist Organizations*. (London: Routledge) (1992)

²⁶ In the case of the Cuban Missiles Crisis and the Middle East, typical examples of intervention beyond the spheres of influence boundaries, diplomatic engagement succeeded in avoiding an irretrievable breakdown of the Cold War international order.

²⁷ The Helsinki Accords set up the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in order to promote East-West co-operation. The Helsinki Final Act held the post-World War Two European border arrangements to be permanent, and the signers agreed to respect the human rights and civic freedoms of their

For the duration of the Cold War, the German Question would remain a structuring factor in the institutionalisation of the society of states. The Allies had a decisive say in the origination, unfolding and unraveling of the German Question. The German Question would take the centre stage of Cold War diplomacy. The ongoing concerns of the superpowers over Germany prompted the continuation of an assiduous diplomatic intercourse. The Final Act of the London Conference on October 3, 1954 endorsed the frontiers of Germany as provisional, pending a comprehensive peace settlement with a future all German government. Reunification was further discussed at the Geneva Conferences in 1955 and 1959 as well as the Paris Summit in 1960, the Vienna Conference between Khrushchev and Kennedy in 1961, the Nassau Agreement of 1962 and the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963. The same Rationalist approach employed by the Allies in achieving a bipolar solution during the 1943-8 was utilised in order to pave the way for détente in the 1970s. Furthermore, the reunification of Germany in 1990 unraveled the Cold War international order within the same legal and diplomatic framework that brought about the two states settlement in the wake of World War Two. The Treaty of Paris (1990) officially ended the Cold War with an arms reduction and a conflict prevention treaty, as well as the reduction of stationed military forces in designated geographical zones in Central and Western Europe and on the flanks of the Soviet Union. The Charter issued by this congress undertook to 'build, consolidate and strengthen democracy as the only system of government» in Europe'. ²⁸ These legal provisions were supplemented by the Treaty on the

citizens, as well as to undertake various forms of international co-operation. Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Final Act, Helsinki, August 1, 1975- www.hri.org/docs/Helsinki75.html

²⁸ Charter of Paris for a New Europe, Paris 19-21, 1990-
www1.umn.edu/humanrts/peace/docs/charterparis.html

Final Settlement with Respect to Germany signed in Moscow on September 12, 1990, which legalised the reunification of Germany.²⁹

The spheres of influence system was conducive to a 'pluralist plus' situation, as polarisation in Germany and Europe provided the superpowers with a framework of cooperation in the aim of securing a 'peace of sorts' but left considerable scope for the inner dynamics in the respective spheres of influence. The 'peace of sorts' achieved through the spheres of influence system required considerable diplomatic efforts as well as a sound legal framework, because of the extent of the responsibilities and accumulation of power amassed by the superpowers during the war and the extension of the franchise in international society. It was in no small part due to the institutionalisation of the international order that the Cold War settlement remained undisrupted until its very demise.

6.5 The German Question and the expansion of international society

The treatment of the German Question created an expansion of the constituency of the society of states. This process originated with the intervention of the United States and the Soviet Union in the political emasculation of Germany and Europe as well as the gradual absorption of former colonies into their spheres of economic influence.

In the aftermath of World War One, the victorious European powers had kept their political autonomy intact. Their imperial possessions (if not their economic influence) had even increased in number, due to the demise of the German, Austrian and Ottoman Empires. Conversely, superpower intervention during World War Two meant that Washington would

²⁹ Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany, Moscow, September 12, 1990-usa.usembassy.de/etexts/2plusfour8994e.htm

have a foothold in Western Europe, Eastern Asia, as well as an unchecked influence in Latin America and the decolonised parts of the world. In addition to this, the Soviet Union would have a significant impact in the process of the expansion of the society of states and in the achievement of a more general equilibrium of power.³⁰ Indeed, the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 and the subsequent advance of the Red Army into the West during the Great Patriotic War created a permanent presence of the Soviet Union in Central and Eastern Europe, depriving the countries occupied by the advancing armies of any possibility of political autonomy. Whereas the European imperial powers extended and preserved their power in the nineteenth century with regards to a delicate balance of power, the United States and the Soviet Union had carte blanche to extend their interests in Germany and Europe due to their overwhelming military and economy power. Economic and political interests made it incumbent upon them that Europe as a whole and Germany in particular would have a politically subordinated role.

The extensive nature of World War Two gave the society of states a truly global dimension. The revisionist challenge initiated by Germany necessitated the contribution of a large constituency in the war effort.³¹ World War Two unfolded in vast chunks of the Eurasian landmass and the Asia-Pacific region. New technologies like the radar as well as atomic and ballistic weapons created an interconnection between the different fronts and brought to the

³⁰ Bull, H., *The Revolt Against the West* in Bull, H. and Watson, A., *The Expansion of international Society*, (Clarendon Press: Oxford) (1984), p. 224-7

³¹ The Declaration of the United Nations of January 1, 1942. The Declaration signatories included the United States, the United Kingdom and the Dominions, the Soviet Union and China which subscribed to the aims of the Atlantic Charter and pledged to 'employ its full resources, military or economic, against those members of the Tripartite Pact and its adherents with which such government is at war' and to 'co-operate with the Governments signatory hereto and not to make a separate armistice or peace with the enemies'. The declaration was open to 'other nations...rendering material assistance and contributions in the struggle for victory over Hitlerism'. Declaration by the United Nations- January 1, 1942- http://www.civicwebs.com/cwvlib/constitutions/un/e_united_nations_declaration_1942.htm

fold political realities that had seemed distant thus far. The eruption of resistance movements in Europe and Asia made certain the possibility of decolonisation and geopolitical redress. This new political reality was acknowledged by the superpowers. Both the United States and the Soviet Union would benefit enormously from the extension of the franchise in the society of states. The decentralisation of authority in the international order, prompted by the German and Japanese invasion of Europe and Asia, coupled with the enormity and vastness of the war effort, created the chance for the two superpowers to expand their political objectives beyond Europe.

The post-war international society retained strong 'pluralist plus' aspects, as it was informed by the impositions of the spheres of influence system and the co-existence of ideologies. But the massive power accumulated by the United States and the Soviet Union during the war and the vacuum of power originated by the demise of Germany and Europe created the scope for more intervention in the international political system and the curtailment of sovereignty as one of the central institutions of the international order. The occupation and transformation of Germany would create a precedent that was later applied to the decolonised areas of the world. While the two blocs co-existed, the superpowers felt free to marshal their own spheres of influence and impart their own concept of order and justice within them.

6.6 Conclusion

The transformational aspects of the treatment of the German Question stemmed from the need to prevent the resurgence of Germany as a challenging power and the decline in the political autonomy of the European powers, expanding international society from its Euro-

centric core and giving it a truly global dimension. This process was facilitated by the increased institutionalisation of the international order.

The transformation of the society of states would unfold within the parameters imposed by the interests of the superpowers. These interests gave rise to the need to intervene in the outcome of the German Question and create spheres of influence which would enable the two superpowers to coexist. Jackson states the 'normative' nature of intervention during the Cold War.³² This normative intervention had its most important precedent in the treatment of the German Question during the 1943-8. Jackson argues that the pluralist construction of world politics and international society entails 'multiple political authorities based on the values of equal sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-intervention of member states' and 'an arrangement in which the domestic affairs of states are their own affairs'.³³ In the case of the inter-Allied intercourse over Germany, the need to intervene in order to recreate the post-war international order according to long range political and economic objectives was not juxtaposed with the normative requirement to configure a society of states capable of cohabitating in spite of their diversity of ideologies. This 'pluralist plus' configuration was decisive in the transformation of international society. Intervention would entail the transformation of Western Europe by ending the internal balance of power. In the case of Eastern Europe, adherence to the bloc institutions created by Communist diktat gave rise to the creation of an economic and political sphere which rehabilitated a region ravaged by the war. Co-existence would determine the parameters of the transformation as well as create the basis for continued dialogue. It is partly because of the tacit acknowledgement of an

³² Jackson, R., *The Global Covenant-Human Conduct in a World of States*, pp. 254-5

³³ Jackson, R., *The Global Covenant-Human Conduct in a World of States*, pp. 178-9

international order composed by two camps that the Cold War unfolded in a non-disruptive manner from beginning to end.

From a solidarist perspective, Vincent argues that in the case of the Soviet bloc non-intervention took second place to shared interests and goals.³⁴ However, the principle of non-intervention did apply to relations between the socialist and capitalist blocs. This seems to back up a 'pluralist plus' interpretation: both in the case of the German Question and the overall realignment of international society after the war intervention served as a tool to demarcate the parameters of the institutionalisation of the international order. This 'selfish interventionist' approach enabled the Allies to operate within their spheres of influence without seeking an overhaul of the international order. By doing so, they achieved the double aim of respecting the diversity of interests and ideologies in the international order and managing the Cold War international political system without systemic disruption.

A typical anarchic and pluralist condition had shaped the international political system after 1919. The Versailles settlement imposed the segregation of the Soviet Union, the American retreat from the international arena and the failure to achieve an effective institutionalisation of the international order. This can be seen in the relative weakness of the League of Nations and the fiasco of the Genoa Conference of 1922, which had as its original intention to bring back to the fold the 'pariah states' of Europe: the Soviet Union and Germany. Moreover, the Versailles system retained its Euro-centric nature, which precluded the expansion of international society. Conversely, since 1943 the Allies transformed international society using solidarist elements. While the superpowers retained an overall

³⁴ Vincent R. J. , *Non-Intervention and the International Order*, p. 187

pluralist approach to their association over the German Question and the management of the nascent international political system, the extent and scope of the responsibilities which burdened America and the Soviet Union were significantly larger than those imposed upon the European powers until the outbreak of World War Two. The Allied treatment of the German Question during the 1943-8 period resulted in the setting of institutions, regimes and diplomatic and legal structures that would regulate the management of the international political system after the war. This 'pluralist plus' making of the post-war international society would kickstart another important break in the history of the society of states. The surrender of the German state to the Allies would entail the reconstitution of international society according to an eroded view on sovereignty and the beginning of an interventionist era. Washington and Moscow would influence the political and economic process within their spheres of influence according to a 'selfish solidarist' criterion. Furthermore, the surrender of the German state would create a precedent which would be used in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and more recently in Iraq and Afghanistan. The defeat of Germany in the battlefield would enable the superpowers to reshape the foundations of the German state(s). In a similar manner, the military intervention on the part of NATO forces in the Balkans in the 1990s and Iraq and Afghanistan in the aftermath of 9/11 would give rise to the creation of new state structures and the imposition of democracy and the free market by great powers such as the United States and the European Union.

The revolutionist aspects of the treatment of the German Question overlapped with the legal dimension in which the Allies operated. The superpowers undertook the process of transformation in order to enforce long range interests. The transformation of Germany and Europe would have a long lasting effect. While the political subordination of the continent ended in 1989-90, the transformative aspects that shaped the outcome of the

German Question continue to inform the European political order. The creation of a single economic sphere dates back to the intervention of the United States in the ending of the internal balance of power system in Western Europe. However, Europe continues to be bound by the financial, political and military institutions established through the treatment of the German Question during 1943-8. The legacy of great power intervention remains one of the key elements informing the process of integration in the European continent as the expansion into the East unfolds within the parameters enforced by the supranational institutions based in Brussels and Strasbourg and the sway of the biggest economic bloc in the world.

CONCLUSION

The German Question, the English School and the origins of the Cold War

This study undertakes to explain the origins of the Cold War from the perspective of the inter-Allied treatment of the German Question. It endorses the view that the conflictual, legalistic and transformative aspects of inter-Allied interaction regarding Germany were the most significant factor in the making of the post-war international order. Linking the English School's theoretical tenets to the understanding of the treatment of the German Question allows us to re-appraise the role of international relations theory in the assessment of the polarisation process that unfolded in the international political system in the aftermath of World War Two. This study endeavours to practically apply the concepts espoused by the English School to the theoretical evaluation of a system-defining historical issue like the treatment of the German Question between 1943 and 1948. To summarise my findings, I will undertake to make some conclusions on the centrality of the German Question in the making of the post-war international order and the relevance of English School thinking in explaining system defining issues in the history of the international political system.

The divergence of interests between the superpowers ultimately brought about the polarisation of Germany and Europe. However, conflict overlapped with the entrenchment of a diplomatic and legal framework capable of sustaining a non-disruptive international order in which the superpowers would be able to pursue their national interest within clearly defined spheres of influence. These developments facilitated the transformation of the society of states. Dealing with the German Question entailed the undertaking of a significant

transformation of the country and subsequently, of the society of states as a whole. As seen in chapters 5 and 6, the denazification process that unfolded in Germany through the inter-Allied occupation had a revolutionist effect in the defeated nation and created several transformations in the society of states. During the 1943-8 period, ideological rivalries, which loomed as the result of dealing with Germany on and off the battlefield, were reflected in the configuration of post-war international society. In effect, *the concern with ideology* became the ideology of the post-war society of states.¹ Furthermore, the disruptive nature of the Hitlerite quest for domination in Europe would create an extension and an institutionalisation of international society unparalleled in the history of the international political system. Pointing to an internationalisation of the system, Luard maintains that ideological loyalties (which transcend national boundaries) become as important in determining action as national loyalties, as states are more affected by developments elsewhere.² As the states-system expanded outside its European core, the extent over which a general balance of power was to be maintained, increased correspondingly.³ The treatment of the German Question between the Casablanca Conference of 1943 and the breakdown of four power control in 1948 was the most significant factor in the creation and evolution of the post-war international order.⁴

The literature available on the German Question has so far attempted to explain isolated aspects of the subject. By using a more comprehensive approach, this study has shown that in the interaction of the superpowers in the treatment of the German Question, elements of

¹ Luard, E., *Types of international Society*, p. 69

² Luard, E., *Types of international Society*, p. 103-4

³ Wight, M., *The Balance of Power and International Order* in James, A. (ed), *The Bases of International Order-Essays in Honour of C A W Manning*, (Oxford University Press: London and New York) (1973), p. 100-8

conflict, legality and cooperation overlapped and shaped the position of Germany in the post-war international order. This work also contributes to determine the extent of the influence of the treatment of the German Question on the origins of the Cold War and the making post-war international order. Like the treatment of the German Question, the realignment of the post-war international order unfolded within the boundaries imposed by two superpowers labouring under highly calculated political moves, which although responding to the national interest, were restrained in their scope of action. The Allies set the path for the reconciliation of Germany's legitimate claims in the international political system and the elimination of the possibility of a post-war German challenge to the international order. *The German Question was the most important issue in the reordering of world politics because of the extent to which all other situational factors were linked to its outcome.* There would have been no successful outcome for the superpowers elsewhere in Europe (as far as their 'grand design' interests were concerned) without a viable solution for the German problem. The treatment of the German Question created a *modus operandi* for superpower interaction which would be successfully transferred to the management of the Cold War international order.

This study attempts to bring about a more comprehensive interpretation of the significance of the German Question in the making of the post-war international order. A more comprehensive and systemic understanding of the factors involved in the outcome of the German Question and its influence on the Cold War international could be facilitated by including areas which have been underworked by the Cold War scholarship. Any attempt to

⁴ For the evolution of the Cold War in Germany see Mitchell, O., *The Cold War in Germany-Overview, Origins and Intelligence Wars* (University Press of American: Lanham, MD) (2005) and Burchett, W., *Cold War in Germany* (World Unity Publications: Melbourne) (1950)

better understand the pivotal character of the German Question in the making of the Cold War international order would have to incorporate more extensive accounts of the contribution of West and East German leaders to the bipolar outcome. Establishing the extent of the indigenous input in events leading up to partition would also enhance our understanding of the role of the German leadership on both sides of the Elbe in the unfolding of the German Question *during* the Cold War. The study of the role of Germany in the making of the Cold War international order could benefit from more systemic accounts, particularly in relation to the transformation that it brought to the international political system. Because of the holistic nature of its trilateral approach, and the relative importance of the debate on the pluralist and solidarist elements of international society, the English School could add more to the analysis of the German Question and the origins of the Cold War, by tackling the different aspects of the historiography available.⁵ The historiography on the German Question during this period is vast. The archival resources on the issues pertaining to it are voluminous. Therefore, the study of the subject could benefit from more narrative, non-Rankean accounts of the history of the treatment of the German Question and its implications of the post-war international order. A more systemic comprehension of *what we know*, focusing on conflictual, legal and revolutionist perspectives, would enable us to better understand the significance of Germany in the origins of the Cold War.

Superpower interaction in the treatment of the German Question produced a peculiar restructuring of the international political system. The study of this realignment has profound implications for the pluralist-solidarist debate. Dealing with Germany on and off

⁵ Roberts mentions my paper entitled 'The German Question and the International Order (1943-8)'- www.leeds.ac.uk/polis/englishschool/lewkowicz05.doc as a practical application of English School concepts to

the battlefield prompted the involvement of the United States and the Soviet Union in the remaking of the international order according to the principle of intervention. Bull warns that the solidarist conception of international society was not only 'premature' but potentially detrimental to the international order of the society of states.⁶ Seen from this standpoint, we can arrive at the conclusion that the influence of the German Question on the making of the post-war international order resides in the 'pluralist plus' elements with which it was bequeathed: intervention within legally-determined boundaries and the pursuit of the national interest within the spheres of influence imposed by the need to co-exist. The 'pluralist-plus' ethic concocted by the superpowers through the treatment of the German Question became a system that restricted intervention to the inner dynamics of the spheres of influence and expanded the idea of co-existence. As such, it differed from the narrow, ultra-realist concept of pluralism and the over-ambitious concept of solidarism. Watson states that hegemonial practice entails the pursuit of the national interest, prudence (minimising risks to the state itself and also to the international society in which it operates) and moral responsibility.⁷ The *modus operandi* employed by the superpowers in the treatment of the German Question entailed the creation of a convivialist ethic within the context of legality and the possibility of transforming the society of states.

Employing a more systemic approach in the study of the most significant issue in the making of the post-war international order has the effect of debunking ideologically constructed theories on the origins of the Cold War. By focusing on the systemic nature of the

actual historical episodes. See Roberts, G., *History and IR*, Review of International Studies, Volume 32 Number 4 October 2006, p. 709

⁶ Bull, H., 'The Grotian Concept of International Society' in Wight, M. and Butterfield H. (eds.), *Diplomatic Investigations*, p. 68-73

⁷ Watson, A., lecture notes for the CSD Encounter at the University of Westminster, June 5, 2002

superpowers' structural interests, the nature of the legal and diplomatic framework and the transformative effect brought about by World War Two, it is possible to put together an interpretation that looks at the German problem and its influence of the Cold War from the perspective of the different elements attached to superpower interaction.

The practical association framework, set in motion with the entry of the United States and the Soviet Union in the conflagration, enabled the Allies to implement cooperative policy not only to deal with the German Question but also to create a more progressive international order. As seen in chapter 4, the Rationalist streak involved in dealing with Germany during the war determined the evolution of the institutions of intervention and co-existence as pillars of the Cold War international order. It is by looking at these developments that the mainstream theories on the origins of the Cold War seem narrow in scope. The orthodox view appears to (almost blatantly) endorse 'Soviet expansionism' as the main contributing factor in the creation of polarisation. Revisionism is also narrow-minded, for it also imputes an ideological response to the creation of conflict. By focusing on the conflictual character of the Cold War, the orthodox and revisionist views fail to address the nature of the post-war international order in a systemic way and neglect the consensual elements involved in its creation. Quite rightly, Leffler points to *a lack of overall synthesis* in the 'new' scholarship of the origins of the Cold War, emphasising that the full story will demand 'to transcend the parts and concentrate on the whole'.⁸

Using a system-defining episode in the history of the international political system can also help us to refine core English School theoretical concepts. The trilateral tradition of

⁸ Leffler, M., *Bringing it Together: The Parts and the Whole* in Westad, O. A. (ed), *Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretations, Theory* (Frank Cass: London and Portland, OR) (2000), p. 58

international relations theory outlined by Martin Wight hinges upon the psychological roots of human association. Let us take the example of a married couple. The couple, upon entering into the institution of marriage, swear to abide by the rules, principles and values which will sustain the basic functions of the relationship. They may undertake to be monogamous, to have mutual respect for one another, to share in the housekeeping duties and to contribute to the household expenditure. These undertakings represent the Rationalist aspects of the relationship. The rules and principles agreed upon by the couple, if honoured, may create the conditions to enhance and revolutionise the relationship. The couple might decide to have children, to spend romantic weekends together or buy a retirement home in the Caribbean. However, this couple may also have opposite views on politics, a different approach to expenditure and alternative ways of expressing their love for one another. These clashing views and attitudes represent the Realist aspects of the relationship. The association in which this couple enters into may be sustained for life or indeed end at some point. However, for the duration of the association there will be elements that will preserve, challenge as well as transform its context, thus providing it with its particular shape and meaning.

Drawing an analogy between individuals and states, one may argue that in any constituted political order there are rules by which citizens abide. There are also group and individual interests, which create a competitive atmosphere between societal actors. At the same time, members of that political entity may feel a fundamental (and potentially transformative) sense of belonging. At international level, states may for instance share membership of international and supranational organisations. They may also be fierce about the protection of their national interest whilst pursuing it within the established boundaries. The dynamics between the member states of the European Union are an eloquent example of the

interaction between conflict, legality and transformation. A member-state like Poland may have a more affectionate view of her relationship with the United States than, for example, France and Germany. At the same time, a country like Poland may help to transform the notion of Europeanness with the mass migration of its people to the western part of the continent. In any case, these elements of conflict and cooperation unfold within the legal and diplomatic commitment that derives from this member-state's association within the supranational unit. The continual overlap of the three traditions provides the international political system with a sense of order. The treatment of the German Question between 1943-8 is an example of how the three lines of interpretation collide, overlap and supplement each other.

The treatment of the German Question determined to a significant extent the roadmap to the post-war international order and helped to shape the diplomacy and institutions that would inform superpower interaction during the Cold War. The German problem provided the superpowers with the opportunity to delineate their national interest priorities in the post-war scenario. The German Question would signpost the evolution of the Cold War. Conflictual issues, diplomatic and legal arrangements as well as the possibility of transformation in the international political system would be negotiated by the superpowers through the treatment of the German problem. The Cold War international order would end in the same way it began: through the orderly resolution of the German Question. The reunification of Germany and the European continent in 1989-90 would have similar characteristics to the process of partition: conflict and cooperation co-habited, framed within a well-established legal and diplomatic system. It is within that context that the superpowers created and unraveled the Cold War.