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ARCHITECTURE AND TEMPORALITY
IN CONSERVATION PHILOSOPHY:
CESARE BRANDI

Fidel Alejandro Meraz Avila, architect, MArch

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Abstract

In conservation of culturally significant architecture (CSA), awareness about problems of temporality and their consideration has been frequently approached with different perspectives. However, these partial explanations have usually focused on accounts of temporality that mainly approach the past and the present, and more rarely the future, but do not consider the complete spectrum of human temporality, nor explicit ontological bases. In this thesis, architecture emerges as a manifold being in constant becoming that compels human being to exercise permanently memory and assimilation. The main contribution is the proposal of an existential approach towards conservation as an intentionality grounded on the more fundamental attitudes of cultivation and care. Through epistemological and phenomenological analysis of Brandi’s thought – focusing on his paradigmatic Theory of Restoration – his attitude comes forth as a particular form of conservation intentionality limited to architecture as a work of art. Following mainly Ingarden and Ricoeur, the results of ontological and phenomenological investigations about architecture and temporality demonstrate conservation in its modern form as a limited temporal intentionality. After these theoretical pre-conditions, the existential approach applied on the previously deduced dimensions of the space and time of Dasein – in Heidegger’s terms – proved the grounding of conservation on an existential interpretation of the more fundamental notions of cultivation and care.

Making an analogy with Ingarden’s notion of the architectural work of art, CSA is ontologically analysed emerging to consciousness as a manifold
being that can be concretized in different ways according with the attitude of the receptor. After the phenomenological analysis of memory, architectural conservation in its modern form is demonstrated as a partial account of human temporality that can be overcome considering human inhabitation in a creative way. Partially supported on the obtained cases of remembered architecture, the hermeneutical approach concluded suggesting a solution for the impasse with an existential account of both, the artistic grounding of architecture and its characterisation as the place that temporally accompanies Dasein. Thus, architecture is ontologically demonstrated to have a manifold being in constant state of transformation that participates of an unavoidable humanised temporality, appearing as a less ambiguous object of conservation. Hence, architecture is existentially demonstrated as constituting the space for the authentically concerned human, whose temporal consciousness compels to cultivate and care about, enriching the possible approaches to conservation as a collective endeavour.
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Glossary

Adumbration. In phenomenology, Husserl calls adumbration the revelation of objects in consciousness not given all at once, but in successive perspectives. These perspectives allow the discovery of the same object while moving around it perceiving it as more of this same thing. These views are given to consciousness as a continuum that is unveiled in contrast with essences that are given at once.¹

Aesthetics. Usually, aesthetics is understood as the area of philosophy which studies beauty and art. In a more classic definition it is referred as the study and philosophy of the quality and nature of sensory responses related to, but not limited by, the concept of beauty. The term aesthetics was only recently invented by Baumgarten in 1735, where it appears in his Meditationes philosophicae de nonnullis ad poema pertinentibus.² In the context of Kant’s three critiques aesthetics is everything having to do with sense-perception.³

Artistic value. In general, artistic values are the characteristics that render man made objects works of art, these characteristics have been identified through an aesthetic intentionality. For some art theories, such characteristics are constant and belong to the object itself. “[T]here is no such thing as the value of art. For works of art can be evaluated from many different points of view and, corresponding to these points of view, they have many different kinds of value: moral, political, social, historical, religious, sentimental or therapeutic, for example. Moreover, for a particular kind of value, whether a work possesses that value, and the degree to which it does so, will often be a relative matter, depending on the kinds of people whose involvement with the work is in question.”⁴

Aura. Benjamin used the term aura for the feeling of awe created by old objects such as works of art or objects produced in the past.

Authenticity. Authenticity is the quality of being genuine both in apparent origin and in content. The claim that certain works are physical objects or are constituted by them depends on an intuitive contrast between singular and multiple works. Among works of the former kind are paintings and sculptures, where the object fashioned by the artist (the authentic object) seems to have a unique status – a proper appreciation of the work requires that the viewer sees that object rather than any copy of it, however good. It has been suggested that every visible feature of the work is potentially relevant to the proper appreciation of it, and so an aesthetically adequate copy of the work would have to look exactly like the original. It is possible then to produce copies of paintings and sculptures indistinguishable from their originals by the modes of perceptual access appropriate for those works. If this were frequently done, the aura of indispensability that surrounds originals would dissipate.  

Astanza. In the context of the concept of the work of art, Brandi divides presence between presence as astanza and presence as flagrance. Astanza is a presence that is disconnected from time while flagrance is the form of being of the real objects that can be perceived. “[A]stanza is the proper mode of being of the work of art, and it is defined in opposition to flagrance which is the mode of being present of ordinary things, that Brandi calls existential reality.”  
He coined this term from the Latin words ad and stare, meaning to be there, to be given in praesentia, to be presentified, in opposition to the flagrance of the real existent. He explains that “The concept of astanza is founded in the being present of something that is only because it is present.”  See also flagrance.

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6 Paolo D’Angelo, Cesare Brandi critica d’arte e filosofia, 149 p. vols. (Macerata: Quodlibet, 2006). p. 31. (Our translation). D’Angelo observes that in Cesare Brandi, Le due vie (Bari: Laterza, 1966)., astanza e realtà pura are almost synonyms. In Cesare Brandi, Teoria generale della critica, Einaudi (Turin: 1974), the term astanza ousteds definitely pure reality. He highlights that Brandi even founded the concept of astanza on new philosophical basis such as the ones of Heidegger and Derrida.
7 Brandi, Teoria generale della critica p. 83.
**Becoming.** Heidegger suggests the structure of human being is comprised of three co-equal moments: becoming, alreadiness and presence. This is what he calls *temporality*. Thus, temporality means being present by becoming what one already is. “To be human means that one is not a static entity just ‘there’ among other things. Rather, being human is always a process of becoming oneself, living into possibilities, into one’s future. […] The ultimate possibility into which one lives is the possibility to end all possibilities: one’s death. Human beings are essentially finite and necessarily mortal, and so one’s becoming is an anticipation of death. Thus, to know oneself as becoming is to know oneself, at least implicitly, as mortal.”

8 See also temporality.

**Bracketing.** Bracketing is the first phenomenological move, the phenomenological reduction, also called by Husserl *bracketing* or *epoché*. The move involves distancing oneself from one’s everyday *immersion* in the ordinary practical activities of life, adopting a reflective standpoint upon one’s experience of the world. This is taken to be the necessary standpoint from which to engage in genuine philosophical enquiry, one which phenomenologists criticize other philosophers for failing to adopt. The philosophical standpoint is radically different from the *natural* attitude of common sense and of scientific enquiry. The crucial difference is that, in the natural attitude, one assumes unquestioningly that the world exists. The philosophical attitude, in contrast, puts aside – brackets – this assumption. The philosophical standpoint after the reduction is differently characterized by transcendental phenomenology (Husserl) and existential phenomenology (Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty). Husserl believed that it was a *transcendental* standpoint, *outside* the natural world. Existential phenomenologists believed that such a standpoint is neither attainable nor necessary. The human standpoint is essentially in the world. The reduction is

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only partial: one cannot put aside all one’s existential assumptions at the same time.⁹

**Care.** Care is the pre-theoretical concern of human being towards its world. The notion of care relates with Heidegger’s concept of temporality. He first conceived care (Sorge) as “the care-taker of beyng, such a care-taking involving an irreducible operation of creation.”¹⁰ According to him, in resolute disclosedness Dasein does not avoid its finite existence but anticipates it, changing its attitude in relation to its surrounding world. This phenomenon points to his notion of care. “In contrast to theories of human being as a self-contained theoretical ego, Heidegger understands human being as always outside any supposed immanence, absorbed in social intercourse, practical tasks and its own interests. Evidence for this absorption, he argues, is that human being always finds itself caught up in a mood – that is, tuned in to a given set of concerns. The field of such concerns and interests Heidegger calls the world; and the engagement with those needs and purposes and the things that might fulfil them he calls being-in-the-world (or equally care).”¹¹

**Concretization.** Concretization is used in the thesis as the act of consciousness of being addressed towards some identified whole or totality formed by other objects either “physical or psychical, abstract or concrete, whether given through sensation or phantasy […]”.¹² For the case of the concretization of Culturally Significant Architecture there is suggested a manifold composition of different identifiable layers.

**Critical.** Critical is Kant’s lifelong approach to philosophy which distinguishes between different perspectives and then uses such distinctions to settle otherwise unresolvable disputes. The Critical approach is not primarily negative, but is an attempt to adjudicate quarrels by showing the ways in which both sides have a measure of validity, once their perspective is properly

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¹¹ Sheehan, *Heidegger, Martin* ([cited]).

understood. Kant’s system of Critical philosophy emphasizes the importance of examining the structure and limitations of reason itself.\(^{13}\)

**Cultivation.** The term is motivated by an existential approach and is associated with Gadamer’s concept of *Bildung* that he relates with the concept of *Kultur*. For Gadamer, “Bildung [is] keeping oneself open to what is other – to other, more universal points of view. [...] To distance oneself from oneself and from one’s private purposes means to look at these in the way that others see them.”\(^ {14}\) Consequently, the idea of *cultivation* is the one of looking after the environment from the most comprehensive horizon for the benefit of the others. Cultivation then implies that we let ourselves grow in the opening towards the others.

**Dasein.** Dasein means human being within the context of Heidegger’s existentialist philosophy. In the thesis, the term refers to the particular way in which human beings are. Since one is within the world, one is concerned with our being but always being-in-the-world. Heidegger used the term to talk about human being in this intimate relation with its place in contraposition to the theoretical explanation of its world.\(^ {15}\) Thus, we privilege this term within discussions related with Heidegger’s philosophy instead of talking about human being.

**Dwell.** According to Heidegger, to live in a particular place and its things means dwelling; thus to dwell is Dasein’s way of being-in-the-world. However, this oversimplification implies that the things of the world reveal their participation in truth. Thus dwelling is to live in particular connection with the place and its things in which there arises as primordial the dwelling place as a comprehensive *somewhere* and not as a separated *something*.

**Epistemic, epistemological.** Related to knowledge. Related to the systematic study of knowledge.

\(^{13}\) Palmquist, *Glossary of Kant’s Technical Terms* ([cited]).


**Epoché.** In phenomenology, epoché is “the setting aside of all historical and natural assumptions and factual knowledge in order to be able to apprehend more readily the phenomena and the subject's consciousness of them”\(^\text{16}\).

**Existential.** Existential is referred to the explanation and reflection about the existence of beings. In particular within the thesis, the existence of human being and its place to dwell.

**Flagrance.** In Brandi’s terminology, flagrance refers to the proper mode of the existent things in their being evident to sensual perception. Brandi divides presence between presence as *astanza* and presence as flagrance. *Astanza* is a presence that is disconnected from time while flagrance is the form of being of the real objects that can be perceived. “[A]stanza is the proper mode of being of the work of art, and it is defined in opposition to flagrance which is the mode of being present of ordinary things, that Brandi calls existential reality.”\(^\text{17}\) See also *astanza*.

**Foundation.** For Husserl, “attitudes, like acts, are founded on one another. [] Foundation, modification and modalization are all structural features of our experiences, and their operations can produce new and more complex forms of consciousness. [P]erceptual certainty [] has a privileged role as a primal belief or protodoxa [] a kind of primitive certainty, a naïve acceptance of the world [].”\(^\text{18}\) All subsequent attitudes would be founded on this.

**Gaze.** Gaze is a particular way of regarding the world, a perspective from which one can perceive it which considers determinant relationship between the observer and the world. In the thesis it is frequently referred to the modern gaze, i.e. the way of Western civilization of observing the world after the Enlightenment.


\(^{17}\) D’Angelo, Cesare *Brandi critica d’arte e filosofia*. p. 31. (Our translation). D’Angelo observes that in Brandi, *Le due vie*, *astanza e realtà pura* are almost synonyms. In Brandi, *Teoria generale della critica*, the term *astanza* ousts definitely *pure reality*. He highlights that Brandi even founded the concept of *astanza* on new philosophical basis such as the ones of Heidegger and Derrida.

\(^{18}\) Moran, Edmund *Husserl founder of phenomenology* p. 150-51.
Hermeneutics. In philosophy, hermeneutics is the discipline, art or science of interpretation. Key exponents of this area of philosophy are: Dilthey, Heidegger, Gadamer and Ricoeur.

Historical value. In the categorization that Riegl articulates about monuments in his book *The modern cult of monuments*, he defines the historical one as one of the values in which he divides the analysis of them. The historical value of a monument is based on the very specific yet individual stage the monument represents in the development of human creation in a particular field. The other values he mentions are the age value, the deliberate commemorative value, the use value and the newness value.

Idealism. In philosophy, idealism is understood as the view that the physical world exists as produced by the mind or of mental nature. It is usually the position opposed to the view of realism.

Intentionality. In Husserl’s phenomenology, intentionality is the fact that all consciousness is consciousness of something or someone.

Intuition. In the context of phenomenology, intuition is considered as the apprehension and content of an object by consciousness. Intuitions can be filled or empty depending on whether perception can confirm the real presence of the intuited object or not.

Isotopy. The term is used, consistently with Brandi’s *Teoria Generale della Critica*, meaning certain level of understanding that demands determinate keys in order to be interpreted. He suggests, for instance, the distinction between these three levels of isotopy: existential reality (flagrancy), conceptualization (meaning) and presentification (*astanza*). These demand, correspondingly, sensual perception, signification and aesthetic attentiveness.

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**Kunstwollen.** Riegl defined *Kunstwollen* as the intentional artistic will that comes through the struggle against function, raw material and technical ability in the production of art.

**Manifold.** The term refers to the varied, complex and multiple composition that constitutes objects that are founded on many other simpler objects. These objects can be events, processes and objects enduring in time. As an adjective manifold refers to that specific quality of being composed in such a way.

**Mimesis.** In a restricted sense, mimesis means the representative or imitative nature of visual arts. In a wider sense, this representation is projected in this thesis to architecture as portraying a way of behaving, inhabiting or being-in-the-world.

**Mnemonic.** Something that refers to memory. It is said also about something that helps in remembering something.

**Noema, noematic.** Noema is the object of intentionality – any objective correlate in the phenomenological attitude – considered as experienced. It is not a copy, substitution, concept, or representation. It is the object itself as it is presented to consciousness. It is “the thing being thought of the thing we are aware of.” Noematic means that is referred to the noema.

**Noesis, noetic.** It is the intentional act of addressing things in the phenomenological standpoint. When discussing about noesis it is assumed that a transcendental reduction has been carried out. Noetic means that is referred to the noesis.

**Ontology.** In philosophy, ontology is a fundamental branch of metaphysics. It studies being or existence as well as the basic categories of it. It aims to explain what entities and what types of entities exist.

**Ornato.** For Brandi, *ornato* is “the transitting step with architecture is produced from the schematic form, and therefore what makes the building not

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24 Ibid. p. 60.
only tectonic, but formal appealing and in short, art.” It should not be taken as ornamentation, which he considers something marginally added. *Ornato* is an indissoluble quality in the constitution of the architectural object corresponding approximately to the concept of style in painting.

**Phenomenic, phenomenal, phenomenology.** Phenomenic refers to a phenomenon. Phenomenology is the study of appearances as they come into consciousness. For Husserl the objects of experience or attitudes were phenomena, since the thing in itself would be ungraspable by consciousness. He considered that it is possible to know the essence of things by studying these appearances.

**Protention.** Protention is the projection of the consciousness of something that is in the present into the future.

**Retention.** It is the present consciousness of something that has its origin in the past.

**Scinded.** In general the term scinded is defined as divided or separated. In the thesis, the term scinded is used to describe the separation of certain architectural attitudes in modern conservation from the integral character of architecture in relation with Dasein.

**Temporality, temporal intentionality.** Temporal is the character of something being developed in time. However, in Husserl’s phenomenology, it refers to the character of the ego of being aware of its own streaming through time. “[T]o speak of time consciousness as such is confusing. [] We are not conscious of time as such, but rather of objects in time.” Thus because of this, conservation in the thesis is taken as a temporal intentionality that finds in architecture its correlative object. More fundamental attitudes such as retention and protention constitute other forms of temporal intentionality, being memory and imagination their manifestation in consciousness. For Heidegger’s account on temporality see also *becoming*.

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25 D’Angelo, *Cesare Brandi critica d’arte e filosofia* p. 89. (Our translation)
26 Moran, *Edmund Husserl founder of phenomenology* p. 139.
**Transcendental idealism.** It is a form form of idealism espoused by Kant, who called himself a transcendental idealist but also an empirical realist. He meant, roughly, that what we experience can only be representations, not things in themselves, of which we can know nothing except that they must exist in order to ground the representations. The idealism is *transcendental* because we are forced into it by considering that our knowledge has necessary limitations and that we could not know things as they are, totally independent of us.\(^\text{27}\)

**Uncanny.** Uncanny is used to describe the feeling of insecurity, mystery, unpleasant uncertainty, weird and uncomfortable experiences that accompany the existential character of Dasein when reflects and is not absorbed by the everydayness, compelling Dasein to look for the place where it can be in peace.

**Weltanschauung.** In the context of epistemology in general and German philosophy in particular Weltanschauung stands for *World-view*. It means the way in which an individual or a particular cultural group conceives its world and its position and role within it.

Chapter 1: Introduction: On the Time in the Stone

Beauty
Time cannot be seen:
born only as a jest of a mad archer
he is only cruel for those who believe in him.
A hostile intent
made Time greedy and devouring,
and on swift wings gave him his scythe.
To contest such a rigid rule,
another, lighter thought was born,
where Time is no longer Time.

Disillusion
Foolishly you deny Time, and at this very hour
he is devouring some part of your beauty.
Tell me, of your ancestors what now is left?
Only their bones remain,
hidden by a grim tomb, a cold gravestone,
of your spent years,
tell me, what remains?
Oh vain delusion! Beauty never returns,
yet the seasons of the year recur.

Benedetto Pamphili, *La Bellezza Ravveduta nel trionfo del Tempo e del Disinganno*, 1707.

As suggested in the libretto for Handel’s oratorio above, from the time of Baroque allegoric compositions to the present day, one can chose to be blind towards time – as the character of Beauty does in its absolute vanity – or to face it with the determination that our limited temporality demands – as does Disillusion, another name for Truth. This twofold possibility of the human condition of seeing time in the context of architecture as a place to conserve frames the theoretical coordinates of this thesis. The context is founded on the notion of architectural heritage conservation being understood as the preservation of buildings, places, sites and cities with special cultural value from deterioration and disappearance. This thesis discusses conservation as a process of assimilation that allows and encourages society to accept

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transformations in its valuable environments. Architecture thus is recognised as the bearer of socially significant values such as utility values, economical values, identity values, and in particular for this thesis, history and memory values and recollection triggers. However, the way in which memory has been considered as a determinant of heritage conservation theory nowadays seems to reveal an incomplete account of temporality in the relation between human beings and architectural place.

Awareness of the problems of temporality and their inclusion in conservation has been offered by several authors with different perspectives. However, in general, these reflections have usually focused on a temporality that mainly considers the past and the present, but rarely the future. Some authors have regarded the problem influenced by postmodern relativism, misunderstanding or ignoring the manifold condition of architecture, or, with narrow perspectives, focusing only in one aspect of the plurality that constitutes architecture. Therefore, this thesis addresses the problem of conservation by uncovering an intentionality of an incomplete temporality behind the paradigmatic Theory of Restoration by Cesare Brandi (1906-1988).29 In addition, this study looks forward to propose engaging with a more comprehensive consideration of time in the relation between cultural place and human existence. On one side the phenomenological ontology proposed by Roman Ingarden in his Ontology of the work of art: the musical work, the picture, the architectural work, the film (hereafter Ontology of the work of art) constitutes the point of departure for the proposal of an ontology of culturally

significant architecture (hereafter CSA). This proposal tries to go beyond the mere artistic phenomena of architecture, which was the focus of Ingarden, and to some extent consider the existential approach of Martin Heidegger. On the other hand, the illuminating and clear treatise about memory by Paul Ricoeur, namely *Memory, History, Forgetting*, constitutes the main guide to approach memory and the complete spectrum of temporality, embracing it from the phenomenological perspective up to the existential hermeneutical approach.

The bases given by Edward Casey, in his *Remembering, A Phenomenological Study* and his *The Fate of Place* are revealing as well to deduce the relevance that memory and place have in the context of conservation intentionality. Philosophical proposals suggested by Heidegger, and in a more hermeneutical key by Georg Gadamer, are taken as the basis to interpret the phenomenon of conservation as intentionality towards architecture studied through theories. In the context of the thesis, the distinction between the notions of memory and history is crucial.

The fact that conservation is a modern action has been suggested by several authors. Eugène Emmanuel Viollet-le-Duc has already stated that the concept and the attitude of restoration themselves are modern and consequently this characterisation of conservation reveals the limitations of the Cartesian paradigm developed since the Enlightenment. In this situation, phenomenology arises as philosophy and as a powerful analytical tool to undertake this problem.

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because it deals with the human consciousness. Thus, the study of conservation as intentionality collides with the consideration of some other phenomena related with the human being changing through time. Problems such as cultural assimilation, collective memory, clash between tradition and innovation, and issues about philosophy of history have been considered in order to acquire a more complete picture of the philosophical endeavour.

Conservation theory, as the field of this thesis, is understood as the epistemological concretization of the intentionality under investigation. The research is centred on positive theory, that is to say openly, explicitly, intentionally and formally expressed explanation of architectural conservation. Brandi’s influential *Theory of Restoration* constitutes the critical case of this thesis. His theoretical proposals are still current explanatory principles and guide for practice in art conservation in general and architectural in particular. Despite the comprehensive thought that Brandi formulates, in an attempt to conciliate structuralistic and phenomenological perspectives, his proposals are object of criticism in the thesis for remaining limited to the work of art as such and remaining, for the case of architecture, detached from the complete existential dimension of the human being.

Phenomenological and hermeneutical approaches have been selected to conduct the research. The research has been influenced by the works of authors such as Ingarden for some ontological perspectives; Ricoeur for the phenomenological and hermeneutical approach to memory; and Heidegger as an existential alternative. The aims of the research are: to offer a philosophical explanation that suggests an ontological frame to build up architecture on; to
disclose a more complete temporality that connects architecture and human
time that remains incomplete through modern conservation intentionality; and
to suggest an existential dimension of temporality within the context of
human’s relation with architectural place and its conservation in time as a
continuum manifold in constant becoming. To embrace this research, it seems
necessary to establish some initial definitions, developed in the next section,
that work as a point of departure to engage with such a complex problem.

1.1 Approaching Heritage

The terms that demand to be preliminarily ascertained in order to start
the enquiry are the phenomenon of memory and by extension the complete
issue of temporality, the concept of conservation differentiated from other
related terms, the notions of assimilation of change, intentionality, and theory.
These concepts are taken as given for the initial stage, but as the thesis
develops, they will be additionally clarified, completed and even partially
transformed, but always following what the phenomenological method
suggests.

Memory and Temporality

Memory as a philosophical problem has been studied since the origins
of Western culture. In the analysis of these origins by Ricoeur, he characterises
it as the present image of an absent thing but this present image is individually
inherent.\textsuperscript{32} From that individual or personal image, memory is transposed to the
collective realm, as is further explained. Whether the nature of this collective
memory is the same as the individual is part of the concerns of the research specifically in the context of architecture. Heritage architecture is claimed to embody part of it.

Etymologically memory refers to the goddess Mnemosyne who was the cause not only of recollection but of knowledge as well. The goddess could know the past, the present and the future. Thus, Mnemosyne was the goddess of temporality, of knowledge in time, of the being of knowledge. Memory lost this characteristic with the emergence of Platonic philosophy and the intentionality of recollection was directed to the past knowledge that all humans inherently possess. With Aristotle the passivist paradigm of memory is finally established as orthodox and this situation persisted more or less during the Enlightenment and the Modern times, when memory was linked with the idea of a mathematical kind of register. The proposal to recover a more complete temporal dimension of memory is relatively recent. Scholars such as Henri-Louis Bergson, Sigmund Freud, Jean Piaget, Edmund Gustav Albrecht Husserl, Jean-Paul Charles Aymard Sartre, Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty would propose, although with significant differences, new interpretations of the capacity of memory. The complete aspect of temporality is not completely taken into account so far for heritage conservation, architectural in particular, and conservation intentionalities remain trapped within the only consideration of the past to which its enlightened origin is linked.

Initially memory is considered in this thesis as the capacity of human beings to remember events, processes and objects of past times, “the faculty by

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which things are remembered; the capacity for retaining, perpetuating, or reviving the thought of things past, [...] considered as residing in the awareness or consciousness of a particular individual or group. From this linguistical definition at the level of the term, the thesis attempts to provide an explanation that can distinguish several kinds of memories applicable to the architectural phenomenon. Phenomenology is revealed as a valid tool of enquiry to disentangle the relevance of memory in conservation, since memory is a specific intentionality within the complete spectrum of temporality. Phenomenology deals with reality from the point of view of human intentionality towards it. The method and its main particularities were first developed by Husserl. For the purpose of the thesis, some considerations about temporality are taken into account in Chapter 5, based mainly on the writings of Bergson, Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger and Ricoeur.

**Conservation and Assimilation**

Two initial methodological steps need to be taken in order for conservation to be defined in the context of this enquiry, at least as a preliminary phase that initially allows engagement with the problem and determination of its characteristics. The first one is to define the terminology for the studied phenomena and the second is the definition of the determinants of this concept itself as a processes of assimilation of the human being to adapt itself to new conditions.

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33 Casey, *Remembering, a phenomenological study* p. 15.
The concept of conservation is taken in the usual sense understood in the Anglo-Saxon tradition, since this thesis has been academically developed in English. Conservation as a term seems to be more comprehensive than the comparable ones of restoration and preservation. Conservation, in the broad sense describes the activities of protection dealing with existing cultural resources. In a narrow sense, conservation is opposed to restoration, so this activity refers only to maintain the actual form of the cultural resource. As a result of the anti-restoration movement led by John Ruskin in England in the 19th century, the term restoration in English was taken as something negative since this action was considered as acting against the historical authenticity of buildings. Therefore, the adopted term instead was conservation. Some other distinctions between conservation and restoration have been underlined, as Urbani states:

It is essential to differentiate between conservation and restoration. [...] Fundamentally, conservation may be defined as an operation aiming above all to prolong the life of an object by preventing, for a more or less long period of time, its natural or accidental deterioration. Restoration on the other hand, may rather be considered a surgical operation comprising in particular the elimination of later additions and their replacements with superior materials, going on occasion as far as to reconstitute what is called –incidentally, in somewhat incorrect manner– its original state.

In the thought of A.P. Zorzi, there was a difference between conservation and restoration. While the latter considered innovation according to the needs being intended for buildings with artistic but no archaeological importance, the former was intended to safeguard against decay, and was for

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buildings with historical importance seen as superior to artistic considerations.\textsuperscript{37} According to Jukka Jokilehto

[M]odern conservation is principally characterized by the fundamental change of values in contemporary society, a paradigm based on relativity and the new concept of historicity. [T]he modern sense of universal significance in cultural heritage [derives] from the conception that each is a creative and unique expression by a particular artist or community and, [...] represents the relevant cultural context.\textsuperscript{38}

It could be argued that concepts based on relativity are very easily challenged and in consequence, they need to be contextualised before any discussion can take place. In that sense, for example, Berducou states that it is necessary to reconcile the word restoration with the more modern term of conservation. She maintains that Latin countries lean more towards keeping a term and continuing to redefine it. Restoration then, for which she cites the case of Brandi’s theory, has been updated as a word that now includes the modern idea of conservation. For Anglo-Saxon countries, she says, conservation is a generic term and restoration a specific operation that leads toward the improvement of the object as an optional moment within conservation. She also notes the appearance of the expression conservation-restoration with the words put together which can be translated without too much misunderstanding, and used as a temporary tool.\textsuperscript{39} Relativist theorists maintain that it is possible to have two basic definitions of conservation. One narrow sense is conservation as opposed to restoration, this is as the keeping activity (opposed to change or destroy); and the second broad sense is conservation as the sum of restoration and other possible activities related to

\textsuperscript{37} Jokilehto, \textit{A History of Architectural Conservation}. p. 199.
\textsuperscript{38} Ibid. p. 295.
\textsuperscript{39} Urbani, "The science and art of conservation of cultural property." pp. 253-255.
this goal of protection.\textsuperscript{40} Jokilehto finally questions whether the concept of conservation is not concluded and whether it is possible to integrate its problem among that of environmental sustainability within a global cultural and ecological view.\textsuperscript{41}

In order to avoid confusion in the terms of conservation and restoration, some authors have developed the composed term conservation-restoration to imply that in the maintenance and care of cultural resources, either the keeping or the changing activity can be adopted. Alessandra Melucco Vaccaro comments on the rise in popularity of this combined concept of conservation-restoration as:

[...] A process that removes the causes of deterioration, takes care of the environment of the exhibition space or settings, respects history, and ensures preservation worthy of an object of aesthetic and cultural significance. It then provides for maintenance, environmental control, and so on, in a complete and, if possible, programmed continuum of procedures. These phases of treatment are all connected and are all indispensable; the sequence should never be interrupted unless limited resources mean resorting to partial and incomplete procedures.\textsuperscript{42}

The controversy in England between restoration and conservation negatively criticised the former; however, restoration constitutes an important concept developed by Brandi that is explored by this thesis. By this same token, the solution proposed by Melucco Vaccaro of joining the terms in conservation-restoration is to be avoided in this study.\textsuperscript{43} Therefore, the term restoration will be used in the sense given by Brandi and which it is: “the methodological moment of the recognition of the work of art, in its physical


\textsuperscript{41} Jokilehto, \textit{A History of Architectural Conservation}, p. 19.

\textsuperscript{42} Urbani, "The science and art of conservation of cultural property." p. 327.

\textsuperscript{43} Price, Talley et al., \textit{Historical and philosophical issues in the conservation of cultural heritage}. pp. 326-7.
consistency and its twofold aesthetic and historical polarity, in view of its transmission to the future,” to be discussed at a later point.\(^{44}\)

The meaning of restoration in English is different to that in Latin languages. In the conservation field, restoration means in English to give back to the cultural object its former or original state, or even to recover a precedent known state. Instead, in Latin languages it frequently means conservation in its broadest sense, the activities of protection dealing with existing cultural resources. As observed by Nicholas Stanley Price, the French term \textit{restauration} and the Italian \textit{restauro} are almost synonymous with the English conservation. However, for the purposes of this thesis the term restoration will be used according to Brandi’s definition in the context of the artistic phenomena, including architecture, unless otherwise stated. These precisions are necessary since nowadays the term restoration is understood, mainly in the North American context, as reintegration of losses in style.\(^{45}\)

In some places, such as in North America, the term restoration has even been changed to historic preservation. Preservation though, seems more related with the stabilisation of a process of degradation, without necessarily performing a significant intervention. In the field of cultural conservation it is “the activity that avoids alterations of something over time” and whose goal is “extending the life expectancy of cultural heritage.”\(^{46}\) Philippot says that “[t]he word preservation – in the broadest sense, being equivalent in some cultures to conservation or restoration – can be considered, from this point of view, as

\(^{44}\) Brandi, Basile et al., \textit{Theory of restoration}. p. 48.
\(^{45}\) Price, Talley et al., \textit{Historical and philosophical issues in the conservation of cultural heritage}. p. xiii.
\(^{46}\) Muñoz Viñas, \textit{Contemporary theory of conservation}. p. 16.
expressing the modern way of maintaining living contact with cultural works of
the past.\textsuperscript{47}

Conservation is initially conceived in the thesis as the intentionality
towards CSA that has the purpose of protecting architecture – that is to say
buildings, places, sites and cities – with special cultural value, from
deterioration and disappearance by means that can imply its transformation.
Conservation can be considered as one among other processes of assimilation
of change in the human being. These changes are produced by the human being
itself or by the natural decaying of the buildings through time.

Conservation has conventionally been determined by some issues.
Scholars, such as Chanfón, have included among these determinants: the idea
of culture and cultural heritage; history and its relation with memory; the
concept of identity; the monument; concepts such as restoration, conservation
and preservation; and aesthetics and the notion of art, which now is
incorporated in the cultural strand.\textsuperscript{48}

Other determinants have been disregarded in this thesis in order to focus
on memory but its importance is considered as part of an interlocked system.
For example, the concept of culture and cultural heritage has been changing
through time from expressions more related with the elite’s concepts of artistry
to a more anthropological view which can be seen as a product of the
Enlightenment inheritance. However, the relation of culture with memory
cannot be disregarded. This tendency leads to the consideration of the objects

\textsuperscript{47} Urbani, "The science and art of conservation of cultural property." p. 268.
of cultural heritage as containers of memory. Other determinants of conservation are the concepts of history and identity. The action of conservation is addressed towards objects or practices that have evolved in time that are supposed to express the identity of human groups. The problematic relation of history and memory is included in the thesis as one of the most noteworthy to be disentangled. The importance of the differentiation between these two concepts has already been highlighted by scholars such as Nora who, for example, conceives them as being opposed.\textsuperscript{49} The issue of identity, on the other hand, has been studied in relation to memory at a personal level when one is capable of “recognition of itself,” a way of memory that is taken for granted.\textsuperscript{50} This experience is related to the collective memory in which a social group is able to recognise itself through the vehicle of its recollections. Despite their inclusion within the cultural issues, the idea of aesthetics and the notion of art in Western culture is another important determinant of conservation. Conservation, as modern activity differentiated from maintenance, was in its initial stage mainly, if not exclusively, addressed to the work of art. The importance that Brandi gives to art within his concept of restoration demands a specific and systematic approach. For Brandi restoration is this “methodological moment of the recognition of the work of art” and nothing else. The recovering of different objects of cultural expression can be validly conserved but restoration is, in the context of his theory, aesthetically defined. Without the epiphany of what he calls astanza – a topic specifically treated – and its methodological recognition, restoration is not performed.

\textsuperscript{49} Pierre. Nora, \textit{Les lieux de mémoire}, 3 v vols. ([Paris]: Gallimard, 1997). pp. 24,5 For a view that does not consider these two terms in such an opposition, cfr. Jeffrey. Blustein, \textit{The moral...
Consideration of values in conservation, a topic that today seems very relevant, is an included aspect to approach the determinants of conservation, especially memory, for this thesis. Values attached to heritage are social constructions that evolve in time, as seems to be demonstrated by Searle’s analysis in his *The construction of social reality*. The importance of the ontological issues of these constructions is crucial for an analysis of how temporality is approached through conservation. Questioning the determinants of conservation theory can disclose problems that rest at the bottom of this activity. Controversies in the practice of conservation are provoked by different intentionalities that determine different points of view.

The complete phenomenon of conservation is regarded as an intentionality belonging to a complete human way of assimilation. This assimilation is not always consciously done and it can be related with the fact that human beings with the help of memory – especially collective memory – are constantly changing and adapting themselves in order to explain their situation in context. Halbwachs has suggested the existence of a rational activity that completes collective memory; the latter functions as a framework to anchor the reflection of the past and the former as a control of the adequate connections of the past with the present. From this perspective, conservation would be part of this rational activity that organises the idea that society has of its own past. This slow process of assimilation has also been experienced in

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other changes in society as in religion, politics, mores, for example, and in the thesis is correlated with conservation.

The dialectical relation between tradition and innovation is observed within the problem of assimilation. This relation, as the correlated phenomenon of assimilation, can be unfolded into, epistemological, but first of all ontological, aspects. Therefore, this thesis approaches the problem of conservation as assimilation, as an attempt to reconceptualise it as crisis in order for it to be overcome. Conservation, as it is demonstrated, deals not only with the change in the valuable built environment but also with changes in the intentionality towards it. These changes can be observed in theories of conservation as epistemological concretizations of human intentionalities. The fact that intentionalities can be collective could be argued; however, theories as explanations are usually a synthesis of thoughts originated from specific perspectives within society. This makes it necessary to specify what is intended by theory and intentionality for the purpose of this thesis.

**From Theory to Intentionality**

Conservation of architecture, as here suggested, is part of the vital relation of the human being with the constant becoming of its place to dwell. Thus, the performing of architecture is not only to think about it and build it, but mainly to live within it. This process in history has been done in many ways: first, it should have been an unconscious activity, but after years of trial and error, and recorded vital situations, knowledge started to arise. Knowledge first was related to tradition, and it founded theory as explanation but especially as guiding principles. Normative theory had a certain pre-eminence at this
stage. However, human beings have to experience architecture before building it, and indeed, they did before conserving it. This experience of architecture does not always constitute part of the consciousness that conservators or architects have in mind when conserving. The preconceptual experience of architecture should be capitalised in favour of a better meaningful understanding.

**Theory in Western Thought**

To shed light on a pertinent relation between theory and practice, it seems necessary to establish some definitions of what theory is. Theory is defined as “a scheme or system of ideas or statements held as an explanation or account of a group of facts or phenomena.”

According to Wang, the word theory, which comes from the Greek *theoria*, has never lost “its basic characteristic as a removed and systematic accountant of an object.”

According to him

[...]theory in general is directly related to research methodology in two ways. First, theory in general seeks to describe, explain, and predict. [...] Second, theory in general seeks to develop descriptions, explanations, and predictions that hold true in all cases of a behaviour under study, and not just in this or that specific case.

We could see architecture in its context – echoing Heidegger – as part of the place to dwell. From this observing of our own dwelling, we develop at least three things: the subjective and objective description of this place where we live, the ontological explanation of it, and the informed prediction of its constant becoming. These three movements constitute what we can call theory.

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53 *OED Online* ([cited]).


55 Ibid. p. 74.
Then architectural conservation theory would be the explanation we give to the phenomena of conservation of the human place to dwell. This viewing of architectural conservation can be performed with different approaches that act as filters, screens or lenses that evidence specific characteristics. These possibilities make theory varied and always partial, being always in state of development.

**Positive vs. Normative**

Theory can be additionally understood in two ways: positive and normative. The former is based on the concept of causality and the latter is supported by authority. Positive theory is nearer to what we conceive as scientific theory – a theory that offers an explanation about the conditions of reality. According to this, if there is no explanation, then there is no theory. This is the sense of theory that this thesis is mainly addressing. Thus, positive theory can be understood as a system of knowledge that applies in a variety of circumstances to explain phenomena. Normative theory instead conveys a different meaning, but one related to the positive. It is assumed that if it is possible to have an explanation of phenomena, it is also possible to configure correct or accepted explanations of praxis. Accordingly, normative theory means accepting a system of values and recommending certain actions supported on it.

It is common that positive theory becomes a guide to practice and that normative theory was subsequently based on it. This relationship runs the risk of turning out to be ideological, doctrinal, or dogmatic. For the purposes of this thesis, the normative sense of theory is to be avoided since the analysis is
guided by the phenomenological bracketing from the explained intentionality whose expression is theoretical in the first instance. The threat is to divorce explanation from life; to explain, and then to suggest, practices that are far from the essence of dwelling as human beings. The pertinent connection between theory and practice in architectural knowledge arises as an indispensable link to improve the way we understand, live and build our place in the world. Thus, for us, theory is approached in the positive sense described before, to explore the way in which the human being gives account of conservation as a specific kind of intentionality. It instead avoids entering into the discussion of any normative aspects, so it is not presented as a guide to praxis but as a previous element of reflection.

The Role of Phenomenology and Hermeneutics

The humanities vs. science debate is another possible dichotomy in the theoretical realm. Hard sciences offer a different nature of explanation than social or human sciences. The Cartesian tendency of reducing everything to quasimathematical descriptions is today one of the problems to be overcome by theory. Science has its place, of course, in the explanation of architectural conservation, but it should avoid aiming at being the only explanation of the entire phenomenon.

Thus, the approach to the problem of conservation as intentionality is based on the assumption that architectural conservation theories represent its epistemological concretizations. In the case of conservation it represents certain intentionality towards the place to dwell in its relation with change through time. In order to approach this intentionality, phenomenology is revealed as an
authoritative method to comprehensively explore experiences of this type. Brandi himself has used this way of approaching restoration according to the method suggested by Husserl. However, he only dealt with the aesthetic phenomena of the work of art of which restoration is the moment of recognition. However for this thesis, the concept of conservation, which includes restorations among its operations, is considered a complete genre of intentionality towards cultural heritage in general and to the existential human place in particular.

In addition to the pure phenomenological perspective, this thesis suggests a hermeneutical dimension in the relation between human being’s temporality and its place to dwell. The particular cultural heritage we are discussing is architecture with significant importance; nevertheless, with the progress of the thesis, the definition of the architectural place is developed up to embrace, in a manifold structure, the complete notion of human place. In order to be conserved, this architecture needs to bear values that can be important for society. It is on these grounds that the term *culturally significant architecture* is used. The term has been previously developed and it has been adopted by the Burra Charter.56 From this point of view, some sort of conjunction or clash could be presented between some architectural theories and some other architectural conservation theories, since their ontological points of departure are not always concurrent. This thesis then offers an outline of a common ground for building up conservation as a holistic intentionality.

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As it can be deduced, the division of the problem in several layers is methodologically necessary since the explanation and interpretation of architectural conservation needs to merge at some point with an ontological definition of architecture in particular, or human place in general. The way of approaching architecture in time as the main problem of conservation is described in the next section in order to problematize it.

1.2 Problematizing Architectural Conservation

If the objective of the thesis is to suggest an overcoming of the present situation in conservation as a way of improving it, it seems necessary to set it up in the form of a philosophical problem. This translation of the topic into a problem has been called problematizing. In order to problematize the topic of enquiry, the definition of intellectual problem according to Nozick in his The nature of rationality establishes that,

A well-defined problem is one in which each of the following features is explicitly specified and delimited. 1. A goal, an evaluative criterion for judging outcomes and states; 2. An initial state, consisting of a (starting) situation and the resources that are available to be used; 3. Admissible operations that can be used to transform states and resources; 4. Constraints on what intermediate states can be passed along the way, what final states may be reached, what operations may be done when, how many times, in what order, and so forth; 5. An outcome, a final state. A solution to the problem is a sequence of admissible operations that transforms the initial state into an outcome that meets the goal, without violating any constraints at any time along the way.

Thus, it is proposed to problematize conservation of architecture according to these elements for the purposes of the research in the present section.

**Initial State and Research Questions**

In this section, the concepts or elements that define the initial state to problematize architectural conservation are introduced, and with this, the research questions are generated.

Architecture is initially taken within the context of this thesis in two differentiated but related senses. Firstly architecture is ontologically defined – taking Ingarden’s theory as initial guide – as a culturally significant object whose concretization is found in the building but is not necessarily always coincident with it. Secondly, the concept of architecture is extended to the place of human being since – following Heidegger – there would not be such a place that is not humanly relevant. What is then obtained is the manifold condition of the architectural objects in which they are constituted by several other objects, some of them physical and others obtained from individual and collective concretizations, including among these the aesthetic dimension. As a point of departure, the first level of research questions asks: **How are the meaning, structure and essence of architecture conceived in conservation theory? What does memory mean for conservation of architecture?**

Architectural conservation addresses the care of the building in its material consistency rather than considering other parts of its manifold reality. Restorers have emphasised the importance of the ideal forms that architecture
has looked after to express. Another option for conservation intentionality is by having the user or receptor of architecture as its focus; this gives more importance to the perception of architecture than to buildings or their ideal image.

The consciousness of time addressed towards these architectural phenomena is evidenced in conservation intentionality, in an incomplete form though. Temporality in conservation has conventionally been focused in the past, in part because of the necessity of the human being to assimilate change, and because of the permanent dialectic of memory. Conservation evidences human intentionality towards change of the place in time. This way the second order of research questions arises as: How memory – especially collective memory – and conservation intentionality are correlated? How architectural memories have projection towards the future?

Once an ontological definition for architecture is outlined as the human place and a phenomenological description for conservation is defined as the temporal intentionality towards change, it is possible to interpret theories of conservation as an epistemic part of an existential enterprise present in the Western world since ancient times. The questions that this concurrence of considerations arises are: How is architecture perceived as changing in time? Moreover, how is conservation founded in relation to the time and place of human being?

The philosophical problem of the relation of the existence of the human being in place and through time is wide to engage with in a thesis. However, the selected architectural perspective is linked with the works of scholars in
phenomenology such as Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger, Gadamer and Ricoeur. The connection with this thesis is as supportive or holistic explicative frameworks to understand human being in place and time, which is the problem that conservation as intentionality manifests.

**Research Aims**

Although there are at the moment important shifts to apparently transform conservation concurrently with a more complete consideration of temporality, we claim that the approach in conservation intentionality nowadays does not consider the manifold nature of architecture. In relation with this manifold, it does not consider the complete nature of memory – especially collective memory – and its capacity to be transformed in a way that includes a more comprehensive temporality. Also it does not consider the relation that place and time have for human society engaging with and interpreting its existence.

Thus the main aims of the thesis are:

To find the origins of the lack of existential understanding of temporality in recent conservation theory, focusing in the interpretation of the outstanding case of restoration intentionality proposed by Brandi;

To suggest a phenomenological ontology of CSA following Ingarden, suggesting its structure and essence as phenomenon, as theoretical precondition for any conservation intentionality;
To suggest a reconnection of temporality – memory included – with architecture and its conservation, proposing the hermeneutical dimension for human existence within the relation of place with time.

The methodology proposed deals with these problems from a phenomenological and hermeneutical perspective, dividing the problem in several layers of enquiry, as it is presented in the following section.

1.3 Research Methods

This thesis could seem philosophical, however it is rather an architectural thesis philosophically approached. The difference resides in that for the enquiry, the analysis of an architectural phenomenon takes assumptions that inscribe it within the philosophical tradition of phenomenology, without necessarily suggesting novelties within this field, intending instead an original approach to the problem of conservation as manifestation of an existential intentionality. Nevertheless, some philosophical assumptions are evidenced in due time, in order to understand their relation with architecture in the discussion of human being in place and time, as part of a broader understanding.

Logical Argumentation

The methods of research are the set of operations suggested in order to change the initial state and the resources used to do it. The paradigm of enquiry of the thesis is inscribed in the qualitative strand. Thus, it could seem inclined to offer more a mythic or poetic description than a scientific one according to Groat, who considers this kind of research as “[...] continuous, holistic,
divergent, and generative” and by the same token, more linked to a base in the area of arts and humanities. Accordingly, this kind of research tends to be based in non-numerical data such as texts or discourses, experiences, or objects. Groat calls the paradigm naturalistic, and uses phenomenological, hermeneutic and constructive as other names for it. She sustains that,

The basic ontological premise of naturalistic research is that there are multiple, socially constructed realities. The corresponding epistemological position is that it is neither possible nor necessarily desirable for research to establish a value-free objectivity. Rather, naturalistic researchers recognize the value and reality of the interactive dynamics between the inquirer and the people or setting being studied. In a similar vein, they also make sure they are explicit in stating the theoretical position and values inherent in their work, and acknowledge the role of interpretation and creation in reporting their findings.

The methodological assumptions for this paradigm of research suggest that the process is characterised by inductive processes; and multiple and cross referential factors. The reality is explored as constituted by a manifold of several strata that is possible to be analysed from different perspectives.

**Tactical Layers**

The problem to be embraced has been divided in three different layers of analysis. The first epistemological layer is formed by theoretical explanations about architectural heritage namely architectural conservation theory. Brandi’s theory finds its place within this layer. The second and most direct layer is constituted by our two main topics. The first is the architectural phenomenon with its own ontological particularities; and the second is the phenomenology of temporality, especially of memory as consciousness of the

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60 Ibid.
61 Ibid. p. 33.
62 Ibid.
past. They are related with the nature of architecture as a real entity and its relation with human existence in time. The rhetorical systemic construction frames, by analogy, on one side some similarities and differences between art in general and architecture; and, on the other side, some equivalence between personal and collective memory. The exploration of this layer, formed by architecture and temporality, constitutes the core discussion of the thesis. The cross categorisation and elaboration of the modes of being of architecture in time, following Ingarden, and the one of these modes of being with the characteristics of memory, help to configure the matrix of the modes of remembered architecture. The relevance of some of the concepts of Brandi about these two topics is considered within the discussion. The obtained categories are elements to embrace the third layer, which is constituted by a process of hermeneutics and critique of conservation, having as instrumental case Brandi’s theory of restoration. This layer is the one constituted by meta-theoretical philosophies supporting conservation as holistic explanations of the world, in which the architectural phenomenon finds a contingent position. An argument from meta-theoretical tradition is applied over this theory of conservation in the way of existential phenomenology. This constitutes the key of interpretation of the final third layer that engages with the philosophical proposal behind the study. Additionally, by casting a new light from recent developments the research also limits its boundaries and suggests further post-ontological research, which goes beyond the topics discussed here.

63 Ibid. p. 28.
Relevance of the Critical Case

Brandi’s theory of restoration constitutes the critical case in which the proposed findings are finally applied. The reason to select it is that it can very well be defined as a “specific, unique, bounded system” that itself proposes a complete philosophical structure to support conservation.64 The use of this case in the research is concerned with its context, contingency and specificity, and for the same token it is very significant in its own right, and not only as a means to test the theoretical proposal. Its uniqueness is based on its historical background and the aesthetical context. The sources of data for this case is not only Brandi’s theory itself, but also other of his seminal writings related with aesthetics and art critique. Additionally, several interpretations of his work have been reviewed in order to understand its influence in Italy and the world. Brandi’s theory still is a recurring point of departure for proposals of conservation in practice. The significance of his theories is recognised as decisive, for instance, in the Istituto Centrale del Restauro in Rome and in the diffusion that his ideas have in the context of heritage conservation.65 The stance of the thesis is not to test the reliability, replicability and validity of Brandi’s postulates but the main concern is to observe how well this theory validates the hypothesis.

65 As an example of the initiatives organised about his thought, cfr.(Associazione Amici di Cesare Brandi, 21-05-2007 2006 [cited 05-06 2008]); available from www.cesarebrandi.org/index.htm. The ICR is one of the most prestigious centres for the study, conservation and restoration of cultural heritage. It offers international scientific and technical consultancy, school of conservation and publications related with these topics. Cfr. Istituto Centrale per il Restauro (21-01-2008 [cited 10-06 2008]); available from http://www.icr.beniculturali.it/indexj.html.
Cross reference with other philosophical approaches is the means by which the study is mainly supported. Therefore, the theory of Brandi is an intrinsic and unique case because it permits improvement of our understanding of research concerns and provides significant opportunity to refine the postulates.

**Constraints**

As the logical argument embraced in the thesis is proposed to be based on the phenomenological tradition, the limits are defined by the tradition itself. However, additional constrains have been established in order to unify some criteria. The first limit is chronological in correspondence with a post-Enlightenment era and the positivist modern view of architecture in general and conservation in particular. The theory that has been considered is one that results from this cultural fracture. It has been argued that this modern Cartesian view has affected the way architecture is conceived. Even when the selected historical time makes the logical system appear dependant on the chronological context, this latter is really transformative and changing.

Another important limit is the cultural context. The research is focused on the Western European tradition and considers the theoretical apparatus that results from the evolution of continental philosophy more than the Anglo-Saxon tradition, although this differentiation is less significant as it is usually considered. For the same token Brandi’s theory is a valid example of a contemporary influential approach to conservation of art in general and architecture in particular. Accordingly, the proposed thesis could not be completely consistent to explain temporality in conservation within a different
cultural context. The inheritance of a particular way to embrace this philosophical approach in conservation could be not a problem in a different cultural context. As Wang suggests, “some logical systems are time dependent, so that the passing of a social-cultural era may render a proposed system more of a historical item than one having current explanatory power.” In this sense, it is the contention of the thesis that nowadays the paradigm of conservation is being reoriented in the sense that the research suggests, although without completely engaging with this new paradigm yet.

The outcome of the research should not be misunderstood as a theoretical “system by itself [...] instead as being a means to have a different or evolved product [...]”. This means that the thesis is presented as a means to attain comprehensive theoretical bases to be applied according with specific cases, through the analysis of an actual theory considered as manifestation of temporal intentionality. In this sense, the research aspires to be not universal but open to offer multiple readings.

The phenomenological approach also offers some limits to consider. The methodology is recognised as originating in this philosophy with all its implications, nevertheless the discussion does not intend to resolve inherent problems at its interior, even recognising and considering some of them. Solution to dilemmas such as the conflict of realism against idealism, the issue of a transcendental phenomenology, and the condition of possibility of collective intentionality, among others are out of the scope of the thesis. However, these problems are structurally considered in one way or another

67 Ibid.
compromising with a meta-philosophical position that intends to make sense of conservation.

Although “[i]nternal logical consistency does not guarantee accurate explanatory power,” the thesis should provide a critical response after being tested in theories other than the one of Brandi.\(^68\) The proposed systemic approach is contrasted only through this chosen critical case, because it permits very appropriate understanding of conservation as intentionality. Additionally this unique case is singular enough to offer special interest in relation with other philosophical links.

**Outcome**

The intention of the thesis is to offer a philosophical explanation, through the examination of the theory of restoration of Brandi, that:

Suggests an ontological frame on which to build up architecture as the human place, evidencing the deficiencies that recently past forms of conservation intentionality have with regards to the relation of CSA and memory;

Discloses part of the hidden dimension of time in conservation, as a complete temporality, that connects architecture – as part of the human place – and human time through conservation intentionality; and

Proposes an existential hermeneutical dimension for temporality within the context of its relation with human place in time, and its conservation as a

\(^{68}\) Ibid. p. 334.
continuum manifold in constant becoming, that exhibit the conditions under which conservation is meaningful.

1.4 Thesis Structure

The thesis is divided in seven chapters. Chapters 1, 2 and 3 are dedicated to the presentation of the theoretical framework with which the thesis has developed its discussion. It represents an epistemological approach to temporality in relation with architecture. Chapter 1, which constitutes the introduction, has dealt with the definition of the domain and subject matter of the research, presenting the intellectual paradox around which the thesis has been developed. It develops the problematisation of conservation according to the following five operations, namely, presentation of the initial state and existing conditions and some literature to overcome; outline of the goal that would overcome the actual disjunction; proposal of operations to change the initial state and the methodological resources to do it (new data, theory and toolkit of research methods); setting of constraints and limitations as well as the operations that could seem unviable; and definition of the outcome that meets the goal to improve the situation. Thus, Chapter 1 frames the research questions, specifically focusing down on the problem of memory in conservation theory; it offers relevant definitions developed such as the concepts of theory, conservation, conjunction, assimilation, and restoration. It additionally gives the description of conservation theory and its determinants in the Western context and justifies the selection of temporality as the main subject matter of the inquiry.
Chapters 2 and 3 develop an epistemological approach to Brandi’s thought, setting a context to our problem, that is to say the philosophical background of architecture and its conservation as a form of temporal intentionality. Chapter 2 outlines Brandi’s notion of art, and architecture as a form of art, based on his phenomenological approach. This chapter describes the main philosophical influences present in Brandi’s theories, emphasising some notions considered as fundamental for the further discussion, coming mainly from the idealism of Benedetto Croce. The significance of the Kantian schematism and the successive phenomenological approach in Brandi’s aesthetics are also described. Chapter 2 offers a view on the relevance of Brandi’s thought in the juncture of the actual post modern condition. Chapter 3 focuses on Brandi’s approach to conservation as temporal intentionality in relation with art and architecture, especially through the analysis of his *Theory of Restoration*. It presents this form of intentionality as a privileged aesthetic and historic recognition of the work of art. Chapter 3 develops relations from that personal level of experience up to collective intentionalities in the context of Brandi’s aesthetic thought.

Chapters 4 and 5 develop the outline of the ontological and phenomenological definitions that configure the theoretical apparatus to suggest new possible perspectives to conservation. In the first place, Chapter 4 develops an ontology of CSA, supported on Ingarden, in an attempt to isolate some aspects that architecture seems to have in its essence. Chapter 5 tracks back the concept of memory, considering ideas of Ricoeur and Casey, and connecting them to architecture. This develops into the comprehensive concept of temporality that conservation has largely ignored. The concept of collective
memory is worked out considering some important insights of Halbwachs, arriving to the description of assimilation as a cultural phenomenon. The consideration of temporality as a whole is embraced in distinction to previous positions.

Chapter 6 develops an existential interpretation of conservation accordingly with the findings of Chapters 4 and 5. It connects hermeneutic tradition with phenomenology mainly in tune with the proposals of Gadamer, Heidegger, and Ricoeur. All this philosophical approach is contrasted with Brandi’s theory revealing some inconsistencies and suggesting ways to overcome the actual conservation impasse. Having Brandi’s theory as contrasting medium, Chapter 6 reveals conservation as a temporal intentionality grounded on fundamental existentialist notions. It reconnects conservation with the theoretical insights previously uncovered and offers some conclusive suggestions. In Chapter 7, the conclusions of the thesis are presented according with the three themes of the thesis, suggesting an alternative for conservation intentionality coherent with our time and cultural condition and considering more comprehensive aspects of existential temporality.
Figure 1-1 Thesis Structure. (Own diagram)

The thesis in its structure proposes an analytic path in which it explores alternatively topics of architecture on one side and temporality of conservation on the other (Figure 1-1). Chapters 1, 2 and 3 correspond to the introduction and the literature review, providing methodology and the exploration of a first epistemological level with the selected data to be explored. Chapters 4 and 5 offer the ontological and phenomenological discussion of the thesis. They contain half of the core of the proposal and it constitutes the theoretical construction to consider in the final existential analysis. It works as a confirmation and proof of the conclusions. Finally, Chapter 6 presents an existential interpretation of conservation contrasting some of Heidegger’s notions with Brandi’s notion of restoration, as analysis and discussion on a concrete theory, and offers the conclusions of the thesis. Chapter 7 gathers all
the conclusions and findings, categorising them according with the main lines of discussion of the thesis.
Chapter 2: Thinking Architecture as Art: Towards a Phenomenological Mode

[...] and thus the likeness of a house pre-exists in the mind of the builder. And this may be called the idea of the house, since the builder intends to build his house like to the form conceived in his mind.

Thomas Aquinas, Summna Theologicae, Prima Pars, Quaestio XV, De ideis, 1265-1272. 69

The suggestion that architecture comes from divine inspiration may certainly appear dated. Whether architecture – or for that case the artistic image, as Brandi would call it – originates from a predetermined idea or whether it could be invented with each new building is still a polemical philosophical question. However, what seems less controversial is that, in assuming as truth one theory or the other the pragmatical consequences are different. Aware of that, Brandi dedicated great part of his theoretical reflections to identifying the essence of the artistic image. His concern was not only free inquisitiveness and the fact that the precious treasury of Italian art was at risk of disappearance after the World War II may well have stimulated him. As founder of the Istituto Centrale del Restauro, he was responsible for the protection of the architectural heritage. Therefore, the preoccupation in finding the most authoritative explanation of art was more than justified and consequently the journey taken by him was one of the most consistent in the Italian art theory scene.

When we mention architecture, we are unearthing the old problem of art and with it the one of aesthetics. The particular problem that this art offers is its lack of disinterest, a condition that art should supposedly have. Nevertheless, at
the same time function gives the key to understand architecture as part of human life. Brandi’s early detachment from idealism – inherited in Italy mainly through Croce – was indicative of a new approach to aesthetic problems.

Even before the designation of aesthetics as a specific Western philosophical discipline dedicated to explain art and beauty – and for the same reason architecture – scholars developed several approaches. However, we privilege a line for being the basis to conceive architecture and temporality in Brandi’s theory. This line – originated in the philosophy of idealism with the inheritance of Immanuel Kant, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and Croce – determined a way in which art had come to be considered by Brandi. Manifestations of these sources are for instance: the Hegelian detachment of the concept of art from time and place as expression of the zeitgeist; the relations between art and language; and the Kantian theory of schematism. Thus, the analysis of some issues within this epistemological layer outlines some ways in which Western Culture has recently explained art and in particular architecture. We choose these examined issues in order to highlight problematic issues discussed later in the context of Brandi’s thought.

Consequently, this is not an attempt to embrace complete philosophical interpretations of architecture. The analyses of these issues illuminate how Brandi may have conditioned his concept of restoration as part of his aesthetic theory.

Although Kant is chronologically before Hegel and Croce, we will discuss his influence later, since Kantianism constitutes the point of departure

for Brandi to structure his theories. Accordingly, section 2.1 “Dealing with Idealist Concepts” discusses two idealist notions related to specific Brandi’s considerations, which are then evaluated through his analysis of the architectural phenomena. The first is the formal manifestation of the spirit in art, as revelatory of a perception of architecture constituted by more than one ontological layer. The second is the concept of mimesis, because of the relevance that Brandi gives to the optical giveness and the separation of the work of art in matter and image.

Section 2.2 “The Croce’s Crux” presents an exploration of some ideas of the aesthetics of Croce, that is to say the notions about art as language in aesthetic theory and their relation with temporality. These notions caused in Brandi a controversial fracture with idealism, facilitating the acceptance of phenomenological and structuralistic approaches. Crocean influence on Brandi was definitive, and the concept of art as expression is especially relevant, since it was his main point of divergence. The influx of phenomenology certainly reinforced this detachment.

Section 2.3 “Approaching Consciousness” links the previous discussions with Brandi’s innovative phenomenological approach, and considers the starting point of Kant’s theory of the schema. Kant established this notion as the way to link appearance with concept. Brandi reworked that theory in an elaborate way to distinguish language from art, from *Carmine* to *Teoria Generale della Critica*.\(^70\) Husserl had developed Kant’s idea of a separation between the noumenal and the phenomenal in his more complex

\(^70\) Brandi, *Teoria generale della critica*. 

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theory. The founder of phenomenology as the science to know the things themselves postulated that all consciousness is consciousness of something and suggested the method of epoché to arrive to the essence of things. Brandi founded his theory of knowing and experiencing art on these coherently structured principles.

Brandi’s requirement to validate his theoretical approach compelled him also to deal with the complexity of structuralistic and linguistic theories, in order to offer a consistent explanation of art. Therefore, section 2.4 “Brandi in the Postmodern Condition” embarks upon considerations that establish divergences between phenomenology as his main approach and some other postmodern approaches, and illustrates some criticism received by him. This frames the ontological proposal that should support Brandi’s journey and ours. Between the – at that time – alternative influences of Marxism and existentialism, he followed the latter, defining his own way of conceptualising art, architecture and the actions in time concerning them.71

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71 The influence of other philosophers is to be highlighted, especially in the Italian scene of the period after the World War II. One of the key figures that influenced Brandi is Luigi Pareyson, whose aesthetics was focused in art creation more than reception. Cfr. D’Angelo, Cesare Brandi critica d’arte e filosofia. pp. 49-71.
2.1 Dealing with Idealist Concepts

The first of the particular arts with which, according to their fundamental principle, we have to begin, is architecture as a fine art. Its task lies in so manipulating external inorganic nature that it becomes cognate to mind, as an artistic outer world. The material of architecture is matter itself in its immediate externality as a heavy mass subject to mechanical laws, and its forms do not depart from the forms of inorganic nature, but are merely set in order in conformity with relations of the abstract understanding, i.e., with relations of symmetry. In this material and in such forms the ideal as concrete spirituality does not admit of being realised. Hence the reality which is represented in them remains contrasted with the Idea, as something external which it has not penetrated, or has penetrated only to establish an abstract relation.

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. Lectures on Aesthetics. 1820s. 72

In Brandi’s thought then, the influence of idealism is clearly there, if not for his unconditional attachment to that philosophical system, it is instead for being constant point of reference, representing concepts against which he dialectically contrasts his own ideas. 73 In his review to Brandi’s book Carmine in 1946, Croce says that the spirit of that book was of idealist character, so anti-historic. 74 Astanza is a presence that is disconnected from time, and Brandi discussed about art as a presented reality in which the present that gave it origin is reactivated ad infinitum, art as an extra-temporal present. 75 Although recognised as one of the exponents of phenomenological approach in the scene of Italian aesthetics, Brandi has been suspected of only exchanging the

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theoretical frame in aesthetics but remaining attached to the idealistic culture. Although the idealist inheritance is undeniable, Brandi managed to have original insights that allowed him to migrate to more advanced positions in the scene of Italian aesthetics.

The concepts under analysis come from the idealist philosophy, even when this influence is dialectically manifested in Brandi. For instance, Hegel characterised art as the sensuous embodiment of the spirit; and beauty as the unity of the concept and the way of being of this concept, that is to say the adequacy of the reality to the concept. Following this line, two concepts seem to have triggered Brandi’s ideas of art as response: these are the formal manifestation of the spirit in evolution – as the Zeitgeist, the manifestation of the spirit of the age – in the artistic phenomena; and the concept of mimesis, the fact that architecture could represent something, what is that something and how is represented.

The Spirit Manifesting Itself

The crucial role that Hegel assigns to architecture as art has been controversial. Despite having determined for architecture an inferior position within the arts, he argued in favour of the symbolic role of architecture to be considered legitimately as such. It seems pertinent to recall that,

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75 D’Angelo, Cesare Brandi critica d’arte e filosofia. p. 39.
77 In Section 3.2, we discuss Brandi’s detachment from the philosophy of history of Hegel in which the existence of the spirit makes sense.
The relation between form and spirit is, for Hegel, the crux of art. [...] Hegel uses these terms [symbolic, classical and romantic categories] to define particular points in the dialectic: symbolic art is marked by a complete separation between form and spirit, classical art brings form and spirit together in discrete forms, while romantic art achieves a complete correspondence between form and spirit and is therefore the highest level of artistic achievement according to Hegel, architecture is symbolic, sculpture is classical and painting, music and poetry are romantic.\textsuperscript{79}

Additionally architecture as art would be in a kind of impure state by the fact that it has a purpose. Art should ideally be only for itself, without any practical function. This issue supposed architecture as the most primitive art. The relevance for us is the recognition of architecture having different layers that integrate it. For instance, for Brandi, appearance and structure constitute two layers of conservation of art. He suggested that the idealist theory of art neglected its material part because the importance of matter was not recognised. He may have done this implying that idealist aesthetics focused on the ideal and not on the actual form that embodied it.\textsuperscript{80} As we analyse further on, Brandi conceived two instances for the restoration of works of art: the aesthetic and the historic. For him the aesthetic instance always has preference over the historical one. Although he suggests that in a work of art the appearance can be in conflict with the structure, he states that usually this is not the case. In this discussion, Brandi seems to challenge the theory of Hegel in the realistic understanding that, it is because of the actual permanence of the antinomy structure-appearance that is possible to preserve the work of art, and not because of an improbable memory of the ideal.\textsuperscript{81} Could this issue evidence a remaining inheritance of his idealist formation? We will come back to this


\textsuperscript{80} Brandi, Basile et al., Theory of restoration, p. 52.
ambivalence between structure and appearance in the discussion of his concept of restoration, in Section 3.1, since the ontological consequences of this are crucial for architecture. For the moment, what is relevant is the possibility of separation between different elements that constitute the same work of art, namely structure and appearance.

Although Hegel’s concepts about art and history are associated with matter, art is taken as expression of the spirit in movement along time and its expression is the manifested human culture.⁸²

For Hegel, romantic art [...] is already the dissolution of the interpretation of form and content which was the characteristic of classical (Greek) art. This dissolution is caused by the discovery of autonomous subjectivity. The principle of romantic art is the ‘elevation of the spirit itself’, which is the result of Christianity. Spirit no longer immerses itself in the sensuous as in classical art but returns to itself and thus posits ‘external reality as an existence inadequate to it’. [...] For Hegel, romantic art is the product of the dissolution of the interpretation of spirit and sensuousness (external appearance) characteristic of classical art. But beyond that, he conceives of a further stage where romantic art also dissolves. [...] Hegel’s aesthetic theory thus leads logically to the idea of the end of art where art is understood to be what Hegel meant by classicism, the perfect interpenetration of form and content. Hegel grasps the development of art with the pair of concepts ‘subjectivity: external world’ (or spirit: sensuousness).⁸³

The way in which Brandi seems to reinterpret this concept is by proposing the division of flagrance and astanza. However, he may have added the complex phenomenological analysis, eliminating the spiritual metaphysical dimension.

While for Hegel the evidence of architecture’s function as content – as a manifestation of the external world – defines its character; for Kant instead, the

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essence of an architectural work of art is its adequacy to a certain function.\textsuperscript{84}

Kant distinguished two forms of beauty in \textit{The critique of judgement}, one that is free (\textit{pulchritudo vaga}) and one that is dependent (\textit{pulchritudo adherens}).\textsuperscript{85}

The first is connatural to the object, whilst the second is for objects that have an end, thus the problem for architecture is that it can participate of both.\textsuperscript{86} As an example of this influence, Brandi mentioned adherent beauty when he challenged the works of conservation in the church of San Domenico of Sienna. He described this conservation as something that,

\begin{quote}
[... ] Involves and threatens to involve more than the architecture, that which counts for the monument, [... ] and I would want to call the adherent beauty of the church, namely the whole furnishing of painting and sculpture that centuries have deposited inside the monument, and in front of which the same monument can not be considered but in its majesty as container.\textsuperscript{87}
\end{quote}

In fact for Brandi, it seemed that the historical context of facts – that determined the actual state of the church – constituted something that, as a whole, was bigger than the architectural work itself, namely the monument.

The relevance of these discussions is significant when assessing the concept of monument, in Section 3.3, and the notion of conservation in Section 3.4, since it is this appearance as a manifold identity in the work of architecture as monument that is fundamental for this thesis. For the moment, it is enough


to highlight that Brandi, in his *Theory of Restoration*, considered that the idealist aesthetics had disregarded the ontological importance of the relation between matter and image.\textsuperscript{88} Therefore, although the fact that Brandi recognised architecture integrated both structure and image; he was not able to consider other elements that constitute architecture, issues that for example determine restoration interventions.

**Mimesis and Images**

Mimesis was seen to be problematic for architecture since architecture does not represent anything existent in nature. To understand this, scholars tracked back the origins of mimesis not as representation of objects but as representation of actions. Mimesis, for instance, can be established – as Koller concludes – as man’s “coming-into-form.”\textsuperscript{89} Nevertheless etymologically, the meaning of mimesis is broader. It could have designed not only representation but also indication, imitation, suggestion, expression, or “the single notion of doing something which resembles something else.”\textsuperscript{90} For Brandi the issue of mimesis in art and its relation with the artistic image became crucial as the fulcrum of his aesthetic theory. He denied the concept of art as mimesis, since that would have implied the assumption for the work of art to have just one

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interpretation. Although he was considering the reproductive sense of the
word, Brandi’s refusal of art as mimesis is constant throughout his thought.

Mimesis however seems to have in its origins a broader meta-structural
meaning. Let us review how the concept of mimesis in its characterisation as
depiction has been proposed as overcoming simple representation.

The basis for the importance of mimesis as a concept lies in the origin of art
as mimetic. Gombrich refers to this origin as a shift in the pictorial
representation of reality. Mimesis came to function as an artistic tool to make
art look like reality. An understanding of this shift is facilitated when the
meaning of the term is interpreted as ‘depiction’. Mimesis is the process of
depicting cultural realities, those things that are real according to a certain
point of view. This point of view is provided by the cultural order. [...] It
emphasizes the act of showing something of reality through formal imitation,
and it also implies an alteration of the piece of reality it is re-presenting;
mimetic depiction encompasses the act of showing an imitative alteration of
reality, according to the standards of a given cultural order. The depiction of
cultural realities through mimesis has as a central characteristic that it
assumes to be about reality, by re-presenting it.

With this conceptualisation, an artistic image does not re-present reality
it rather properly depicts it. This interpretation helps to understand the Hegelian
characterisation of architecture in the three proposed modes: symbolic,
classical and romantic. A separation between the ritual – or the activity –
depicted through architecture and the architectural object as such, and the
further coming into presence of that depiction, would define architecture in
Hegelian terms. When the depicted activity is more evident, architecture is
symbolic; when form dominates it is romantic, and when there is equilibrium,
classical. Depiction then emerges as an alternative way to consider mimesis in
the artistic context; it could help to bring into the ontological constitution of
architecture additional elements belonging to its manifold.

91 Teresa De Lauretis, “The Discreet Charm of Semiotics, or Esthetics in the Emperor's New
Although formed under the idealist influence, Brandi challenged as well his understanding of mimesis. Even though for different reasons, for Brandi as for Hegel mimesis is not the final intention of art. Brandi instead considered that in the mimetic concept of art

we care only about the concluding part of the artistic process, and we assume the work as a given from the same experience in which our knowledge finishes, art is imitation, is illusion, pleasure, naturalness fixed and deprived of becoming.\textsuperscript{93}

This would demonstrate that Brandi understands mimesis as reproduction and not as depiction. By taking mimesis as depiction, architecture performs a reality that could be integrated into Brandi’s conservation theory. However, this would not be within the artistic part of its manifold, which would specifically correspond to the notion of restoration. We come back to this argument in Chapter 3.

More recently, some authors have again related mimesis to action, in the context of authenticity in heritage conservation, highlighting the importance given to how humans creatively generate culture rather than to aspects of image perception.\textsuperscript{94} In this sense, the approach to a wider meaning of mimesis seems viable, although falling under the area that Brandi defines as flagrance. It has been observed that,

The theory of \textit{mimesis} can also be seen to imply, not a simple copy, but the representation and creative interpretation of a particular idea or theme. In the late 19\textsuperscript{th} century, Friedrich Nietzsche saw that the only way for humans to

\textsuperscript{92} Mathijs and Mosselmans, "Mimesis and the Representation of Reality: A Historical World View." p. 81. Italics in the original.


\textsuperscript{94} Paul Ricoeur has raised the question: “Can the relation to the past be only a variety of mimesis?” He doubts about that option discussing the historical narrative representation as \textit{standing for or taking the place of}. Cfr. Ricoeur, \textit{Memory, history, forgetting}. p. 13.
generate truth and values was through a creative process, guided by the ‘will
to power’. This idea would not only be referred to works of art but to all
human activity, where one takes his/her full responsibility in setting forth a
creative contribution.95

Consequently, there is a relation between the concept of mimesis and
the one of representation and re-presentation of ideas and themes. Mimesis
would encompass creative interpretation of new cultural forms and an
enlargement of the concept of heritage to other practices, rather than limit itself
to its objectual manifestations.96 Brandi seems to have embraced mimesis in
the reproductive sense. His aesthetic theories, specially the one of restoration,
seem too focused on the part of the artistic manifold embodied by the image.

Although these considerations may be debatable depending on the
expression to which conservation is applied, today’s broadening of the concept
of heritage uncovers a positive evolution in conservation attitudes that deserves
further analysis. We will come back to this issue in the analysis of collective
memory as creative act in Sections 5.3 and 5.4. Brandi’s critical position,
refusing certain concepts and implicitly accepting others revealed an idealist
influence. The awareness of a manifold identity in architecture as a work of art
– whether real or ideal entities constitute this manifold is subject to further
analysis – and the significance of mimesis and image are concepts that already
had in nuce some of the notions developed here. How he was able to overcome
idealism and make these concepts evolve more or less successfully according
with an existential approach is for us to interpret further in Chapter 6. Although

95 Jukka Jokilehto, Considerations on authenticity and integrity in World Heritage context
[Online], (2006 [cited 03-10 2006]); available from http://www.ct.ceci-
96 This could seem consistent with the ancient Greek conception of mimesis that some scholars
have suggested, before the shift from re-enactment to re-presentation. Cfr. Mathijs and
Brandi absorbed the idealist aesthetics mainly from Croce, very early he demonstrated independence of thought and was influenced by other sources. The scission between depiction of activity and architectural form is an important precedent for the ontological outline of architecture in the context of conservation, and most particularly in Brandi’s specific concept of restoration.

### 2.2 The Croce’s Crux

Knowledge takes two forms: it is either intuitive knowledge or logical knowledge; knowledge obtained by means of our power to create mental representations, or knowledge obtained by means of the intellect; knowledge of individuals, or knowledge of universals; of particular things, or of the relationships between them; it is in short, either that which produces representations or that which produces concepts.

Benedetto Croce. *The aesthetic as the science of expression and of the linguistic in general.* 1902. 97

It seems pertinent at this point to review some of the main issues in the Crocean association of intuition and expression that synthesise art as language, so to contrast later on with the opposite theory that Brandi started to formulate, in which art and language are separated as the result of a different path after the constitution of the object. Croce synthesised his aesthetics in his *The aesthetic as the science of expression and of the linguistic in general*, which intended to be an introduction to a complete “philosophy of the spirit.” 98 It is there that we find the opening epigram of this section, presenting the Crocean dialectics between intuitive and logical knowledge. In a sense, Croce is relating logics with abstract conceptualisation and intuition with representation, including signification within this representation. In doing this, he was able to link
linguistic expression and aesthetics. Consequently, according to his view, every human would be able to become an artist, to express itself through art.  

What he is implying is that expression always contains elements that are not evident. Only in that way is it possible to categorise together for instance a trivial exclamation and a complex work of architecture. As already observed, Brandi criticised this assimilation of art and expression under the same category. In his *Celso* he writes: “The aesthetic synthesis? The aesthetic synthesis to call a taxi?”  

It was not clear in Croce, which surplus art would need, in order to overcome the apparently simpler status of a practical expression. Let us follow the rationale behind this identification and establish precedents to some of the attitudes towards temporality in this system, which influenced for decades the evolution of aesthetic ideas in Italy.

**Art as Expression**

Brandi shares Croce’s detachment of art from any scientific, practical and moral commitment, considering it an autonomous entity. It seems pertinent to recall that the Crocean system divided the mental activity into theoretical and practical; the theoretical was itself separated into aesthetic and logic whilst the practical one was separated into economic and moral. Art is then an aesthetic form independent from any usefulness. Art for Croce is expression or

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98 Ibid.  
99 For him there are not words in themselves except as abstractions. Ibid. p. 159.  
otherwise it is not at all.  

This is problematic for architecture for two reasons; the architectural functional value is singled out as alien to the artistic nature; and architecture does not communicate as language does. However, in the aesthetic activity Croce assimilated intuition and expression. He did not express clearly what the difference between any expression and a work of art is, except by saying that the latter has something extra, a kind of higher pitch of intensity.  


[...] intuitive knowledge is expressive knowledge. Independent from and autonomous with respect to the intellectual; indifferent to any distinctions we subsequently make between the real and the unreal, and to subsequently awareness of space and time; – an intuition or representation is to be distinguished from that which feels and endures, from the flood and flux of sensation, from psychic material, as form; and this form, this taking possession, is expression. To intuit is to express; and nothing else (nothing more, but nothing less) than to express.  

Croce indeed connects intuition and expression, but additionally he introduces the differentiation between intuition and “that which feels and endures.” However for him “the two forms of knowledge, the aesthetic and the intellectual or conceptual, are certainly different but not entirely detached from each other, like two forces, each pulling in its own direction.”  

He considered them this way because aesthetics and logic divided his theoretical understanding. He recognised art as the highest level of expression and its creators as artists. A necessary connection between intuition and expression manifests itself in its highest quality and intensity through the work of art.

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101 Croce, The aesthetic as the science of expression and of the linguistic in general. p. 59.
102 Ibid. p. 12.
103 Ibid. p. 11. (Our emphasis).
104 Ibid. p. 24.
Art’s Interiority and Art as a Whole

Art has an interior and an exterior manifestation within the philosophical system of Croce; this offers the possibility of confusion between the material embodiment of the work of art, its vehicle; and the work of art as an interior intentionality. There are then, two forms of knowledge: the intuitive and the conceptual, based on an idealist understanding of the world. 

Brandi’s realist approach could not be more opposed to Croce’s idealist ideas. By offering to architecture the possibility of having manifestations that are interior and exterior to the human being, it is possible to assume a broader ontological structure.

Since for Croce the artistic beautiful is equal to expression, he concludes that if the expression is not successful it is not expression at all. As a significant issue for us, Croce discusses the importance of memory in the context of art, but he extends this importance to the life of the spirit itself. In a way that recalls Bergson’s Matter and Memory and his concept of temporality, Croce states that,

\[ \text{expressions or representations follow one another one by one, each banishing its forerunner. [...] nothing that is born dies, [...] even if everything passes, nothing can die. Even representations that have been forgotten persist in some way in our spirits [...]. But other representations are still causal elements in the actual processes of our spirits; and we must not forget them or must be able to recall them as and when we need to. And the will is constantly vigilant in this work of conservation, which aims to preserve (one could say) the greatest and most fundamental of all our riches.}\]

The relevance of this we will prove crucial in the evaluation of the reification of memory, as when common talk infers that the matter of

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106 Croce, The aesthetic as the science of expression and of the linguistic in general pp. 35, 57.
107 Ibid. p. 87.
monuments keep the memory of the past. We will come back to this discussion in Chapters 3 and 5. Croce seems to suggest that if a reality triggers an expression, then the same real conditions can re-trigger again similar expressions and intuitions.\textsuperscript{109} He refers here to works of art, and he adds that “[t]he spiritual power of memory, subsidised by the physical things which are provided, makes possible the conservation and reproduction of the intuitions man continually produces.”\textsuperscript{110} Temporality is then, in Croce’s system, approached from the past towards the present. Brandi instead fixed temporality’s gravity centre in the present where the recognition of the work of art takes place.

Architecture

Croce’s specific ideas about architecture did not seem to have much influence on Brandi. When Croce discusses architecture, he does it in the context of freedom in artistic activity. He states that architecture is not completely free, since it has to deal with practical ends.\textsuperscript{111} Croce seems to propose that to make architecture as a work of art the main knowledge that is necessary is the aesthetic one. Thus, he describes architecture treatises as collections of good intentions.\textsuperscript{112} Brandi instead appealed to a phenomenological approach to reach the formulation of the image and the constitution of the work from a phenomenological perspective, discussing architecture aesthetically in terms of optical giveness.\textsuperscript{113} He found that particular forms in plan or elevation were conditioned by the functional

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{109} Ibid. p. 108.
\item \textsuperscript{110} Ibid. p. 108.
\item \textsuperscript{111} Ibid. p. 112.
\item \textsuperscript{112} Ibid. p. 126.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
requirements of the building – cultural context included – “but the freedom of choice of the structure with which the internal-external interaction will be realised remains a fact.” Accordingly for Brandi, in architectural creation freedom is not limited by the need to fulfil a function; however, the significant distinction between architecture and the other arts of optical giveness is the presence of space and the relationship of interior and exterior.

Croce’s aesthetics relates art to expression. Therefore, art’s origin is found in human mind’s capacity of communication. The actual matter of the work of art was only a vehicle for this expression. In contrast for Brandi art did not communicate. He founded art as astanza, an immaterial presence; something that was there but did not exist. This opens up an interesting debate. The fact that for Croce the work of art is a complete and effective expression allowed him to approach the present from the standpoint of the past. The origin of the artistic expression was in that past and as such, it was there that any correct interpretation had to be found. Brandi worked on a theory that demonstrated that some of these Crocean notions were not tenable. However, he did not deduce his theory having as object this opposition. It was because of his method that new influential ways of approaching reality drove his philosophy to evolve.

**Genesis of Brandi’s Path**

During the 1950s the reference to neo-idealism in Italy – the connection with a philosophy of the Spirit: the systems of Croce and Gentile – was

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somehow systematic. At the time, there was complete scepticism about any definition of art because of the attacks from phenomenological positions. As early as 1952 an article published after the death of Croce described those considered to be the most representative scholars in Italian aesthetics and stated that after the war, Italian philosophical thought tried to achieve independence from the dominance of Croce’s idealist influence. Brandi had been associated to the group of scholars that mixed idealism, formalism and Sartre’s existentialism. Accordingly

Brandi also stems from Croce, but he breaks in two the double term ‘intuition-expression’. For ‘intuition’ he substitutes two terms: ‘the constitution of the object’ (which includes the knowable substance) and the ‘formulation of the image’ (the latter being without existential status, entirely pure and formal). However, by so doing, Brandi does not separate himself very much from the idealistic formulas, which he shades with existentialist coloring.

By doing this scission, Brandi entered a new field of exploration at the time, that is to say the issue of artistic creation rather than reception of the work of art. In his writings, he approached phenomenologically the constitution of the object and the formulation of the image as a sort of epoché, from which the artist extracts and synthesises the image. The relevant fact is that Brandi took a different approach to specific core elements in the concept of art, this despite the early claim that Brandi was a Crocean idealist in disguise – an occurrence which proved to be frequent. The path of development followed by Brandi

115 D’Angelo, Cesare Brandi critica d’arte e filosofia. p. 27.
116 Ibid. p. 28.
119 Ibid. p. 194.
120 A scholar has illustrated this misunderstanding, cfr. Paolo D’Angelo, “Realtà e immagine in Cesare Brandi,” in Attraverso l’immagine. In ricordo di Cesare Brandi, ed. Russo, Luigi
broke in a characteristic way with some of the dogmas of the great philosopher, and an *idealistic language* conditioned it, although the situation of aesthetics in Italy during the 1950s was of gradual detachment from the strong Crocean influence.\textsuperscript{121} The influences on Brandi were not common in Italy at the time; his references to authors such as Sartre, Husserl, Heidegger and Kant give an indication of his originality.\textsuperscript{122}

The consideration of architectural creation is set in contrast with Croce’s aesthetics, which focused on the work of art as a final product. It is again the dialectical and sometimes even opposite way of approaching the phenomena of art that separates Brandi from Croce. For Croce, the process of creation – in the form of preparatory drawings, sketches, and so forth – is irrelevant to the final work, because for him “the work of art possesses ‘a genesis hardly ideal, which derives from its very presence’.”\textsuperscript{123} Therefore, Croce’s phenomenon of art is something that happens as an event, which is not part of a larger process of creation. This is something that Brandi tried to disentangle by investigating what a scholar has called the *dynamics of the artistic process*.\textsuperscript{124}

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(Palermo: Aesthetica Preprint, Universita degli Studi di Palermo, Centro Internazionale Studi di Estetica, 2006). p. 14. Cfr. also D’Angelo, *Cesare Brandi critica d’arte e filosofia*.\textsuperscript{125} Cfr. Dorfles, "New currents in Italian aesthetics." p. 196. On his side Croce suffered the same kind of stigmatisation in relation with Hegelianism. Cfr. Simoni, "Benedetto Croce: A Case of International Misunderstanding."\textsuperscript{126} D’Angelo, *Cesare Brandi critica d’arte e filosofia* pp. 15, 36. Croce made a review of Brandi’s *Carmine* where he praised the general spirit of the work and the theoretical content. However, in portraying Brandi as a continuator, the philosopher tried to tie Brandi’s ideas to his own thought, highlighting more the confirmations to his philosophical system than the original insights of the novel writer. Cfr. Benedetto Croce, "Review: Carmine o della pittura, by Cesare Brandi,” *Quaderni della Critica* 4 (1946).\textsuperscript{127} D’Angelo, *Cesare Brandi critica d’arte e filosofia*. p. 59. Brandi sustains that, “[...] one phase, a state of consciousness, prior to the formulation, which, if it is fully known only by the artist, not because of this is untraceable in the work of art once it is formulated. This early but indispensable stage for the work is what I have called constitution of the object.” Brandi, *Elicona II. Celso o della poesia*. p. 155. “Uno stadio, uno
From his point of view, the repercussions of an ontological conception of architecture are considerable since, in Crocean theory, the work of art would need to be frozen at a certain point, at least for its consideration as possible work of art. Our further analyses in Chapters 4 and 5 aim to demonstrate that theories such as the Crocean are not tenable. For Brandi:

[with the constitution of the object] the artist separates the object from the reality in which it is immersed, breaking the links with the existentiality through a sort of phenomenological reduction. By this means, there is not a duplicate of the object, but rather a selection of some traits to be subject to symbolic attribution. The artist works on them and gives expression and external consistency to the image, fixing it in the second stage of the formulation.  

For our thesis, there are two problems associated with this theory. One is to attribute the moment of the constitution of the object to the case of architecture, and the other is the usefulness that architecture needs, which seems to hinder its constitution as pure figurativeness. However, with this analysis there implicitly is an alternative interpretation of the concept of mimesis. This attribution of symbolism to architecture constitutes a return to the original concept of mimesis as expression of cultural practices. Brandi’s introduction of the Kantian theory of the schema would be part of the solution to overcome these theoretical problems, since it involved considering the function as part of the original epoché that the architect does from his or her memory of precedents. A sort of library of successful resolutions.
Croce’s influence proved to be significant for Brandi at the beginning of his intellectual journey. Nevertheless, later on, Brandi left behind most of his idealistic formation, developing theories in which he incorporated new sources. His attitude towards the great Italian philosopher was always respectful and objective. However, it did not prevent the subtle criticism to Crocean theories through works such as the dialogues of *Elicona*; the opposition to certain dogmas such as the identity of intuition and expression; and the consideration of the hermeneutical dimension in restoration – although with new criteria – among others. He inherited from Croce certain concepts such as, the distance from accepting abstract classifications within the arts; the refusal of positivistic and scientific determinism; and the concepts of autonomy, individuality, and a-temporalità of the work of art. Brandi may have found inspiration for his two forms of consciousness – intuitive knowledge and logical knowledge – in the Crocean division between intuition and understanding.\(^\text{128}\) Thus new approaches marked a big difference between Crocean and Brandian aesthetics. The incorporation of phenomenology, structuralism and semiotics were significant, despite the challenges received by Brandi’s theories. The distinction of the process of creation of the work of art from its reception, characterised important detachments from previous and contemporary approaches, all of them fuelled in Italy by the need to overcome an age dominated by the philosophical influence of Croce.

2.3 Approaching Consciousness

The phenomenological vision is closely analogous to the aesthetic vision in 'pure' art [...]. The artist – that 'observes' to draw 'knowledge' of nature and human from the world for his own purposes – behaves towards that world in a similar way to the phenomenologist’s [...] For him the world – while he observes it – becomes phenomenon, his experience is irrelevant, just as happens to the philosopher.


By making phenomenological epoché comparable to aesthetic vision, Husserl was opening the door to new ways of interpreting artistic phenomena. On one hand, the creative act could be interpreted as the result of a phenomenological reduction of the world, from which a re-presentation of it was offered by the artist according to the isolated aspects. On the other hand, the reception of the work of art needed to emulate that process again by isolating the work of art from the world in which the receptor experienced it. Brandi needed an adequate theoretical structure to support this phenomenological approach. 130 First, he looked for it in the Kantian theory of the schema, and then in developing his theory of the distinction between *astanza* and flagrance.

Not only researchers in art and architecture but also philosophers, such as Heidegger, Sartre, Otto Friedrich Bollnow or Gaston Bachelard, have approached the artistic and architectural phenomena from phenomenological and existentialist points of view. Their approaches considered, in one way or another, Husserl’s principle that all consciousness was consciousness of

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130 Brandi has described aesthetic attitudes in terms of epoché, reduction and bracketing, in similar fashion to the way Husserl had already done it, as it is now evident in some then
something. Brandi was not to remain alien to these tendencies and to the Italian interest in such a theory.\textsuperscript{131} This approach defined what art was and, consequently, his theory of restoration reflected it, in that he suggested it to be “[...] the first time one tries to reach the concept of restoration from the rigorous deduction of the very concept of art.”\textsuperscript{132}

The distinction that Brandi found between sign and image was always fundamental. For him the preconceptual schema – as he started to call it – could concretize images, as in art; or signs, as in language.\textsuperscript{133} Brandi attempted to offer an explanation of the essence and existence of the work of art with his phenomenological approach. The need to configure this system compelled him to explore, and then to overcome, the philosophical trends of the time proposing an aesthetics from which his theory of restoration could be later deduced. In this move towards phenomenology, we highlight here two issues as significant precedents for our further analysis of the ontology and, therefore, conservation of architecture in the context of Brandi’s ideas. One is the so-called Kantian schema and the other is the notion of the antinomy of \textit{astanza} and flagrance. With the former, Brandi explained the emergence of the work of

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item Among the figures mentioned as influential Antonio Banfi is one of the leading figures. Cfr. D’Angelo, \textit{Cesare Brandi critica d’arte e filosofia}. p. 41.
\item Brandi meant by “[c]onstituting the object to perform an \textit{epoché}: ‘the reality or, if preferred, the existence of the object is as put between brackets.’ Moreover, the two terms, ‘reality’ and ‘existence’, stop being exchangeable, and are used to design both polarities of the consciousness: ‘reality is given in the intuition, the existence in the intellect’.” Cfr. Brandi, \textit{Carmine o della pittura}. p. 23, quoted in D’Angelo, \textit{Cesare Brandi critica d’arte e filosofia}. p. 17. “Costituire l’oggetto significa sottoporlo a un’epoché: ‘la realtà o, se preferisci, l’esistenza dell’oggetto è come messa fra parentesi.’ Più precisamente, i due termini, ‘realità’ ed ‘esistenza’, cessano di essere intercambiabili, e vengono utilizzati per designare le due polarità della coscienza: nell’intuizione si dà la realtà, nell’intelletto l’esistenza.” (Our translation).
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
art from the creative mind of the artist; whilst with the latter, he resolved the 
phenomenological characteristics of a work of art in contrast with the flagrance 
of reality, supporting the complete detachment of art from language with this 
theory.

The Kantian/Brandian Schema

Kant’s doctrine of schematism constitutes an important and complex 
part of his *Critique of the pure reason*. Kant’s epistemology distinguishes two 
kinds of mental representations: immediate representations, which are called 
intuitions; and mediated representations, which are called concepts. The 
schema, helping imagination, connects: concepts with the correlative 
experience, understanding with sensibility, subjectivity with objectivity, sign 
with image. Thus the schema takes hold of the different sensible features that 
later constitute the concept and the image; however, the image keeps some 
traces of the conceptual understanding and the sign keeps some figurativeness 
of the image. Brandi bases his theory in a reworking of this Kantian doctrine 
of schematism taking the schema as the origin of both: the cognitive substance 
– that becomes concept or language – and the image – that originates the image 
and the work of art.

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134 For Kant: “The schema is the rule for subsuming under the concept items that are 
empirically given; it is what we have to know if we are to understand how to apply the concept 
in our experience. Every concept must therefore have a schema if it is to be applicable to 
experience at all. In the case of empirical (and mathematical) concepts he says that the schema 
is a rule for producing images; more generally, it is what one knows when one knows what an 
instance of the concept would look like, feel like, etc.” Ralph Charles Sutherland. Walker and 

135 Cfr. Chapter 3 in Sarah L. Gibbons, *Kant’s theory of imaginatio 


137 Ibid. pp. 18-9.
Sartre’s ideas developed in The psychology of imagination have been mentioned as another important influence, in which he proposes a similar mechanism for the relation between model and image. The revealing role of reflective consciousness in order to appreciate image as representation is noticeable within Sartre’s thesis. However, for the moment two issues are important for our analysis of Brandi’s thought: first, the rational constructions on prelogical foundations that Sartre mentions seem analogous to Kant’s schema and therefore to Brandi’s interpretation; and second, the distinction made between sign and image, which comes to support Brandi’s idea of art as distinct from language. The relevance of the relation between image and preconceptual schema in Brandi has been recently highlighted as a sort of “anthropological bing-bang” able to constitute cultural forms. It has been noticed as well that “Brandi was able to actually discern with lucidity and indicate with absolute precision the link between the problem of schematism and the problem of language.” This has allowed Brandi to discuss his

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139 Brandi was one of the first to relate the Kantian doctrine of schematism with the twofold relation with language and image, being the root and the mediation between them. Cfr. D’Angelo, "Realità e immagine in Cesare Brandi." p. 16.
concept of art regarding the semiotic tendencies in theories during the 1960s and 1970s.\textsuperscript{142}

The theory of schematism constitutes in Brandi’s thought a significant part of the explanation of the creation and reception of the work of art. Brandi explains that,

The schema [...] is a monogram of the pure imagination. [...] the schema is the first selection obtained from the referent and as such, it is preconceptual. However, if the referent does not have an existential matrix [...] the gathered features within the schema will promote the referent [...]. One schema without referent is obliged to return to a referent, being a geometric figure, an abstract formula, visible though, somehow expectable from the senses. [...] Corrected this way the theory of the preconceptual schema does not determine at all the dissolution of the schema within the empirical concept.\textsuperscript{143}

Whilst the connection of schematism seems more evident for the figurative arts, for architecture Brandi presents variations to the theory of the schema in order to explain it. Accordingly, he correlated tectonics to conformation. Let us analyse how Brandi applies the theory of schematism to conceive architecture. If in the case of painting the schema preceded the constitution of the form to constitute the figurativeness, in the case of architecture Brandi – in the role of Eftimio, one of the characters in his \textit{Eliante o della architettura} (hereafter \textit{Eliante}) – suggests:

[...]


\textsuperscript{142} Brandi, \textit{Teoria generale della critica}. p. 91. “Lo schema [...] è un monogramma dell’immaginazione pura. [...] lo schema è la prima selezione tratta dal referente, e proprio come tale è preconcettuale. Ma se il referente non ha una matrice esistenziale [...] saranno i tratti accostati insieme nello schema a fomentare il referente [...]. Uno schema senza referente è ineluttabilmente portato a risalire ad un referente, sia esso una figura geometrica, o una formula astratta, eppure visibile, eppure in qualche modo esigibile ai sensi. [...] Corretta così la teoria dello schema preconcettuale, non determina affatto una disolvenza dello schema in seno al concetto empirico.” (Our translation).
primitive humans identified this figurativeness with the cave and transferred it later into the hut. But in fact, before the hut raised there was neither concept nor image, there was only an imprecise intentionality within human consciousness, that need of protection from the whether, the dangers of the beasts and other humans, and so for.\textsuperscript{144}

For Brandi accordingly, architecture does not have its origin in an object, but in the schema, which keeps record of the practical need. In this context, art also can develop into knowledge and not only into intuition.\textsuperscript{145} For the moment, what seems important is the possibility for the schema to connect empirical intuition with conceptual knowledge.

Brandi has argued that architecture does not have an object as painting does. Architecture is born from a need.\textsuperscript{146} He discusses in Eliante how the preconceptual schema works for architecture; he returned to this idea in Teoria Generale della Critica stating that the schema is connected both with the concept and with the image. In architecture, the schema is of a solution to a need, which is not yet a concept or an image. It separates itself from the instinct and it finds the figurativeness of the prehistoric cave and later the primitive hut and – we argue – later on the memory of all kinds of buildings. Brandi sustained that the spatiality of a work of art is not only the existential space, but rather that the work of art creates its own space.

“[…] quando ti parti da un bisogno a cui non corrisponde ancora nessun oggetto esterno, e, ad esempio, da quel bisogno primordiale di riparo che dovettetro sentire i primi ominidi e che ancora non si condensava nel concetto e nella figura della casa, tu, in quel bisogno a cui, nel prenderne coscienza, cerchi una sodisfazione, hai né più né meno che uno schema, il quale non è ancora immagine. È il nucleo della sostanza conoscitiva la quale cerca prima di tutto di convertirsi in figuratività: la figuratività che i primi rozzi uomini identificarono nella caverna e trasferirono poi alla capanna. Ma appunto, avanti che la capanna sorgesse, non esisteva né concetto né immagine, esisteva solo, interiormente alla coscienza vitale dell' uomo, una imprecisa intenzionalità, quel bisogno di riparo dalle intemperie, dai pericoli delle belve e degli altri uomini e che so io.” (Our translation).
\textsuperscript{145} D'Angelo, Cesare Brandi critica d'arte e filosofia. p. 88.
\textsuperscript{146} Brandi, Elicona. III-IV. Arcadio o della Scultura. Eliante o dell'Architettura. p. 119.
In his theory of schematism, Brandi considered mainly the figurative arts. The case of architecture presented him with a different kind of connection between sensible experience and intuitive image. Brandi’s theory demanded an equivalent to the constitution of the object and the formulation of the image. We have seen that for Brandi architecture was image. Therefore, the architect first takes into consideration the functional needs. They stimulate the recollection of schemata that can solve those needs. Then, the constitution of the object comes, reworking on the schemata available to the architect. At that moment, the mind suggests a solution and the formulation of the image is effected. This connection needs to be done through the combination of tectonics and ornate whose balanced combination will evidence the distinction between plain tectonics and architecture as a work of art. (Figure 2-1)

Figure 2-1 Creation of architecture as art deduced from Brandi's theory of schematism. (Own diagram)
Flagrance vs. Astanza

In order to distinguish the mode of being of the image from that of the sign Brandi defines two notions: flagrance and astanza. Flagrance is the proper mode of the existent things in their being evident to sensual perception. For Brandi “astanza is the proper mode of being of the work of art, and it is defined in opposition to flagrance which is the mode of being present of ordinary things, that Brandi calls existential reality.”

For Brandi, [...] art presupposes an act of the consciousness irreducible to any other, an unmistakable ‘intentionality’. Art is knowledge ‘just as it becomes consciousness of an object that experiences that suspension. When consciousness with an intentionality addresses an object’.

Presence is, for Brandi, divided into presence as flagrance of the existent and presence as astanza. He coined this term from the Latin words ad and stare, meaning to be there, to be given in praesentia, to be presentified, in opposition to the flagrance of the real existent. In one of the chapters of Teoria Generale della Critica, Brandi explains that,

The concept of astanza is founded in the being present of something that is only because it is present; that is only as long as it is the same difference that opposes it to the existent, to what has with it the difference between being and existing.

He describes how the Derridean concept of trace or difference introduces appearing and significance as the dislocation of these two kinds of presence. It seems worth remembering that he developed his semiotic

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147 D’Angelo, Cesare Brandi critica d'arte e filosofia. p. 31. (Our translation). D’Angelo observes that in Due vie, of 1966, astanza e realtà pura are almost synonyms. In Teoria generale della critica, of 1974, the term astanza ousts definitely pure reality. He highlights that Brandi even founded the concept of astanza on new philosophical basis such as the ones of Heidegger and Derrida.


149 Brandi, Teoria generale della critica. p. 83. “Nel presentificarsi di qualcosa che solo è in quanto è presente, che solo è in quanto è la differenza stessa che lo contrapone all’essistente, a
reflections as a theory of art to reveal the difference between language and art.

Art manifests itself through *astanza* and – in analogous manner to flagrance
that becomes sign through the establishment of arbitrary codes – it is subject to
codes as well.\textsuperscript{150} The structure of the so-called code of *astanza* is different from
the language code, and the experience would be the organiser of that code.
Consequently, sometimes it is possible to associate *astanza* with language, and
other times not.\textsuperscript{151}

Brandi’s aesthetics is about the constitution of the object, about how the
artist selects, modifies and attributes to the object symbolic values that isolate
it; performing a phenomenological reduction. The artist puts in evidence some
aspects of the object and hides others. Constitution of the object is the
precondition of the form and is inseparable from formulation of the image; they
are stages on the way towards the form. For Brandi, the Sartrean idea that the
work of art is the image and not the matter that supports it seems
fundamental.\textsuperscript{152}

Brandi considers *astanza* as having a structure invariable in time. When
something transforms *astanza* then either it is weakened, or it disappears, or it
is transformed into a new one. We correlate these characteristics with the

\textsuperscript{150} Ibid. p. 87.

\textsuperscript{151} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{152} D’Angelo, Cesare Brandi critica d’arte e filosofia. pp. 54-9, 133. It is worth recalling that
for Croce variants and different versions of a work during its production did not document its
process. Croce discussed about them as a false genesis of the work of art, interesting for the
psychologist but not for the critic. Brandi seemed then more sympathetic with Ingarden’s
ontological considerations of the work of art, in which the final work is the result of multiple
stratification and conjunction of different moments. For instance, in reference to some of these
stages according to Brandi Cfr. D’Angelo, Cesare Brandi critica d’arte e filosofia p. 70.,
Brandi, Elica II. Celso o della poesia pp. 155-56. and Ingarden, Ontology of the work of art:
the musical work, the picture, the architectural work, the film p. 291.
analysis of Ingarden’s ontology of the work of art in Section 4.2, especially for the constitution of architecture’s core, to be disclosed in Chapter 6. The final essence of astanza – and its material substrate – is part of a core that if destroyed is transformed or disappeared. So any transformation, he says, in the system or structure of the astanza affects the rest of it. He concludes that astanza is deduced from the structure of the consciousness and adds, significantly for our study, that art is the epiphany of astanza.

For the consideration of architecture as art, the interplay between flagrance and astanza is given through the “dialectic of the interior and exterior.” For Brandi, this dialectic is the way of givenness of architecture in contrast to any other space. There is the requisite that at any moment:

[...] the form of architecture is both external and internal to itself. We can not penetrate into the form, but the form sets itself as a penetrable-form [:] accordingly to set itself as a penetrable-form, architecture cannot be only an interior or an exterior, but the exterior should participate of a spatiality that renders it interior to itself, and the interior reciprocally exterior.

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153 Brandi bases the understanding of astanza as being in the same isotopic level. He explains that a determined isotopic level does not necessarily correspond with the reality, using as an example Euclidian geometry, which does not invalidate the non Euclidean geometry, but it is still real. Brandi, Teoria generale della critica. p. 89, 91. This means that one looks at a painting assuming it as real but knowing it unreal. What he calls isotopic levels would be the particular context in which certain schemata can be applied. It is worth recalling that Brandi related his discussion in semiotical terms at the time of writing Teoria generale della critica. The reduction of art to linguistic system of significant and signifier was for him out of the question. Therefore, he explained that the code of astanza could be extensional and intentional. By extensional he meant the truth-value of an expression, while by intentional is the proposition itself. He underlines the importance of this difference in the field of art criticism since sometimes the code of astanza, according to its position against the flagrance could be extensional or intentional. He explains with this the trends in the history of art as more or less realist or symbolic.

154 Ibid. p. 99.
155 Ibid. pp. 102-4.
Thus, Brandi mentions the inherent spatiality as specific to architecture, but in a way opposite to other visual arts. Whilst, for instance in painting, the interplay between inherent spatiality and phenomenic spatiality is characterised by a discontinuity, in architecture these two spaces are continuous.\footnote{Cfr. Brandi, \textit{Teoria generale della critica} pp. 278, 99.} Brandi finds \textit{astanza} – that makes architecture an art – in the evidence of the dialectic interior-exterior of the work of architecture.\footnote{For more on the experience of architecture as art in the context of Brandi’s ideas cfr, Carboni, \textit{Cesare Brandi. Teoria ed esperienza dell’arte}. Chapter 3.}

Brandi deduced a phenomenological system that, as the Husserlian method, implies a necessary reduction. Then, he arrived to suggest an essence of the artistic phenomena, sacrificing other of its relationships. Brandi performs the phenomenological approach to architecture within the schematism system of Kant and identified flagrance and \textit{astanza} for architecture as two ways of constituting a presence. Flagrance and \textit{astanza} reveal two dimensions of architecture. If \textit{astanza} was the main preoccupation of Brandi for being the necessary condition of its artistic nature, within flagrance it might be possible to identify other elements. Although these elements do not belong to the artistic part of the manifold of architecture, they are not less important because of that. The possibility to attach other than the aesthetics values to architecture is fundamental for this thesis. \textit{Astanza}, it seems true, has an extemporal way of being, however human life evolves in time. How we approach \textit{astanza} in time is part of our further exploration.
2.4 Brandi in the Postmodern Condition

With the structure, inevitably one comes to [a] threshold, whether one asserts its ontological reality or not. Having present that, the noematic direction concerns the intentional object and the noetic one the mode of the cogito itself – namely the one of consciousness – if then one approaches Husserl’s distinction of two basic directions of the description: noematic and noetic, one cannot say that the structure is a ‘real’ determination of the intentional object. Its givenness does not include it. It belongs to the modalities of the cogito therefore it is noetic.

Cesare Brandi, Teoria Generale della Critica. 1974. 160

Up to here, we have discussed Brandi’s ideas in the context of what was probably one of his most relevant roles: the art critic. He was a very prepared and philosophically informed art critic. The depth of his philosophical insight is what stimulates this thesis. However, we cannot ignore that conservation is a social activity. Brandi wanted to base restoration as part of this activity on firm philosophical bases. However, how did Brandi connect these two issues? It appears that his interest did not focus on the systemic aspects of society in relation to art; whether they are structural or not is out of the reach of this thesis.

Thus, if we consider some aspects of his theory, it seems that his theoretical proposals are philosophical, and the correspondent implications that had in practice, should not merit consideration within the multifaceted expressions of what is in a broad sense called Critical Theory. Many works about architectural criticism published in the last century have focused on

160 Brandi, Teoria generale della critica. p. 97. “Con la struttura inevitabilmente si approda a [una ] soglia, sia che se ne affermi o no la realtà ontologica. [...] Se poi si accede alla distinzione di Husserl di due direzioni fondamentali della descrizione, quella noematica e quella noetica, e si tenga presente che la direzione noematica riguarda l’oggetto intenzionale e quella noetica la modalità del cogito in se, ossia della coscienza, la struttura, non si potrà affermare come una determinazione ‘reale’ dell’oggetto intenzionale, non rientra nella sua
examination under postulates and proposals arrived from Critical Theory.  

These views anticipated innovative tools to dissect architectural ideas and additionally they came to a perfect field of application when the crisis of modern architecture became evident. However, Brandi was not investigating the structural problem of the social context that surrounded architecture but its inherent ontology. In a sense, he was working in an opposed sense to the “meta-assumptions of critical theory.”  

Brandi did not accept as tenable teleological final causes out of subjectivity. His premise was that, the pertinent practice of conservation should emerge from an ontological project whose importance has diminished considerably in the age of postmodernism. He connected instead with society through the encouragement of a positive attitude towards heritage. One instance of that supportive action is his role in the creation and direction of the Istituto Centrale del Restauro, a role that he performed from 1939 to 1959. Another example of his active engaging in theory of restoration as good practice in conservation is the role that his theoretical proposals played as precedent of the configuration of the Italian Carta del Restauro of 1972. The inheritance of his constant activity as critic of art, director of conservation projects and specially the significance of

’datità’, appartiene alla modalità del cogito, è cioè noetica.” (Our translation, emphasis in the original).

161 We take here the broad sense of critical theory suggested by Bohman, although the theories of Brandi did not have as much direction on social emancipation as in eliminating the sophism of his time. However, they did not aspire to be “descriptive and normative bases for social inquiry aimed at decreasing domination and increasing freedom in all their forms.” Cfr. James F. Bohman, Critical Theory Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language and Information, Stanford University, Spring 2005 [cited 01-06 2008]); available from http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2005/entries/critical-theory/.


163 Brandi, Teoria generale della critica. p. 27.
his still tenable *Theory of Restoration* has recently started to be reevaluated. A reworking of his theory emerges as a relevant issue within the present juncture of conservation.

**An Ontological Project**

As we have mentioned before, Brandi in *Teoria Generale della Critica* takes history as the paradigm of knowledge. However, history is not the only kind of knowledge; science can be another. Brandi conceives then two strands: in the first one history is dedicated to the study of semiosis, meaning the relation between significant and signified. On the second strand he identifies the study of flagrance that is subdivided into flagrance of the real and *astanza*; the former is the object of the sciences and the latter the study of the essence of art. This is the sense of the study that gives the name to *Teoria Generale della Critica*, that is to say the criticism of art. Brandi sustains that there is an epistemological shift, which shares different kinds of research in modern times. He suggests the existence of structures that the historian should reveal. For him, the historian needs to escape the limitations to which it was subject, such as the notion of a historical teleology or certain relations of causality that suggested a holistic structural system.

Brandi could not ignore the criticism made after Marx since the arise of Critical Theory, and accordingly – as can be noticed in *Teoria Generale della Critica*, p. XI.  

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165 During 2006 and 2007, the celebrations of the 100\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of Cesare Brandi’s birth date implied the organisation of eight national conferences, a touring exhibition, the publication of a Brandi’s dictionary in several languages and the translation of his *Theory of Restoration* to Spanish, English, Rumanian, Czech, French, Greek, Portuguese and Japanese, and the German one in progress. Cfr. (cited).
Critica – he took his own stance. During the first half of the 20th century, varied trends existed after the downfall of idealism: neo-Kantianism; Marxist interpretation; Critical Theory; and from the 1960s onwards, postmodern criticism. Among the available perspectives, Brandi empathised rather with phenomenology and existentialism than with the interdisciplinarity of critical theories as a sort of combination of philosophy and social science.

He made an indirect criticism to Karl Marx through the discussion of some epistemological changes that he finds in Foucault’s approach to history. He questioned Marxism as shifting towards an objectification of the human being by focusing on relations of production. According to his view, the dialectical materialism “represents a rigid centralization and levelling of history for which a single key is given.” Thus, as we have seen, Brandi accepts different levels of isotopy in order to understand different structures, however he discards any attempt to give to history a fixed structure, making an analogy with science in which the principle of indetermination and the principle of complementary have not limited its evolution.

At the beginning of this chapter, we framed a line of thought that later on made him to endorse phenomenological existentialism. This line constituted an important influence in Brandi’s thought. Although he was conscious about other currents in philosophy, Brandi was concerned by the one that took history as part of the given conditions, as a phenomena to be analysed. The other

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167 Ibid.
168 Ibid. p. 15.
169 Ibid. p. 21. “rappresenta invece un rigido accenramento e livellamento della storia per cui viene data un’unica chiave.” (Our translation).
current took the path of Marxism and from there it evolved into critical theories and postmodern criticism.

Although being in the middle of polemics about the crisis of the Modern Movement, Brandi as a critic of architecture did not fall into one of the two sides then defined namely the organicist and the functionalist.

Its discussion, expressed mainly in Eliante and Struttura e architettura was based on a latent awareness that architecture was a phenomenon composed of organic and rational aspects at the same time. Brandi then rejects the opposition functionalism-organicism and declares for architecture the impossibility to be only functional without denying itself as architecture and being reduced to a constructive passivity.\(^{171}\)

Hence, the consideration of architecture as a manifold is present in the notions of Brandi. The lack of more relevance of these theories about architecture is probably due to a decline of the phenomenological ontological project during most of the 20\(^{th}\) century. The arrival of postmodern criticism with its load of indeterminacy and relativism – not always philosophically tenable – occluded the eventual progress on this area.

Brandi was sceptical about interpretations of art criticism that – analysing artistic, architectural and urban phenomena – were derivative of Marxism. A series of theories have inherited some of these conceptions. For instance the studies developed by Manfredo Tafuri – who accused Brandi of being a metaphysical mystical neo-idealist – about architecture and the city’s development relate them to the productive processes and the ideology of consumption.\(^{172}\) In Progetto e Utopia, Tafuri analysed architecture and city as

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the result of ideological transformations in society. He conceived them as the place of technological production and a resultant of it. Architecture accepted its condition of commodity abandoning the utopias and getting into realism.\textsuperscript{173} The ideology of consumption becomes in this century the ideology of the correct use of the city.\textsuperscript{174}

In Tafuri’s analysis, he evidenced the critique to society as user more than the critique to architecture. Tafuri elaborated a discourse from the architectural phenomena towards the exterior. Without losing contact with the discipline of architecture, as an architectural historian he saw architecture more as a mediation between the human being and the society in which it was rooted.\textsuperscript{175} What Brandi was trying to do instead was a phenomenological approach to ontology in architecture. He was investigating architecture as a point of departure towards an eventual internal, inherent, structure, and therefore towards the consciousness of architecture itself. He seemed to respond to the words of Jameson when he says that without

normative conception of architecture space of radical difference from this one, the criticism of buildings tends to be conflated with the criticism of the ideology of such buildings; the history and criticism of architecture thus tend to fold back into the history and criticism of the various ideologies of architecture, the manifestos and the verbal expressions of the great architects themselves.\textsuperscript{176}

Brandi in that sense was encouraging certain kinds of actions in order to conserve CSA founding the normative of the praxis on firm ontological bases.

The performing of criticism in the context of the artistic phenomenon does not

\textsuperscript{174} Ibid. p. 78.
preclude the possibility to link that criticism towards other aspects of human life in order to put in contact art and society.

If the analysis and criticism of his considerations are to be valuable it is because we can consider that an overcoming and improvement of his theory is possible. Brandi’s ontological attempt to define art, and architecture as art, requires to be enriched; merging into his theory aspects that go beyond the artistic condition that he may have left out. Tafuri’s systematic view is but an example. The historical instance in his theory of restoration may encompass a more comprehensive perspective. We consider this in more detail in Chapters 3, 5 and 6.

**Criticism and Revaluations**

Although being a respectable figure in Italy and abroad, Brandi was not exempt of criticism. We have mentioned several times the suspicion of which he was a victim, of being just a follower of Croce’s idealist philosophy. We have discussed as well the contrast with approaches such as Tafuri’s, who even censured Brandi as neo-idealistic. The case of the so-called controversy published in *The Burlington Magazine* about the cleaning of paintings in relation to patina, varnish and glazes is but one of the most well-known examples of polemical discussion. The debate was about “the unfortunate cleaning, performed at the National Gallery of London” of some works against his theoretical principles.\(^{177}\) He supported his argument not only arguing

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theoretically, but philologically, demonstrating the origin of the terms and procedures in discussion.

Some other critiques that Brandi received were instead in the context of that conflictive relation of art with semiotics. For instance, in a review of *Teoria Generale della Critica*, a scholar, then committed to the study of language and structuralism, criticised the book on the grounds of considering it as a rework of previously studied theories, put together only in an attempt to explain the nature of art criticism. According to her, Brandi took the structuralistic standpoint accepting history as method and not as object. However, history is but a backup of demonstrations for Brandi. Therefore, that argument was weak, since the method is evidently phenomenological and not historical. She argued that Brandi’s conclusion was that “the primary manifestation of the thing occurs in two cases only: in existential flagrancy and in art.” Brandi instead seemed to suggest that astanza found its peak in art without explaining other eventual manifestation. She remarked that according to Brandi

[the] [f]ailure to maintain the distinction between different planes of isotopy leads to the confusion between existential reality (flagrancy) one the one hand, and conceptualization (meaning) or presentification (astanza) on the other. [...] the first isotopy of intellection is judgement [...] for astanza [...] the first isotopy is the recognition of non-existence, of difference.

Therefore, Teresa De Lauretis suggests Brandi contradicts his own theory when he says that “the superimposition of new semantic strata on the artistic structure does not bear directly on the structure which remains

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178 De Lauretis, “The Discreet Charm of Semiotics, or Esthetics in the Emperor's New Clothes.” pp. 16-7
179 Ibid. pp. 16-7.
180 Ibid. p. 20.
unchanged.” \(^{181}\) Her criticism seems tenable since as she argues, the work of art can enter in the process of semiosis and social signification. However, here one could doubt if the suggestion would not be an abstraction of a different order or level, a different isotopy. We take this critique as evidence of the possibility to attach different significance or value to architecture. These values would define additional elements to consider when performing conservation. We come back to this issue in Chapter 5.

Another scholar criticised Brandi’s *Teoria Generale della Critica* noticing that

Art is not language: to clarify and deepen the truth of that proposition is the primary aim of Brandi’s book. But given the meaning Brandi accepts for ‘language’, neither thinking nor criticism is language either, and Brandi’s unawareness of this truth concerning his own mental activity weakens his book so that its main connections are ambiguous to the point of confusion. \(^{182}\)

According to this reviewer, Brandi’s development of an own terminology was limited except for the introduction of the terms flagrancy and *astanza*, considering his language a combination of Husserl, Heidegger, Louis Hjelmslev and Umberto Eco. Again, this critic felt that for Brandi, Croce’s early aesthetics and Brandi’s own work as critic were the main forces. \(^{183}\) He even related the “bipolar” consciousness of Brandi with Croce’s distinction between *conoscenza intuitiva* and *conoscenza logica* and thus he tried “to establish a qualitative difference between *astanza* and semiosis, or art and language, much like Croce’s distinction between intuition and concept.” \(^{184}\) In substance, according to him, Brandi seemed to fight against opponents that are

\(^{181}\) Ibid. p. 21.  
\(^{183}\) Ibid. p. 231.  
\(^{184}\) Ibid. pp. 231-2.
not interested in his main conflict: to demonstrate that language does not engulf art.\textsuperscript{185}

Brandi was very pessimistic at the time regarding modern architecture. He wrote his \textit{Eliante} as a dialog emulating the form of the classical writings to discuss his ideas about architecture as art. He situates the scenes in Italy after the World War II where a group of friends meet to discuss about how architecture had been affected after the conflict by the new tendencies. The discussion regarded mainly the validity of the modern movement in its different expressions.\textsuperscript{186} He rejected both Rationalism and Organic Architecture as art because in them the architect could not arrive to formulate the image and in organicism not even arrive to constitute the object.\textsuperscript{187} It has been observed that,

\begin{quote}
The \textit{Eliante o della architettura} concluded with [...] the impossibility that modern buildings were inserted in urban context of other times, because of their specific spatiality, absolutely different from that of any other epoch and so, incapable in any case to harmonise with them.\textsuperscript{188}
\end{quote}

According to Brandi, there was a rejection of the figurative tradition making the discipline of rational architecture become theory and praxis at the same time, concept and act.\textsuperscript{189} On the other hand, the problem for organic architecture was that it put in evidence the issue of conformation of architecture and not architecture itself.\textsuperscript{190} A scholar has observed that he did not trust in ideology supporting art creativity which seems a very tenable argument.

\textsuperscript{185} Ibid. p. 234.
\textsuperscript{186} Cfr. Carboni, \textit{Cesare Brandi. Teoria ed esperienza dell'arte}.
\textsuperscript{187} D'Angelo, \textit{Cesare Brandi critica d'arte e filosofia} p. 78.
\textsuperscript{188} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{189} Brandi, \textit{Elicona. III-IV. Arcadio o della Scultura. Eliante o dell'Architettura}. p. 105
\textsuperscript{190} Ibid. p. 115.
nowadays. This evidences Brandi’s critical capacity of diagnosis in reference to the artistic phenomena.

The previous analyses have been discussed also recently by scholars in Italy with the reborn interest in Brandi’s thought. Several symposiums and conferences have been organised, not only as commemoration of his work but also as deepening and development of his theoretical explanations. Examples of these studies are the works such as: Cesare Brandi critica d’arte e filosofia by Paolo D’Angelo; Cesare Brandi. Teoria e esperienza dell’arte by Carboni; or Attraverso l’immagine. In ricordo di Cesare Brandi, edited by Luigi Russo because of a seminar organised to commemorate the 100 years of Brandi’s birth, among several other publications.

More recently in an article, a scholar recalls Brandi’s declaration of the significance of art during the presentation of Teoria Generale della Critica done by Giulio Carlo Argan, Emilio Garroni and Roland Barthes. According to him, astanza presupposed a structure of relations and reciprocal differences. For him Brandi’s merit is to have opposed a theory to the “banal researches pertaining the content, historicist and scientific-realistic done contemporarily with his research.” Another merit that he underlines is “to expose the inconsistencies of many theories that […] looked to reduce art, in particular architecture, to a language similar to the verbal one, […] without the mediation

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191 D’Angelo, Cesare Brandi critica d’arte e filosofia p. 81.
193 Prestinenza Puglisi, Brandi - Teoria generale della critica ([cited].
194 Ibid. ([cited]. (Our translation).
of linguistics and structuralism.”¹⁹⁵ According to him, it may be the moment to re-evaluate Brandi’s research under the light of the advances of linguistics and phenomenology.

Brandi belonged to the strand of criticism committed to philosophy as the dilucidating reflective power of human being. Supported on that knowledge his theory and practice were always consistent. Between the existentialist and the Marxist approaches, he chose the first as one that offered the open possibility that art supposes. His philosophy did not lack inconsistencies and criticism; however, it still proposes possibilities of reflection and, probably more importantly today, resulting actions. He incorporated the phenomenological exploration of being for theorising art and architecture. Thus, one of the consequences of this choice is his theory of restoration with its particular attitude on temporality in relation with the work of art. His approach was characterised by going from the object to the consciousness of it, rather than one directed towards exteriorisation with its structural consequences.

Retaking the quote that opens this particular section, he was more interested in deducing the noetic from the noematic, leaving their structural consequences to the study of history.

Conclusions

We have mapped Brandi’s journey in his approach to the knowledge of art in general and architecture in particular. We have emphasised two significant consequences from idealist notions present in Brandi. One is the

¹⁹⁵ Ibid. (cited). (Our translation).
awareness of architecture as being constituted by a manifold identity, one of whose elements is its being art. Brandi seemed to discard the duality of spirit and sensuousness of the idealism and reinterpret their presence distinguishing them in flagrance and astanza. The importance he gave to the issue of mimesis was the second legacy from idealism. If the image was for him a constant object of theoretical reflection, the concept of mimesis instead somehow remained fixed in the notion of reproduction or copy. The possibilities to develop the notion of mimesis, to encompass cultural practices, within the theory that he established could have been promising of a positive evolution in the paradigm of conservation. As other of his generation, the advanced theoretical corpus that Brandi developed overcame the Crocean idealism that preceded him. Brandi’s attitude towards the Italian philosopher did not lack a critical reaction. The opposition to the identity of intuition and expression was constant during his life – not only as reaction to Crocean concepts – arguing against the semiotical trends of the age. Thus, the incorporation of new approaches to study art – and architecture as art – characterised the overcoming of idealism. Through a phenomenological epoché, Brandi deduced the essence of the artistic phenomena sacrificing other realities that the artistic phenomenon affects. He approached architecture phenomenologically within the frame of Kantian schematism. Flagrance and astanza revealed two dimensions of architecture as in the other arts, although implying for the case of architecture some consequences in relation to human temporality. We have suggested the significance of architectural values beyond the characteristics of architecture’s presence in order to update Brandi’s theoretical frame. Brandi’s choice to continue towards the construction of an understanding of the ontological
structure of architecture, and in a wider sense the human world, is significant for this thesis. As we have suggested the approach of Brandi was phenomenological in method and ontological in goals. This seemed to detach his philosophy from the trends of critical theory and link it more to the neo-Kantian and phenomenological philosophical enquiry, despite the criticism received from structuralistic and semiotic commentators.

However, the ontological project was relevant for other strands of scholars investigating human existence. The fact that architecture is the conformation of the human place – and its artistic condition – triggered the question of what this human place is. Art, according to Brandi’s theories, is the privileged manifestation of astanza. However, Brandi defines astanza as an intemporal form of presence. Thus, architecture lingers in the middle, between the role of the dynamic and changing place of human dwelling and the one of support of the intemporal work of art. To deal with its conservation means to deal with human temporality, and this makes us shift our investigation towards conservation as a form of temporal intentionality.
Chapter 3: Conservation as Temporal Intentionality: The Approach of Brandi

The work of art is the maximum effort that may make man transcend its transient existence, detaching from time and conforming within the immutability of eternity. [...] The work opposes the concrete standing reality – in which the present that gave it origin is reactivated – to an expired existential reality.

Cesare Brandi, *Carmine o della pittura*, 1945.196

Social life develops in architectural place, that is to say an environment formed by a combination of a natural pre-existence and human intervention. However, this place evolves and changes in time acquiring cultural significance. There have always been reasons to keep changing this cultural context and reasons to keep it stable. Modern conservation, understood as a scientific attitude of preservation of the cultural heritage, was born after the impulse of Enlightenment. There are, of course, precedents to this attitude, each one of them with different notions. Their conceptual differences reside in the particular concretization that they produce in consciousness, since they imply particular attitudes towards the endurance of architecture in time.

Brandi distinguished his particular emphasis from modern conservation by restricting it to the aesthetic phenomena. When one recognises art within the object to conserve, then it is a subject of restoration according to his theory; otherwise, the object belongs to the field of study of the social sciences, such as history or archaeology, or it is more generally subject to repair.197 While

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196 Brandi, *Carmine o della pittura* p. 64. “L’opera d’arte è il massimo sforzo che possa compiere l’uomo per trascendere la propria transeunte esistenza, togliendosi al tempo e conformandosi nell’immobile dell’eternità. [...] L’opera ad una realtà esistenziale perenta oppone la concretizzazione di una realtà astante, in cui si riattiva all’infinito quel presente, che le dette vita.” (Our translation).

197 Cfr. Brandi, Basile et al., *Theory of restoration*, p. 47. This point of view is analogous with the approach of Chanfón, who says that restoration is an instrument of history. He sustains that
modern scientific conservation emphasises objectivity and historical
authenticity, restoration focuses on the recovery of the image of the work of art.
The deduction of Brandi’s theory was a phenomenological endeavour, based on
an account about how art is presented to consciousness.

Brandi’s theory has a phenomenological point of departure, assuming
the concept of intentionality as the fact that all consciousness addresses
something – or some other.\textsuperscript{198} He defines restoration as “[…] the
 methodological moment in which the work of art is recognised, in its physical
being, and in its dual aesthetic and historic nature, in view of its transmission to
the future.”\textsuperscript{199} Therefore, restoration implies an aesthetic intentionality directed
towards the artistic object. For this approach, the issue of appearance is
fundamental because of the explored notion of astanza. Thus, we
phenomenologically label restoration as intentionality, as a specific case within
the wider conservation genus. For Brandi, this intentionality has the artistic
object – the work of art – as correlative, and within this category, we focus on
the architectural object. We contrast the emphasis he puts on the artistic nature,
with other elements of the manifold that constitutes architecture that he may
have not considered because of the pre-eminence that he gave to art.

\textsuperscript{198} Chanfón Olmos, \textit{Fundamentos teóricos de la restauración} p. 266.
Chanfón did not seem to understand that the theory of Brandi has this specificity and therefore
he assimilates it to the more general concept of conservation, which in Spanish language is
frequently called restoration. Chanfón supports his judgement about Brandi’s theory on the
misleading commentary of Conti, who considered Brandi an idealist. Cfr. Alessandro. Conti,
p. 43.
\textsuperscript{199} Cfr. Moran, \textit{Edmund Husserl founder of phenomenology} p. 54.
\textsuperscript{198} Brandi, Basile et al., \textit{Theory of restoration}. p. 48. Cfr. also, Catalano, "Una definizione che
103-4.
How aesthetic intentionality merges with the consciousness of time is the result, again, of Husserlian deductions. It has been said that “[t]o speak of time-consciousness as such is confusing. Strictly speaking, for the early Husserl at least, time appears only in conjunction with an appearing object. We are not conscious of time as such, but rather of objects in time.”200 This establishes a first connection between objects and time. The second is human awareness about its relation with those objects and consequently with its own temporality.201

Therefore, awareness of time comes from identifying a unity whose endurance in time is apparent to consciousness.202 Temporality is usually understood as the interplay between consciousness of past, present and future and it is distinguished in three levels: world time level, internal time level and consciousness of internal time level. These levels of temporality refer to intentionality and the experience of time as the time lived in the real world, the time as awareness of sequence within the mind, and the consciousness about this awareness. Brandi instead, identifies three instances of time in his Theory of Restoration: the time of the creation of the work of art, the time between the end of the creative process and the awareness of it by a consciousness, and the time of recognition of the work of art as such.203 In relation to architectural monuments, Brandi emphasises the transformation of their surroundings bringing him to consider architecture as an element within a more extended monument, namely the environment. Temporality in this case arises as a

200 Moran, Edmund Husserl founder of phenomenology p. 139.
202 This is possible through retention or primary memory as it is called. Cfr. Moran, Edmund Husserl founder of phenomenology pp. 141-2. We explore this issue further in Chapter 5.
problem whose time scale depends on the speed of transformation of the city, the awareness of which is usually collective.\textsuperscript{204}

What we call conservation intentionality is then a combined attentiveness in which one is conscious of an object and additionally of its endurance in time.\textsuperscript{205} The correlative object of these intentionalities is the architectural object. From Chapter 4, however, we can deduce from the architectural object the object as such and the object as intended; this may suggest a path to what and why to conserve.\textsuperscript{206} Husserl considered all attitudes as being grounded in the natural attitude since they presuppose it, and the characteristics of this first naive epoché have determined subsequent attitudes.\textsuperscript{207} For his theory, Brandi was assuming an aesthetic attitude for the appreciation of art; an attitude that could be characterised as individual, subjective and intemporal.\textsuperscript{208} From that crucial attitude in his theory, we move towards a conservation intentionality that gradually allows the possibility of being collective and grounded in architecture as the human place to live.

In this chapter, we explore this progression of concepts from individual to collective conservation intentionalities, up to the idea of cultural heritage in relation to Brandi’s theories. We call these concepts determinants of conservation. Accordingly, section 3.1 “The Supremacy of Art as Individual Experience” embraces the exploration of the individual aesthetic experience. It explains the characteristic conservation attitude of Brandi – the notions of his

\textsuperscript{203} Brandi, Basile et al., \textit{Theory of restoration} p. 61.
\textsuperscript{204} Ibid. pp. 94-5.
\textsuperscript{205} Even better, it is the result of these two intentionalities that, for Brandi, are judged, and then expressed as a kind of duty. Cfr. Ibid. p. 49.
\textsuperscript{206} This differentiation is the one that Husserl finds between the noetic and the noematic. Cfr. Moran, \textit{Edmund Husserl founder of phenomenology} pp. 133-9.
theory of restoration – and details temporality from that perspective. He conceived architecture as art, and by doing so, he was privileging some elements to receive conservation in the architectural manifold, establishing supremacy for art in any restoration intervention.

The way in which Western culture has determined its decisions about what and how to conserve, derive from the way in which it has conceived these concepts. Therefore, the section 3.2 “From Personal Experience to Shared Knowledge” explores memory and history as determinants. Memory implies a dynamic concept, whilst history has suggested a subject-object relationship. The understanding of the difference between these two ideas is fundamental for the thesis and is analysed in more detail in Chapter 5.

Section 3.3 “Monuments and Identities” explores the issues of monument and identity, in which the correlative objects of conservation and restoration start to imply collectiveness. With this collective intentionality based on memory, the concept of monument finds its origin and development; and has influence on another determinant for exploration, that of identity.

Brandi’s theory of restoration has importantly influenced the foundations of conservation of cultural heritage in an institutionalised form. Hence, section 3.4 “Conservation and Society” examines the concept of cultural heritage and the distinguishable attitudes of conservation and restoration. An historical description of these two attitudes is outlined with the result of the current practice of heritage conservation emphasising relevant links to Brandi’s theory.

\[207\] Ibid. p. 55.
### 3.1 The Supremacy of Art as Individual Experience

[a] work of art is such because of a particular and conscious recognition. This recognition [...] must be performed again and again by each individual, and [...] can be validated only by such personal acts. [...] a work of art [...] is not considered as such in relation to its essence or to the creative process that produced it, but in relation to the way it enters into the world, into each individual’s particular way of being in the world.


Brandi would acknowledge conservation of buildings of the Industrial Revolution such as railway stations, vernacular architecture of small villages, or even some of the – for him controversial – creations of the architecture of the Modern Movement. However, he might not have considered these architectural monuments as a work of art, and therefore not as objects for restoration. The instance to conserve them would be historical and not aesthetic. Brandi’s aesthetic theory was consistent throughout his life, being subject to changes more of perspective and terminology than modifications to core principles. Brandi has been described as representing “[…] the type of critic-philosopher who founds his judgement and his own interpretative structure on a coherent theory of art, on an aesthetics.”  

Crucial in understanding his theory of restoration is the consideration of its exclusive application for the work of art.

Architecture – and its conservation – is problematic for Brandi, not only for the inclusion of function within its manifold: arts, or at least arts other than architecture, do not involve practical use, but also for the concurrence of three

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206 Brandi, Basile et al., *Theory of restoration* p. 47.
209 Ibid.
210 D’Angelo, *Cesare Brandi critica d’arte e filosofia*. pp. 13-4. The other option to be a critic was based in the so called *connoisseurship*. 
temporalities: the temporality of creation; the interval between creation and reception; and the recognition of architecture as work of art. In his theory, architecture manifests *astanza* through the presentation of an exterior that implies an interior and an interior that implies an exterior, supported by a structure that for Brandi does not have artistic value. It is on the aesthetic value that Brandi centres the emphasis of his theory because of his particular phenomenological perspective.

**Art in time**

For Brandi, art is the epiphany of *astanza* that is manifested through the spatiality offered in the image. Let us recall that for him architecture is always image.\(^{211}\) For the case of architecture, he does not consider the existential space as the one constituting the artistic spatiality.\(^{212}\) He says:

What I deny immediately [...] is [...] the claim to establish architecture as an art that would be entitled to a qualification, through space, more than painting or sculpture. [...] Detaching architecture from space [...] takes it back to the field of the image, where it can ascend to form: to that reality that does not transcend the existential reality, but stands as the only reality that the consciousness can provoke within it without transcendence.\(^{213}\)

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\(^{212}\) He disqualifies the definition of Le Corbusier when he says that “architecture is the representation of space [...] is certainly the most formalist definition of architecture that could be given, more unilateral than the one — abstractly phenomenological — which sees in architecture a combination of spaces, masses and lines that is revealed through a play of light and shadows.” Brandi, *Elícona. III-IV. Arcadio o della Scultura. Eliante o dell’Architettura* p. 174. “L’architettura è rappresentazione dello spazio [...] è certo la definizione più formalistica che possa darsi dell’architettura, non meno unilaterale di quella, astrattamente fenomenologica, che vede nell’architettura una combinazione di spazi, di masse e di linee che si rivela attraverso un gioco di luce e d’ombra.” (Our translation).

\(^{213}\) Ibid. pp. 174-5. “Quello che negherò subito [...] è [...] la pretesa di istituire l’architettura come un’arte che avrebbe diritto ad una qualificazione, attraverso lo spazio, più della pittura o della scultura. [...] Staccando allora l’architettura dallo spazio [...] vale riportarla subito nel campo dell’immagine, dove, o in nessun altro, potrà ascendere alla forma: a quella realtà, che non trascede la realtà esistenziale, ma si pone come l’unica, che la coscienza riesca a suscitare a se stessa senza trascendenza [...]” (Our translation).
This perception of architecture as work of art is individually experienced. In his *Eliante*, Brandi approached phenomenologically the creation of architecture as a work of art, where he described it as being supported on Kantian schematism. However, in his *Theory of Restoration* he approaches the work of art from the point of view of reception. In this text, he seems to suggest that art occurs *when* it is perceived and it is *then* recreated, suggesting a complementary temporality of the work that closes the cycle of creation-reception.\(^{214}\) Whilst the implied temporality for architectural creation has ontological implications – that we explore further subsequently – the concept of restoration focuses on a hermeneutical endeavour. Architecture as work of art – and for that case any other art – creates an intemporal interval between its creation (Figure 3-1 Architecture as Art t1) and reception (Architecture as Art t2), in which it potentially subsists but does not exist.\(^{215}\)


\(^{215}\) Brandi, Basile et al., *Theory of restoration* p. 48.
Architecture’s reception in consciousness is, Brandi sustains, given in a double instance: the aesthetic and the historic. He discards usefulness as a significant instance in the work of art for restoration; usefulness is only important for the origin of the physical form and for maintenance. For Brandi, the time of the work of art ends with the loss of its aesthetic instance, that once lost originates a ruin. The time between creation and reception leaves only traces on the work. Matter represents the time and the place of restoration.

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218 Ibid. p. 51. For him the marble of a sculpture – for instance – is only illusory, the same as recent extracted marble; he calls it *illusion of immanence.* Human intervention has historicised the former marble by making it vehicle of the image and that marble belongs to the present. Brandi, Basile et al., *Theory of restoration* p. 51. According to him, idealistic and positivistic conceptions of the work of art have disregarded the importance of matter in its double aspect of appearance and structure. He for example criticises Semper and Taine for assuming that the material determines the style, and also the idealist aesthetics as conceiving the matter as dissolved. Cfr. Brandi, Basile et al., *Theory of restoration* pp. 51-3.
Brandi says that in the work of art, time is found in three different moments:

First there is the duration of the externalising of the work of art, while it is being formed by the artist; second, we have the interval between the end of the creative process and the moment when our consciousness becomes aware of the work of art; third, is the instant when the work of art strikes consciousness like a bolt of lightning.\(^{219}\)

He seems to focus on the temporality that concerns the work of art. The time he is discussing in his *Theory of Restoration* is the transcendent time of the object and not the internal time of the observer. Therefore, we can identify: the temporality of the creation of the work of art, according to what he develops in *Carmine* – and *Eliante* for the case of architecture; the time that he calls the interval between creation and reception, according to what he develops in his *Teoria Generale della Critica*; and the time of reception in an instant of recognition, that he implies in the *Theory of Restoration*. If by hypothesis, we consider architecture as a temporal object within the times that Brandi suggested, Husserl would describe a particular *running-off phenomena* for each one of them. Yet, it is worth considering that,

Every temporal being ‘appears’ in one or another continually changing mode of running-off, and the ‘Object in the mode of running-off’ is in this change always something other, even though we still say that the Object and every point of its time and this time itself are one and the same. The ‘Object in the mode of running-off’ we cannot term a form of consciousness (any more than we can call a spatial phenomenon, a body in its appearance from one side or the other, far or near, a form of consciousness).\(^{220}\)

Consciousness has to repeat this constitution of the object individually for each one of the times that Brandi proposes, unless the complete history of the object through different ages was considered as a single phenomenon.

\(^{219}\) Brandi, Basile et al., *Theory of restoration* p. 61.
According to Husserl’s theory, it is worthy noticing that in any case, architecture as spatial object is a temporal object as well. One perceives architecture through time, while one moves through it.\(^{221}\)

Brandi calls attention to the fact that the three temporalities he suggests are frequently confused with the historical time of the work of art; the transcendent time in Husserl’s terms. With this, Brandi denied any kind of zeitgeist expressed through the work of art.

\[\ldots\] the artist decides whether to incorporate the sacrosanct tastes and concerns, theories and ideologies, desires and schemes that he might have in common with his epoch. \[\ldots\] of these concomitant outside factors that come together in the final object, nothing will remain, or will remain only as an insect trapped in amber. The time in which the artist lives might or might not be recognisable in his work, and the validity of the work neither will be increased nor diminished an iota.\(^{222}\)

For him, these inclusions are objects of suggestive interpretation, matter of chronological history but not art history.\(^{223}\) On the other hand, Brandi underlines the fact that the time of the interval between conclusion and reception of the work of art “slides over the reality of the work,” ignoring its physical consistency.\(^{224}\)

In Brandi’s view, art is immaterial and intemporal. Nevertheless, it is supported by and manifested through the matter of the work of art that endures in time. Structure and appearance, then, belong together. He looked in his theory for the proper moment in which the work of art access into historical


\(^{221}\) Husserl says that “It is tempting to draw a parallel between [the] modes of the consciousness and appearance of temporal Objects and the modes in which a spatial thing appears and is known with changing orientation, to pursue the ‘temporal orientations’ in which spatial things (which are also temporal objects) appear.” Ibid. pp. 46-7.

\(^{222}\) Brandi, Basile et al., *Theory of restoration* pp. 61-2.

\(^{223}\) Ibid. p. 62.
time, determining as legitimate only the “actual moment of conscious awareness of the work of art.” Once the *when* of art’s manifestation and the *what* of its epiphany has been defined, then it is time to phenomenologically understand how Brandi conceives the recognition of art in consciousness. That recognition defines the *how*, but, importantly for us, it opens additional dimensions in which art is involved, that are not necessarily dependent on its being art.

**Restoration Attitude**

Humans could be blind to art, since art apprehension depends on the attitude of human consciousness; the scientific and the aesthetic are but some instances of this consciousness. Brandi founds his theory of restoration mainly on an aesthetic attitude, bracketing out the elements of the work that are not the manifestation of astanza. However, restoration is an operation in which two intentionalities are involved: an intentionality that finds its correlative object in an intemporal work of art; and a temporal intentionality that finds its correlative object in a temporal object. This merging of intentionalities makes restoration problematic. The distinguishing attribute then is that restoration aims to preserve or recover the artistic image. Brandi defines restoration as “[...] the methodological moment in which the work of art is recognised, in its physical being, and in its dual aesthetic and historic nature, in view of its transmission to the future.” Restoration therefore constitutes a double intentionality of an artistic object in time.

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224 Ibid.
226 Ibid.
Brandi seems to suggest that while the historical instance involves consideration of the aspects determined by the flagrance of the existential reality of the work of art, or more properly its material substratum, the aesthetic instance instead focuses on the aspects of *astanza* determining the image. We are correlating, then, the instances of Brandi’s theory of restoration with pertinent intentionalities. As mentioned before, Brandi privileges the aesthetic instance because it is the artistic quality more than the temporal testimony that brings uniqueness and value. However, the historical instance determines an attitude in terms of temporality, since he considers the artistic condition to be out of existential time. Therefore, for restoration to be pertinent, time has to be always recognised and presented in the flagrance of the work. An intervention that pretends the abolition of time is to be avoided.²²⁷

For the aesthetic instance, the aim is the re-integration of the potential unity of the work of art. Brandi states that, “if a work of art, which is not a sum of parts, is physically fragmented, it will continue to exist as a potential whole in each of its fragments.”²²⁸ What Brandi intended here is that even when the matter of the work of art has traversed in time losing integrity, its parts contain by implication the complete work that can be recovered via restoration through interpretation. Time is in consequence a destructive or at least a dissipative power. In a similar fashion, Brandi presents the conflict of the patina, as evidence of time passing, with the aesthetic unity, by stating that

²²⁷ Brandi criticised the Italian motto “as it was, where it was” arguing that this attitude negated the principles of restoration. Ibid. p. 75. The people of Venice when considering the reconstruction of the Campanile in St. Mark Square on the 17th July of 1902 coined the famous motto “com’era dove’era.” For a synthesis of this historical case, cfr. Jukka Jokilehto, "A history of architectural conservation. The contribution of English, French, German and
[...] given that the transmission of the formed image occurs through the material, and that the material's role is as transmitter, the material must never take precedence over the image, in the sense that it should become unseen as material, and act only as image.\(^{229}\)

Matter is significant then, because it supports the image and not because it is important as such material. Brandi saw patina as the evidence of the historicizing of matter, so it is viewed as the same matter transformed in time rather than adhered matter to the original.

Brandi does not discuss astanza in his theory of restoration, that he still calls pure reality; he instead gives examples of how aesthetic issues determine certain conservation and restoration interventions. It is worth recalling that, although having already conceived the role of astanza in the process of creation and reception of art, Brandi had not completely incorporated it in his vocabulary.\(^{230}\) Astanza, or pure reality, deserves additional explanation in the context of restoration as conservation intentionality. An analysis of the theory in light of the considerations of his Teoria Generale della Critica could be a way to update his theory. Let us, for instance, consider the example of the optical giveness in architecture. Brandi starts by considering that visual perception is always perception of something.\(^{231}\) However, in opposition to the other arts, in architecture the inherent space presented in the image is continuous or co-existent with the phenomenic space.

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\(^{228}\) Italian thought towards an international approach to the conservation of cultural property” (PhD, The University of York, 1986) pp. 344-5.

\(^{229}\) Brandi, Basile et al., Theory of restoration p. 57. (Emphasis in the original).

\(^{230}\) Ibid. p. 74.

\(^{231}\) For a description of the development of the concept of pure reality that became then condensed in the neologism astanza, cfr. Carboni, Cesare Brandi. Teoria ed esperienza dell’arte pp. 11-78.

\(^{231}\) Brandi, Teoria generale della critica p. 277.
Brandi differentiates the giveness of *astanza* in architecture from that in painting and sculpture, due to architecture’s opposition *inherent spatiality-phenomenic space*; namely between the space that the work develops in the image and the phenomenic space in which the material work and human being’s existence is immersed.\textsuperscript{232} Yet, the interior reveals the exterior and the exterior the interior. Each one of both manifestations can be thematic, and consequently, their recovery can be the main purpose of restoration. Restoration for architecture, according to Brandi’s theory, would imply the recovery of the interplay of exterior and interior revealing themselves mutually. The essential formal characteristics of architecture, tectonics and *ornato*, in Brandi’s terms, are to be deduced through phenomenological analysis in order to proceed to critical restoration. Consequently, an adumbration of these features should start the filling of restoration intentionality. Whilst the external-internal relation is guaranteed by the conservation of the interior, only the internal-external relationship needs the involvement of the conservation of the urban or natural continent environment.\textsuperscript{233}

There is an additional dimension to highlight in Brandi’s restoration intentionality.

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\textsuperscript{232} Ibid. p. 300.
\textsuperscript{233} Brandi, Basile et al., *Theory of restoration* p. 94.
humans to conserve what seems to have value, especially in view of time as phenomenologically intended. Thus, this aspect of Brandi’s theory merges with the temporal intentionality in the moral imperative, “in view of [art’s] transmission to the future”, namely the art that human beings have in the present. For Brandi, the centre of gravity of this temporality is located in the present and the filling object of intentionality is the work of art as such. Nevertheless, one could argue whether this transmission to the future is already an existential position that can join the present interpretation of architecture as art and the future apprehensions of those others to come or not. We reconnect these three issues – moral dimension, temporality and intersubjectivity – again in Section 6.4. Despite the temptation to consider this universal consciousness part of an idealist inheritance in Brandi, more probably he was implying Jung’s notions of collective unconscious, although he was sceptical about applying psychology as a key to interpret art and its significant dimension.

There are some other important features in conservation analysed as temporal intentionality. However, some of them are examined in Chapter 4 and 5, since they constitute ontological moments developed in time, such as the issue of spatiality. The way in which Brandi framed temporal intentionality in his theory specifying what and when humans restore has been the key issue here. Art is the specific object of restoration intentionality, and the present moment of recognition is its specific time. Restoration according to Brandi is then, for our purposes, about architecture as a work of art; and it is directed

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Ibid. p. 49.
Ibid. p. 48.
Actually he mentions Jung in Teoria generale della critica in relation to the deviated trend of psychoanalysis to enlarge the concept of the unconscious. He strongly criticised these
towards its specific artistic qualities. It is also an attitude to the present, in view of the future of others to come. Restoration so understood is a step on the path towards an interpretation of architecture. According to Brandi, human consciousness takes this first step individually. However, a mnemonic operation achieves the retention of the traces that permits this connection between art and future human consciousness; it is interpretation as a collective necessity.

3.2 From Personal Experience to Shared Knowledge

If matter does not remember the past, it is because it repeats the past unceasingly, because subject to necessity, it unfolds a series of moments of which each is the equivalent of the preceding moment and may be deduced from it: thus its past is truly given in its present. But a being which evolves more or less freely creates something new every moment; in vain, then, should we seek to read its past in its present unless its past were deposited within it in the form of memory. Thus [...] it is necessary, and for similar reasons, that the past should be acted by matter, imagined by mind.

Henri Bergson, *Matter and Memory*, 1896.237

[...] since, by hypothesis, the historical fact consists in what really has happened; but where ever did something happen? Every episode of a revolution or war is resolved in a myriad of psychic and individual movements; each one of these expresses unconscious evolutions; and these latter are resolved in cerebral, hormonal or nervous phenomena, which refer at their time to physical or chemical orders. In consequence, the historical fact is not a data of the others; it is the historian, or the agent of the historical becoming, who constitutes it as abstraction and as under the threat of an infinite regression.

Lévi-Strauss, *La pensée sauvage*, 1962.238

Memory is for restoration a temporal intentionality, which has been essentially characterised by Plato as, “the present representation of an absent

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theories as an attempt to make of them a first cause. Brandi, *Teoria generale della critica* pp. 30-1.


thing.”

Despite the fact that this quality of absence presupposes a having been, in contrast to imagination, whose image is about the possible, memory is always present as Bergson’s epigram suggests. The opposition is between retention and protention. If for Brandi restoration is about art and art is about image, then the role of this image as the object to fill mnemonic intentionalities becomes crucial, bearing symbols and signs, but importantly for Brandi, becoming the place of manifestation of astanza.

History on its side has suffered epistemological revolutions and some reflection about the philosophy of history seems necessary in order to understand it both as a fact – the past – and as a discipline. Brandi’s thought about history emerges mainly in *Teoria Generale della Critica*. We have mentioned that he proposed history as a sort of paradigm of conceptual knowledge. Echoing Lévi-Strauss, however, Brandi dissolved the category of event to constitute an object to observe. In freezing the actual moment as a present object of analysis, Brandi highlighted flagrance as the main point of contrast between history – that can be analysed as sign or as science – and the manifestation of astanza that is out of its reach. The intention here is not to outline his complete approach to history, but to pinpoint the relevant connections with his restoration intentionality.

**Memory**

The identification of memory with image is intrinsic to Brandi. In philosophy, this emphasis on memory as representation or image has been
Henri Bergson suggested in *Matter and Memory* that “[…] memory is just the intersection of mind and matter.” What seems relevant for the discussion of Brandi’s notion of art as image is the deduction from Bergson’s epigram: the impossible recognition of the past just through the presence of matter. The past comes with the *spiritual* work of memory. This notion of embodied memory correlated to architecture brings again the question of mimesis. Human beings have always remembered architecture – the apparent main point of conservation – but also significantly remembered by means of architecture. We discuss in more detail this issue of architecture embodying memory in the form of culture in Chapter 5. Brandi concedes the dependability of embodied memory to matter when he says, “Only the material of a work of art is restored. […] Some of the physical structure will be acting as supports for the parts that are actually transmitting the message […]”

Memory in its personal and collective dimensions can have architecture not only as the object of intentionality, but also as its trigger. This arises in two different ways, as affection and as an active search: memory and

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240 Discussing Sartre’s ideas in *The psychology of imagination*, Ricoeur calls the attention to the fact that “[t]here must be an irreducible feature in the living experience of memory that explains the persistence of the confusion conveyed by the expression memory-image.” He does a plea to redefine whether memory manifests itself always in the form of an image within consciousness. Ibid. Cfr. Sartre, *The psychology of imagination*.

241 The ontological system in Bergson’s *Matter and memory* has many paradoxes. We used it here to illustrate the fixation of precedent manifestations of existence in present matter. In reality, Bergson suggests that “past and present are no longer located on the same line, but constitute different planes of being, related and articulated in coexistence. This coexistence offers a continuity of a different sort than that found in linear succession – a continuity that holds within itself the seeds of its own discontinuity and differentiation. This will mean that the present already includes the past (in principle and not merely in fact), that presence implies memory and cannot be conceived without it.” Alia Al-Saji, “The memory of another past: Bergson, Deleuze and a new theory of time,” *Continental Philosophy Review* 37, no. 2 (2004): pp. 6-9. Bergson then resolves this way the controversy realism-idealism via an *imaginism* in whose different levels of contractions or expansions consciousness travels with the only instrument of freedom. Cfr. Bergson, *Matter and memory* p. 54.

242 Brandi, Basile et al., *Theory of restoration* p. 49.
recollection. Although with Bergson matter embodies a sort of revealing memory, restoration in Brandi’s theory aims to unveil *astanza*, whose main quality is its intemporal condition. Here we can establish a first distinction between architecture as memory and as recollection. For memory, architecture emerges from an image of an experienced architectural place. For recollection, instead one has to incorporate it within the search to remember, or the moving in time within the architectural space. In the first case, architecture becomes a sort of monument, something that assists remembering; in the second case, its supports existence, constituting the life within architectural place. We describe some of these cases in Chapter 5.

Brandi did not explicitly include memory in his explanations as an abstract notion. Nevertheless, memory is frequently implied in his discussions about image. For instance, in his *Eliante*, Brandi considers previous typologies of buildings. Making an analogy, he says that, for example, a church is a church even if its use changed, in the same way a sculpture of Jupiter is always a Jupiter even if nobody believes in such a god. Thus, he meant that architectural form recalls a way of being; mimesis in the meaning of re-enactment is at play.

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244 However, he refers to memory discussing the renowned description of the Proustian *madeleine*. Marcel Proust, Jean-Yves Tadié et al., *À la recherche du temps perdu*, [Nouvelle éd.] ed., 4 v. vols. ([Paris]: Gallimard, 1987). Brandi claims that that image belongs to Proust and nobody else, however it has become universal thanks, not to the denotation – the biscuit – that is not important, but to the connotation, that has merited the writing of the novel. Brandi, *Teoria generale della critica* p. 41. He does this in the context of his distinction, in semiotic terms, between the existential substratum of subjective intentionalities in the form of mental images. Thus, Brandi links again image with the preconceptual schema. Brandi, *Teoria generale della critica* pp. 42-3. For us, this is particularly significant for our further adoption of the concept of *culturally significant architecture* in Chapter 4, and the possibility of one same object filling different intentionalities.
Another concept related with memory is the one of trace that Brandi examined in one of the shorter but more significant chapters of *Teoria Generale della Critica*. The existentialist thread comes forth but limited by the nature of the semiotic discussion when he says:

Presence, as the very manifestation of reality at phenomencic level, is also the point of insertion of the transcendental search of being: here, however, it is limited in the first place to the presence in that consciousness is so immediate
and original, as the irreversible moment of temporality in which consciousness is aware of itself.\footnote{Brandi, \textit{Teoria generale della critica} p. 81. \textquote[Brandi, Teoria generale della critica p. 81.]{“Presenza, come il manifestarsi stesso della realtà a livello fenomenico, è anche il punto d’innesto dell’indagine trascendentale sull’essere: qui tuttavia, si stringe in primo luogo la presenza in quanto si costituisce alla coscienza in modo immediato e originario, come momento irreversibile della temporalità in cui la coscienza prende atto di se stessa.” (Our translation).}}

Thus, discussing the twofold manifestation of presence in flagrance and \textit{astanza}, he indicates that the distinction between the two is inscribed in \textit{astanza}, as an assumption of existence, in the form of a difference; difference that he assimilates to this notion of trace. In this trace, there is a constant return to the origins. He mentions that the notion of trace has been investigated by Heidegger uncovering it in the difference between being and existence.\footnote{Ibid. p. 81-2.} The trace though remains as evidence of origin in the phenomenic level of the Kantian schema, important for us as a way to trace back cultural practices.

Brandi mentions a trace of a different nature though. “[I]n the body of the work [of art], traces might remain of the place of its creation, or for which it was intended, and of the place it is when received anew into consciousness.”\footnote{Brandi, Basile et al., \textit{Theory of restoration} p. 50.} The nature of this trace is historical and is constituted by the flagrant evidence of the passing of time, place of origin, changes of use, and so forth, whilst the nature of the first kind of trace belongs to \textit{astanza}.

Memory is also included in concepts that are more complex, as the schema that we have correlated before to the Greek concept of mimesis. Brandi may have included \textit{ornato} in his interpretation of the schema that selects characteristics of previous models and performs a sort of preconceptual \textit{epoché}.\footnote{The sign keeps traces of the form and the image keeps traces of knowledge. D'Angelo, \textit{Cesare Brandi critica d’arte e filosofia} p. 88.} We can relate this conceptual emergence of previous models with
memory as affection. Architecture manifests in its form a memory of the original need, in the species of traces to interpret. In the concept of *ornato* instead, the relation with memory seems more directly related with cultural practice.

Architecture for Brandi can have indexes from the past, but not messages with linguistic validity. If architecture could have a message, then, in the context of art criticism, Brandi would have suggested a sort of “figurative history of the image.” Within this history by way of critical judgement – identifying specific ways of giveness – it is possible to find a connection with traces of cultural forms, other than the intemporal nature of *astanza*.

Brandi considered, as part of the critical judgement, not only the recognition of the work of art but also,

[...] all the procedures that ensure and keep the work without tampering and without additions, for the culture of the future. Thus even restoration is critique, even the placement of a work [...] will be exposed to public culture and thus warranted to the future.

This contribution to general culture connects individual recognition of art by just one person with the collective activity of remembering together. The

250 Carboni, *Cesare Brandi. Teoria ed esperienza dell'arte* p. 138. Brandi declared, “[i]f the essence of language lies within communication, the essence of architecture does not emerge from communication. The house does not communicate to be a house, more than the rose communicates to be a rose. [...] Any semiotic system draw up a code to send a message, and architecture does not transmit this message: the information that you can deduce or draw from it is not the message that should guarantee its semiotic nature.” Cesare Brandi, *Struttura e architettura* (Turin: 1975. first edition 1967) p. 37. “Se l’essenza del linguaggio sta nella comunicazione, l’esenza dell’architettura non si rivela nella comunicazione. La casa non comunica di essere una casa, più di quanto la rosa comunichi di essere una rosa. [...] Qualsiasi sistema semiotico elabora un codice per trasmettere un messaggio, e l’architettura questo messaggio non lo trasmette: le informazioni, che se ne possono dedurre o ricavare, non sono il messaggio che dovrebbe garantire la sua natura semiotica.” (Our translation). Quoted in D’Angelo, *Cesare Brandi critica d’arte e filosofia* p. 93.


remembrance is about an artistic figurativeness but indirectly relates to other indexes that human collective existence contains. Brandi’s theory of restoration implies this established link. His theory is already suggesting a temporal intentionality, namely a way of conceiving time – of being conscious about it – in which the privileged time of the present protects the traces left by the past in order to transmit them to the future. As we have mentioned before, this transmission is presupposing the otherness of intersubjective relations. In this juncture, the leap from individual memory to collective history implies another dimension for restoration intentionality. Brandi did not contemplate this possibility of collective intentionalities concerning the recognition of art. In that sense, the introduction of an historical dimension to restoration links the individual experience of *astanza* with the experience of flagrance that can more easily be shared.

**History**

In conservation intentionality, memory participates in the personal temporal involvement with art. When this memory is shared, transmitted, fixed, codified, archived, institutionalised, and so forth, it becomes objectified in history. Brandi’s historical instance of restoration can be discerned from his concept of history, outlined in *Teoria Generale della Critica*. Brandi seems to merge the two ways of understanding the philosophy of history, both analytic and speculative, in one notion. He questions:

[...] does the object [of history] exist outside of the way in which it is studied? The dichotomy between chronicle and history corresponds to the basic ambiguity: chronicle as slavish collection of facts in a first agnostic

verbalization; history as a superior investigation on those facts. But, what is this superiority about? Is it about investigating the facts looking for a causal sequence or about their disposition for a second intention? Moreover, will it be possible to maintain this investigation with absolute objectivity, or is this objectivity an illusion, even constitutionally unreachable? In the same first verbalization of the chronicle, if only for the selection made, will there not be an involuntary intromission of the subject?253

Brandi understands history in the twofold manner that portraits two intentionalities of consciousness. On one hand, history is in the form of chronicle and corresponds to the perception of the flagrance of reality. On the other hand, history becomes the interrogation produced by that reality, its meaning. History in the analytic sense is the record of perceived or as-perceived facts, correlated with his idea of chronicle; history in the speculative sense is the attempt to understand reality offering a meta-structural explanation.254 Therefore, history – as record of flagrance – is the first one and philosophy of history – as the search for significance – the second one.255

Brandi belonged to the class of thinker sceptical about historic tradition as source of objective knowledge.256 This condition places him half way towards postmodern scepticism in which the search for objectivity took him away from interpretations that considered for history any explanation supported

253 Brandi, *Teoria generale della critica* p. 7. “[... ] esiste l’oggetto [of history] al di fuori del modo con cui è trattato? All’ambiguità di base corrisponde la dicotomia fra cronaca e storia: cronaca come sillabe pedissequa di fatti, in una prima agnostica verbalizzazione; storia come indagine superiore portata su quei fatti. Ma la superiorità in che cosa consisterà: nel indagarli ricercando una concatenazione causale o nel disporli secondo un fine? E sarà possibile mantenere a questa indagine una oggettività assoluta, oppure questa oggettività è una illusione, anzi è costituzionalmente irraggiungibile? Nella stessa prima verbalizzazione cronachistica non si produrrà all’insaputa dell’estensore, non fosse che per la selezione operata, un intrusione del soggetto?” (Our translation).


256 We can understand this with Gadamer’s discussion about historicity. He describes how from the Enlightenment onwards the prejudice started to be attacked and discredited, and with it the authority of tradition, specially written tradition. Cfr. Gadamer, *Truth and method* pp. 271-74, 76-7.
on final causes, ends, theology or teleology. Consequently, Brandi abandoned conceptions of history such as: Vico’s discovery of the master key, “derived from reinterpreting ancient writings by locating the meaning of the language they used in terms of the cultures from which they emerged;” Hegel’s idea that supports historic evolution on the Spirit; or Marx’s history of relations of production, class struggle and economic determination. Brandi conceives history in a way that seems to anticipate proposals such as the following:

[...] critical historical consciousness is born of an awareness of a gap between historical events and the language used to represent them [...] Awareness of the disparity between language and historical reality is the basis of history’s prime auxiliary discipline, source criticism [...].

For Brandi, the fact that history as collection of facts could have manifestation before becoming sign was clear. He noted that Husserl had distinguished between predicative evidence and ante-predicative evidence. He stated that the ante-predicative evidence is what he called flagrance: “the presentific intentionality, opposed to the significant intentionality that is the semiosis.” Consequently, he proposes the analysis of art not in its currents, schools, influences, authors, etc, but in the peculiar structure of the work of art.

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258 Lemon, Philosophy of history a guide for students p. 129.


261 Ibid. p. 21.
On one hand, history studies the structure of presence, in its two modes of perceptive fact and signification. History becomes science when it approaches the perceptive fact in the flagrance of the real, and art criticism when it approaches the *astanza* of the work of art. History par excellence has always privileged the research of signification. According to Brandi, in Croce’s thought, “the need for *semanticising* history, refused in the philosophy of history, is reborn in *philosophy as methodological moment of historiography*.” Actually, he paraphrases Croce when he says that restoration would be the methodological moment of the recognition of the work of art. The analogy that he seemingly suggests is that restoration is the result of a process of reflection about *astanza*, as philosophy might be the methodological moment in which history is approached by understanding, philosophy as such.

We have seen how Brandi considered matter as the vehicle of *astanza* through history. That matter becomes historicised as flagrance, and *astanza* instead remains detached from time. Brandi suggests two historicities within the work of art.

[The] fluctuations [of praise and rejections of works of art] are certainly not beneath the notice of history; indeed, they are history and history of culture, when understood as the purposes and ideas involved as viewed in the light of the current taste and chosen interests. Such history is undeniably legitimate and undoubtedly useful. For the purposes of reading the form, it can be valuable field of study, but it will never be history of art. History of art is the history that addresses – albeit through the chronological succession of artistic expressions – the extra-chronological moment of the *time* that is enclosed in

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the rhythmic consonance. The history of taste is the history of *chronological time*, which gathers the finished and immutable work of art into its flow.\(^{263}\)

Thus, the historical instance of restoration is restoration at the limit, since it only dominates over the aesthetic instance when the aesthetic qualities of the work of art have almost disappeared, as in the case of ruins. There is in this juncture an ontological issue, namely the definition of, “when a work of art ceases to be a work of art and becomes a ruin.”\(^{264}\) What Brandi suggested is that when the work of art is not manifesting *astanza* it becomes matter of the historical instance; restoration then focuses on the preservation of the flagrance of the ruin and its historical message. Within the historical instance, Brandi considers the inclusion of the natural environment when it involves an aesthetic aspiration to form. Moreover, he suggested cultural values established in relation to the way in which human life establishes a relation with the place, in a primordial way as essential as the one of art. We mention this weak suggestion of Brandi in Section 3.4.

Brandi argued that the only legitimate moment for restoration is the present of recognition. Restoration is fundamentally a form of temporal intentionality concerning the work of art. For the case of architecture though, restoration seems needing additional considerations because, artistic or not, it constitutes the common human place to dwell. Memory and history are bound together in the matter that constitutes its support, within the work of architecture as art. Memory is manifested in the concretization of a solution to the original need, initially recorded and infused within the flagrance of the form. Moreover, there is also memory in the trace as difference, established

\(^{263}\) Brandi, Basile et al., *Theory of restoration* p. 62.
between being and existence, and manifested in the *astanza* of art. However, Brandi balanced his emphasis on the pre-eminence of the aesthetic instance with the importance given to matter in the work of art, “recovering a complete intrinsicalness of matter compressively understood as transmitted memory of cultural, contextual, social and political values.”

As observed, for Brandi, the historicity of the work of art is given only in the moment of its recognition, when the present of creation and the present of reception merge. The historicity of the interval between creation and reception instead is a historicity that concerns only the flagrance of its existential reality. This flagrance can be analytically disengaged from the aesthetic phenomena to conform to the concept of monument, in which the mnemonic importance is the essential characteristic not necessarily linked to aesthetic qualities.

### 3.3 Monuments and Identities

[...] the house has nothing in common with art and is architecture not to be included among the arts? That is so. Only a very small part of architecture belongs to art: the tomb and the monument. Everything else that fulfills a function is to be excluded from the domain of art


The word monument is usually associated with objects whose main purpose is to assist social collectiveness to remember. Once personal and familiar architecture started to focus on broader social aims, architecture to remember became monument. The simple tomb becomes something that

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264 Ibid. p. 66.
266 D’Angelo, *Cesare Brandi critica d’arte e filosofia* pp. 138-9.
aspires to have an artistic form. This aesthetic will is detached from its function as a reminder for the future. Loos’ quote suggested that artistic quality was not compatible with constructions with functional performance. This separation of function in daily life from both aesthetics ambition and remembrance stimulus is characteristic of the modern approach in conservation. The memorial aim, however, was assimilated to the scientific historical interest, merging two things that are distinct. A comprehensive journey of the notion of monument in Western culture escapes the aims of this thesis. However, previous ideas to Brandi’s theory illustrate the dissociation of intentionalities that architecture can fulfil. Some evidence of this is found already within the ideas of Antoine Chrysostôme Quatremère de Quincy and Alois Riegl, who separated the architectural object according to different attitudes of valuation.

When the monument becomes of collective interest, if either it is to facilitate remembrance or as an artistic treasure, it belongs to a manifold larger than its own. Society attributes significance and recognises common values, assisting in the development of a sense of identity. This social construction so obtained in the Western world recognises art as an important element of its culture. The objective here is not to favour any specific concept of identity, since it is a debatable field. The intention looks instead to discuss the concept of restoration as a temporal intentionality in association with a collective sense of identification based on architecture.

**Frozen Sources of Memory and Beauty**

Prior to the focus on knowledge or aesthetic delight of the notion of monuments though, the original meaning for the word monument relates to the
intentionality of remembering. For our analysis, the focus is on intentionalities addressed towards monuments after the modern concept of conservation. The modern idea of monument has precedents that revealed an interest for the architectural object as such. For instance, Quatremère put a particular emphasis on the notion of the architectural object as antiquity among other old objects; the antique needs to have additional qualities.\(^{268}\)

The attribution of aesthetic value to antiques is not only understandable but also evident in the history of conservation; after all, the architectural monument usually has aesthetic distinctiveness. However, Quatremère in his definition of ruins unveils a second kind of value that can be endorsed to architectural monuments:

The ruins of ancient monuments have become the object of special research and imitation in architecture [...]. One must say, however, that the knowledge of ancient art, studied in ruins, was initially very incomplete; [...] additional fields of ruins must be opened for the exploration and comparison that benefit the history and the theory of art.\(^{269}\)

Thus, appreciation for ancient monuments has as stimulus not only the aesthetic appeal, but also the will of historical and philosophical knowledge. This interest characterises the modern approach in conservation with an increasable component of anthropological issues.\(^{270}\)

Riegl is a crucial figure within the modern intentionality towards the notion of monument. He defined that, “[...] a monument is a work of man erected for the specific purpose of keeping particular human deeds or destinies (or a complex accumulation thereof) alive and present in the consciousness of


\(^{269}\) Ibid. pp. 220-21.
future generations.” These are, as a first category, the deliberate monuments, since he distinguished between the intended and the unintended monument. A second category is the one of the monuments of art and history, considered as monuments only when their historical value is acquired with time. He contrasted age value against historical value, revealing age value as a fascination for ruins. In contrast with this emotive view, the historical value “is far more concerned with preserving the most genuine document possible for future restoration and art historical research.” This again suggests an increasing interest in the monument as a source of knowledge for history.

A characteristic in Riegl’s thought is that he conceives significance as rooted in consciousness; thus, the commemorative value is not inherent to the monument but rather assigned. However, he underscores that the modern meaning of the term monument includes two kinds of values: artistic and historic. This established a significant precedent to Brandi’s aesthetic and historical instances. Nevertheless, Brandi conceived artistic value as being embedded in historical value. Riegl focused on the materiality of the monument, and in that sense, his approach is consistent with Brandi’s

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270 Chanfón Olmos, Fundamentos teóricos de la restauración pp. 172-9.
271 Price, Talley et al., Historical and philosophical issues in the conservation of cultural heritage. p. 69.
272 Riegl speaks of gewolte und ungewolte Denkmal, intended and unintended sign for thinking.
274 Cfr. Price, Talley et al., Historical and philosophical issues in the conservation of cultural heritage. pp. 73, 74.
275 Ibid. p. 75.
276 Ibid. pp. 70, 71. Cfr. Riegl and Choay, Le culte moderne des monuments. Riegl considered that the values of the monuments were: the memorial values – age value, historical value and intended memorial value – and present day values – use value, artistic value, newness value and relative artistic value. Thus, he related the concept of value with the temporality in which value has its origin.
277 However, for Riegl the characteristic of being historic is primordial, since everything is given within the chain of history. Price, Talley et al., Historical and philosophical issues in the conservation of cultural heritage. pp. 70, 71.
explanation of the historical instance, where matter has pre-eminence as bearer of artistic image. Where Brandi’s proposal instead finds differences is in reference to the artistic value, given that for Riegl the fulfilment of a work of art is the result of the requirements of the contemporary Kunstwollen that is changeable from moment to moment.\textsuperscript{278} Artistic values, Riegl said, cease being commemorative values and should not be included in the notion of monument.\textsuperscript{279} Against Brandi’s idea of art as intemporal, Riegl seemed to suggest that there are no universal values; artistic values could only be appreciated according to the present Kunstwollen and so could be considered as contemporary values only.\textsuperscript{280}

Evidencing the influence of Sartre, for Brandi, the monument would be the historicised material supporting an artistic image, and not the work of art as such.\textsuperscript{281}

Any privilege of matter over the human activity that has shaped it cannot be allowed by means of the historical consciousness […]. From an historical point of view […] the conservation of patina, as conservation of that particular haziness that the novelty of matter receives through time and is therefore testimony of time passing is not only desirable but absolutely required.\textsuperscript{282}

\textsuperscript{278} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{279} Ibid. p. 72.
\textsuperscript{280} Jokilehto, A History of Architectural Conservation. p. 216. Riegl stated that “[a]ll human will is directed toward a satisfactory shaping of man’s relationship to the world, within and beyond the individual. The plastic Kunstwollen regulates man’s relationship to the sensibly perceptible appearance of things. Art expresses the way man wants to see things shaped or colored, just as the poetic Kunstwollen expresses the way man wants to imagine them. Man is not only a passive, sensory recipient, but also a desiring, active being who wishes to interpret the world […]. The character of this will is contained in what we call the worldview […].” Christopher S. Wood, The Vienna School reader politics and art historical method in the 1930s, 485 p. vols. (New York: Zone Books, 2003) pp. 94-5.
\textsuperscript{281} Cfr. Sartre, The psychology of imagination. For the case of architecture, Brandi exemplifies with the foundations, but he really should say any material that is part of the structure. Brandi, Il restauro, teoria e prattica 1939-1986 p. 17.
\textsuperscript{282} Brandi, Il restauro, teoria e prattica 1939-1986 p. 29. “Un qualsiasi privilegio della materia sull’attività dell’uomo che l’ha foggjata non può essere ammesso dalla coscienza storica […]. Dal punto di vista storico […] la conservazione della patina, come conservazione di quel particolare offuscameneto che la novità della materia riceve attraverso il tempo ed è quindi
Thus seen, the passage of time leaves a trace that should only be contended if the artistic image is at risk. Moreover, the first axiom of his theory of restoration states that, “[o]nly the material of a work of art is restored.” However, the case is different for Brandi in the layering effect of additions on monuments of different ages. He argued that the insertion of the new in the old has two ways of being approached: as critic conservator and as artist. In the first case, the monument, as unit or as a complex, is considered other than a work of art, as part of history; in the second, as a becoming entity, that is possible to develop and make evolve. He stated that the latter case intends to make history and give new artistic significance to the complex. He privileged the first solution since the monument gives access to the only instrument of transmission of the original. Therefore, his argument finds its basis on a temporal intentionality in which the value is located in the past as past, and not in the present of the constant becoming of architecture.

Paradoxically, and against the existential imprint with which Brandi considers the work of art, he describes how,

[...] the attitude of looking at the past rather than as source of inspiration as source of science arose [a]t the same time in which the vital momentum of the Renaissance finished in the neoclassical mortuary. [...] This end of a figurative civilization as high as that of the Renaissance [...] with the onset of

testimonianza del tempo trascorso, non solo è auspicabile, ma tassativamente richiesta.” (Our translation).

283 Brandi, Basile et al., Theory of restoration p. 49.
284 In the context of the insertion of the new within the old, Brandi stated that he intended by monument “any figurative expression, architectural, pictorial, sculptural, and also any environment which is particularly characterised by individual monuments, although not in relation to a single age.” There is a shift from restoration of art – with all the features that allow astantza – to a more comprehensive notion, which includes the concept of environment. Brandi, Il restauro. Teoria e pratica. 1939-1986 p. 35. “qualsiasi espressione figurativa, sia architettonica, pittorica, scultorea, ed anche qualsiasi complesso ambientale che sia particolarmente caratterizzato da monumenti singoli, anche se non in relazione ad una sola epoca.” (Our translation).
a rigorous science of the past that examined sources and verified everything, brought a radical change in the way we approach a monument.\textsuperscript{286}

This seems controversial, since he recognised a problem for architecture as an entity in a constant state of making, but at the same time, he endorsed the scientific attitude with the view of the architectural monument as an object within which historicity should be frozen. It is true that he criticised the emphasis of modern historical science on the attainment of knowledge from the monument; however, he could not attribute to new architects and artists the capacity to intervene within architecture, as a legitimate expression of their own time.\textsuperscript{287} These issues are further considered in Chapters 5 and 6.

**Placing Cultural Practices**

The monument in the modern sense does not only support memory, artistic image and history, but is also a depositary of values that the collectivity attributes to it. Architecture is a unity formed by a manifold; the idealist model had already adumbrated this notion, but architecture also belongs to broader manifolds. When monuments, with all the burden of artistic and historic values, go beyond the simple condition of valuable objects, they start their transformation into something else; an identity that enters in the value system of societies constituting feelings of belonging. We can phenomenologically define identity as

\textsuperscript{286} Ibid. p. 39. “Allo stesso momento in cui il vitale slancio dell’arte rinascimentale si esauriva nell’obitorio neoclassico, sorgeva l’attitudine a guardare al passato non più come fonte di ispirazione ma di scienza. [...] la coincidenza dell’esaurirsi di una civiltà figurativa altissima come era stata quella del Rinascimento [...] con l’insorgere di una rigorosa scienza del passato che vagliava le fonti e tutto sottoponeva a verifica, determinò un cambiamento radicale nel modo di porsi in situazione verso un monumento.” (Our translation).

\textsuperscript{287} The example about the re-insertion in the religious consciousness of the Pantheon in Rome as Sancta Maria ad Martyres that Brandi offers is significant in this regard. The, so called by him, historical consciousness is as out the historical life of the present days. Cfr. Ibid. p. 40.
An empirical consciousness of a self-same thing that looks ‘all-round’ its object, and in so doing is continually confirming the unity of its own nature, essentially and necessarily possesses a manifold system of continuous patterns of appearances and perspective variations, in and through which all objective phases of the bodily self-given which appear in perception manifest themselves perspectively in definite continua.\footnote{Husserl, Ideas. General introduction to pure phenomenology p. 131.}

We analogically extrapolate this notion to collective intentionalities to determine how human groups perceive their belonging. We do this as a phenomenological point of departure and not as a conclusive notion. We explore this further in Chapter 5. What is relevant here is the consideration of a collectively constituted identity, which is perceived collectively and individually. Identity is characterised by the recognition of a human group with common values that tradition ascribed, for instance, to CSA. This sense of belonging develops concentrically with other manifold elements in which not only architecture participates. In that sense, when Brandi insists that a work of restoration has to be justified to the “universal consciousness,” we can interpret that he is appealing to the most comprehensive of the human identities, the one that distinguishes humans from other beings.\footnote{Brandi, Basile et al., Theory of restoration p. 49.}

Brandi would have accepted that the artistic image had different meanings according to the collective identities that recognise it. As evidence of this, Brandi exemplified the modifications that Bernini made to the Pantheon, because he did not consider it as a monument \textit{closed} by historical consciousness.\footnote{Cfr. Brandi, \textit{Il restauro. Teoria e pratica.} 1939-1986 pp. 40-1.} This reveals how the collectivity identified a renewed manifold with attributes in the species of a Christian temple, and it implies that
Brandi justified the closure of the monument, its scission from the collective life, on the grounds of historical consciousness.\textsuperscript{291}

We need, then, to distinguish between the significance attributed to the architectural work of art as support of collective identities, and the manifested *astanza* as architectural work of art. While, in the first case architecture supports collective concretizations, perceived as common values in societies; in the second, the work of art offers a place to manifest *astanza*. In general, Western culture considers artistic appreciation as contained within cultural identity; however, collective values are not always concurrent with aesthetic values in architectural works of art.\textsuperscript{292}

Brandi suggested that the predominance of meaningful elements over expression images is characteristic of cultures that, according to him, have an unbalanced historical situation.\textsuperscript{293} Within the meaningful features contained in the sign, there is what Brandi called *symbolic investments*.\textsuperscript{294} Rituals, commemorations, historical moments, events, and so forth, participate in the symbolic investments that monuments are bearing. For Brandi, art, in its evolution, has to be distanced from language. However, it becomes a secondary instrument of knowledge of social practices revealing a cultural context in the

\\textsuperscript{291} We have already noticed how this modern historic consciousness is result of the Enlightenment. Brandi considers the historic consciousness regarding monuments a “conquest merit of the great historicism of the nineteenth century” Ibid. p. 39. “[..] è conquista che si deve al grande storicismo ottocentesco.” (Our translation).


\textsuperscript{293} He says that “[h]owever and wherever the paths of image and sign merged, overlapped or intersected, this will evidence a deterioration of the civilization’s development of the being of consciousness and symptom of a historical situation of imbalance.” Brandi, *Segno e immagine* p. 15. Quoted in D’Angelo, *Cesare Brandi critica d’arte e filosofia* p. 119. “Comunque e dovunque le vie dell’immagine e del segno si fondano, si acavallino o si intersechino, ciò costituirà sintomo di una alterazione della civiltà nel suo sviluppo dall’essere della coscienza, e sintomo di una situazione storica di disequilibrio.” (Our translation).
form of expression of taste and interests. Brandi denied that this knowledge is art history, because it is not the history of the pure reality of art with its rhythms and inherent elements, according with its givenness; it is instead history of culture.  

Nonetheless, art and its way of being within the cultural context configure an identity to which human beings feel a belonging.  

All the burden of historical knowledge and collective memory manifest in the form of cultural identity, which – ideologically instrumentalised or not – can thus create, reinforce or resist feelings of identity and belonging.  

Brandi protected cultural heritage supported on his theory of restoration. The appeal to a universal consciousness does not take into account cultural differences. However, he portrayed an Italian way of seeing art restoration with a characteristic intentionality, contrasting the inheritance of Italian idealism with English empiricism.  

Thus, he identified different ways to approach artistic phenomena as part of cultural identities, revealing that a universal consciousness is less universal than we may think.  

In the zeal of his theoretical grounds, Brandi was reluctant to accept completely, for instance, unorthodox works of conservation in the name of cultural identities.  

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298 His comments on the cases of the reconstruction of the Venice’s Campanile, the Athens’ Parthenon and the Stoa of Attalos, the Trani’s Campanile, are but examples of this criticism.
and knowledge, without this knowledge being the main aim of the work of art, which actually should not have practical use. Nevertheless, Brandi does not discard the way in which art can lead to cultural knowledge and thus to the reinforcement of determinate identities. What seems evident is that in theory, Brandi was oriented towards reflection on the intrinsic aspects of art more than to its connections with larger structures, as in the social and cultural context; at least not in the implications that his theory had regarding restoration as a particular operation of conservation intentionalities.

The fact that Brandi was conscious about the existence of cultural identities – and the relations between these identities and the attitudes towards the monuments that represented them – is out of the question. What is significant for us is that in his theory of restoration, the connection between architectural places – as works of art – and their dwellers, there is a privileged connection of the restorer as the one who recognises the epiphany of *astanza*. Out of the aesthetic or historic ones, values attributed to the monument by society are not considered. The survival of the architectural work of art seems to depend on a privilege attributed to the work of art as work of art, and not as an eventual architecture where people dwell. Feelings of identity acquire significance not only through historical or aesthetic instances, but also through collective intentionalities grounded in ways of being in the world. It is also true that, phenomena such as the, “pictorialization of space and time” and the *musealisation* of the contemporary city present challenges to theories of

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conservation. However, the possibilities to revaluate, complete and improve Brandi’s theory of restoration appear open and feasible. Moreover, since his theory seems phenomenologically pertinent when applied to other figurative arts, although not without theoretically founded criticisms.

We have explored the concepts of monument and identity in relation to conservation of architectural works of art, as defined by Brandi, representing the connection between an individual relation, human being, CSA and the collective intentionality that approaches the conservation of that architecture through time. Not always all the stakeholders understand the activity of conservation in society in the same way, despite the best intentions to educate in the fields of art and cultural awareness. Conservation of architecture needs to justify its actions not only towards universal consciousness, as Brandi suggested, but also to real human beings that inhabit architecture, even in the ignorance that it may constitute a work of art. In this context, the words in the epigram of Loos demand a choice: either we include the dwelling spaces within conservation intentionality as part of cultural identities or we excise specific monuments as being out of the social life and as mere objects of study and contemplation. Society is then impelled to structure notions that allow it to act regarding the survival of its place to live as a reinforcement of its way of being in the world. If monuments and identities are the causes of the collective

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300 Kobau, for instance questions whether the recognition of the restorer is really assimilated to the one of the epiphany of art; or whether the recognition of value does not contain additional intentionalities such as the economical. Cfr. Pietro Kobau, "Cesare Brandi e i problemi dell’arte contemporanea," *Aesthetica Preprint* Suplementa, Attravero l’immagine. In ricordo di Cesare Brandi (2006).
intentionality to conserve, the rise of institutionalised conservation and the shared idea of cultural heritage are some of its consequences.\textsuperscript{301}

3.4 Conservation and Society

[...] Unesco’s cultural program added to its successful conservation projects for cultural heritage a new focus on living cultures. [...] emphasis was placed on the enthusiasm of young people everywhere to create new meanings – their own cultural heritage, so to speak – so they can adapt to the unprecedented situations they are destined to live in.

Lourdes Arizpe, \textit{Cultural Heritage and Globalization}, 2000.\textsuperscript{302}

The long path from an initial concept of monument to the institutionalisation of conservation of cultural heritage in Western culture has received many influences. The intention here is to sample milestones to contrast with Brandi’s specific conservation intentionality, evidencing the shift from simple maintenance of architecture towards an intentionality characterised by a critical approach to the monument in the form of theory. Some authors locate this change since the 17\textsuperscript{th} century with several precedents that announced the arrival of the modern paradigm.\textsuperscript{303} The existence of the attitude to conserve


\textsuperscript{303} The precedents of Alberti’s comments about restoration in his book X of his \textit{Della Architettura}; Leonardo’s pragmatic emphasis on the merging of the old and the new; Filarete’s linking the structure of the city to the design of the city; Raphael’s highlighting the importance of the history of the city and the technical understanding of architecture in order to restore it; or Serlio’s lamenting about the cosmetic reuse of buildings instead of building new ones, are but examples of attitudes that anticipated the arrival of modern conservation. Cfr. Gaetana Cantone, \textit{La Città di marmo, da Alberti a Serlio, La Storia tra progettazione e restauro} (Rome: Edizioni Officina, 1978). Some other authors establish the \textit{Capitolato} of Pietro Edwards as one of the first codifications for restoration. Cfr. Chanfón Olmos, \textit{Fundamentos teóricos de la restauración} p. 232, Muñoz Viñas, \textit{Contemporary theory of conservation} p. 2. The salient
since ancient times is acknowledged; nevertheless, we need to define some nuances within that genre of intentionalities. The perception of an object is not the same for someone who is giving maintenance to some building – even a valuable one – than for someone who is dealing with an artistic architectural object.

Conservation as collective intentionality assimilates conservation as an institution within. However, conservation needs to be considered as a social construction, and therefore there should be a negotiation between traditions, individual and collective worldviews. Brandi’s theory has found acceptance as a structure of support in the organization of cultural protection. His influence has been important in the writing of several charters of conservation, especially in Italy, and in having an input in what constitutes the present conservation intentionalities at collective level in the Western world. Despite his insistence on the individuality of restoration cases, his particular view – emphasising aesthetics – ran the risk of being misunderstood worldwide without contextual considerations. Nowadays, and not without debate, pluralistic trends with more nuanced stress on aesthetic values constitute a positive shift that is welcome with the present awareness of cultural diversity, assimilating also the significant contribution of Brandi.

The Conservation-Restoration Dialectic

Phenomenologically, the intentional object that fills conservation intentionalities has varied historically according to what was expected from the characteristic of Edwards’ codification is the evolution of the activity of the restorer from one that completes the work of the artist in favour of one that preserves the artistic object.
transformation of one state of an architectural object to another. Quatremère, for instance has distinguished between the actions of restoration and restitution. He says that,

One *restores* a dilapidated or partially destroyed work of art, based on the surviving remains that allow, more or less, the repetition of what is missing; one *restitutes* a work or a monument that has entirely disappeared based on the authority of descriptions, or sometimes based on indications furnished by other works of the same kind.\textsuperscript{304}

His distinction reveals a different concretization of the original architectural work of art according to the remaining material. For Brandi’s theory, in the first case, it would require a restoration done in a recognisable manner. The reprehensible second case constitutes an instance of the restoration of fantasy, “the most serious heresy of restoration.”\textsuperscript{305} For restoration, Quatremère implied the artistic ability to *reproduce* the missing parts of a work of art, even if for architecture he stated that is not so much of a problem, given its mediated production.\textsuperscript{306} His idea, then, does not correspond with the one of Brandi who refuses the idea of the restorer repeating the act of creation, in other words acting in that past temporality, which does not belong with the present moment of the restorer.\textsuperscript{307}

Viollet-le-Duc had already stated that the concept and the attitude of restoration were modern. In his *Dictionnaire raisonné*, to restore a building is defined not as to preserve, to repair, or rebuild it but “to re-establish it in a

\textsuperscript{304} Quatremère de Quincy and Younés, *The true, the fictive, and the real. The historical dictionary of architecture of Quatremere de Quincy* p. 217.
\textsuperscript{305} Brandi, Basile et al., *Theory of restoration* pp. 57, 64.
\textsuperscript{306} Quatremère de Quincy and Younés, *The true, the fictive, and the real. The historical dictionary of architecture of Quatremere de Quincy* p. 219. The lack of what Brandi calls historical consciousness makes Quatremère consider as ridiculous prejudice the preference to see ruins than complete buildings. It is possible to observe the arising conflict between historicist and aesthetic notions, moreover contrasting his suggestions with Brandi’s postulates.
\textsuperscript{307} Brandi, Basile et al., *Theory of restoration* p. 63.
complete state that could have not existed at a given time.”

Therefore, he put the emphasis on the possibility of the work of restoration being wrong even based on a serious hypothesis that, however, improved historical studies could rectify. The intended object sought after restoration differs from the one at which Brandi’s theory aims for. Viollet-le-Duc trusted in the development of historic scientific knowledge to rectify possible wrong decisions in the work of restoration. Brandi was very critical of Viollet-le-Duc’s attempted restorations, attributing them to the Romantic Gothic revival and the scientific aspirations of classic archaeology. He sustained that the success of Viollet-le-Duc’s theory was due to his apparent scientificism and the analogous conception of the monument with genetic characteristics, obeying the dominant positivism.

Brandi denounced in these discussions an intentionality that regards science as the possessor of a true knowledge to restore. Nevertheless, regarding the objectivity or subjectivity of the restorer’s action, Viollet-le-Duc said that, “[the architect restorer] is always under the obligation to reconcile his role as a restorer with his duty as an artist to deal creatively with unforeseen circumstances and necessities.” Moreover, he emphatically stated that, “the adoption of absolute principles for restoration could quickly lead to the absurd.”

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After several controversies, too long to enumerate here, the 20th century saw the arrival of more mature theoretical models regarding conservation in the Western world. Nevertheless, Brandi did not see progress in restoration until the arrival of Camillo Boito, who influenced the Restoration Charter of 1931.\textsuperscript{312} Italian scholars represented one of the avant-gardes in theoretical proposals, not only offering advice and proposals, but also explaining the phenomena of restoration. Figures such as Luca Beltrami, Giacomo Boni, and Gaetano Moretti, gave contributions to conservation theory under the influence of previous trends. It was within the theoretical proposals of Gustavo Giovannoni – who assisted in the edition of the Athens Charter of 1932 – that the emphasis on a \textit{scientific restoration} was encouraged, despite his sometimes-paradoxical opinions regarding several restoration projects.\textsuperscript{313}

Significantly, Brandi wrote his \textit{Eliante} with the destructions of World War II in Europe as background. He stated, for instance, through the character of Diodato, that “[they were] after [an] unfortunate tabula rasa that Europe had become. And eager of desire to rebuild it more European than ever, they were waiting, feeling the duty of beginning from ideas.”\textsuperscript{314} With this burden, that already revealed consideration of identity, Brandi consolidated the thoughts about restoration that would constitute his later theory, evolving dialectically with the practice.\textsuperscript{315} Despite the influence of Croce on the theory of restoration

\textsuperscript{313} Cfr. Jokilehto, “A history of architectural conservation. The contribution of English, French, German and Italian thought towards an international approach to the conservation of cultural property” p. 329-56.
in Italy, and especially on Argan, Pane, and Bonelli, the influence on Brandi is more evident on the form than the approach.\footnote{Jokilehto, "A history of architectural conservation. The contribution of English, French, German and Italian thought towards an international approach to the conservation of cultural property" pp. 412-3.} In parallel with his strict phenomenological aesthetic considerations regarding architecture, Brandi expressed timid approaches towards a more inclusive notion of conservation, considering the environment as a larger element within the manifold of the object to restore.\footnote{Brandi, Basile et al., Theory of restoration p. 67.} However, he did not consolidate his theory on the consideration of architecture – before being that object of aesthetic delight and source of historical knowledge – as the legitimate human place to live.

Moreover, referring in his writings to existentialist philosophers such as Sartre or Heidegger, one would expect some concern regarding the merging of architecture, the city and human dwelling.

As it is evidenced in the exploration of Chapter 5, recently, the receptor has started to be considered the fulcrum of conservation; and the restorer “an operator intended as hermeneut and as mediator of an exegesis for a wider public.”\footnote{Paolo Fancelli, Il restauro dei monumenti (Fiesole: Nardini, 1998). p. 169. (Our translation).} Brandi’s methodological moment has bonded historiographical methods and philosophy of history. The aesthetic conception would command the intervention and it is to it that the work will refer. Therefore, the intervention can be creative, but it must respect the work and respect itself, the philological process, the composition and avoid simulations.\footnote{Ibid. pp. 169-176.} Brandi considered some analogous creative and hermeneutic involvements of the restorer, such as the consideration of exhibition of the works of art, or the role
of the conservation of frames in paintings.\textsuperscript{320} However, more crucially, it has been questioned whether it is possible to restore values, and if it is possible to conceive separately values and meaning from the work that bares them.\textsuperscript{321} All these recent debates reveal a shift concerning the object to fill conservation intentionalities. When human beings have consciousness of architectural theories of conservation, the content of that activity becomes focused with more emphasis on the human being than on the work of art. We endorse this change in the values of cultural heritage; however, it does imply some risks as well, since theory can be relativized, hindering its capacity to assist in the interpretation of the human place to live.

**Cultural Heritage**

Brandi was always very aware of the significance in society of conserving the cultural heritage as testimony of human history.\textsuperscript{322} The importance of his participation within institutions such as the *Instituto Centrale del Restauro* and his academic activities prove his preoccupation with the protection of the cultural heritage. What is less evident is the inclusion of the human existential dimension within the context of architectural conservation. In this context, he distinguished between the notion of monument as a work of art and a monumental complex. The first is grounded on the whole of his aesthetical theory, whilst the second seems sometimes vaguely defined as a work of art, but understood more as an environment with values anchored to the culture of the place. Discussing the insertion of the new in the old Brandi

\textsuperscript{320} Cfr. Brandi, Basile et al., *Theory of restoration*.
incorporates a sense of culture as the way in which society dwells in a place. He suggests,

Do make new monuments, but retain those ancient in the way the genuine historical tradition has handed them to us: and this is not the imperative of conservators, but the imperative that is both respectful of the autonomy of our time and of the historical tradition to which we owe being what we are.\textsuperscript{323}

Thus, on one hand Brandi considered the aesthetic dimension of architecture, according to his theory, in order to restore it as a work of art; let us recall that he links restoration to a concept of the work of art. On the other hand, when he considered architecture as a complex where human society develops its life, although somewhat vaguely, he took a more comprehensive standpoint, where issues of tradition and identity were significant factors. The emphasis on the analogous treatment of the image of the city to a work of art is characteristic of his theory. The presence of human life is bracketed out from his architectural conservation intentionality.

The sense of historicity, romantic nostalgia, the qualities of past achievements and the supposed lessons from the past, and the shock by the destruction of monuments and works of art, have been mentioned as motives for interest in heritage. Accordingly, the western \textit{Weltanschauung}, a worldview, proposes a new approach to the past propitiated by new concepts of historicity and aesthetics, and relations with culture, religion, nature and environment renewing the concept of time and values.\textsuperscript{324} The question seems to be whether the concept of conservation is even dated and its problem should be integrated within environmental sustainability awareness from a global cultural

\textsuperscript{323} Ibid. p. 42. “Si facciano monumenti nuovi, ma si conservino quelli antichi come la tradizione storica genuina ce li ha tramandati: ed è questo non già l’imperativo dei conservatori.
and ecological view. Although this perspective seems a move toward the consciousness of the totality of the human place to live, the architectural place comprises specific features that need reflection when being approached with temporal intentionality. From this perspective, Brandi has been often depicted as elitist and a long way removed from considering the historical fabric and minor expressions of culture as part of the restoration endeavour.

Consistent with his view, Brandi approached conservation as a contributor within the cultural system of institutions, such as museums, research institutes, and governmental organisations, in a concerted activity. This culture of critical and scientific activity found its bases in an historical and artistic consciousness, in which the role of education was fundamental with, for instance, the diffusion of his theory of restoration as part of the courses within the Istituto Centrale del Restauro, guaranteeing the formation of a discipline that constituted a tradition to follow. In the Italian context, this offered a precedent that was later followed by other universities and institutions. Nowadays two main trends in Italian conservation philosophies have been identified: the first called pure conservation and the second called restoration. They present two contrasting views in which the former seems to include the change as part of its approach, respecting the old consolidation without

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326 Ibid. p. 19.
intervening and incorporating contemporary elements that collaborate with the new functions and life of the buildings.\textsuperscript{327}

As an occurrence of misunderstanding of conservation intentionality, it has been argued that in contemporary approaches, “[i]t is the subjects who are served through conservation” and that,

\begin{quote}
[t]he authority that people have on heritage objects therefore derives from, and is proportional to, two closely related factors: their contribution to the overall significance of the object and their being affected by the object’s alteration.\textsuperscript{328}
\end{quote}

Although suggesting that, “contemporary theory stresses that artistic merit, style colour, shape, material, etc. are the meaning-bearing features; they are valued for what they mean to people, not for their relation to truth,” the confusion, we suggest, is located in the relation between collective meaning and truth. While the concept of meaning for people is an existential subjective reality, the flagrance, to say it in Brandian terms, of the scientific truth is an objective, historical fact.

The present state of the consciousness about cultural heritage reveals paradoxes in the encounter of new and old and of restoration as hermeneutics. This is shown not only in the phenomenon of simple architectural forms, but also in the significance of architecture as a cultural fact. It has been observed that,

\begin{quote}
[...] if the traditional hermeneutics that sought to account for the mediative structure passed, not accidentally, into history at the same time as Rhetoric, we presently find ourselves caught up in the infinite relations of the demands of \textit{praxis} and their possible outcomes. We give the impression of being disinclined or unable to either appropriately renew the tradition or to
\end{quote}


\textsuperscript{328} Muñoz Viñas, \textit{Contemporary theory of conservation} pp. 158, 61.
reformulate our situation in terms equivalent to, or better than, those which we have abandoned.\textsuperscript{329}

The dialectic between tradition and innovation unavoidably traps cultural heritage between stasis and movement, permanence and change, past and future. Nowadays, newness in the architectural place creates a state of expectation that promises fundamental change but ends being only stylistic variation, instead of a demonstration of the significance of renewing.\textsuperscript{330} When, exceptionally, the manifestation of newness is authentic, it constitutes an opening to a hermeneutic operation through architecture, becoming the interface between different stages of space and time.\textsuperscript{331} The consideration of the architectural place seems existentially pertinent in view of the globalised but diverse world. The collective agreement towards a renewed temporal intentionality is necessary. Conservation and assimilation are revealed as dialectical forces that oscillate in society. To negotiate the how and the when presupposes the previous understanding of the what, that is no longer an epistemological exploration but an ontological proposal.

\textbf{Conclusions}

Conservation is a temporal intentionality. Art was for Brandi the fundamental category of his approach to conservation and therefore the peak of culture. He privileged it from two main points of view: the aesthetical and the historic. The consideration to \textit{astanza} granted this privilege to art of being the superior form of human creation. The existentialist influence seems to play an

\textsuperscript{330} Ibid., p. 21.
\textsuperscript{331} Ibid.
important role in his more evolved aesthetic thought. However, his theory does not propose paths of interpretation other than criticism and restoration, as distinct from that privileged epiphany of art. Architecture, other than being art, should be the human place to live that demands additional paths of interpretation. Brandi already had implied a moral dimension for restoration. This suggests that other dimensions of the understanding of architecture would be possible, merging the factual reality with the intemporal presence of astanza. Conservation intentionality, as analysed here, merges these two attitudes: the temporal and intemporal. For conservation in Brandi’s thought, memory as temporal intentionality is supported through the object to restore. Architecture keeps the record and the traces of past human ways to live, evidenced in the form and charged of meaning in both astanza and flagrance, although in a different sense. However, the centre of gravity of his temporal intentionality is situated in the present, to where the rest of the worldview confluences. If cultural memory is relevant, it is so because of the permanence of matter. Matter is for Brandi the vehicle of memory, constituting not only the artistic, but also the historical and cultural, monuments. Architectural monuments, then, are valuable not only as works of art but also as portraits of ways to be, to see, and to imagine the world. This mimetic dimension of the monument finds relevance in the historical transmission of culture in two ways: in the flagrance of reality and in the astanza of art. The monument thus is the link between an individual perception of particular architectural experiences and the summation of collective intentionalities that constitutes cultural identities. Architecture as cultural monument finds a problematic juncture, though. Either, it is considered as an object with exclusive aesthetic, historic
and significant values, isolated from real life by a *musealisation* or it enters in the dynamic of the human dwelling in the dialectic of stasis and assimilation. The social institutions that protect monuments need to balance the views of the stakeholders. Architectural place as cultural heritage would thus need to be approached as a separable object of analysis for history, art history and the social sciences, or be assimilated within the flux of the collective life. The organisations that deal at international level with the protection of cultural heritage have started to shift towards wider understanding of the significance of this heritage for those most involved.

Although the aesthetic dimension is fundamental for architecture, for the focus of this thesis, architecture needs to be situated with these reflections, considering better its conflation as cultural heritage and as the architectural place to live. This opens possible interpretations of conservation intentionalities – restoration in the particular case of Brandi – as ways to situate human existence within a place that evolves in time. Brandi’s view of conservation implied a way to see the world as coming from the past, with significance in the present and potential evolutions towards the future. Nowadays, the varieties of conservation depend on the intentionalities with which architecture as the place to live is approached. Society has options to consider it as an object to protect separated from daily life, or as the meaningful place that evolves along with time. The significance of the consequences of such a hermeneutical endeavour demands, even if only as point of departure, an ontological outline that considers the architectural phenomena in its constant becoming. We proceed now to that attempt.
Chapter 4: Ontology of Culturally Significant Architecture: A Manifold Way of Being

“Only as phenomenology, is ontology possible.”
Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit* 1927.332

Jean Nouvel has said, “I would not only die for architecture, I would kill for it.”333 This may seem exaggerated but, the concretizations that architecture produces as embodied values can lead to actions that would be unthinkable justified only by its physical nature. If architecture arouses emotions, it is not only because of its aesthetic form, but because it embodies other cultural representations; it symbolises taking the place of something else. The concretizations of architecture vary with human attitudes. In the encounter with architecture, humans can be naïf believers or sophisticated critics; members of a sharing community or alien explorers; everyday dwellers or architectural scholars.

After the epistemological examination of Brandi’s theories of art and architectural restoration, we shift into a phenomenological ontology following the method and terminology of Ingarden to understand these phenomena. This chapter then explores a second layer of analysis, that is to say the one constituted by CSA. In this context, the theories of Ingarden, in his *Ontology of the Work of Art*; and the *structure of being* in his phenomenological ontology of *Time and Modes of Being*, are illuminating to the scope of the ontological

assembly of this notion. Consequently, a correlation between the architectural work of art and CSA is herewith proposed, with some discernment to modes and moments of being regarding the latter. This chapter suggests that CSA can be considered as a manifold of moments that does not always correspond necessarily to aesthetic architecture or its recognition as a work of art, as it is discussed subsequently.

Ingarden studied mathematics and philosophy, and later for some time under Husserl in Göttingen, becoming his friend. Although one of Husserl’s best disciples, he could not agree with the turn towards transcendental idealism, against which he concentrated all his studies trying to demonstrate that error. He worked lecturing philosophy in Lvóv in Poland where he secretly taught during the World War II. He moved to the Jagellonian University in Kraków after the war where he was banned from teaching during the Stalinisation, paradoxically due to his supposed empathy with idealist philosophy. Reappointed in 1957 he published his most celebrated works on aesthetics. His theories – the lack of diffusion of which is mainly due to language barriers and a discontinuity during the cold war period – have significant influence on contemporary literary studies.

334 Ingarden, Ontology of the work of art: the musical work, the picture, the architectural work, the film, Roman Ingarden, Time and modes of being (Springfield, Illinois: Thomas, 1964).
between entities that are mind-independent and those that are merely subjective,” offering a more diverse variety of ontological structures to explain different entities such as architecture.  

The terminology of culturally significant has been chosen for being more neutral in character than historic. A definition that privileges the historical character could mislead towards features of positive science, objectivism, or historicist standpoints. Historicity in architecture can become problematic if analysed in terms of existential ontology because of the need to objectify memory that history apparently already covers. History as notion has necessary links with the past, but can also be considered inauthentic depending on its distance to the present. Therefore, the description culturally significant connects the object more with its contemporaries and the values that society assigns to it. This does not necessarily mean that conservation cannot be misled; however, when it is misled, a false condition arises responding more to the hitherto society than to its historical origins. Moreover, cultural significance is also an accepted concept in conservation, well defined by the Burra Charter as a flexible notion. It identifies cultural phenomena with the present community and the values found in architecture.


Rieser, "Roman Ingarden and His Time," p. 446.

http://www.icomos.org/australia/burra.html. “Cultural significance means aesthetic, historic, scientific, social or spiritual value for past, present or future generations. Cultural significance is embodied in the place itself, its fabric, setting, use, associations, meanings, records, related places and related objects. Places may have a range of values for different individuals or groups. The term cultural significance is synonymous with heritage significance and cultural heritage value. Cultural significance may change as a result of the continuing history of the place. Understanding of cultural significance may change as a result of new information.” Cfr. Lowenthal, Throsby et al., "Values and Heritage Conservation. Research Report," pp. 7-10.
Section 4.1 “Primordial Modes of Being” explains how the model of Ingarden has been adapted in order to undertake an ontological outline of CSA. It explains the conditions of possibility of being as phenomenologically deduced, not as an empirical fact. Thus, some basic forms of being are delineated within the possible modes of being deduced by Ingarden. With this first approach, architecture starts to be considered in two ways of being: the event and the process. These two ways evidence certain features that have been problematized by conservation.

Since these previous modes of being suggest some limited ontological landscape for architecture to exist, the third way of being – the object enduring in time – proposed by Ingarden is considered. Thus, section 4.2 “The Architectural Object” explores the ontological structure and the main phenomenological features that CSA as an intentional object might reveal. Since the possible concretizations of architecture are more varied in this way of being, the issues of an identity and a core for CSA emerge.

Section 4.3 “To Be or Not to Be Architecture” explores some pertinent similarities and differences between the work of art, architecture as art, and CSA, according to the proposed ontological structure. This phenomenological assessment concludes with an ontological epoché that seizes essential characteristics of CSA, which stimulate a wide variety of concretizations in the form of collective values.

Based in phenomenological analysis, section 4.4 “Architecture as Noema” approaches the illustration of the formal structures that CSA presents as phenomenon. The manifestation of architecture as a whole integrated by
parts and moments; the possibility of having a constant identity grasped in manifold appearances; and the possibility of being present and absent from the perception of the subject, reveal CSA as an object with multifarious possibilities. CSA’s variable and flexible essence – founded in collective intentionalities – poses significant challenges for temporal attitudes that concern it.

4.1 *Primordial Modes of Being*

Being or a mode of being is always the existence or the mode of existence of something, never something separate in itself. The ‘idea of existence,’ therefore, or the ‘idea of a certain mode of being’ likewise cannot be understood to mean that only a single element appears in the contents of these ideas, namely, ‘existence’ (or ‘mode of existence’). There is only the idea of the existence of something (in one way or another) – in particular, the idea of something really existing.


Recent debates about the ontology of art continue with the challenging task of finding a definition that conveys its identity, whilst some scholars argue the impossibility of such an endeavour. 340 Moreover, in our post-ontological age, things are defined by highly developed and complex theories reaching a peak in proposals where reality is epistemologically described in terms of differences and not of identities. 341 However, for two methodological reasons we have selected the ontology of the work of art suggested by Ingarden as our point of departure. The first is that Ingarden followed the Husserlian phenomenology to support and deduce his proposal, which is attuned with

Brandi’s theories, and that we further contrast with existential phenomenology in our hermeneutical approach in Chapter 6.\textsuperscript{342} The second is that Ingarden offered within his theory a complete proposal for architecture as a work of art, something that is rarely found in more recent ontological research about architecture.

According to the categories of Ingarden, CSA could belong to two modes of being: that of real entities and that of intentional objects in the social-cultural strand. The analysis has to start with the argument of establishing what kind of object conservation is protecting. Some existential moments – moments of dependence – are established for architecture in this context. The problem embraced here is to define ontological characteristics of the architectural object and the assimilation of its transformations in society. This definition needs to be constructed bearing in mind that CSA is a special case within architecture in general, since we deal with structures whose values have been collectively celebrated. While it can be argued that all architecture is in some way assimilation of new into the existent, this process is all the more apparent when the threat to the socially established cultural environment seems immediate.

**Adapting Ingarden’s Existential-Ontological Model**

Ingarden deduced his aesthetic theory in an attempt to understand “the structure and the mode of being of works of art as determinately constituted,


\textsuperscript{342} In fact, Ingarden declares that what he calls “existential-ontological research […] does not have anything in common with M. Heidegger’s ‘existential philosophy’ [and] have nothing in common with French ‘Existentialism,’ with which I was to become acquainted only after I had written this book.” Ingarden, *Time and modes of being* p. 22. We have not found evidence of
We use the method of Ingarden as point of departure to suggest an ontology of CSA, taking his existential-ontological considerations as the conditions of possibility of existence of architecture in its different possible modes of being. Ingarden states that there are three groups of ontological questions: existential, formal and material. He assumes among the mental experiments the phenomenological epoché, as a way to explore the ontological modes of being and moments of existence. Consequently, he establishes the following:

> Whenever we deal with objects that exist in one way or another, we have to deal also with their existence. [...] Yet existence is not something separate from an existing object. When I deal with an object, by that fact its existence is within the frame of my experience. Therefore, in order to realize clearly what the mode of being of an object is (existing in one way or another), it would seem sufficient simply to intend it carefully. [...] An existing object can never be given to us in experience without its mode of being, nor a mode of being without a corresponding existing object.

In order to do this epoché, he establishes the concepts of modes of being (modus existentiae) and moments of existence (momentum existentiale). The way he presents the difference between them is determined by the nature of the abstraction and separability from the object. He assumes that “every object can exist in only one mode, and [...] everything whatever which can be distinguished in it exists in the same mode as it does.” This means that, modes of being contain existential moments within and existential moments are only manifested through modes of being. Several moments of existence can

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343 Brandi being acquainted of Ingarden’s philosophical writings although the consonance between their notions.

344 Ingarden, *Ontology of the work of art: the musical work, the picture, the architectural work, the film* p. x. Although, he did this in order to unravel the problem of realism vs. idealism. We share his conviction that ontology needs to be considered in order to investigate the attribution of values to – in our case – architectural objects.

345 Ingarden, *Time and modes of being* p. 22.

346 Ibid. pp. 32-3.

347 Ibid. p. 37. (Emphasis in the original).
share a unique mode of being; however, a mode of being of an object is exclusive from any other mode for that object.

Ingarden then proceeded to distinguish and describe pairs of opposite existential moments: Autonomy vs. Heteronomy; Originality vs. Derivation; Separateness vs. Inseparateness; and Self-Dependence vs. Contingency.\(^{347}\) He deduces that these moments do not imply that they can really be given in real existence, since he considers this a metaphysical question, but only that they are ontologically feasible.\(^{348}\) The same can be said of the concepts of being absolute and being relative.\(^{349}\) We cannot possibly describe all the feasible oppositions of moments of existence Ingarden deduces; however, we can start mapping within this ontology the possible location of architecture. He establishes the categories of moments of existence that are not self-exclusive as the base of analysis, before going into the argument of being in time. (Figure 4-1).

\(^{347}\) Ibid. pp. 43, 52, 82, 89.
\(^{348}\) Ibid. p. 93.
\(^{349}\) Ibid. p. 92.
The preliminary proposed location of architecture is deduced according to the possibilities of considering it as an autonomous or heteronomous entity; always derivative; either separated or inseparate; and either self-dependent or contingent. It is worth noticing that we suggest this situation before the disentangling of the manifold that can constitute architecture and the consideration of the significant deductions of Ingarden with reference to the work of art and other cultural objects. Once a basic ontological situation of architecture is preliminary mapped, the dimension of time needs to give more precision to the possibilities of a being that is in or out of time.

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350 Ibid. p. 93.
351 Cfr. Ingarden, *Ontology of the work of art: the musical work, the picture, the architectural work, the film.*
Architecture as Event

Because the existence of the real world is ontologically related with time, Ingarden develops his analysis with preliminary clarifications about the kind of time he is discussing. He defines this time as concrete, in opposition to both abstract time – as mathematically or physically deduced – and ordinary time. To him “[c]oncrete time is likewise filled time [...] [t]hat is, concrete time is filled with what happens, takes effect, or endures in it.”352 This notion is correlated with the one of Objective time in Husserlian sense, that is to say not sensed temporal datum but perceived temporal datum.353 To define the existence of a thing, Ingarden needs to relate the abstraction of the modes of being and their moments of existence with time. Although this could seem abstract at this point, the relevance of locating architecture within Ingarden’s system is that a coherent ontology should emerge in order to qualify different apprehensions of architecture – as memory, object, or project of architecture, or the combination of more than one of these instances – in consciousness.

Thus, we categorise architecture according to its existential relation with time and its determination on it. Ingarden’s first division is between objects that are determined in time and extra-temporal objects.354 He proposes three kinds of beings in time that we consider for architecture according to the determination of time: events, processes and objects enduring in time. For the mode of being of events, he defines that,

The occurrence of something, its coming into being, the actualization of a certain state of affairs: this is what constitutes an event. [...] according to one

352 Ingarden, Time and modes of being pp. 100-1.
experience of time, everything that exists temporally is limited to only one ‘now,’ conceived as nondimensional, and beyond which there are, as it were, two abysses of absolute nonbeing. According to a second experience, however, the past exists in its own way, as does the future. Time is not a force that destroys being.  

Consequently, intending architecture as event implies its perception in consciousness as a state of affairs. This perception of architecture is the now of its experience. Time for this kind of existence of architecture is not significant since events by definition cannot endure.

This architectural apprehension is, for example, the one to be conserved following the principles paradigmatically attributed to Viollet-le-Duc. He stated that to restore a building is “to re-establish it in a complete state that could have never existed at a given moment.” The instantaneous image that the conservator pursues is conceived as a privileged instant. Brandi attributes many mistaken restorations to Viollet-le-Duc and to conservators that followed the approach of restoring by fantasy or by reperfecting. Brandi blames as aberrant the Romantic trend that took other figurative traditions but “was not a new way to relive and shape it in an autonomous figurative culture, but to synchronise it with a chosen and prefigured age, or put it in a second-hand figurative culture, as [...] was the case of the architecture of the nineteenth

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355 Ibid. pp. 102, 4. (Emphasis in the original).
356 We say the criticism to Viollet-le-Duc is paradigmatical despite he said that “ [...] there is as much danger in restoring a structure simply by reproducing an exact facsimile of everything found in as there is in substituting later forms for those originally existing in the structure.” Viollet-le-Duc, The Foundations of Architecture. Selections from the Dictionnaire raisonné p. 197.
357 Viollet-le-Duc, Dictionnaire raisonné de l'architecture française du XIe au XVIe siècle. vol. 8, 14-34. “[l]e rétablir dans un état complet qui peut n’avoir jamais existé a un moment donné.” (Our translation and emphasis).
358 Brandi, Basile et al., Theory of restoration p. 64. Restoration by reperfecting is the translation of the Italian ripristino used in the English version.
Figure 4-2 Narbonne Gate, Carcassone, France, Viollet-le-Duc. Project.
(http://www.carcassonne.culture.fr/en/rt403.htm)

167 century.’”359 (Figure 4-2 and Figure 4-3 illustrate how the image intended by Viollet-le-Duc in his project resulted in a state presented as event).

The noematic content of this perception of architecture is as frozen in time under the illusion of constant and timeless sameness. The fascination with this kind of image is significant because of the relation between aesthetic image and memory.\textsuperscript{360} A conservator with this approach can concretize an architectural object, which is absent but whose concretization reveals formal characteristics of the object to receive conservation action. Ingarden says that this mode of being presupposes the existence of a world to whose history the event belongs. This world persists longer than the event itself and it is where events happen – connected with processes, with objects and between them – enduring in time only “through their after-effects.”\textsuperscript{361} Therefore, the event survives only as memory.

**Architecture as Process**

Ingarden establishes the mode of being of processes, distinguishing within it a manifold of phases and an object that is subject to that process; both the manifold and the object are two sides of the same entity.\textsuperscript{362}

The general constituent property of a process as an object is that it is a temporally extensive aggregate of phases. This means that (1) phase after phase, from the initial one to the final one, takes place in continually new periods of time, and (2) the aggregation of phases constantly increases until the process comes to an end, and in its essence – in contrast with an event – cannot be contained in one instant, in one ‘now’. [...] every determinate process being constituted in the succession of phases as a subject of properties.

\textsuperscript{360} Ricoeur has already stated that the paradigm of the noema of memory is the memory-event. “Things and people do not simply appear, they reappear as being the same, and it is in accordance with this sameness of reappearing that we remember them.” Ricoeur, Memory, history, forgetting p. 23.

\textsuperscript{361} Ingarden, Time and modes of being p. 104.

\textsuperscript{362} Ibid. p. 107.
has this property essential to it, that the phases of which it is composed are *continuously transient*.\(^{363}\)

As examples of processes, Ingarden mentions movements of bodies, developments of organisms, lives of people, or all acts and activities.\(^{364}\) The characterisation of this mode of being for architecture is the succession of phases. This implies the consideration, at least theoretically, of an origin and an end of architecture. These phases that increase until they reach an end, even if distinguishable, are not necessarily discrete entities. They constitute a continuum where an independent image of architecture is not distinguished in architecture’s actuality. This mode of being of architecture is for instance the one in the stereotyped view attributed to John Ruskin’s intentionality, where the building’s ruin is expected to dissolve someday into nature. For this apprehension, Ruskin attacks the notion of restoration.

You may make a model of a building as you may of a corpse, and your model may have the shell of the old walls within it as your cast might have the skeleton [...]: but the old building is destroyed [...] Take proper care of your monuments, and you will not need to restore them. [...] Watch an old building with an anxious care; [...] better a crutch than a lost limb; and do this tenderly, and reverently, and continually, and *many a generation will still be born and pass away beneath its shadow. Its evil day must come at last;* but let it come declaredly and openly, and let no dishonouring and false substitute deprive it of the funeral offices of memory.\(^{365}\)

Architecture is thus a being in evolution: originated in the project, as in drawings, then developed in its building process, its finishing, its conservation, alteration, and eventual destruction. Ruskin criticised the picturesque taste for ruins and decay, similar to Riegl’s old value.\(^{366}\) Once the building is in decay or destroyed, there is no much else to do in order to gain a renewed life for it – “as

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\(^{363}\) Ibid. pp. 107-9. (Emphasis in the original).

\(^{364}\) Ibid. p. 107.


\(^{366}\) Ibid. p. 245.
impossible as to raise the dead” – but delaying and waiting for its final dissolution.\textsuperscript{367}

The noematic content of this architectural perception can be varied and changeable. It maintains an identity experiencing the passing of time, from the beginning to an end, even when transformed from a piece of paper, to technical drawings, construction site, building in use, or ruin; a building, like for instance the ruined seminary of St. Peter College in Cardross, which can be considered the same process.\textsuperscript{368} (Figure 4-4, Figure 4-5 and Figure 4-6 illustrate different phases of this architectural process).

\begin{center}
\textbf{Figure 4-4 St. Peter College, Cardross, UK, Gillespie, Kidd and Coia. (Drawing of the project phase)}
\end{center}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{367} Ibid. p. 252.
\textsuperscript{368} St Peter's College, Cardross, Dunbartonshire, UK. Although credited to the firm Gillespie, Kidd and Coia, the project was leaded by architects Isi Metzstein and Andy Macmillan. Date of completion: 1966. It was closed as seminary in 1980, later it was used as drug rehabilitation centre from 1983 until building finally abandoned in 1987, now derelict. Kilmahew House (John Burnet 1865-8) around which the seminar scheme was built, was demolished after a fire in 1995. In June 2007 St Peter's was placed on the World Monument Fund list of the World's 100 Most Endangered Sites for 2008. RIBA Bronze Regional Award 1967, Listed Category 'A' 1992. The Lighthouse, The Glasgow School of Art et al., Gillespie Kidd and Coia: Architecture1956-1987 (2008 [cited 09 August 2008]); available from http://www.gillespiekiddandcoia.com/home.html.
\end{flushleft}
Certain combinations of moments of existence prove to be contradictory, therefore ontologically unfeasible. Other combinations instead determine the possibility of beings that are absolutely in opposition to relative objects. Architecture is included in this latter group. According to Ingarden’s
ontological structure, the possible combinations of the basic moments of existence determine the modes of being when time is taken into account.

Events and processes establish basic modes of being that can participate in the understanding of architecture; these ways of being of architecture have been concretized in the past, motivating different varieties of conservation actions. Conservation of an event or a process demand different actions from this point of view. Brandi was opposed to the consideration of architecture as an event frozen in the past time, such as the kind of Viollet-le-Duc’s proposals. Although, Brandi concretized a specific event in the being of the work of art as “[...] the instant when the work of art strikes consciousness like a bolt of lightning,” he also concretized two processes involved with the work of art.\footnote{Brandi, Basile et al., Theory of restoration p. 61. (Emphasis in the original).} The first is “[...] the duration of the externalising of the work of art, while it is being formed by the artist; second, [...] the interval between the end of the creative process and the instant when our consciousness becomes aware of the work of art.”\footnote{Ibid. (Emphasis in the original).} He criticised restoration actions where these three modes of being are confused. Despite the apparent limitation that these possible ways of being architecture expose, they are important also as elements in the concretization of the third kind of being suggested for architecture: the object enduring in time.

### 4.2 The Architectural Object

If we succeeded in grasping moments of existence or modes of being in direct perception, this alone would be an inadequate result of scientific research; in order to communicate it to others, it would be further necessary to express the result of our intuitive examination in appropriately formulated statements. However, if many modes of being actually should be differentiated [...] then all
the verbs and all such words as ‘is,’ ‘exists,’ etc., in particular, acquire many meanings when we use them as predicates.


Oh my goodness! Shut me down! Machines making machines? Huh! How perverse!

C3PO, *Star Wars, Episode II, The Attack of the Clones*, 22 BBY.372

A future depending on machine-originated creations seems not as impossible as it could have been before. However, the character called C3PO saw that kind of creation as an inexplicable distortion of reality. In a parallel manner, Ingarden deduced ontologically how certain beings originated other beings as purely intentional objects. Actually, C3PO is one of them, among other characters of literary works, mythological creatures, works of art in Brandi’s sense and arguably architectural objects, as we shall see. When it is stated that tourists have recently visited the Barcelona Pavilion, what is it exactly that fills consciousness within its apprehension of that object? A lost historical building? A physical visited building? An architectural idea? A fake construction inspired in a destroyed work? A restored monument? The answers of these questions depend on the kind of intentionality with which consciousness addresses this architectural object.

The notions of architecture as an event and as a process seem limited and somehow incomplete when evaluated vis-à-vis the complex object that human being is. Ingarden deduces in his ontological structure a third mode of being in which time is taken into account, that is to say the mode of the object

372 George Lucas, "Star Wars: Episode II - Attack of the Clones," (United States: 20th Century Fox, 2002). Being C3PO a purely intentional object according to Ingarden’s categories of being, the date of this quotation could less arguably be cited as 2002, which is not a purely intentional chronology.
enduring in time. Thus, architecture as event and as process participates in this more intricate mode of being that can include other varieties of concretizations, such as events, processes and other objects. Moreover, Ingarden includes human consciousness within this kind of objects with its capacity to be aware of time and then somehow transcend it. The intertwined existence of objects such as human consciousness – with its capacity to direct its intentionality towards something else – originates the possibility of still another mode of being to emerge in the form of purely intentional objects.

**An Object Enduring in Time**

The third mode of being Ingarden describes, is the one of objects enduring in time, which

 [...] differ from events in that they are capable of *lasting beyond* the individual instants in which events, in a way, are locked, and they therefore *endure longer* than events. […]Yet it is just in the way in which an enduring object *outlasts* individual instants that is shown its profound dissimilarity to processes. […] an enduring object *remains identically the same* through the constantly new instants in which it exists. 373

Thus when architecture is intended as an enduring object its mode of being is distinguished from processes in which it appears constituted by strata, maintaining from the beginning to an eventual end, its same identity. This makes architecture outlast individual phases. Architecture therefore is conceived as a manifold of layers, with a particular character for each one of them. The view of architecture as an object enduring in time is compatible with the approach to the work of art in Ingarden’s and Brandi’s theories. Brandi would have recognised, for instance, structure and appearance, or interior and

373 Ingarden, *Time and modes of being* p. 125. (Emphasis in the original).
exterior, as parts of the architectural manifold. Within this perception of architecture, the noematic content can be diverse according to the attitude of the subject who can recognise even other events, processes or objects constituting parts of this architecture as a whole. The memory of this mode of being of architecture is analogous to the memory of a person – a face – in which the subject identifies the same individual, but directs to him or her different intentionalities.

The fact of being fully constituted since the beginning makes them different from processes that emerge with time; furthermore, their being is support for other processes to occur. This notion is significant for the case of architecture during successive phases of existence. Consequently, the intentionality of the same architectural core subsists a whole series of phases, from conception, design, building, use, destruction, memory, and eventual reconstruction of the object. For instance one same cathedral, no matter what changes and transformations have taken place, may fill the intentionality of apprehensions during its existence. In Brandi’s restoration theory, the identified work of art in the moment of its methodological recognition is the same one at the moment of its creation. Some theoretical problems could arise when attempts to define until what moment in time an architectural work continues to be such an object, and when it becomes only a heap of material. Nevertheless, for this aim the consideration of Ingarden’s *Ontology of the Work of Art* is fundamental.

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A significant issue at this point is the argument of whether objects enduring in time are really such objects and not a manifold of events and processes that constitute this apparent object. To this issue Ingarden explains that,

[...] it may be that only combinations of events or systems or processes exist and that, as something different from them, enduring objects do not exist at all. [...] A multiplicity of successive events or of whole combinations of them does not produce anything but a certain manifold, and does not constitute one simple object that remains identical in time. Obviously, every manifold is also a certain kind of object, but [...] it is an object of a higher order, the totality of whose properties cannot, it is true, be identified with the totality of the elements of that manifold, but does imply the existence of those elements. [...] such elements [...] in themselves, are no longer manifolds, but take the form of ultimate elements – objects that are primordially individual.375

This consideration of objects resulting from a manifold of primordial objects is one of the most significant accounts to formulate our understanding of Ingarden’s ontology applied to CSA. With this notion, architecture is not considered a single event or process, but its mode of being is more assimilable to that of an object enduring in time. The recognition of a manifold mode of being was already apparent in the analysis of social objects discussed in Section 3.3, when architecture constitutes monuments, heritage or cultural identities.

A layered structure for objects enduring in time is suggested here. Although Ingarden is concerned in this discussion with humans as objects enduring in time, for this thesis, the analogous extrapolation of the theory to architectural objects represents a way to reveal the ontology of CSA. Noteworthy in this context, Ingarden considers the problem of a retentive essential core of objects. This would be the ultimate essential component of an object. Over this core, other characteristics and variations could occur, but as

375 Ingarden, *Time and modes of being* pp. 135-6.
long as this core is not changed or destroyed, its identity is guaranteed.376
Sometimes buildings or fragments of buildings conserve this core. Ruins, for example the Western Wall in Jerusalem, keep that core which is significant for the continuity of concretizations of remembrance and sacinality. Some of these remaining parts are not complete buildings anymore, but they constitute, in some way or another, concretizations of CSA. (Figure 4-7 and Figure 4-8).

Figure 4-7 The destruction of the Second Temple by the Romans, David Roberts (1796-1864). An instance of artistic concretization of the Second Temple in Jerusalem. (http://www.preteristarchive.com/JewishWars/images/churban/1850_roberts_jerusalem/doj_roberts_01.jpg)

376 Ibid. p. 138.
The core persists in time during the existence of the entity. In the moment of the destruction of this essential core, the connection with the notion of memory, and arguably with history, emerges, since for Ingarden:

In the instant when [the consistency of the object-core itself] is disrupted, and when, therefore, this absolutely immutable core is drawn in its entirety into a process of change, the destruction of the object is effected. It loses the actuality of its being and its last present changes into the past. The final phase of its actual existence then also belongs to its history, but everything in it is already transformed; its very identity has been breached, broken off – insofar as we relate it to some later actual entity. If it leaves any traces or after-effects of its existence in subsequent presents, these maintain it or its history in retrogressively derivative being.\footnote{Ibid. p. 139. (Our emphasis for the last sentence).}

In any case, these traces or after-effects of the existence of the object are a variety of memory. Ingarden calls to this maintaining it or history of it, but more properly it is memory. The character of this memory obtained as result of reception of CSA, depends on the observer – as subject or as collectivity – and its capacity to assimilate the new state of affairs resulted from its alteration.
Possible Architectures

The ontology suggested by Ingarden opens the possibility to locate architecture according to multiple concretizations. These instances of architecture do not necessarily contradict each other, since they might address different aspects of its manifold layers. This does not mean that the notion of architecture can be filled with any intentional content, since restricted categories of moments, events, processes and objects can determine architecture’s ontological core and its possible layers. Moreover, the ontological constitution of architecture is variable in time in consonance with the physical and cultural context originating multiple variations. In this context, Ingarden discusses identities and the possible transformations – and eventual annihilation – of objects. Concerning the likely incorrect confusion between processes and objects enduring in time, Ingarden suggests a process of differentiation:

The static identity appears in a certain objective moment whose qualitative determination is perfectly immutable and is constantly apparent in the object. [and] On the other hand, the dynamic identity [which] appears in the qualitative determination of a certain objective moment that is subject, it is true, to change, but this change affects only the mode and degree of the consummation of its existential and phenomenal aspects, or, if one prefers, the incarnation of this moment in its entirety.  

Although the existence of this core is controversial, from our perspective – as long as a core becomes apparent for humans as an object enduring in time – it could be the case that architecture inherits this quality as part of its humanised condition. Nevertheless, extrapolating his theory to

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Ibid. p. 145.

A definite answer is offered with our further existential interpretation of Chapter 6. The conception of the core as emptiness is a controversial point between the ontological theory of Ingarden and the one of other existentialist philosophers. Heidegger and Sartre, according to
architecture, the difference between an identity that remains constant and another that is qualitatively determined is significant. As might be inferred, the ambition of conservation to be truthful, objective, authentic, scientific, and so forth, depends on the objective moment with which CSA is noematically identified. The consideration of objects resulting from the manifold of other primordial objects is also related to the analysis of social objects, through consideration of CSA as monument, vis-à-vis the notions of heritage and cultural identity. Architecture can be concretized for instance by the collective memories of society, by the artistic quality that the building conveys, or as an engineering marvel where its value is a technical achievement. (Figure 4-9, Figure 4-10 and Figure 4-11).

Figure 4-9 Holocaust Memorial, Berlin, Germany. Peter Eisenman. (Own picture)

Ingarden, suggest that human lacks a core and is formed from a basic emptiness that is filled during life following its potentiality. Ibid. p. 144.
Ingarden explores the ontology of being in time starting from the event, then the process, and finally the intricacy of the object enduring in time. This latter shows more complexities in the case of living entities, and especially human consciousness. It seems relevant to correlate these cases to architecture as an object endowed with *humanised qualities*. For instance, when Ingarden discusses the characteristics of living objects he says that,
[...] in a living individuum, the residue from the past constitutes a meaningful whole, which can be understood in itself, in its ‘organic’ structure (as we say), without regard for the fact that the living entity carries traces of actions effected on it during its existence by various factors unconnected with each other and accidental for it, which counteracted its meaningful unity and thus threatened its existence.\footnote{Ibid. p. 152. (Emphasis in the original).}

Although referring to living beings, this also seems valid for architecture and in general for most of the cultural objects, which by being embedded in human existence acquire certain organic meaningfulness. If we relate this aspect with the core, we could infer one core for architecture as object enduring in time that remains identical during its existence.\footnote{He discusses more on this aspect in his ontological analysis of architecture, when he describes how something like the consecration of a church is possible. This being of a church as a church is possible with that core that paradoxically seems existentially empty, as Heidegger and Sartre seemed to suggest. Ingarden, Ontology of the work of art: the musical work, the picture, the architectural work, the film p. 259.}

As another instance, we can establish this relationship between inanimated objects – such as architecture – and living beings, regarding Ingarden’s discussion of the fragility of living beings. This fragility, which he characterises as the defect of being susceptible to organic decay, and self-dissolution, or death,

[...] proves to be the frangibility of something which is \emph{in itself autonomous}, the \emph{basis and the source of active resistance}, and the \emph{center of strength} from which it constructively struggles against being overcome by externally conditioned disturbances of its existence and the threat to that existence from time itself.\footnote{Ingarden, Time and modes of being p. 154.}

According to him, inanimated objects unresistingly submit to change in the form of passive opposition. However, architecture does not seem simply passive, but especially prepared by human beings to endure. Protection and assistance in the continued existence of the human itself is its purpose; it
appears as an autonomous centre of strength.\textsuperscript{383} Whether this appearance reveals something like a core, or instead it is produced by an illusion, is furtherly deduced from the exploration developed in Chapter 6.

Ingarden approaches living conscious subjects as entities whose temporal fissuration seems to be surmounted. He calls fissuration the “actuality of their existence,” in contrast with “the retrogressively derivative existence of their past, and [...] their future existence that is only foreshadowed.”\textsuperscript{384} Human beings are able to prepare a place that helps them to endure thanks to its capacity to see time. This quality of fissuration, a sort of window that allows us to look through time, is given, as ontological legacy, to architecture by its condition of being an accompanying element of human beings. This is presented more evidently in Chapter 6.

Ingarden’s next movement is the crossing of the three modes of being with the applicable moments of existence according to their relation with time, obtaining the following categorisations. First, he presents the absolute and extratemporal modes of being. (Figure 4-12).

\textsuperscript{383} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{384} Cfr. Ibid. p. 155.
In contrast with the categorisation of temporal objects, these modes of being are not relevant for this thesis since architecture is not an original being but it is always derivate. Ingarden obtained these categories of temporal objects analysing the possibility of existence for any existential moment according to time. Thus, secondly, he deduces the different varieties of temporal objects. (Figure 4-13).

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He sustained that everything that is temporal, so that it exists in time, “must pass through these three different modes of being,” that is to say future, present and past, and he adds significantly that that passage is what is called reality. Finally, he suggests the most relevant mode of being for his aesthetic theory, namely the purely intentional mode of being (Figure 4-14). In the same way as Don Quixote, the symphonies of Beethoven, and C3PO, architecture as a work of art belongs to this mode of being and it is possible thanks to a particular kind of intentionality.

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386 Ibid. p. 161.
With an ontological mapping of the possibilities for architecture to exist, we suggest the location of their possible notions as temporal being and as purely intentional being. This latter suggestion corresponds to Ingarden’s concept of architecture as a work of art, which presents significant correspondences with the aesthetic concept of Brandi, as we have seen in Chapter 2. Within Ingarden’s ontology that suggests all possible kinds of objects, we locate possible instantiations of architecture; however, for desirable conservation praxis it would still be necessary to define precisely which qualities correspond to what concretizations of architecture. Since Ingarden considers the work of art as a purely intentional object, it seems crucial at this point to consider his concepts developed within his *Ontology of the Work of Art*, especially concerning architecture, in order to suggest an ontological structure for CSA, taking into account Brandi’s input.\(^{388}\)

\(^{388}\) Ingarden explains in his *Ontology of the Work of Art* that he was during its writing “unravelling the problem of reality.” Ingarden, *Ontology of the work of art: the musical work, the picture, the architectural work, the film* p. x.
4.3 To Be or Not to Be Architecture

And when the builders laid the foundation of the temple of the Lord, they set the priests in their apparel with trumpets, and the Levites the sons of Asaph with cymbals, to praise the Lord, after the ordinance of David king of Israel. And they sang together by course in praising and giving thanks unto the Lord; because he is good, for his mercy endureth for ever toward Israel. And all the people shouted with a great shout, when they praised the Lord, because the foundation of the house of the Lord was laid. But many of the priests and Levites and chief of the fathers, who were ancient men, that had seen the first house, when the foundation of this house was laid before their eyes, wept with a loud voice; and many shouted aloud for joy: So that the people could not discern the noise of the shout of joy from the noise of the weeping of the people: for the people shouted with a loud shout, and the noise was heard afar off. 

Ezra 3. 389

And I say also unto thee, That thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my church; and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it.

Matthew 16:19. 390

God has promised the believers, men and women, gardens underneath which rivers flow, forever therein to dwell, and goodly dwelling-places in the Gardens of Eden; and greater, God’s good pleasure; that is the mighty triumph.

The Qur’an - Repentance, IX.72. 391

What did Jewish people see as the Salomon’s temple that was so important to be reconstructed? What kind of church could one found upon a rock that is a person? What kind of dwelling-place could God have promised? What architecture are we talking about in all these cases? Houses of god, churches with no buildings, dwellings in paradise, these are instances of purely intentional objects. This is, according to Ingarden, the mode of being of architecture as a work of art. However, it is also the way of being of CSA as a

390 Ibid. ((cited). 
cultural object. Architecture in general is as one of the several possibilities of being; however, as cultural object it shares some of the ontological characteristics of the work of art. The examination of the way of being of the work of art in Ingarden’s ontology illuminates these features, not from the aesthetic or artistic perspective, but as bearer of different collective attributes. Architecture as concept, as it is the case in the above given examples, has as the object of its intentionality a sort of building, but its real existence in space and time is not necessarily always the case. Intended architecture could be either *The Old House* of Christian Andersen or the house of the Proustian character of *In Search of Lost Time*. Nevertheless, CSA needs support on real buildings.

Ingarden developed his aesthetic theory deducing for literature, music and painting the mode of being of purely intentional entities. It could seem to be challenged by the consideration of buildings such as Notre Dame or St. Peter’s Basilica, as purely intentional formations. Nevertheless, with some specific nuances, architecture as a work of art is deduced by him as pure intentional object as well. The correlation of this particular kind of object with CSA reveals the phenomenological mechanisms with which a real architectural object presents to consciousness a quite discernible architectural object as existent.

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392 Ingarden, *Ontology of the work of art: the musical work, the picture, the architectural work, the film* p. 255.
The Analogy of the Work of Art

Ingarden’s arguments to define the ontology of the work of art are pertinent to analyse CSA, since some phenomenical characteristics are shared between these two objects. The artistic and aesthetic values in the case of the work of art, find a correspondence with the values that constitute an instantiation of CSA. For example, when Ingarden discusses the constructional roles of the elements in a picture, he distinguishes three different qualities present in a picture as a work of art: aesthetically neutral qualities, aesthetically valuable qualities, and aesthetic value qualities. All these qualities determine the aesthetic object appearing with the work of art as its background. For the case of painting, Ingarden makes the distinction between the picture and the painting. Thus, whilst the picture is the objectification supported physically by the painting but not constituted by it, the building is the material support of CSA. Therefore, the building can support the instantiation of the work of art – privileged by Brandi – or any other, for example: sacred place, memorial or monument, symbol of authority, place of value, and so forth.

Ingarden presents the close relation between picture and the corresponding painting, stating that they are not the same. The painting is a real physical thing to which the picture is anchored as a coexistent intentional being. However, the picture could not exist without the painting having existed before. Copies of the painting are, in appearance, possible supports of the same picture. The picture as a work of art is an historical object, notwithstanding

\[393\] Ibid. pp. 162-3.
being *merely intentional*, so it has a beginning and an end.\textsuperscript{395} He founds the difference between picture and painting on their corresponding modes of givenness, saying that,

The painting is given to us in simple, primarily visual perception, in the course of which it appears in a multiplicity of concretely experienced aspects. In the viewing of the picture, on the other hand, a relatively complex train of acts of consciousness is executed [...]\textsuperscript{396}

Therefore, Ingarden distinguishes three objectivities: the painting, the picture, and its possible concretizations. According to him, an observer who is not aesthetically prepared to *see* the work of art: “[...] is not aware of the distinction between the picture and the concretization constituted by himself. He takes the concretization he has constituted for the picture itself, or vice versa.”\textsuperscript{397} These concretizations as personally, collectively and historically conditioned can be variable along time, but the work of art as such remains ontically unaltered. In similar fashion, CSA needs for its apprehension certain intentionalities that – in contrast to the artistic object – are changeable in time, since they do not depend on individual’s original concepts. Brandi called to these original concepts *the constitution of image*, as already mentioned in Section 2.3. CSA as intentional object is contextually multifaceted, being constituted by progressive *sense-giving phases*, as we describe in Chapter 5, from the immediate bodily experience to the constitution of the architectural place.\textsuperscript{398}

\textsuperscript{394} Ibid. pp. 165, 6.
\textsuperscript{395} Ibid. pp. 197-8, 201.
\textsuperscript{396} Ibid. pp. 201-2.
\textsuperscript{397} Ibid. pp. 224, 9.
\textsuperscript{398} We refer here to the fact that “[...] the noetic side of intentional experience does not consist exclusively of the strict ‘sense-giving’ phase to which ‘sense’ or ‘meaning’ specifically belongs as correlate. [...] the full noema consists in a nexus of noematic phases, and [...] the specific sense-phase supplies only a kind of necessary *nucleatic layer* in which further phases are
Coincidently with the aesthetic theory of Brandi, Ingarden argues that,

[...] the picture, as a particular kind of intentional object, has its ontic foundation, on the one hand, in the painting, and on the other hand, in an *ideal* viewer, who does not merely have an overview of different possibilities of the picture’s concretisation, but who is also able, through his own critical evaluation of all those elements of the concretisations that go beyond the original picture, to penetrate to the picture in its schematic structure, and who opposes it to all possible concretisations as their common source.\(^\text{399}\)

In the Brandian notion of restoration, as an exclusive artistic methodological moment, this precision is important. For Ingarden as for Brandi, the picture has part of its ontic foundation in the observer.\(^\text{400}\) At this point, the problem of the relativity or subjectivity of the aesthetic value arises. The solution proposed by Ingarden considers the distinction between artistic and aesthetic values. The former are relative because they occur in the work of art as a medium towards the concretization of the work of art itself by an aesthetically prepared observer. The latter is absolute in the sense that it is an end; it corresponds to the final aesthetic experience proposed by the artist.\(^\text{401}\) He sustains that, only persons with “a natural taste and sensitivity, but also a certain degree of practice and experience, or, better, aesthetic culture,” are able to concretize the work of art.\(^\text{402}\) The case of CSA is different, since the problem of an original *artistic constitution* is not necessarily given. The object concretized in CSA might not have an original artistic schema but a mythical, historical, symbolic, and so forth, explanation or origin.

\(^\text{399}\) Although Brandi does not explicitly mention this connection, the discussions about the concept of restoration and time in relation to it reveal this link. Cfr. Ingarden, *Ontology of the work of art: the musical work, the picture, the architectural work, the film*. pp. 229, 30.
\(^\text{400}\) Brandi, Basile et al., *Theory of restoration* pp. 47, 49, 64.
\(^\text{401}\) Cfr. Ingarden, *Ontology of the work of art: the musical work, the picture, the architectural work, the film* pp. 231-2.
\(^\text{402}\) Ibid. pp. 237, 8.
This ontology is valid for the conservation of CSA and the theories to be applied to this aim. From this perspective, it is possible to consider not only the artistic and the aesthetic objects to conserve, but also other possible objects depending on the intentionality that is directed to the building. Further analysis might determine to what degree this could be done and what would the implications of these operations be. For Brandi, for instance, the main objective of architectural restoration is the conservation of the artistic image. However, that is not the case for CSA in which the possible valuation of architecture to be conserved is supported by different features other than the aesthetic ones.

After this analogy of the work of art, we follow Ingarden in his definition of the architectural work of art to correlate it with CSA. However, for us it is pertinent to identify not only the artistic work of art, whose relevance we recognise, but also the particular concretizations that constitute CSA. In the same way that Ingarden suggests that art asks from the viewer some aesthetic preparation to be appreciated, CSA needs from the observer a somehow learned attitude in order to be concretized. For instance, after defining an ontology for other works of art, Ingarden distinguishes architecture from the things of nature by being product of human work, and by possessing certain properties that are not indispensable to it for the fulfilling of its religio-social functions, but which confer on it certain aesthetically qualitative characteristics, by virtue of which it is treasured as a work of ‘great art.’

He notices that a building is for humans not only a real object, but goes beyond this reality. He adds that, “[m]oreover, this reality (the being-real) itself plays no particular role in our attending to the building as a work of art, so that

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403 Ibid. p. 255, 6.
it appears to lose meaning for us. As we shall see, this is observed as well in CSA where the object that fills this intentionality transcends the material reality of the building, if there is still any.

**The Architecture Human Being Cares For**

At this point, we proceed with a reduction of significant features that CSA appears to have in its essence. This sort of epoché attempts to be attuned in order to illustrate issues for the discussion on temporality. Our departure is the consciousness of the generic built environment. It is built because it is not natural but manmade; and it is environment because it is usually the part of the universe that surrounds human beings. It could be argued that nature is also part of the environment; thus, the built environment is the part of the environment that participates of human constructions and in addition, it may participate of nature as well.

The built environment is composed – among other probable parts – by discrete units called buildings; these are categorised according to different characteristics, such as use, materials, forms, hierarchy, colours, and so forth. Buildings are usually – although not necessarily – constructions elevated above the horizon’s level, that define the space in a different way than when they were absent. As a result, they transform the environment; with their gradual emergence they change the status quo, and with it, the objects that can be

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404 Ibid. p. 256.
concretized and supported on that environment change too. They bring into existence at least two things, namely a new state and the memory of the previous state.

In order to build, society takes materials from the natural environment, but also from pre-existent constructions. Humanity improves its building techniques with the technological development. One of the purposes of this improvement is to produce more long-lasting buildings. This allows people to apply their efforts to construct new buildings instead of maintaining or reconstructing the existent ones. Nevertheless, in opposition, there is a tendency of reality to entropy as a constant resistance to be overcome. Weathering, gravity force, fatigue of materials, and so forth, are examples of phenomena linked to this continuous process.

After some fundamental buildings were erected, or maybe from the first moment humankind had spare time, humanity started to embellish not only the buildings, but also the environment with buildings. Significantly, this additional aesthetic care was not a uniformly distributed quality, but it was prescribed for particular distinguished buildings. Society witnessed in succession buildings that were new, remade completely again because new needs arose, and old buildings needed to be replaced or that had been destroyed. They saw buildings that decayed because they were abandoned, for being in disuse or insecure, or by lack of workers or resources to maintain them. They also had buildings that were renewed, adapted, or reconstructed probably when it was cost-effective, or easier to do so than to substitute them with new structures. Finally, they saw buildings that were destroyed; they were
replaced or reconstructed when there was the necessity of radically changing characteristics of an existing building or, on the contrary, when a destroyed one needed to be rebuilt. The relation between society and each one of these cases of buildings determined different intentionalities.

After generations, society established singular historical relations with buildings, and concretized values supported on them depending on numerous reasons. These buildings, for instance, had become temples, government seats, royal residences, museums, theatres and so forth. Society keeps transforming them according to the necessities of the time, but in general, it tends to conserve them. Different viewers concretize diverse kinds of social objects through them. For example, they concretize through buildings sacred places, sites of remembrance, seats of authority, national monuments, works of art, and so forth. These objects acquire value, and for that reason, their physical support – the building – is protected. This manifold of concretized objects that the material building supports is what we identify as CSA. In contrast to Brandi’s and Ingarden’s notions, architecture here is not conceived only from its artistic quality – which originates the privileged artistic epiphany, consequently architecture as a work of art – but it is also source of a varied manifold of concretizations. Even aesthetically banal or ugly buildings might eventually be valued for countless reasons. This seems relevant since CSA is not necessarily architecture as a work of art, although architecture as a work of art should be in general culturally significant.

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405 The concept of social object is supported on the social ontology discussed in Section 5.4. Cfr. Searle, *The construction of social reality.*
As Ingarden observes, attitudes toward the same building can be different depending on the viewer. These changes of attitude do not change the identity of the real thing, which remains receded in the background, but a new objectivity comes forth with every new attitude.\textsuperscript{406} He adds that

\begin{quotation}
[i]t would undoubtedly be an error – an error that was, by the way, often committed in the second half of the nineteenth century – to regard such changeable intuitive traits of the building, that are ontically dependent on the way we attend to them, as something ‘mental’, as our ‘mental images’, or the like. But it would be just as wrong to regard them as something ontically autonomous in the same sense as real objectivities.\textsuperscript{407}
\end{quotation}

We establish thus a correlation between this phenomenon and CSA, distinguishing it among the objects that arise after diverse intentionalities are directed to the building.\textsuperscript{408} Brandi, for instance, distinguished valuation of the image from valuation of the structure; a frequent prejudice that, according to him, is the result of considering historical intentionality of the structural value at the expense of the aesthetic value of the artistic concretization of the image.\textsuperscript{409} Ingarden instead, uses the consecration of a church as an analogous example to demonstrate the necessity of a certain attitude, in order to concretize the aesthetic object. However, significantly, this analogy is also applicable to cultural objects, as other scholars have also observed.\textsuperscript{410} The building does not only support aesthetic attitudes. For example, attitudes of technical awareness, achievement, remembrance or commemoration can also be recognised in relation to it.

\begin{footnotes}
\item[406] Ingarden, \textit{Ontology of the work of art: the musical work, the picture, the architectural work, the film}. p. 256.
\item[407] Ibid. p. 257.
\item[408] Ingarden offers as an example of this kind of phenomena the consecration of a church. Cfr. Ibid. p. 259.
\item[409] Brandi, Basile et al., \textit{Theory of restoration} p. 98.
\item[410] Ingarden, \textit{Ontology of the work of art: the musical work, the picture, the architectural work, the film}. p. 260. Cfr. Amie L. Thomasson, "Ingarden and the Ontology of Cultural Objects," in
\end{footnotes}
Having outlined some general features of the ontology of CSA, we find that the values on which this object is concretized can vary considerably. The notion of architecture as a work of art has helped us to understand how this happens. Brandi considered as supreme the condition of being a work of art; however, that exceptional quality, despite its importance, is not the only one and in fact, it is not always the most appreciated. In its dwelling within the architectural place, society approaches architecture with different temporal intentionalities. If architecture can be given to human apprehension in so different manifestations, how could this indeterminacy be reduced when determining the purpose of conservation of CSA? Phenomenological analysis should assist in order to disentangle this problem.

4.4 Architecture as Noema

What is the ‘perceived as such’? what essential phases does it harbour in itself in its capacity as noema? We win the reply to our question as we wait, in pure surrender, on what is essentially given. We can describe ‘that which appears as such’ faithfully and in the light of perfect self-evidence. As just one other expression for this we have, ‘the describing of perception in its noematic aspect.’

Edmund Husserl, *Ideen*, 1913. ⁴¹¹

[...] if a work of art, which is not a sum of parts, is physically fragmented, it will continue to exist as a *potential whole* in each of its fragments. This *potential* will be achieved in direct proportion to what has survived of the original artistic features on each fragment of the material that has disintegrated. [...] if the ‘form’ of each work of art is indivisible, where the work has been physically broken up, one will have to attempt to develop the original potential of oneness held within each fragment.


Understanding that, whilst the immediate visualisation of architecture as phenomenon will give the exterior as exterior and the interior as interior, a split will occur in the flagrancy of the phenomenon, as when in a mixture of oil and

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⁴¹² Brandi, Basile et al., *Theory of restoration* p. 57.
Brandi’s words above illustrate two different attitudes concerning architecture. No one is to be privileged over the other; no one is stating something that makes the other invalid. The difference between them derivates from the way in which consciousness surrenders, as Husserl puts it, to architecture; the way in which architecture is given. Since, according to phenomenology, it is not possible to know the thing-in-itself, it is necessary to know it through its presentation to consciousness. If human intentionality has CSA as this object given to consciousness, different possibilities of being concretized emerge depending on varied attitudes; its constitution in noema demands an epoché of the intended object. For our particular case, it is important to underline the main features that constitute CSA. The case of cherished ruins venerated since long time ago is paradigmatic, since heaps of stones or fragments of walls are enough elements to constitute it. However, tradition and old value are not necessary conditions for CSA to upsurge. The coincidence of concretizations of many individuals individuating similar – or in any case compatible – moments and manifolds, certainties, memories and hopes, anchored in the same building or complex of buildings constitute cases of CSA. The work of art in Ingarden and Brandi’s theories is self-identical through all its possible concretizations, but CSA is not. Apprehension of CSA

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\[(\text{Brandi,} \textit{Teoria generale della critica}) p. 304. \text{“fermo restando che se la visualizzazione immediata dell’architettura come fenomeno darà l’esterno come esterno e l’interno come interno, nella flagranza del fenomeno avverà una scissione, come quando in una miscela d’olio e di aceto l’olio sale a galla; nell’esterno del fenomeno si rivelerà l’interno, nell’interno l’esterno,}}\]
as such is always referring to previous apprehensions. To perceive cultural significance one needs to be grounded on the world that originates, maintains, and develops that meaningfulness.

The fact that CSA does not find its origin in any building, but in that which contains the capacity to generate cultural appreciation, is a relevant distinction in conservation. Buildings can – as also can architecture as art – support intentionalities other than the aesthetic or the scientific; these values may, for instance, be associated with collective memories and social values. The building is a real material thing, but it is not formed by the concretization of architecture as cultural object. On the other hand, the building is the physical foundation of this CSA and the latter is certainly dependent on the former. The difference between building and architecture is determined by their mode of givenness; the experience of a building does not demand the same as the experience of CSA. This ontological theory distinguishes three objectivities: the building, CSA, and its concretizations, whose possibilities of presentation depend on the formal structures with which architecture is presented to consciousness, that is to say parts and moments, identities and manifolds, and presence and absence. These formal structures, in which CSA is given to consciousness, are in constant interplay and do not interfere between each other. They blend constantly and it is by changes in the focus of intentionality that we are aware of them.

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e sarà questa e non altra la struttura della forma sul piano dell’espressione architettonica.” (Our translation).

414 Cfr. Ingarden, *Ontology of the work of art: the musical work, the picture, the architectural work, the film*, pp. 197-8 and working analogically the building corresponds to the physical part of which givenness demands only the perception senses. Architecture as such, and by extension CSA, demands a consciousness contextualised in time and cultural space.
Parts and Wholes

The whole of an architectural object can be given as composed by two different kinds of parts. The first is the kind of pieces, that are independent objects having existence by themselves, for example floor, walls, columns, windows, roof, and so forth. They can be integrated by sub-orders of parts and analogously buildings may constitute parts of complexes of buildings. The second kind is the one of moments, already discussed as conceived by Ingarden in Section 4.1. They do not have independent existence and consequently could not be presented separately. Colours, function, form, textures, dimensions, backgrounds, and so forth are instances of moments. The pair form-function is an example of a moment within architectural objects. Function is not a thing that can be detached from the object and the form is not separable from the matter of the object. Moments are phenomenologically analysable and some of them can be the foundation of some others. As Brandi suggests, even the light and the air around a work of architecture are part of the materials with which it is composed.\footnote{Brandi, Basile et al., \textit{Theory of restoration} p. 53.}

From the standpoint of the work of art, Ingarden sustains that the building that bears the architectural work needs to satisfy principles independent from the functional considerations. For him, the term \textit{principle},

\[\ldots\] can be understood [as] conformity to law, that can be formulated in words and applied as a rule of structuring, or that can be drawn from the finished work. On the other hand, it can be understood as a concrete regularity which obtains or is realized in the finished works between the moments belonging to the work, and which at least in some cases, also finds its concrete expression or its full-blown form in an immediately apprehensible Gestalt quality.\footnote{Ingarden, \textit{Ontology of the work of art: the musical work, the picture, the architectural work, the film}. p. 279.}
The reference to Gestalt qualities is significant for its coincidence with Brandi’s discussion on the potential oneness of the work of art.\textsuperscript{417} This perception of the architectural object as a whole constituted by parts is a significant problem in architectural conservation. Within these principles mentioned by Ingarden, some moments can be distinguished. Proportions, symmetry, distributions, hierarchies, and the like, are founded on other moments such as the occurrence of static and mechanics laws, functional needs, or meaningful orientations. Thus, there is an order of foundation in the determination of the real building. Without that order, the building could be imagined but not always realised, so not arriving then to the constitution of CSA.

Despite the immediate apprehension of the architectural work as a whole, Ingarden refuses the analogy between living organism and architectural work, among other reasons because, “the spatial forms of the masses that occur in the architectural work of art [...] are always [...] concretisations of certain idealizations of abstract geometric formations.”\textsuperscript{418} He states that organic forms tend to irregularity. On the other hand, he observes how nature occupies a special place in determining architectural form, but for completely different reasons. He states that,

\[\text{[...]} \text{since every architectural work of art must be realized on the basis of a real building consisting of heavy masses, they conform to the laws of the statics of heavy, rigid bodies, so that the whole work made up of them can stand in the earth’s gravitational field, rather than unavoidably collapsing.}\textsuperscript{419}\]

\textsuperscript{417} Brandi, Basile et al., \textit{Theory of restoration} pp. 55-9.
\textsuperscript{418} Ingarden, \textit{Ontology of the work of art: the musical work, the picture, the architectural work, the film}. p. 285.
\textsuperscript{419} Ibid. p. 285.
He states that geometry does not dominate in organic bodies and it tends to deviate from them. For instance, he compares structures made by animals with those made by humans, deducing that architecture is possible because humankind has discovered Euclidean geometry, “rationally constructed but nevertheless [...] ultimately based on a peculiar immediate apprehension of spatial forms.”420 This seems consistent with Brandi’s ideas about architecture and art restoration.421 Brandi conceives the work of art as having an entire unity and not a whole unity. What he means is that the independent separate parts “retain no memory of the wholeness that, through the action of the artist, they once formed part.”422 These phenomenological considerations are relevant for an understanding of CSA. Thus, the concept of fragment, ruin and unity is of capital importance given that CSA can be of considerable dimensions, composed by other works of art as parts, or formed by different buildings, spaces, or structures. Certainly, these same criteria can be extrapolated to the city considered as CSA.423

Other moments which constitute parts of CSA, are the interior and exterior spatialities that Brandi mentions for architecture as a work of art.424 He seems to refer here to the implied spatiality of the astanza of the work of art, and not to the actual physical spatiality. To be clearer he adds that,

420 Ibid. p. 287.
422 Ibid.
423 Brandi seems to have confusion between work of art and CSA – in the form of monuments – when he shifts from the work of art to the city considering them as objects of conservation. Cfr. Ibid. pp. 94-5.
424 In an obscure way, when discussing the spatiality Brandi states that it is “[...] not the examination of the singular structure of the consciousness that reveals the work of art to the individual self that is now the concern. Rather [...] we must look at the spatiality of the work of art, in order to see what spatial aspects must be protected by restoration: here, it must be stressed – not only in restoration but by restoration.” Ibid. pp. 77-8. (Emphasis in the original).
A work of art, given its figurative nature, exists in a spatial autonomy that is the prerequisite of pure reality. Its spatial essence then inserts itself into physical space, the very space in which we live, and even intrudes into this space, without truly belonging there. This effect is not unlike that of the absolute chronology the work produces, [...] while representing an extra-chronological present [...].\textsuperscript{425}

This may seem clear for the case of painting, but, then the case of architecture needs additional discussion. The spatiality Brandi considered is the one belonging to the constitution of the image in the act of artistic creation. In order to distinguish different spatial moments for the CSA we can categorise them as existential spatiality, aesthetic spatiality and artistic spatiality, as seems to be suggested by Ingarden. The artistic spatiality would correspond to what Ingarden calls \textit{schematic formation}, which is the one intended by the creator as artist and to which all the other aesthetic concretizations tend.\textsuperscript{426} However, among the much possible indeterminacies in the work of architecture, the completion of the work by the observer leads to varied values, be they aesthetic or of any other kind.

\textbf{Identities in Manifolds}

Thus conceived, the identity of CSA transcends the manifold of presentations in which it can be perceived, especially in view of the intersubjectivity of the world in which architecture is essentially embedded; architecture is a public issue even when it is private. These manifolds are different manifestations of the same architectural object that CSA offers to consciousness in different ways of giveness. For instance, architecture can be intended as remembered, perceived, projected, designed, represented,

\textsuperscript{425} Ibid. p. 78. Chronology is \textit{temporality} and extra-chronological is \textit{extra-temporality} in the Italian original. Emphasis in the original.

\textsuperscript{426} Cfr. Thomasson, \textit{Roman Ingarden} ([cited].
imagined, enjoyed, suffered, and so forth. An example of this is the description Ingarden gives of the structure of the architectural work as two-layered; he stated that “the architectural work consists principally in its objectual stratum, in the spatial shape of the work’s body and the aesthetically valuable qualities attaining to appearance on the basis of that shape.”\textsuperscript{427} Therefore, he is intending a layer of physical presence and another of moments in the form of appreciated qualities. An analogous instance is Brandi’s account that physical medium and image coexist, being the former support of the latter.\textsuperscript{428} Medium and image are part of the same architectural object intended in dissimilar ways. An assumed real material building – whose existence is either perceived in the present, remembered in the past, or projected in the future – equally supports different concretizations of CSA.

A group of similar manifolds that reiteratively is manifested through certain buildings constitute a type. However, oppositely to the architectural work of art, the identity of CSA can be variable in time, being in constant becoming. According to Ingarden, certain types of buildings are culturally

\textsuperscript{427} Ingarden, \textit{Ontology of the work of art: the musical work, the picture, the architectural work, the film}, p. 269.  
\textsuperscript{428} Brandi, Basile et al., \textit{Theory of restoration} p. 49. In 1963 in the word \textit{Restauro} of the \textit{Enciclopedia Universale dell’Arte}, Brandi mentions again that “the matter is understood as that ‘that facilitates the epiphany of the image’. Brought again and limited to the epiphany of the image, it represents the splitting in structure and appearance.” Brandi, \textit{Il restauro. Teoria e pratica. 1939-1986}, p. 18. “[…] la materia si intende come ‘quanto serve all’epifania dell’immagine’. Riportata e circoscritta all’epifania dell’immagine, esplicita lo sdoppiamento fra struttura e aspetto.” (Our translation). Cfr. \textit{Enciclopedia Universale dell’Arte}, vol. XI (Venezia-Roma: 1963). pp. 322-32. According to Brandi, tectonics in architecture conditions the spatiality in the construction manifold but not in the aesthetic manifold. He denies that the architectural form pure and without ornament could have dignity as form, as in the case of architecture of the Modern Movement. Brandi, \textit{Elonica. III-IV. Arcadio o della Scultura. Eliante o dell’Architettura}, p. 191. Brandi seems to suggest that, as long as tectonics can guarantee the building structure without reinforcements on sight, it is fulfilling its function. Brandi, \textit{Elonica. III-IV. Arcadio o della Scultura. Eliante o dell’Architettura} p. 239.
established and therefore they suffer transformations. In the English language for instance, the word *church* reveals the evolution of a cultural term, sometimes referring to a building and sometimes to an institution. Moreover, the term is differentiated from other related terms such as chapel, oratory, cathedral, parish, and so forth, depending on characteristics such as history, use, adscription, hierarchy, and the like. These types of buildings configure cultural memory evidencing cultural practices, recalling the mentioned Greek notion of mimesis. Another example is the basilica, originally a public commercial and then administrative building, and later transformed into the temple to which it has remained linked as a type of CSA. (Figure 4-15, Figure 3-3 and Figure 4-17)

Figure 4-15 Ruins of the basilica in Pompeii, Italy. (http://flickr.com/photos/72213316@N00/345660545/sizes/l/)

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429 Ingarden, *Ontology of the work of art: the musical work, the picture, the architectural work, the film* p. 261.

430 *OED Online* ([cited].)
As an example, the complete reconstruction of areas of Warsaw after their destruction during WWII demonstrates recovering of CSA as a valid operation, founded not on an aesthetic intentionality, but on the rescue of cultural identity. The character of these concretizations is not the exclusive
result of an aesthetic attitude, but the distinction of different manifolds of more or less stable identities participating in the constitution of CSA. (Figure 4-18 and Figure 4-19).

4-18 Warsaw's Old Market Square, Poland, 1945. (Scan from 8 x 5 cm print from Marek Tuszyński's collection of WWII prints)

4-19 Warsaw's Old Market Square in its present state. (http://flickr.com/photos/hampshiregirl/300410855/sizes/l/)

Operating analogically with the case of the consecration of a church, Ingarden discusses the apprehension of the architectural work of art as
objectivity. Considering the example of a reconstructed building that had been previously destroyed, he states that the

[... destroyed building no longer exists today and can never be resurrected. On the other hand, on the basis of the new building we can see identically the same architectural work of art just as it was formerly [... as a work of art, [... In point of fact, the newly constructed building is different from the destroyed one in some details, so that the work of art attaining to appearance on the basis of this building is different in some respects from that which formerly came to appearance. [...] to be sure, all of these differences need not be, although they certainly can be, of essential significance for the work of art arising on the basis of the new building.]

This discussion illustrates the issue of authenticity as part of a manifold, which for Brandi is fundamental. Because of the historical instance, a reconstruction of architecture does not consider authenticity a value and therefore it is “not belonging to the field of restoration.” Therefore, for Ingarden, the architectural object is defined as an ontically relative object, whose double relativity connects creator and viewer through its physical shape and spatiality. In an ideal situation, the physical building allows both creator and aesthetically-prepared observer to intend the same part of the manifold – the work of art whose identity remains unchanged. The difference with CSA is that the intended concretization can be changeable and variable according to the individual and the context. It does not depend on an individually conceived object but on collective notions that, despite sometimes having uncertain beginnings, society constructs and develops in the form of shared values. Despite its changeability, the identity of CSA transcends through all the manifolds as the same thing.

431 Ingarden, *Ontology of the work of art: the musical work, the picture, the architectural work, the film*. p. 262. (Our emphasis highlights the significance of authenticity).
432 Brandi, Basile et al., *Theory of restoration* p. 69.
433 Ingarden, *Ontology of the work of art: the musical work, the picture, the architectural work, the film*. p. 263, 4.
The manifold proposed by this thesis follows the model of the categories deduced by David Smith Capon in his *Architectural Theory*, in which he suggested two sets – primary and secondary – of three interlinked categories. The primary ones are form, function and meaning; the secondary ones are construction, context and will. The manifold suggested here rests on an interpretation of that categorical distribution, considering each one of these categories as manifold aspects of architecture, which reveal distinct sides, aspects or profiles of the object. The phenomenological bracketing or thematization of each one of these elements would present differentiated views of the architectural work to the consciousness. (Figure 4-20)

![Diagram of architectural categories](image)

**Figure 4-20** The manifold of architecture interpreted from the categories of Smith Capon. (Own diagram, adapted from, Smith Capon, David. *Architectural theory*. 2 v. vols. New York: John Wiley, 1999. p. 4)

The examples offered in Section 4.2 reveal certain elements of the manifold as more apparent than others, according to the suggested intentionalities with which consciousness approaches them. (Figure 4-21)

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The emerging of these elements of the manifold does not necessarily mean that other elements are absent, but only that they are less apparent to consciousness. The relevant notion to consider is that architecture is not only form, not only function or not only meaning; it is composed of different manifold elements that come forward according to the attitude of the observer. In order for CSA to exist, having a shared view of architecture as something valuable within the social group is necessary.

**Presence and Absence**

For our particular issue, the interplay of presence and absence is relevant to intend architecture. It is given depending on the filling of the intentions that present CSA. If the intentionality with which consciousness approaches CSA finds its content confirmed in presence simultaneously with its perception, then the intention is filled and the intuition of the architectural object occurs; if instead it is not confirmed, the intention is empty. Time and space might be related in one way or another with the generation of empty intentions. For instance, looking for a building that cannot not be found,
produces its empty intention related with space, distance or location;
remembering a building already destroyed, produces a different kind of empty intention related with the former existence of a building. If people emigrate, and after a long period return to their original home, the intuition of that known architectural place is unfolded as a filled intention whose determination has to do with time and place. Examples of these intentions are anticipation and protention, (unfilled); intuition (bringing an object to presence), perception and primal impression (filled) or memory and retention (unfilled).

For the architectural work of art, Ingarden and Brandi emphasised the optical givenness for the unfolding of its intuitions. Brandi defines the optical givenness, saying that “the optical givenness is summarised in the recognition that the visual perception is always perception of something.”\footnote{Brandi, \textit{Teoria generale della critica} p. 277. “La datità ottica fondamentale si riassume fenomenologicamente nel riconoscimento che la percezione visiva è sempre percezione di qualche cosa.” (Our translation).} He sustains that there is an indivisibility of the object from the space, and consequently the irreflexive experience finds the space as discontinuous. This is originated by the fact that the part of architecture that is seen is perceived as present, whilst the part of the spatiality that is unseen is given as absent. The observer then is compelled to reconstruct the complete work moving through it, remembering it, imagining it, and so forth, in a constant flux of actualisations. Brandi states that the cultural evolution can be conceived as the transformation of the relations between discontinuous spatialities. This way he recognises two spaces: the inherent and the environmental.\footnote{Ibid. pp. 278-9.} He bases on this possibility the different
modalities of the optical *astanza*. However, the space of the work of art is not always coincident with the space pertinent to concretizations of CSA.

Brandi maintains that, the basic distinction between the opposition spatiality-space of painting and sculpture and the one of architecture, is the characteristic of architecture of not being an impenetrable block, of having an interior and an exterior in an indissoluble way, and belonging to the level of the expression, the level of the form.\(^{437}\) For Brandi, the first phenomenic characteristic of architecture is its being a transformation of the space in which it is inscribed, but remaining perfectly distinguishable from any natural object. The relationship of presences and absences concerning interiority and exteriority of architecture highlights the necessity to distinguish phenomenal interior from architecturally artistic interior. The architectural interior is the one that is afferent to the architectural form, not as part of the structure, but as a complete system in which interior and exterior is required. He gives the example of the interstitial space of the dome of St. Peter in Rome, which being a phenomenal space, is not an architectural space. He sustains that – even when the internal is visualised as internal and the external as external – it is the revealing of the external in the internal and the internal in the external that structure the form at the level of architectural expression.\(^{438}\) Thus in his definition of the artistic characteristic of architectural *astanza*, as presented in Section 2.3, Brandi gives extreme importance to the interplay of presence and absence of these two spatialities.

\(^{437}\) Ibid. p. 300.
\(^{438}\) Ibid. pp. 301-4.
However, the interaction of presence and absence is, for CSA, not only important from the visual point of view. Presence and absence can be combined in the same consciousness of CSA. Other senses can have an important role in distinguishing presences and absences of the manifold of which architecture is constituted. Many other elements contribute to the constitution of CSA, such as materials conferring particular smells, the texture and hardness of floors revealed while the building is explored, the temperature that changes with the shades, the sensed flows of breeze within and around the building, the echo of steps that reveals the breadth of the space, the evidence of attendance of other users in the form of murmurs, prayers and so on.

Differently to Brandi and Ingarden, whose interest is in defining precisely the notion of the architectural work of art, for CSA all these phenomenological sides are significant. CSA is given in particular ways that distinguish it from the pure architectural work of art, despite being the artistic one of its possible presentations. However, the noematic content of CSA may be sometimes richer in sensual variety and possibilities than architecture as a work of art, depending on the attitude of the receptors. It remains more open to the multifarious ways in which collectivity approaches its existential place, not being confined in its origin to the finding of an original schema. Moreover, the noematic identity of CSA is characterised by its collective nature, resulting in a sort of average temporal perception of architecture, whose identity is progressively and continuously constructed.
Conclusions

The ontological bases suggested by Ingarden seem consistent with Brandi’s notion of architecture as work of art. The different possibilities of being reveal ways in which architecture can be delivered to consciousness. Whether architecture is conceived as event, process or enduring object depends on particular ways of setting consciousness in order to apprehend it. These ways of being of architecture are more or less dense in noematic nuances. The way of being as object enduring in time gives a richer field of possibilities given its affinity with the human being and offers to consciousness different profiles that depend on the attitudes with which architecture is intended. For instance, CSA can be seen, with scientific curiosity revealing certain features that an aesthetic intentionality conceals, and vice versa. The building then, as the paradigmatic architectural object, acts as a support of possible concretizations of architecture configuring for CSA an identity that is flexible, despite having an intimate core, whose definition is tackled in Chapter 6. The formal structures of CSA reveal an architecture that is not only meaning, not only function and not only form. CSA has a rich manifold existence that is revealed according to attuned attitudes of groups of observers, depending on degrees and nuances of this collective cultural interpretation, within which the conservator is a rooted agent.\(^{439}\)

\(^{439}\) Before concluding, we should not ignore some criticism expressed to the ontology proposed by Ingarden. Concretely about the nature of cultural objects, it has been argued that, the dichotomy between the physical and the mental is problematic to define the status of cultural objects. Thomasson, "Ingarden and the Ontology of Cultural Objects." p. 129. Her argument seems not taking into account the distinction between cultural object as a material entity and the supported cultural concretisation.
consciousness towards the monument” is but an option among the many possible, and it should not be necessarily prevalent.440

Significant effects for conservation can be deduced from the suggested ontological structure. Their implications affect not only architecture as work of art but also the construction of cultural and social objectivities. The first one is that instances of CSA are temporal and thus significant for a conservation that develops in time, in contrast with Ingarden’s deduction about the architectural work of art as paradoxically extra-temporal.441 The second is that the work of art is a third order of concretization; therefore it is not only the result of an aesthetic intentionality in relation to the building, but also a special connection between creator and observer. As stated before, Brandi saw this phenomena as well as a connection with what he called universal consciousness.442 The third consequence is that the work of art being extra-temporal – consistently with Brandi’s aesthetics – cannot constitute a form of memory as other socio-cultural concretizations can. This is because it is revealing in its pure reality – astanza in Brandi’s terms – an existence out of time: parousia without ousia.443 Instead if memory, or in a wider sense temporality, is in some way embedded in architecture, it is because of its manifestation as CSA and not as a work of art, according to the proposed ontology. These conclusions are relevant to conceive CSA as a manifold of moments of existence, which finds its origins in the building. Ingarden has said that architecture is:


441 Ingarden, Ontology of the work of art: the musical work, the picture, the architectural work, the film. p. 282.

442 Brandi, Basile et al., Theory of restoration p. 49.

443 “parousia senza ousia” Brandi, Teoria generale della critica p. 133. (Our translation).
[c]reative because it is based on the invention (on a kind of artistic discovering) and realization or embodiment of new ‘forms’ – that is, shapes – and new qualitative harmonies, of shapes and harmonies that are new both in relation to the spatial form of rigid bodies found in nature, and in relation to the already invented forms of finished architectural works of art of earlier ages. Limited and made difficult by the laws governing heavy rigid bodies, architecture is also an expression and a result of humanity’s living together with the world of matter, one of humanity’s ways of making a home for itself in the world that makes human life easier, and that at the same time is a manifestation of humanity’s victory over matter, a sign of its mastery over matter and of matter’s subjugation to humanity’s ability to impose on lifeless matter forms that correspond in the highest degree to the human being’s intellectual life and emotional needs by satisfying his yearning after beauty and aesthetic magic.  

Architecture – as building, as work of art, and as CSA – finds in these words a synthesis that amalgamate together elements of its manifold. It is part of the real world inhabited by humans, created by them, by their techniques and against laws of nature, and perceived by them as representation of its time. These invented forms of finished architectural works of art can be conceived, for the purposes of conservation, as culturally significant forms constituting also a fundamental part of the cultural memory of society. The endeavour now is to apply this ontology of CSA to problematize the reception of change and the new within the existent, which largely is the essential concern of conservation, considering no less the fate of art – as paradoxical intemporal pure reality – in the context of this temporal attitude.

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444 Ingarden, *Ontology of the work of art: the musical work, the picture, the architectural work, the film* pp. 294, 5.
Chapter 5: Temporality and Assimilation: The Mnemonic Mode

The big-name architects can be very dangerous if they are not humble. Any architect makes a mess when he intervenes where there is no need for him to intervene. Where there is definite harmony, there is no need to add anything. Architects need to intervene in situations where there is damage, where there is the need to do something, where there is necessity. Not to do something for the sake of doing something.

Vittorio Sgarbi, 2004.445

The project for the exit of the Uffizi Museum in Florence by Arata Isozaki (Figure 5-1) has provoked controversy since it won the competition back in 1998. The public opinion and cultural officers – such as Sgarbi, quoted above – rejected the proposal of the huge pergola covering most of Piazza del Grano. Later in 2004, the project was suspended allegedly by the findings of medieval archaeological remains. After the social and political commotion, the architect was given time to make amends. However, without any changes to the project, a second go-ahead is given in 2006. Recently in August of 2008, the Minister of Culture Sandro Bondi disapproved it arguing that the pergola could not have a harmonic relation with the historical context.446 Similar cases to this are not uncommon in the practice of architecture, when society perceives a

conflict in the inclusion of new architecture in sites of CSA. This situation can
be observed even with projects that may affect recent CSA, as for instance it is
the case of transformations to architecture of the Modern Movement.
Conservators frequently protect architectural heritage arguing concepts such as
truth, objectivity, authenticity, scientific evidence, protection of the sources,
landscape integrity and so forth. On the other hand, contemporary architects
support their novel projects claiming artistic freedom, technological innovation,
expression of the zeitgeist, reinterpretation of history, among others. In this
context, what is the role that social memory plays as determinant of
conservation theories? Is memory’s social expression evolving to receive
changes to CSA in a better way? It is our contention that there are existential
stands that would more easily support architectural assimilation. The role that
contemporary postmodern conditions have in the change of Western culture is
definitive and although the thesis is focused in this context, architectural
conservation seems to be today a global attitude.

Figure 5-1 Winner project for the New Gate for the Uffizi Museum. Limited competition,
Florence, Italy. Arata Isozaki. (http://www.isozaki.co.jp/plans/)

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Architecture is practiced today by some of its leading figures as a postmodern avant-gardist art and by others in a very conservative way. The formers confront easily the status quo and the tradition as some scholars have suggested.\textsuperscript{447} Their projects demand from the public new modes of receiving architecture in the existent context. The architect is considered an artist interpreter of the spirit of the age, an individual able to express it through buildings almost as with language. There are several cases of this phenomenon, some more successful than others.\textsuperscript{448} On the other side of the spectrum, other architects emulate classical architecture in conservative fashion as the only one that recognises the values of Western society.\textsuperscript{449} Both tendencies represent in different manners contemporary attitudes in architecture that clash with some of the concepts that theories of conservation claim as their essential principles.\textsuperscript{450}

This chapter discusses memory as an attitude of assimilation to engage with architectural temporality. The point of departure is memory, but the arrival point is the description of collective human being conserving CSA. Assimilation is the selected term for this conflict that thrusts society – and conservators in particular – to admit the pertinent transformation of the valuable environment. While it could be argued if architecture is not always somehow assimilation of new into the existent, this problem is more evident when society is compelled to accept a sudden challenge in a determinate state.

\textsuperscript{448} The pyramid of the Louvre by Pei; the roof of the central space of the British Museum, and the reuse of the new Reichstag of Berlin by Foster; are examples of successful assimilations.
\textsuperscript{449} Some projects of Quinlan Terry, Terry Farrel, and Michael Graves are examples of this.
As already stated in Chapter 3, it is possible to address more than one kind of
intentionality towards CSA, nevertheless there are some essential attitudes that
configure it. Thus, this chapter focuses on memory as a privileged determinant
intentionality within the manifold of CSA. The discussion about memory in
relation with architecture should reveal why some conflicts between
conservation of CSA and contemporary architectural practice exist.

Section 5.1 “Memory as Temporal Intentionality” offers a
phenomenological exploration of memory at individual level focusing on its
capacity to assist the understanding of human temporality. The discussion tries
to relate memory with the particularities of the architectural place. It is mainly
indebted to a critical correlation of the work of Bergson, Ricoeur and Casey
with the architectural phenomenon, concerning the characteristics of
embeddedness and autonomy as characteristics of memory.

Section 5.2 “Memory and the Architectural Place” sets the elements that
constitute the material context of memory, the place in which this is given.
Consequently, the layer of the architectural place is added to the personal level.
This implies that architecture be recognised by the receptor as bearer of
relevant values – memories and recollection triggers in particular. The
phenomenon of CSA is constituted by historical assimilation of places and
times in a continuous overlapping of architectural strata, which seems the main
focus of heritage conservation. Five ways in which architecture can be
remembered and through which we can remember are suggested, according to
the ontological premises of the previous chapter.

450 It has been proposed also that architecture is able to represent or manifest national truths.
Since the architectural place in isolation is somehow limited to influence the multi-determined attitude of conservation, the phenomenological concern towards the others is needed. Thus, section 5.3 “Collective Architectural Memory” deals with the concepts of collective memory in the context of architectural assimilation of change. It is suggested that there are contradictions between some conservation theories and the concept of social reality, in particular with reference to its ability of assimilating the new.

Section 5.4 “Temporality as Creative Attitude” incorporates the findings from the correlation between memory and conservation as assimilation, suggesting possibilities of dealing in a creative manner with CSA in order to take care for existent valuable architecture and simultaneously not to hinder the constant becoming of the human architectural place. It establishes whether memory can still be considered as determinant of conservation of CSA given the postmodern condition or not.

5.1 Memory as Temporal Intentionality

But if the will of God has been from eternity that the creature should be, why was not the creature also from eternity? Who speak thus, do not yet understand Thee, O Wisdom of God, Light of souls, understand not yet how the things be made, which by Thee, and in Thee are made: yet they strive to comprehend things eternal, whilst their heart fluttereth between the motions of things past and to come, and is still unstable. Who shall hold it, and fix it, that it be settled awhile, and awhile catch the glory of that everfixed Eternity, and compare it with the times which are never fixed, and see that it cannot be compared; and that a long time cannot become long, but out of many motions passing by, which cannot be prolonged altogether; but that in the Eternal nothing passeth, but the whole is present; whereas no time is all at once present: and that all time past, is driven on by time to come, and all to come followeth upon the past; and all past and to come, is created, and flows out of that which is ever present? Who shall hold the heart of man, that it may stand still, and see how eternity ever still-standing, neither past nor to come, uttereth the times past and to come? Can my hand do this, or the hand of my mouth by speech bring about a thing so great?

What is realized in my history is not the past definite of what was, since it is no more, nor even the present perfect of what has been in what I am, but the future anterior of what I shall have been for what I am in the process of becoming.


Temporality as problem for phenomenological research is one of the most challenging for this discipline. In his The Phenomenology of internal time-consciousness, Husserl already referred to Augustine as the first “thinker to be deeply sensitive to the immense difficulties to be found” concerning this. 453 The difficulties for human temporal understanding are reflected in the angst of addressing the contrast between both a supposedly eternal divine temporality and a transitory human one, in Augustine’s words above. However, for Husserl the problem was to investigate the character of objects of perception, memory and expectation in Objective time first, to explore later “the conditions of the possibility of an intuition of time and a true knowledge of time.” 454 Although we are aware of the importance of perception and expectation for a complete sense of temporality, we focus the exploration on memory as a way to argue that conservation has been so far a non-comprehensive form of temporal intentionality. In fact, there is research that suggests that the muddle of memory, the sharp distinction between past and present is but a confusing fallacy. 455

454 Ibid. p. 23. We use Object as the translation of the German term Objekt and object for the term Gegenstand, consistently with the criteria of the translator.
Although, in philosophy it has been suggested that the most important issue in the problem of memory is the conjunction between external stimulation and internal resemblance. This makes memory significant for its opposition to imagination as the paradigm of the unreal, fictional or possible.\textsuperscript{456} This paradoxes, it is assumed, originate inconsistencies in the assimilation of the new into the existent because the new comes supported on fantasy to confront the security of the supposed truthful memory. Some theoretical disjunctions between conservation, memory and the rest of temporal consciousness are located in this other than simple process. The arrival of the new breaks the stable structure of the known present, compelling to reconfigure past and present in dialectic fashion. Merleau-Ponty describes memory as a continuous and never ending process of construction of the present through recollection of the past.\textsuperscript{457} A similar phenomenon might occur in the case of collective memory at a social level. The objective of this section is not to offer a complete outline of temporality and memory, but to look at some of its features as relevant to suggest better ways to take care of CSA.

**The Embeddedness of the Internal Time-Consciousness**

It appears that, the elements in the manifold of identity for the human being is constantly actualised and updated with the continuous movement between consciousness of the present and consciousness of the past. The past is accepted as gone, its knowledge may be constructed from within

\textsuperscript{456} Ricoeur, Memory, history, forgetting. p. 21.
consciousness in the present only by memory.\textsuperscript{458} Merleau-Ponty sustains that more than the perception of time as such, what human being experiences is organised in consciousness in terms of before and after.\textsuperscript{459} Thus, he claims that perception of inner time is related with experiences that are necessarily perceived by one self. However he says, consciousness is not only a series of experiences nor an eternal being. Thus, human consciousness is embedded in a body being trapped in a span of time whose limits – beginning and end – are an empirical reality. Consequently, he deduces that at least part of time – Husserl’s inner time – is subject-dependent.\textsuperscript{460} It has been argued that what Merleau-Ponty explains with his approach to temporality is objective time and not Objective time as a whole.\textsuperscript{461} He seems to focus on the categories of past, present and future, which are related to a subject and not in the sense of succession of events related by the categories of before, simultaneous and after, which are independent of consciousness awareness. The former categories are subjective since they are related to consciousness addressing time; the latter are not necessarily related with consciousness.

Bergson’s intuitions about temporality in his work \textit{Matter and Memory} develop the theory that “[...] memory is just the intersection of mind and matter.”\textsuperscript{462} His hypothesis is based on the premise that the universe is constituted by images. All human awareness of reality depends on the images

\textsuperscript{458} Cfr. Ibid. p. 413.
\textsuperscript{460} Ibid. p. 129. Merleau-Ponty is against the Husserlian notion of the subject receiving the present. He seems to suggest that if there is consciousness of time, it is always addressed by the subject, without any passivist attitude in it. Priest, \textit{Merleau-Ponty} p. 136. What appears to be behind this argument is an opposition to the acceptance of “an ultimate non-temporal ground of time.” That would be absolute consciousness, a temporal apprehension that is usually attributed to God.
\textsuperscript{461} Priest, \textit{Merleau-Ponty} p. 137.
that the body can convey to consciousness.\textsuperscript{463} Therefore, he suggests that memory performs a sort of phenomenological reduction of the perception of the world from which consciousness selects and discriminates what is of its interest and what is not.\textsuperscript{464} Although, what is relevant for us is that the representation of the material universe – consciousness about reality – is not supposed to have a different nature than reality itself. Consciousness is as emerged from that reality. In conservation, this is translated into the awareness that the architectural object and consciousness are parts of the same whole. Consciousness is embedded in the same world that it is addressing in order to conserve. The temporal abilities of consciousness move through time recalling and perceiving without always a sharp distinction.

Bergson explains how the interior self-awareness of our self, of our body, constitutes part of those affections we call – in Husserl terms – perception, memory and expectation.\textsuperscript{465} Perception then moves with the body in order to grasp the images that constitute reality.\textsuperscript{466} In this system, he finds memory playing a significant role in the interplay between space and time, between extension and duration, since

Pure perception [...] however rapid we suppose it to be, occupies a certain depth of duration, so that our successive perceptions are never the real moments of things, as we have hitherto supposed, but are moments of our consciousness. [...] the part played by consciousness in external perception would be to join together, by the continuous thread of memory, instantaneous visions of the real.\textsuperscript{467}

\textsuperscript{462} Bergson, \textit{Matter and memory}. p. 13.
\textsuperscript{463} Ibid. p. 18.
\textsuperscript{464} Ibid. p. 38.
\textsuperscript{465} Ibid. p. 58.
\textsuperscript{466} Ibid. p. 69.
\textsuperscript{467} Ibid.
Thus, memory would be an independent power that is not in the body but in a sort of spiritual agency. Bergson suggests that spirit is an entirely distinct reality than matter since according to him: “matter is [...] the vehicle of an action and not the substratum of a knowledge.” Thus, knowledge of time is not the result of a separation of consciousness from the object enduring, but the perceived image by the body – understood as an interface of consciousness – of the spiritual movement through time. Consequently, CSA stops emerging as object to become temporal environment, an architectural place.

Bergson defines the present time as a moment with at least a minimum duration. He questions

What is, for me, the present moment? The essence of time is that it goes by; time already gone by is the past, and we can tell the present the instant in which it goes by. But there is an ideal present – a pure conception, the indivisible limit which separates past from future. But the real, concrete, live present – that of which I speak when I speak of my present perception – that present necessarily occupies a duration.

His conception of the reality of time and space offered solutions for the doubt of the existence of that that cannot be perceived or recalled. The idea of

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468 Ibid. p. 74. Bergson recognised to human being the power to renounce to some parts of reality in order to achieve through memory other past parts of it. However, memory cannot be performed with the same strength all the time and this fact makes it fugitive. Cfr. Bergson, Matter and memory pp. 82-3. There is always the tendency to bring the intentionality back to the present in the expectancy of the future that existence implies.

469 Bergson, Matter and memory p. 137. This seems consistent with the observations of Husserl about the perception of internal time consciousness. Cfr. Husserl, The Phenomenology of internal time-consciousness. Especially Section One. This intuitions seem also confirmed in environmental psychology where the term specious is taken from. Gibson said, “The stream of experience does not consist of an instantaneous present and a linear past receding into the distance [...] There are attempts to talk about a ‘conscious’ present, or a ‘specious’ present, or a ‘span’ of present perception, or a span of ‘immediate memory,’ but they all founder on the simple fact that there is no dividing line between the present and the past, between perceiving and remembering. A special sense impression clearly ceases when the sensory excitation ends, but a perception does not. It does not become a memory after a certain length of time. A perception in fact, does not have an end. Perceiving goes on. Perhaps the force of the dichotomy between present and past experience comes from language, where we are not allowed to say anything intermediate between ‘I see you’ and ‘I saw you’ [...] Verbs can take the present tense or the past tense. We have no words to describe my continuing awareness of you, whether you
Bergson confers time with certain thickness or speciousness in which no matter whether it goes by it will not stop existing, as matter does not stop existing when it is not being perceived. He suggests that “[...] the brain, insofar as it is an image extended in space, never occupies more than the present moment: it constitutes, with all the rest of the material universe, an ever-renewed section of universal becoming.”

This means for him that “[...] every perception is already memory. Practically, we perceive only the past, the pure present being the invisible progress of the past gnawing into the future.”

This seems confirmed by studies of environmental psychology that suggest that the difference between past and present may come from the impossibility of language to express continuing awareness. The identification of the borderline between perception and memory is explained in similar terms by Merleau-Ponty.

The recognition of the past through the presence of matter is impossible, for Bergson, in beings that evolve with certain freedom, the past is only obtained through the spiritual work of memory. From Bergson’s point of view, matter cannot remember the past, cannot become memory, since its

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470 Bergson, Matter and memory, p. 149.
471 Ibid. p. 150. According to Bergson, all this discussion reveals a metaphysical problem. “This problem is no less than that of the union of soul and body. It comes before us clearly and with urgency because we make a profound distinction between matter and spirit.” Bergson, Matter and memory p. 180.
472 Merleau-Ponty states that, “To remember is not to bring into focus of consciousness a self-subsistent picture of the past; it is to thrust deeply into the horizon of the past and take apart step by step the interlocked perspectives until the experiences which it epitomizes are as if relieved in their temporal setting. To perceive is not to remember.” Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of perception p. 22. (Our emphasis).
473 Cfr. epigraph in Section 3.2.
vocation is to be always present. Architecture from this perspective inherits certain humanised or spiritualised characteristics that make it, in its physical embodiment, deposit of re-enacting memory. This discussion can again be conflated with the one of mimesis as memory of past cultural practices, in which architecture demands constant interpretation through inhabitation.

The Transformable Relation Noesis-Noema

Greek philosophy distinguished two main kinds of memory, namely memory and recollection. Ricoeur has arisen the issue of memory as a form of true knowledge stating that “when the affection is present but the thing is absent, what is not present is ever remembered.” In conservation of CSA, this can turn into a paradox since even when architecture is not present but it is remembered, the remembered can be merged with the imagined. Purely intentional objects concretized from an existing building can amalgamate the remembered with the imagined. Architecture should be conserved elucidating which parts of its manifold belong to memory and which ones to imagination. For Ricoeur the relevant issue in the problem of memory is the conjunction between external stimulation and internal resemblance. Although in architectural conservation intentionality, this refers to the kind of intentionality that is addressed towards architecture. It becomes even more relevant whether the conservator has actually known the architectural object or only a memory of

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475 Bergson, Matter and memory p. 249.
476 Ricoeur, Memory, history, forgetting pp. 26-7. Ricoeur locates in the capacity of consciousness of addressing itself towards a recent past, and intend its sinking back without being conscious about it as something different from the now. In this way, he detaches the idea of present with the identification of presence. Ricoeur, Memory, history, forgetting p. 33. We will come back to this in Chapter 6. For the moment, it seems that consciousness has a double mechanism in which retention stores memories and reproduction delivers them.
477 Ricoeur, Memory, history, forgetting pp. 15-7.
it. For that purpose, a further phenomenological analysis is suggested in Section 5.2.

Conservation is not given as an affection of memory – as pathos; it looks more like the model of recollection, as an active search. Conservation in this sense attempts to keep the authenticity of the past in the content of its intention. A noematic analysis of memory would describe characteristics of the intentional content. This for CSA implies not only its particular mode of being but the environmental memories of the context that surrounds the architectural object, the time of the remembrance, the occasion, and importantly all the aspects that define the world of the rememberer; her bodily presence, sensations, movements and moods. Memory is conceived as an image from the past whose true evidence should emerge without recurring to fantasy. Casey divides the noematic part of memory in two: the mnemonic presentation, or what is remembered (specific content, memory-frame and aura); and the modes of givenness, or how the mnemonic presentation is given (clarity, density, texturality and directness). For the memory of architecture, we can think in the first group as the memory of parts of architecture, according to the phenomenological description developed in Section 4.4, whilst the second correspond not only to the qualities of the object remembered, but also to qualities of the intentional act itself.

478 The context of conservation as temporal intentionality and its ambition to be truthful arises the problem of the conservator considering herself giving testimony of the past when in reality she is interpreting the past. Her noesis is moved by certain purpose that is scientifically, historically, aesthetically and existentially determined. However, the fact that the distinction exists between the two kinds of memory means also that conservation is not a primordial level of temporal intentionality, but that it includes other components. This theoretical distinction has a significance that will point to the foundation of conservation in Chapter 6. In any case according to Ricoeur “[t]o memory is tied an ambition, a claim – that of being faithful to the past.” Ibid. p. 21.
In architectural memories, the gradient of temporal distantiation relates again to the concept of mimesis as the calling to inhabit the architectural place in specific ways. As suggested before, in the mimesis that CSA demands to be inhabited, this becomes crucial because the more temporal distance from the present architecture there is, the more filtered the interpretation of the way of inhabitation will be. Commemorative monuments represent a special case in the establishment of social rituals, traditions and cultural practices. Monuments from this point of view include for instance temples, museums, royal palaces, seats of power, and so forth.

In the context of CSA, the pair persistence/pastness becomes significant, since memory is the consciousness of an architectural object originated in the past but which persists in the present, and this means that the distance between past and present is discernible in the present moment. A relevant connection with this is the aspect of the couple actuality/virtuality. Casey has said

It is but a short step from pastness to actuality. For the past is populated with actualities – with what has actually been the case. We remember just this: former (and sometimes still surviving) actualities. [...] What we recall is finished to the point of possessing a certain minimal coherence or intelligibility; otherwise, it is not identifiable as a memory, a memory of something in particular that has happened. [...] This presence is first-person presence, the only kind of presence in which actuality is experienceable and hence rememberable. 480

In this sense, the actuality of memory calls for self-presence. In Section 5.2, we outline a phenomenological scheme to locate some possible cases.

Virtuality instead is understood as the aspect of memory that lets the

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480 Ibid. pp. 41-2.
rememberer intuit “a readiness of former experiences to be reactivated.” In the apprehension of CSA, this involves the sense of missing something that did not survive time. Conservation of CSA is differently approached, not only depending on the theoretical frame that guides the intervention, but also on the temporal relationship between conservator and architecture.

Memory implies, as we have seen, not only the remembered but also the rememberer, namely the relation between noema and the noesis. If for the case of CSA, the architectural object constitutes the remembered, the rememberer instead is always the first person who recalls or is affected by the memory. Memory is not given in abstract isolation, it is always embedded in the world of who remembers. The ways in which memory can be performed or given, as search and as affection is very varied. The features discussed here are a selection that singles out the capacity of memory to transform the apprehension of the past. Since time keeps flowing, we remember each time from a different temporal position so to say. This locates the present – as in the comet’s image of Husserl’s explanation – in the head of a comet that may constantly see a different image of the past. The illusion is that the past changes; however the past has to remain past, what does change is its concretization.

If this appearance of the past always changing is the case for memory as intentionality of time, it seems necessary a revaluation of its role within conservation of CSA. Theories of conservation in its modern form seem to consider material architecture as deposit of memory. However, the paradigm of the event, appearing as fixed image in its non-endurance, seems too limited to

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481 Ibid. p. 42.
482 Husserl, *The Phenomenology of internal time-consciousness* p. 52.
be considered the object of conservation of CSA. The concretization of architecture in the mode of process, although being a more complex mode of being, presents a flattened surface in which just one thread can be identified as the architectural aim of conservation. It changes form in every stage without sense of sameness. The last considered possibility is the object enduring in time, in which we have assumed not only a single core of identity preserved during all its existence, but a manifold of layers to be constituted around this core according with the intentionality. Although this has defined for architecture a more complete ontological structure, in which we have recognised even humanised qualities, its noematic expression in memory is still a relation between a subject and an object. We develop this notion of a humanised object further in Chapter 6.

Casey describes what he calls the thickness of remembering as the involvement of memory in “the very thick of things.” This involves the embeddedness we mentioned before as “the interpenetration of remembering into the world around us and of this world itself into our remembering.” Moreover, the awareness of a world that includes CSA begins with a body that is rooted within the architectural place. The collection of memories and recollections starts since childhood and from the spaces that we inhabit. If we are able to recognise CSA, it is because a long chain of temporal experiences entrench in architectural place have been accumulated within consciousness. We learn or not to appreciate it, we are taught or not to identify it, and we are cultivated or not to take care of it. The question arises, how could

483 Casey, Remembering, a phenomenological study p. 264.
we transform the past? The past depends on our position on the present. It is true, we cannot change the past, but if we are at the comet’s head, we may have certain autonomy to influence its movement, changing the past that we are leaving behind. It seems that we can change the past and the present is always a definite given.

5.2 Memory and the Architectural Place

Just as imagination takes us forward into the realm of the purely possible – into what might be – so memory brings us back into the domain of the actual and the already elapsed: to what has been. Place ushers us into what already is: namely, the environing subsoil of our embodiment, the bedrock of our being-in-the-world. If imagination projects us out beyond ourselves while memory takes us back behind ourselves, place subtends and enfolds us, lying perpetually under and around us. In imagining and remembering, we got into the ethereal and the thick respectively. By being in place, we find ourselves in what is subsistent and enveloping.

Edward Casey, Getting back into place. Toward a renewed understanding of the place-world, 1998.

One definition of the term nostalgia describe it as the “sentimental longing for or regretful memory of a period of the past, especially one in an individual's own lifetime” and also “sentimental imagining or evocation of a period of the past.” Although, what the description hides and the etymology reveals is that the term was formed with the Greek words νόστος, meaning the returning to home, and αλγία, which means pain. The also called homesickness – considered sometimes as a medical condition – reveals the dominant link between human memory and architectural place. It could be

484 Ricoeur highlights the importance of construction for inhabitation. Cfr. Ricoeur, Memory, history, forgetting p. 150.
486 “nostalgia”. The Oxford English Dictionary (Draft Revision June) OED Online, (Oxford University Press, 2008 [cited 20 August 2007]); available from
suggested that when a supposed memory lacks this specific location, intentionality might belong more to the region of imagination than to that of memory. Less arguably we can say with Casey that “memory is naturally place-oriented or at least place-supported.” If that is the case then, the characteristics of the inhabited place to which memory is always anchored acquire particular significance.

The noetic and the noematic characteristics of memory that we have selected cannot be understood as abstract qualities without an adequate context surrounding the movement of consciousness. Just as consciousness is always consciousness of something and remembering is always remembering something, the memory of that something is always anchored to somewhere. The philosophical survey of Casey about the significance of place seems to offer this conclusion. However, the characteristics of this place can be further investigated. Already in Chapter 4, we mentioned the connection between natural environment and manmade environment. What we did not emphasise enough is that – rewording the motto of Terentius – architecture is human, so nothing human is strange to it. Within the manifold of which architecture is constituted, the simplicity or complexity of its different elements is always configuring the human place. Human can inhabit in the most basic or primitive conditions, however there is always an interaction with the environment in the forms of intervention, permanence and care. This configures what Casey calls place, and we are consequently referring as the architectural place. Thus seen, the architectural place is not a different sort of place than that where human

being inhabits, but a different concretization of it, from which CSA emerge and on which conservation is nowadays performed. The analysis of this architectural place vis-à-vis temporal intentionality should reveal the more or less pertinence of conservation as memory in its present form.

**Memory Places**

Ricoeur considers that place memory and commemoration, which we discuss in Section 5.3, are not out of the sphere of conscious intentionality “but reveal its nonreflexive dimension.” He states that “[i]t is indeed at this primordial level that the phenomenon of lieu de mémoire – places of memory – is constituted before they become reference for historical knowledge.”

Place memory is a concept with particular importance to further structure collective memory. It is possible to consider it as the scenery of the social memory, the story to which it is tied. Nevertheless, it has been observed that place has been continuously overlooked from the studies of memory due to the preponderance of temporality as a more essential aspect of memory. Despite this omission, its significance has not been completely ignored, since Pythagorean and Aristotelian traditions recognise the importance of place. The Cartesian concept of site – “place as levelled down to metrically determinate dimensions” – has a lot to do with the demotion of place and its substitution for

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487 Casey, Remembering, a phenomenological study pp. 186-7.
489 Cfr. Casey, The fate of place a philosophical history.
the concept of site. With thinkers such as Issac Newton, René Descartes, and Daniel Bernoulli – Casey argues – “space was conceived as continuous extension in length, breadth and width and, thus, as mappable by the three-dimensional coordinate system of rational geometry.” On the other hand, it has been suggested that each memory looks for its particular place to be linked to. Accordingly, it seems that individuality is what allows reinforcing the memorability of place.

It is the stabilizing persistence of place as a container of experiences that contributes so powerfully to its intrinsic memorability. An alert and alive memory connects spontaneously with place, finding in it features that favor and parallel its own activities. We might even say that memory is naturally place-oriented or at least place-supported. Moreover, it is itself a place wherein the past can revive and survive; it is a place for places, meeting them midway in its own preservative powers, its ‘reservative’ role. Unlike site and time, memory does not thrive on the indifferently dispersed. It thrives, rather, on the persistent particularities of what is properly in place: held fast there and made one’s own.

Since ancient times tradition has endowed place with distinct potencies: genius loci, Lar of the home or spirit of a place. These myths reveal the importance given to the place as bearer of significance. Although as result of Enlightenment, the concept of place space suffered a simplification through rationalisation that took away any metaphysical attribute from it. The question arises; could the shift from collective memory to historical knowledge be deduced from the connection between, on the one side rational geometrical space and chronological time, with, on the other side, lived time and lived space? Is it possible that conservation of CSA is entrapped in the middle of this impasse? Conservation of CSA has attempted since Enlightenment onwards to

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490 Casey, Remembering, a phenomenological study p. 184.
491 Ibid. pp. 184-5, 89.
be only scientifically truthful, but at the same time, it still may invoke values that go beyond the simple determination of exact time and precise space. The aim of conservation applied to CSA demands to reveal what is its essential nature and which values has embedded within, in order to perform actions to take care of it. The significance of place for the concept of memory can be inferred from the description of lieu de mémoire offered by Nora

Because, if it is true that the fundamental raison d’être of a ‘lieu de mémoire’ is to stop time, to block the effort of oblivion, to fix a state of affaires, to immortalise death, to materialise the immaterial [...] enclosing the maximum of sense in the minimum of signs, it is clear then –and this is what renders them fascinating – that the ‘lieux de mémoire’ do not live but because of their capacity to metamorphose, in the incessant reprocess of their significations and the unpredictable splitting of their ramifications.\textsuperscript{494}

This view could be supported with the argument that the perceptual power of the body and its need to seek orientation, anchors experience in place, and help to anchor this memory.\textsuperscript{495} The long path, from the primordial body memory to the symbolic complexity of the lieux de mémoire, implicitly bears inhabitation.\textsuperscript{496} All possible memory is phenomenologically intended dwelling somewhere, about somewhere, or about something situated somewhere.\textsuperscript{497}

Memory and place have also been compared as symmetrical. Accordingly, a modern function ascribed to memory is the containing

\textsuperscript{494} Nora, Les lieux de mémoire p. 38. “Car s’il est vrai que la raison d’être fondamentale d’un lieu de mémoire est d’arrêter le temps, de bloquer le travail de l’oubli, de fixer un état des choses, d’immortaliser la mort, de matérialiser l’immatériel pour [...] enfermer le maximum de sens dans le minimum de signes, il est clair, et c’est ce qui les rend passionnants, que les lieux de mémoire ne vivent que de leur aptitude à la métamorphose, dans l’incessant rebondissement de leurs significations et le buissonnement imprévisible de leurs ramifications.” (Our translation).

\textsuperscript{495} Cfr. Ricoeur, Memory, history, forgetting p. 41.

\textsuperscript{496} In reference with the significance of body memory in relation to inhabitation, cfr. Ibid. pp. 147-53.

\textsuperscript{497} A significant aspect is that of the expressiveness of the memorability of place. Casey underlines the idea of nostalgia in relation to place. Cfr. Casey, Remembering, a phenomenological study. p. 201.
function. Casey affirms that “[t]he place/memory parallel assumes still further forms which we can designate under the headings of horizon, pathway, and constituent things.” However, he warns against trivialising time in the concreteness of place reducing it to the mere expression of objective time. He comments Bachelard’s observations about the pre-eminence in memory of location over time

If Bachelard is [...] correct about the nature of memory, not only is narratizing of secondary interest but the idea of remembering as re-experiencing the past is rendered moot, including Husserl’s claim that ‘we can relive the present [even if] it cannot be given again.’ Also contested is Heidegger’s view in Being and Time that Dasein achieves authenticity only in a resolute repetition or its past. Could it be that authenticity lies instead in the very spatiality which Heidegger makes into a mere function of temporality?

Three threads seem derivative of this argument. One that at this point should be clear for us is that, as it also can be deduced from Ricoeur, the importance of the link between Cartesian space and Objective time with memory and place is a relevant connection for historic knowledge. We have sustained that conservation of CSA, as it has been conceived until very recently, belongs to an attitude that aims to objectify architectural place. Conservation has been approaching architecture as alien to the existential human condition considering it as event, process or object enduring in time. We discuss more about this connection in Section 5.3. Conservation has taken CSA as container of memory in its matter, when matter would only be the support for memory to emerge, embedded in the inhabitation of the familiarity of the city and the intimacy of the house.

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499 Ibid. p. 203.
The second refers to the emphasis on the intimate relation for consciousness between memory and place. The sterile determination of Objective time shows – in contrast with the location of time-consciousness that memory involves – an almost complete lack of existential significance for human experience, except for the scientific attitude and its consequent values. However, conservation of CSA, as practiced nowadays, is especially difficult when it needs to deal with human inhabitation and the human perception of its architectural place. The parts and the qualities of architecture are not merely matter in time. They offer sense of origin, belonging, destiny and structure of activity to the human being, at not only individual level but also especially in collective life. We discuss this dimension in the next Section 5.3. The third thread is the possibility of other interpretation of the human condition in its juncture of architectural place and existential time. We postpone such an endeavour until Chapter 6.

**The Cases of Remembered Architecture**

Temporal intentionality needs to be addressed by consciousness towards something, it is not passively received. This implies effort and movement that in conservation becomes work of interpretation of architecture. Phenomenologically, architecture, and specifically CSA, can be considered for memory in a twofold sense. First in the noetic sense, architecture participates of the consciousness’ process of intentionality. It supports, facilitates, triggers and eventually keeps memories. In the noematic sense, architecture belongs to the object of remembrance. CSA as noema is the aim for conservation to recover, protect and preserve. The object of modern conservation has been CSA in its
noematic presentation, therefore as content of consciousness. However, this content of conservation as temporal intentionality can be varied according to the relative temporal relationship between conservator’s consciousness and CSA to conserve.

Consciousness remembering architecture is situated in the present. In correspondence with its flowing experience of time, it has three cones that define the possible horizons of experience. These horizons as we have seen do not have sharp limits but a blurry overlapping. One looks in expectation towards the future, another narrowly addresses the present of perception, and the third looks towards the past in recollection. They define the possible temporal experience of consciousness in relation to architecture in different ways. Accordingly, it is possible to individuate at least five temporal cases of remembered architecture.

The first case is when consciousness remembers architecture that was both built and destroyed in the past, beyond its horizon of experience. The support to concretize this noematic content is by reference, never a relived perception. This mode is usually amalgamated with imagination. It is not pure memory in the strict sense of the term. Because of its temporal distance in the past, the appearance in memory can be similar to the event, or a part of a process. The noesis of this memory is analogous to the concretization of purely intentional objects, in which similarly to the Brandian astanza it calls into pure existence something that is absent. Consequently, the possibility to conserve this architecture in its material form is by reconstructing it, constituting a new

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501 Sometimes the effectiveness of this memory – the happy memory in Ricoeur terms – rests in belief.
building that can merge with the past one. The manifold of this architecture necessarily brings new elements and abandons others.

In the second case, the building began its existence beyond the horizon of the past but finished its existence within the cone of the present-past experience. This case supposes an observer remembering architecture because she experienced it, and she may have witnessed the building’s destruction. In this case, the definition of the noematic content of architecture depends on the temporal distance between the end of the building’s existence and the present of the experience of remembering; if it is short, the memories can be very rich; but if the distance is long, architecture start to lose many dimensions and appears mnemonically flattened as an event. Conservation of this case is also by the means of reconstruction. However, its reconstruction can rescue parts of the old building in order to bring some elements of its constitutive manifold to life again.

The third case is the one of architecture that having the beginning of its existence in the past and beyond the horizon of experience of consciousness, accompanies the existence of the rememberer’s consciousness until the present perception. The content of this remembered architecture may merge easily with the environment given its pervasiveness in the experienced time. Even if the building is transformed in time in drastic forms, its memory may seem wrapped in the familiarity of the everyday. This case of remembered architecture is similar to remembering a person in which one recalls certain features – expressions, gestures, voice, attitudes, and so forth – according to the occasion of the memory. The memory of this architecture can be very familiar as well,
since in general terms this is most of the architecture that accompanies the existence bringing sense of place, belonging, identity and stability. If this case of remembered architecture is CSA, its conservation may deal with the interests of several stakeholders. The manifold constituting this CSA can be very complex, since it may embrace the coincident cone of existence of many people and its conservation demands the complete evaluation of its existent manifold considering its evolution in time.

The memory of a building whose existence starts within the cone of experience of the observer and that continues to exist in the present is the fourth case. As in the previous one, its noematic content is embedded in the present existence of the observer; however, depending on the temporal distance of its coming into existence, it can be experienced either as something new that collides with the status quo, or as architecture that has started to be assimilated. The collection of memories of this case establishes a sort of middling that usually facilitates assimilation. The interplay of the noetic processes of this case and the previous one constitutes the main part of the dialectics between existent and new, tradition and innovation, standard and revolutionary, conservative and progressist, and so on. This memory of architecture is easily related with the one of building as activity, in which the processes of creation, construction, and inhabitation may be distinguished. Conservation of this case of CSA is similar to the previous case depending on the distance of its creation. The reconstruction of architecture that does not exist anymore constitutes with its coming into existence a new instance of this fourth case, since it is a new building, although supported on the memory of a previous one.
The fifth case of remembered architecture is the one of a building whose existence started and finished within the cone of experience of consciousness. Always depending on the temporal distances between its start, its end and the present of consciousness, the content of this memory can be either precise and sharp because of a short existence, or similar to the cases two, three and four. If architecture in this case constitutes CSA, its conservation implies reconstruction. The cases previously described are illustrated in Figure 5-2.

![Figure 5-2 The five cases of remembered architecture. (Own diagram)](image)

This phenomenological schematisation makes a reduction only of the time dimension, thus analysing only the temporal relationship between consciousness and architecture within a cone of existence. The analysis can be helpful to describe the real possibilities of encounter with architecture and the ways to remember it, knowing that in any case none can experience all the
existent architecture. Additionally to the cases of architecture as an object enduring in time, some possible memories of architecture as a process or as an event can be described as synchronic or diachronic noemata. The physical and temporal existence of a work of architecture, moreover CSA, is rarely sharply outlined. The mnemonic cases analysed here offer a phenomenological schema in which consciousness approaches architecture in isolation. However, conservation is a social activity that should never be performed in individual form, so the implications of memory from a collective point of view demand additional reflection.

5.3 Collective Architectural Memory

[when society becomes too different from what it had been in the past and from the conditions in which [determinate] traditions had arisen, it will no longer find within itself the elements necessary to reconstruct, consolidate, and repair these traditions. Society will then be obligated to adopt new values, that is, to rely on other traditions that are more closely in tune with present-day needs and tendencies. But it is within the framework of these old notions and under the pretext of traditional ideas, that a new order of values would become slowly elaborated.


One of the most relevant issues in phenomenology nowadays is not only the concerns for analysis of intersubjectivity, but also the actual existence of collective intentionalities. Whether we talk about collective memory as an existing entity or as a useful linguistic metaphor is matter of discussion.503 The assumption of the existence of collective architectural memories demands to take a provisional stand on this regard. Within the theories that consider the notion of a group mind, two main strands of conception of collective memory

have been distinguished. One considers collective psychology and the other the notion of the superorganism. Congenial with the theories of Halbwachs – author of the seminal work *On collective memory*, and who developed importantly this notion – are the theories within the first group. One of these theories is the social manifestation thesis, “[…] a thesis about how some psychological capacities are manifested only in certain kind of social circumstances.”

Architecture and its ways of being remembered and incorporated within the collective memory play a significant role in the construction of the world-view of human groups. In discussing collective memory then, it is important to precise *who* and *how* remember in the phrase: we remember.

Ricoeur has explored relevant issues in the manipulation of memory in search of identity, individual and collective, as well as the level of ethico-political level. However, our endeavour cannot provide the comprehensive view that all the nuances that architectural memories have in the configuration of the complete social exercise of memory. Instead, this section presents the links that join the individual architectural mnemonic intentionality with the collective intentionality that constructs CSA. Ricoeur emphasised the paradox of the obligated memory questioning

‘[...] how can it be permissible to say: ‘you must remember,’ hence to speak of memory in the imperative mood, although it is characteristic of memory to emerge as a spontaneous evocation, hence as pathos, according to Aristotle’s *De memoria*?’

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504 Ibid.: p. 229.
505 Ricoeur, *Memory, history, forgetting* pp. 80-6.
506 Ibid. p. 87.
He connected the possibility of direct memory and the notion of heritage to the ethical aspects of justice and debt in “[t]he duty of memory [as] the duty to do justice, through memories, to an other than the self. [...] We are indebted to those who have gone before us for part of what we are.” Despite the relevance of these ethical concerns, this thesis argues that the construction of CSA begins even before than the possibility of directing or manipulating memory, that is to say in the sources of our tacit knowledge. In a similar way as the architectural place establishes a definite connection with consciousness’ memories, apprehension of CSA results from the social construction that is partly founded on the temporality of collective inhabitation.

**From the Ego to the We**

A crowd of tourists visits a temple in function to appreciate its artistic and cultural treasures. As they enter in the architectural place, they may notice not only a building but also a particular environment, an ambience. Architecture conditions the air, quality of light, level of noises and echoes, textures, materials, colours and decoration, creating an atmosphere. There may be other people within, maybe believers performing rituals. Suddenly the tourists do *behave* in a certain manner, and if not, they may notice their transgression of an order. How do people know that, in presence of certain conditions in the architectural place, one – for instance – must keep silence, not shout, walk slowly? This knowledge seems acquired by gradual social exposure to the life in commonality; nevertheless, the process to accumulate the memories that construct this is a complex one. In Section 5.2, we mentioned a

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507 Ibid. p. 89.
sort of middling that was produced within consciousness in which memories of the inhabited places are accumulated. Something analogous may occur for the concretization of collective memories of CSA, producing the gradual acceptance of cultural significance of certain buildings or architecture with particular characteristics.

The link between individual memory place and collective memory about CSA seems ordered by the performance of modes of memory that imply some progressive inclusion of social interaction. For instance, the mnemonic mode of reminding that induces the *remindee* to something that he could otherwise forget includes both, the individuality of the practical use and the possibility of a collective dimension. In the individual dimension

> [t]o remember a future commitment is to presume, but not necessarily to recall, a past event of committal. [...] The reminder is thus a point of connection between past and future, a *Janus bifrons* which is apprehended in a present moment situated *between* the past of engagement and the future of enactment.\(^{508}\)

In its collective variety, this mnemonic mode is the one asked by monuments, in which society is admonished to remember. This connects with the ethical and political aspects highlighted by Ricoeur lines above. Monuments establish a link between a presupposed past – that can even be unknown by the rememberer – and a future moment of remembrance. Since much of CSA is constituted by intended monuments, this mnemonic mode in its collective form already suggests the existence of social memory’s performance in the form of a commitment to remember.

\(^{508}\) Casey, *Remembering, a phenomenological study* p. 93.
Ricoeur has located the primary link between individual and collective memory in language, to be precise in narrative.\textsuperscript{509} This seems related to the mode of memory of reminiscing, which is remembering with others. The passivity of reminding has been contrasted with the activity of reminiscing; the subject remembers or recollects something, but reminisces about something. Some of the characteristics of reminiscing are significant in the context of CSA as process or content of memory. For instance, the presence of \textit{reminiscencia}, – or objects that in some way survive from the time of the memory being reminisced about – is fundamental for triggering recollection of architecture.\textsuperscript{510} Casey has developed the communal-discursive aspect of reminiscing suggesting that the company of others somehow favours it. This is of particular importance in the path from individual architectural memories towards their collective dimension. It has been stated that

\begin{quote}
Whether those present be relatives or friends, or mere acquaintances or even strangers, they must all share to some degree the experiences being reminisced about. For what evokes and sustains reminiscence is the possessing of certain common or like experiences. […] the reminiscer and those who are co-present with him or her need not have had literally the same experiences.\textsuperscript{511}
\end{quote}

From his analysis, he extracts two corollaries: the first is that reminiscing is mainly addressed to others; and the second is that reminiscing is most fully realized in language.\textsuperscript{512} The relevant fact for the concretization of memories of CSA is the connective role of reminiscing between the intimacy of the individual and familiar architectural place, and the public life that other modes of architectural memories imply. The sense of place, identity and

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{509} Ricoeur, \textit{Memory, history, forgetting} p. 97.
\textsuperscript{510} Casey, \textit{Remembering, a phenomenological study} pp. 110-12.
\end{flushright}
belonging or their later evolutions and transformations seem necessarily originated at this primordial stage.

Commemoration is defined as remembering with others through the mediating role of something else and in a special social occasion. This something else can be texts, traditions, rituals, special visits to historic places, and so forth in which the explicit or implicit existence of CSA is at play. Because of this social involvement, it is at this stage of the collectivisation of memory that the architectural place starts to be perceived as CSA. If architectural place shall be considered the scenery of collective memory, commemoration should then constitute the script. Casey underlines the importance of the others in this form of remembering when one feels that we remember instead of I remember. One leaves the privacy of the private architectural place to access the public space in the solemnity of this kind of recollection. The individual mnemonic place is abandoned and instead consciousness recalls through the mediation of ritual, words and the presence of others. Casey calls commemorabilia to the elements whose role is as a mediating vehicle to remember people or events – the participant may have not known them – but through which it is possible to participate. Architecture in this context sometimes has the role of commemoration’s container and sometimes as part of commemorabilia itself. Monuments, temples, tombs are examples of this.

For ritual in commemoration to take place the following constituents have been suggested: “[... ] an act of reflection or an occasion for such an act

512 Casey, Remembering, a phenomenological study. p. 116.  
[...]; an allusion to the commemorated event or person [...] that precedes or sanctions the ritual itself [...]; bodily action [...] and collective participation in the ritualistic action [...].”

Additionally, solemnisation, memorialisation, and perdurance are found within the significant factors in commemoration rituals. The most relevant element to consider in this form of memory is perdurance, not only as part of commemoration, but also as a concept at the core of conservation of CSA. The possibility to intuit perdurance in CSA is fundamental in the support of adequate environments for commemoration. As it has been observed, this is a concept that Western thought has ignored in some measure.

The reason for this neglect doubtless lies in the fact that reflection on time has focused on the extremities of ‘time’ and ‘eternity.’ Eternity connotes an intelligible, wholly fulfilled order of being, while time in contrast, signifies something degenerate, fleeting, and opaque to intelligence. Indeed time may come to be regarded as the mere ‘image’ of eternity, its ‘moving likeness (eikon)’ in Plato’s phrase.

The importance of commemoration is crucial for the construction of collective memory and the creation of identity as cultural patterns of inhabitation, and not as still images of the past. It constitutes a gathering of uses that enter in the constitution of the mores in society. Commemoration constitutes an important ingredient in the structure of social values implicit in architectural conservation, which are independent from history but run parallel to it.
Collective Memory as Mechanism of Assimilation

Halbwachs has presented collective memory as a flexible interpretation of the past. It could be argued that there are some experiences whose memories are independent of society even when “it is in society that people normally acquire memories”\(^{518}\). The primordiality of individual architectural memories to which we referred in the previous section is sometimes given, by necessity in a social environment, but without the social involvement of the rememberer. One of the noteworthy issues that Halbwachs arises in his account of the notion of collective memory is the idealisation of the past in the sense that society seems to consider it as a better age to live than the present.\(^{519}\) This idealisation and the fact that humans feel more connected with people of similar age sharing perspectives and interests happen in society in general but in special manner within the family.\(^{520}\) Significance and meaning of family thoughts are achieved by finding cohesive elements.\(^{521}\)

He presents family’s collective memories as flexible interpretations of the past. These interpretations imply changes and incorporation of new parts constructed with the intention of making them understandable to the novice members.\(^{522}\) Nevertheless, the phenomenon is also observable in society.\(^{523}\) This correlation explicates the gradual shift that conservation is experiencing resulting from a process of ‘social communalization’ (§58, 132) We certainly do not encounter the word ‘common memory’ in this broadened context of transcendental phenomenology, but it would be perfectly in harmony with the concept of ‘worlds of culture,’ understood in the sense of ‘concrete life-worlds in which the relatively or absolutely separate communities live their passive and active lives.” (§ 58, 133).” Ricoeur, Memory, history, forgetting p. 118.

\(^{518}\) Halbwachs, On collective memory p. 38.
\(^{519}\) Ibid. p. 48.
\(^{520}\) Ibid. p. 52.
\(^{521}\) Ibid. p. 54.
\(^{522}\) Ibid. p. 75.
\(^{523}\) Ibid. pp. 86-7.
through a new conception of it that would allow its legitimisation in the present
world.\textsuperscript{524} Halbwachs also observes the phenomena of social integration of new
values into old structures of social classes with a practical objective. The
epigraph of this section explains this phenomenon. This happens in the
development of conservation theories to support the reconstruction of the past
in order to have integrity within society’s view. This is a fundamental part of
the equilibrium in human society to function as a place that fulfils aspirations
to its members, even when the cost can be the \textit{falsification of the past}.\textsuperscript{525} He
suggests the existence of a rational activity that completes collective memory.
This collective memory functions as a framework to anchor the reflection of
the past and the rational activity controls the adequate connections of past with
present.\textsuperscript{526} Conservation in this scheme is part of this mechanism that organises
the idea that society has of its past. Conservation would even influence the idea
of what to consider CSA in the collective memory accordingly to its changing
values.\textsuperscript{527}

This means that the manifold of concretizations that architecture
produces can be gradually adapted and transformed creatively to generate
coherence in the complete socio-cultural environment. The double relativity of
memory that refers to the viewer and the material support, allows the
possibility of social participation in the construction of the collective memory
leading to its assimilation. This suggests that in the ontological foundation of

\textsuperscript{524} Ibid. p. 156.
\textsuperscript{525} Ibid. pp. 182-3.
\textsuperscript{526} Ibid. p. 183.
\textsuperscript{527} This interpretation could make clear the gradual shift that conservation is experiencing
through a new conception of it that would allow its legitimate performance in the present world.
Ibid. p. 156.
CSA exists a constant field of action in which architects, conservators, users, viewers, and the like, can act and operate.

The concept of collective memory has been evolving and nowadays it is being reevaluated because of the apparent compression of the interval between past and present.\textsuperscript{528} It seems that the epistemological shift from memory to history – already mentioned in Chapter 3 – is analogous to the transition from personal to collective memory.\textsuperscript{529} Collective memory and history are not similar things as could mistakenly be supposed.

Memory is life, always taken by living groups and by this reason it is in constant evolution, open to the dialectic of remembering and amnesia, unconscious of its successive deformations, vulnerable to every use and manipulation, susceptible to long expectations and sudden revitalisations. History is the reconstruction always problematic and incomplete of that that is no more. Memory is an always actual phenomenon, a lived link to the eternal present; history, a representation of the past.\textsuperscript{530}

This position may seem extreme to some scholars, however the mechanisms to have memories and recollections through architecture at collective level is what is relevant for this thesis.\textsuperscript{531} It seems apparent that CSA bears a manifold of values and among them collective memories and recollection triggers. How collectivity establishes what memories are to be preserved and forgotten is less obvious, because of the fear of annihilation of the physical references for collective identities. Actually, Ingarden described as

\textsuperscript{528} Cfr. Ricoeur, Memory, history, forgetting p. 297.
\textsuperscript{529} This seems to be the conclusion that can be inferred from the phenomenological approach that Ricoeur does concerning memory. Cfr. Ibid. pp. 21-55.
\textsuperscript{530} Nora, Les lieux de mémoire. pp. 24,5. “Mémoire, histoire : loin d’être synonymes, nous prenons conscience que tout les oppose. La mémoire est la vie, toujours portée par des groupes vivants et à ce titre, elle est en évolution permanente, ouverte à la dialectique du souvenir et de l’amnésie, inconsciente de ses déformations successives, vulnérable à toutes les utilisations et manipulations, susceptible de longes latences et de soudaines revitalisations. L’histoire est la reconstruction toujours problématique et incomplète de ce qui n’est plus. La mémoire est un phénomène toujours actuel, un lien vécu au présent éternel ; l’histoire, une représentation du passé.” (Our translation).
incomprehensible the transition from being to non-being.⁵³² This explains why, in the assimilation process, it is more difficult for society to admit the cessation of the existence of CSA than to accept its transformation into something changed or new. In the context of this apprehension towards the end of the existence, conservation should emerge as a form of caring for the environment that confers a stable architectural place to society, a temporal intentionality that aimed to make apparent the elements of the manifold of CSA that require actions of preservation.

The discussion about the autonomy conceded to memory is conflated with that of the truth that is sought in it and as consequence in proposals of conservation of CSA. Casey has argued that

Despite our propensity for subjecting recollection to the passivist paradigm of the photograph, recollecting itself is hardly an unactive affair. It models the past rather than merely remodelling it, and to be able to do this is to be autonomous [...]. Recollecting [...] deals with past actualities, which it transforms rather than simply transmits. The transformative work of recollection belongs to a complex circumstance in which effort and resistance, recasting and re-viewing, are all in play. [...] The delaying power points instead to a model in which the past provides the very depth of memory, yet is continually reshaped in the present. Rather than being a simple stockpile of dead actualities [...] the past ‘begins now and is always becoming.’ In short, the past develops, thanks to the delaying action of remembering.⁵³³

If memory is then accepted as a determinant of conservation, attitudes regarding assimilation of the new should evolve in order to learn how and when to receive it. Consciousness about the constitutive manifold of architecture can increase the ability of society to configure past concretizations in healthy and creative ways. For all this, our contention is that memory has to remain as an integral part of conservation intentionality. However, conclusive

⁵³² According to him, humans are leaned to see this more as transformation than as cessation of being. Cfr. Ingarden, Time and modes of being pp. 34-5.
⁵³³ Casey, Remembering, a phenomenological study p. 275. (Emphasis in the original).
methods would depend on the conception of architecture as a manifold of architectural objects. As seen in Chapter 4, CSA is a manifold of entities, some of them anchored in the same physical and material whole, but others constructed from the individual and collective consciousness. Among these, there are memories, aesthetic values, symbols, and so forth. If conservation intends to deal with them it needs to understand their essential nature. As spectators with a life limited between birth and death, the decaying of CSA shows us the passing of time. It works as a constant memory of the past, but also a reminder of our future: a naturally limited human future.

5.4 Temporality as Creative Attitude

[...] whenever we remember and in whatever way we remember we get a different past every time. [...] remembering makes a very considerable difference in how we relate to the past. [...] We regain the past as different each time.

Edward Casey, Remembering, a phenomenological study, 1987. 534

The Templo Mayor in Mexico City was reconstructed at least seven times over the previous version every 52 years approximately. It could be suggested that the concretization of the temple was the same but in a renewed mythical cycle. 535 Certain Japanese Shinto shrines, such as Ise Jingu, are done having in mind that they need to be rebuilt every regular period of years in an

535 We do not attempt here to suggest that an equivalent concretisation in Aztec civilization could be understood as Western’s concretisation of the same temple, but that consciousness had as their filling the same temple and not a different one. Temporal intentionality varies from culture to culture and in relation with Aztec temporality is interesting to note that “[t]he idea that one can understand the actions of people from another culture in their own ideological terms arises from the undeniable fact that values infuse everything and, in that sense at least, we do not have an objective understanding of the world but a conceptually constructed one that is best explained from the vantage point of that culture.” Ross Hassig, Time, History, and Belief in Aztec and Colonial Mexico (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2001) p. 48.
immediate next site reserved for that purpose. The shrine keeps its identity in this constant renewed being the same. These buildings not only were but also they became all the time. Given these examples of concretization of CSA in relation with temporality and change, and if there has always been insertion of new buildings in contexts of CSA, the question arises, how is the attitude toward architectural transformations in the Western world after the arrival of the Modern Era? Moreover, how could insertions be considered in the postmodern conditions nowadays? Until recent times, these renewing interventions were cases of the former activity of maintenance and adaptation of the architectural place. As suggested in Chapter 3 after the impulse of the Enlightenment, the inclusion of the new in the old acquired different importance because of the changes in the historical consciousness and its meant objectivity. Modern conservation as temporal intentionality was originated with the purpose to protect this objectivity.

Nevertheless, as Voegelin has said “[i]n the illuminative dimensions of past and future, one becomes aware not of empty spaces but of the structures of a finite process between birth and death.” Beyond these two points, we cannot have experience. Thus, to explain that beyond we have to recur to symbols, myths, philosophies or rational and scientific explanations. From that point – he argues – a bad philosopher would try to reduce the plurality of the process to a single one; a good philosopher would try to rationalise the myth as a tool to speculate. Voegelin states that when the symbolical language has

538 Ibid.
been exhausted and does not match with the symbolised, civilization is in crisis. He then legitimises the tabula rasa as something required to develop a new symbolism. He states emphatically that “protesting against such a new beginning in the name of tradition is nothing more than a symptom of spiritual sterility.”539 This can be considered as a radical measure, however there may be other paths of assimilation towards a more complete consideration of human temporality.

From Myth to Social Ontology

Before the Humanism of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment that followed it, the mythical dimension of the explanation that Western civilization had about its place and its time provided society with a more stable perception of its architectural place in equilibrium and continuity. Changes and transformations were slowly assimilated in periods of several generations with the help of collective mechanisms such as the one described by Halbwachs.540 This situation helped consolidate the collective memory inherited through time. Nevertheless, another implicit kind of knowledge is suggested that humans develop on the grounds of their nature.

The structure of tacit knowing [...] shows that all thought contains components of which we are subsidiarily aware in the focal content of our thinking, and that all thought dwells in its subsidiaries, as if they were part of

539 Ibid. pp. 81-2.
540 The importance of the incorporation of myths as part of the explanation of the architectural reality and the privileged notion of science as the more adequate explanation has frequently been highlighted. The intention here is not to give a historical account of that process of concealment, but to speculate on the process in which this has happened in human consciousness. For different perspectives on these matters, cfr. Alberto Pérez Gómez, Architecture and the crisis of modern science, 400p + vols. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1990), Julia W. Robinson, “Architectural Research: Incorporating Myth and Science,” Journal of Architectural Education 44, no. 1 (1990), Dalibor Vesely, Architecture in the age of divided representation the question of creativity in the shadow of production, xviii, 506 p. vols. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2004).
our body. [...] Thinking is not only necessarily intentional, as Brentano thought: it is also necessarily fraught with the roots that it embodies.\textsuperscript{541}

Polanyi sustained that “[t]hought can live only on grounds which we adopt in the service of a reality to which we submit.”\textsuperscript{542} The knowledge that human has of its architectural place is then acquired in the everydayness of the interactions between life and architecture, as part of a natural process, and not always as conscious activity.\textsuperscript{543} Polanyi explains how different levels of tacit knowing exist in which “[...] operations of a higher level cannot be accounted for by the laws governing its particulars forming the lower levels.”\textsuperscript{544} An instance of this chain in the context of CSA is the one that goes from techniques to an architectural work of art, in which the technical and pragmatic level of tectonics cannot explain the mimetic level of the distribution of the building, and this mimetic level cannot explain the epiphany of the work of art. This chain of ontological emergences from one level to another can also be compared with the linking of different levels of social constructions that Searle proposes.

\textsuperscript{542} Ibid. p. xi. This discussion seems comparable with the social ontology suggested by Searle discussed further on, which he bases in the meaningful dimension of language. Cfr. Searle, \textit{The construction of social reality}. However, Polanyi includes a different aspect suggesting that “[w]e know more than we can tell.” Polanyi, \textit{The tacit dimension.} p. 4.
\textsuperscript{543} In this sense, his arguments seem consistent with the social ontology developed by Searle; however, his notion of tacit knowledge seems more connected with Searle’s idea of the background. Polanyi, \textit{The tacit dimension.} p. 4. This background has features that allow humans to interpret the structure of consciousness, motivate interest, facilitate readiness, and dispose behaviours. Searle, \textit{The construction of social reality} p. 139. On these grounds, he defends external realism – the fact that there is an external reality independent from any representation of it – as part of the necessary background to understand utterances, reality is then an assumption that we take for granted. Searle, \textit{The construction of social reality} p. 178. Realism is the claim that “reality is radically nonepistemic.” Opposed to Putnam who says – attacking realism – that “[t]ruth is supposed to be radically nonepistemic.” Searle, \textit{The construction of social reality} pp. 233-4. (Emphasis in the original)
\textsuperscript{544} Polanyi, \textit{The tacit dimension.} p. 36.
Searle builds up his theory to prove that all our presuppositions are based in the tacit acceptance of external realism, where representation is independent from the represented, establishing an ontology for social reality founded on a sequence from the physical to the social. As suggested in Section 5.2, human society obtains this meaningful structure since childhood when “[t]he complex structure of social reality is, so to speak, weightless and invisible [,] [t]he child is brought up in a culture where he or she simply takes social reality for granted.” Searle distinguishes two kinds of objective-subjective opposition. One is given in the epistemic sense and the other in the ontological sense. The epistemic is exemplified by opinions or judgments, whilst the ontological is referring to entities and type of entities. The epistemic notion of architecture as CSA is socially configured supported on public opinion and by the ontological sense of architecture as part of the material world, configuring the sensations that human perceives from it. These two senses combine in the construction of social entities like monuments, architectural heritage, World heritage, and so forth.

Searle explains the distinction between intrinsic and observer-relative features of the world saying that,

Observer-relative features are always created by the intrinsic mental phenomena of the users, observers, etc., of the objects in question. Those mental phenomena are, like all mental phenomena, ontologically subjective; and the observer-relative features inherit that ontological subjectivity. This ontological subjectivity is acquired from the experiences in the first social environment – the family – and evolves as tacit knowledge in the

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This distinction is correlative with Ingarden’s modes of existence discussed in Section 4.1.

system of signification. Since he founds this system in the capacity of language to signify, he sustains that collective intentionality cannot be considered simply the summation of individual intentionalities.\textsuperscript{548} For him, there should not be a false problem in considering the existence of collective intentionality since

\[\ldots\] it has seemed that anybody who recognizes collective intentionality as a primitive form of mental life must be committed to the idea that there exists some Hegelian world spirit, a collective consciousness, or something equally implausible. \[\ldots\] It has seemed \[\ldots\] that we have to choose between reductionism, on the one hand, or a supermind floating over individual minds on the other.\textsuperscript{549}

Significantly, and detaching from these two extremes, what seems to emerge is a field where human creative intentionality is able to concretize CSA. Collective intentionality works in accordance with precedent traditions, with intimate and familiar perceptions, with public opinion, but also with individual participation. Let us provisionally call this field \textit{cultivation and care}.\textsuperscript{550} This region of human life was filled in pre-modern times with myths, religions, traditions, mores, and so on in a meaningful system that was more or less stable. Nevertheless, modernity and later post-modernity brought rupture and unbalance leaving that field to be filled with consumerism, fashion, unprecedented mutation. Cultivation and care to create and preserve CSA as a meaningful architectural place appeared delayed.

By claiming, “language is essentially constitutive of institutional reality” the deduction is that to have institutional facts society needs language

\textsuperscript{548} Ibid. pp. 24-5.
\textsuperscript{549} Ibid. p. 25.
\textsuperscript{550} We introduce the terms of cultivation and care, not in exactly the same meaning given by Heidegger to care. We detail the sense we give to these notions in Chapter 6. Instead we call this region according to Heidegger’s definition of the “[…] ‘whither,’ which makes it possible for equipment to belong somewhere, and which we circumspectively keep in view ahead of us in our concernful dealings […].” Heidegger, \textit{Being and time} p. 136.
and each institution needs linguistic elements.\textsuperscript{551} Even if it could be argued that, this is not the only way to produce social facts, as Brandi would suggest for the phenomena that fall out of the sphere of flagrance and signification, that is to say the work of art. Those institutional facts require language also because language is epistemologically indispensable; these facts need to be communicable; they are extremely complex so they need to be represented; and they resist in time independently of the participants.\textsuperscript{552} For us, the relevance of Searle’s theory is the establishment of a structure of the socially constructed reality in relation to the ontological apparatus that builds up the notion of CSA and its conservation as an institutional fact. Social reality results in values that give some kind of power to other social objects or actors that acquire hierarchy. The nature of the power that is given in this way to CSA seems related directly to temporal intentionalities in the form of memories, perceptions and expectations. So far, CSA as social object has focused on both the pastness of memories and the patrimonial of heritage. However, humankind does not only need to remember or to possess, it needs an architectural place to live in. The inclusion of this possible social reality within the \textit{aspectual shape} of the manifold of CSA seems imminently indispensable. Creative collective intentionality in the identified region of cultivation and care seems to be a plausible option.

\textsuperscript{551} Searle, \textit{The construction of social reality} pp. 59-60.

\textsuperscript{552} In fact, he presumes that “[t]he Y status can be imposed on several different ontological categories of phenomena: people […]; objects […]; and events.” Ibid. p. 97. This refers back to the same categories established by Ingarden in his ontology. Methodologically he tries to simplify saying that “we have nothing but the ability to impose a status, and with it [also] function, by collective agreement or acceptance” demonstrating that institutions need: initial creation, continued existence and official representation. Searle, \textit{The construction of social reality} pp. 112, 15. However, it would be a radical understanding of this theory of social ontology to suppose that everything that is shared in collectivity is the result of a possible
Changing Fulcrum

The need to conciliate conservation of CSA with the existential architectural place has been emerging in the form of the illustrated conflict between new and existent since even before the consolidation of the Modern era.\(^{553}\) We have argued, at the beginning of Section 4.1, that all architecture is necessarily in some way assimilation of new into the existent; however, this process is all the more apparent nowadays when the threat to socially established cultural environment is immediate. The question arises as, how would it be possible to reconcile at least these two aspects of the architectural manifold, let alone the significant issue of the manifestation of architecture as art? How does conservation intentionality need to evolve to accept changes and transformations in the architectural place in a better way? Moreover, when the architectural artistic object may constitute an integral part of the human dwelling place the reduction of the perception of architecture to mere knowledge, historical data, or intellectual information makes of it not only an alien object but also an obstacle to future cultural evolution. Modernity demanded distance from the past; nevertheless, it also implied a degree of negation of it. The past became, then, the object of study and not the blurring origin of a process that continues. The complete rationalisation of the relation


\(^{553}\) Alberti complained about that kind of phenomena when he wrote: “I call Heaven to Witness, that I am often filled with the highest Indignation when I see Buildings demolished and going to Ruin by the Carelessness, not to say abominable Avarice of the Owners, Buildings whose Majesty has saved them from the Fury of the most barbarous and enraged Enemies, and which Time himself, that perverse and obstinate Destroyer, seems to have destined to Eternity.” Leone Battista Alberti, *L'Architettura (De re aedificatoria)* (Milano: Edizioni il Polifilo, 1966) p. 869-70. Quoted and translated in Jokilehto, “A history of architectural conservation. The contribution of English, French, German and Italian thought towards an international approach to the conservation of cultural property” p. 18.
of society with its heritage has been until very recently the main agenda of the modern approach in conservation.

At this point, the correlation of how Ingarden conceives architecture seems relevant to suggest conservation as theoretically consistent with the assumed CSA at its basis. He finds the concrete architectural work as the resultant of different factors and perspectives stating that

The architectural as such is based on this unitary coherence in a transparently clear disposition of all the visible moments of various origins that participate in the work, the moments connected with the spatial form constituting the foundation of every architectural construction. An architectural work of art in the pure sense of the term thus forms something like the only possible solution of an equation with a certain number of ‘unknowns’ (in the mathematical sense), so that all details of the form unequivocally result from the selection of these unknowns and of the equations formulated, which determine the reciprocal relations of the unknowns.\textsuperscript{554}

Ingarden proposes this definition of architecture as a work of art; nevertheless, if we associate the architectural work of art with CSA, the purpose of its conservation should be to regain this coherence of moments. It seems consequent that, since time continues to flow, the historical, social and cultural conditions change and therefore the \textit{equation} has to be constantly reformulated to find the possible solution to the transformed system. These conditions imposed in a first moment on architecture by society, are sought after in the form of values linked to collective memories. These memories change but never in a definitive way.

Scepticism and fear are ingredients of the new conditions of post-modernity. The importance of certain forms of art for the construction of memory and the confrontation of man with time has been underlined, stating

\textsuperscript{554} Ingarden, \textit{Ontology of the work of art: the musical work, the picture, the architectural work, the film} p. 291.
that, “[...] visual arts confer perpetuity, as they come to preserve at least a semblance of eternity [that] is part of their appeal: they help banish the terror of time.”\textsuperscript{555} In this confrontation with the passing time, human being is obligated to consider his physical end. Nevertheless, this burden has to be overcome with a sense to be found outside of the perception of time as a destructive force.\textsuperscript{556} Therefore as pinpointed in Section 3.4, the receptor of CSA has started to be considered the main fulcrum of conservation. The contemporary concern is whether it is possible to preserve values, whether is it possible to conceive values and meaning separately to the CSA that bears them. The intention should be to conserve while recovering values without compromising others; might there be conflicts between values the choice should be determined by the cultural context.\textsuperscript{557} This cultural context cannot avoid considering receptors, users, and stakeholders.

One of the threats of the shifting away from the extreme rationalisation and objectification of CSA is the relativisation of its entire manifold. The architectural manifold – as analysed in Chapter 4 – is subject of different concretizations, however that does not imply its detachment from its ontological support. An example of this risk is the idea that in contemporary theory of conservation “[t]he authority that people have on heritage objects [...] derives from, and is proportional to, two closely related factors: their contribution to the overall significance of the object and their being affected by the object’s alteration.”\textsuperscript{558} Although, this plausible position is based on the

\textsuperscript{556} Ibid. p. 226.
\textsuperscript{557} Fancelli, \textit{Il restauro dei monumenti}. pp. 202-205.
mislead notion that “truth is only desirable when and because stakeholders desire it, not necessarily because it is an abstract moral imperative.”

Although it is true that the interests of conservation of CSA on the dwellers have to be taken into account, to discuss about truth seems delicate if we do not consider the ontological constitution of the architectural place.

According to studies, the nature of the debates about assimilation varies from acceptance to refusal and “[t]he greater the turmoil caused by transformation, the greater the need for anchors to culture as a reaffirmation of identity in the face of globalizing and homogenizing influences.”

Scholars have noted that assimilation does not necessarily mean conflict and loss of identity, mainly if the big projects sponsored by big institutions or the state are considered. As an example, the urban solutions presented in Berlin after the reunification of Germany have been explored precisely in terms of spatial memories and their social implications. Huyssen finds there a revaluation of making history and its constructive consideration has underscored the shift from the former importance given to the past to the significance with which nowadays the present is considered. He states that “[s]ince the 1980s, it seems, the focus has shifted from present futures to present pasts.”

In general, the postmodern condition in conservation is full of ambiguities. A complete “pictoralisation of space and time” that hinders a reform of the social order has

559 Ibid. p. 192.
561 Erik Cohen in Ibid. p. 48.
been suggested.\textsuperscript{563} It has been argued that after the break of modernism in architecture

contemporary reevaluations of ‘history’ have crushed any redeeming sense of tradition. By now, traditions have been so thoroughly ‘invented’ or homogenized, and ‘history’ so absolutely marked or commodified, misrepresented, or rendered invisible, that any oppositional potential rooted in collective memory has been eclipsed completely.\textsuperscript{564}

Given these postmodern conditions in the theoretical debate of conservation, in which the lack of mythical explanations that sustain identity and the importance of the users, is it still attractive to keep conservation as a temporal intentionality focused on memory? Does society really require the pathos and the praxis of memory through conservation of CSA? An interpretation of what actually means to dwell today could suggest some answers.

**Conclusions**

Architectural perception in time apparently belongs to two different worlds. The first is the one of matter and the other is the one of humanised memory to be re-enacted. Architectural mnemonic power then is revealed through the mimesis that inhabitation suggests with the variants that the thickness of the present world demands. This memory is born from the body memory that is always one with the architectural place. It offers shelter to selfness because in confront with a past that “begins now and is always becoming,” it remains humanly persistent; memory does not stop there in a past

\textsuperscript{563} Boyer, *The city of collective memory its historical imagery and architectural entertainments*. p. 3.

\textsuperscript{564} Ibid. p. 5.
event, it is always being built.\textsuperscript{565} The succession of architectural memories – from the intimacy of the family home up to the shared space of the collectivity – supports the social environment, which promotes cultivation and care. These tacit memories of significant architecture have been gradually ignored in conservation, giving preference to the determination of Objective time and Cartesian space. This becomes problematic in conservation of CSA when inhabitation is involved. Consequently, it seems that if memory is accepted within the theoretical manifold of conservation, attitudes should evolve in order to learn how to assimilate transformation. Individual and social constructions in the form of values, memories, symbols, and so forth acquire relevance in the constitution of a meaningful architectural place that conservation of CSA should support. However, the post-modern conditions nowadays present considerable challenges to actions of conservation given its plurality and the rapidity of changes.

Conservation of CSA should not be an uncreative activity; it may creatively develop an identity for a past anchored in the present. This identity is plastic and malleable and recognises both extremes: a blurred and uncertain beginning and the running present. Conceiving conservation detached from memory would make it a rigid institution trying to solidify what is naturally fluid. If instead memory is accepted, attitudes concerning assimilation should evolve in order to learn to receive creatively the new. This does not imply endorsing irreflexive postmodern trends of everything goes. It means that

\textsuperscript{565} Casey, \textit{Remembering, a phenomenological study} p. 275.
conservation has to be open to the transformation of the image that we have of the past. It is our contention that memory has to remain an integral part of the theoretical manifold of conservation. Nevertheless, this implies the acceptance of the nature of memory and therefore asks that society – in particular conservation theoreticians and practitioners – improves its understanding of what and how we conserve. This effort has to be addressed for instance in the social education about memory, heritage and the architectural place; in the research about the conditions of collective memory of involved cultural groups; and in the ontological analysis of the objects of conservation. If the past is not an essential part of the present, the stable idea that society has about it is challenged and society needs remembering creatively. This perennial effort has to be considered under the light not only of objective determinants – as it has been the case so far – but also taking into consideration the intersubjectivity that a lived world implies, a world lived in society. The understanding of these conceivable intentionalities starts to be evident in the gradual shift in some recent trends of conservation attitudes. However, an interpretation of human existence in its juncture of architectural place and existential time opens a territory where pure phenomenology – à la Husserl – seems limited to deal with the problems of memory, temporality and conservation of CSA and a hermeneutic approach is required. Decisive concerns about the intersubjectivity of being-in-the-world urge at this point our attention.
Chapter 6: Architectural Hermeneutics: On the Place and Time of Human Existence

Narrative and construction bring about a similar kind of inscription, the one in the endurance of time, the other in the enduringness of materials. Each new building is inscribed in urban space like a narrative within a setting of intertextuality. And narrativity impregnates the architectural act even more directly insofar as it is determined by a relationship to an established tradition wherein it takes the risk of alternating innovation and repetition. It is on the scale of urbanism that we best catch sight of the work of time in space. A city brings together in the same space different ages, offering our gaze a sedimented history of tastes and cultural forms. The city gives itself as both to be seen and to be read. In it, narrated time and inhabited space are more closely associated than they are in an isolated building.


It seems that the model suggested by Bergson – mentioned since Chapter 2 in occasion of memory in matter as a form of mimesis, and later in Chapter 4 supporting the embeddedness of the rememberer in the matter of the world – in which consciousness is as one with the world that it navigates, is, after the explored individual and collective phenomenologies, more pertinent than expected. The Husserlian distinction between consciousness and object has allowed us to suggest a setting for human beings within which they are conscious of their constant becoming in time. Having a past, present and future they are supposed to exist in Husserlian terms.567 However, for conservation of architecture, the centre of gravity of temporality has been situated preferably in the past, sometimes in the present but rarely in the future. Temporality as a whole for human existence has been considered in that context. Probably more importantly than any other philosopher, Heidegger started to question, not so much the relation between human being’s consciousness and time, but the existence of human being as temporality and, in a broader sense, Being as

temporality. Thus, instead of recurring to the so far used generic term human being, we employ in this chapter Heidegger’s concept of Dasein that supposes human being as the place of disclosure of Being, as a being-in-the-world that breaks with the paradigm subject-object to emphasise rather its embeddedness. Thus, we attempt to illuminate the relation between Dasein’s temporality and architecture considering also interpretations of this relationship in the context of conservation.

The place where Dasein dwells is conformed by nature and architecture. This all-embracing environment constitutes the only possible dwelling and the only horizon that can be perceived. Gadamer has stated that “[...] a hermeneutical situation is determined by the prejudices that we bring with us. They constitute, then, the horizon of a particular present, for they represent that beyond which it is impossible to see.” Thus, as a sort of trace or inscription – as Ricoeur suggests in the epigram above – the architectural place discloses readable structures as part of these prejudices that Dasein persistently carries.

568 Some scholars have already suggested alternative existential stances to Heidegger’s in relation to existential space or place. Cfr. Sylvain De Bleeckere, “The transcendental origin of architectural space” (paper presented at the Proceedings of the Conference: Architecture + Phenomenology, Haifa, Israel, 2007). De Bleeckere contrasts the postures of Bollnow and Heidegger, suggesting that the former engages in a more optimistic and creative way the condition of existential spatiality than the one of the latter. Cfr. also Kolb, Postmodern sophistications philosophy, architecture, and tradition. Kolb declares that “Heidegger did not understand the need for travel and dialogue across places because his philosophical commitments forced him to evaluate the contemporary multiplicity of discourses as a degenerative rather than creative condition.” So according to him Heidegger prefers “to explore our roots in depth rather than encounter the Other.” Kolb, Postmodern sophistications philosophy, architecture, and tradition p. 152. Heidegger’s philosophy is also frequently disqualified by some scholars due to his association with Nazi ideology. We would argue that his way of approaching philosophy does not finish necessarily in fascism. Instead, his existential philosophy is to be reconsidered under the light of that of other philosophers, such as Sartre, Merleau-Ponty and Ricoeur. The resurgence that Gadamer represents in order to continue two nowadays un-privileged tasks is valuable for this thesis: the ontological project of defining what being is – especially for us, the being of architectural place – although arguably ideologically misleading in some Heideggerian manifestations; and the consideration of human
These structures are neither static nor fixed. They evolve along with the historicity of Dasein in a way that for each step it gives, the environment reacts. The city, although not exclusively, is the paradigmatic place where this happens. As previously described in Chapter 5, constant processes of memory and assimilation incessantly take place and with them Dasein evolves in time in a play of unveiling and concealing of its existential condition. Disclosedness involves then an uninterrupted decoding of Dasein’s place in the world, whose understanding is always merged with that of its constant temporalizing.

Heidegger has first suggested in *Being and Time* that temporality occupies this ontological primacy. However, in his late writings he was preoccupied by the issue of dwelling, as the form of Dasein being-in-the-world. Thus, scholars have sustained the primacy of placeness for Dasein, starting with the analysis of the word that is already stating a *there* before time.\(^{570}\)

This chapter approaches an interpretation of the intentionality of the conservation endeavour addressed to CSA in existential terms. Accordingly, an hermeneutical approach to human being in its architectural place is engaged. This interpretation of existence is correlative with the categories obtained from the modes of being in Chapter 4 and some phenomenological temporal standpoints concerning the architectural place, understood as Dasein’s sheltering environment. As suggested before, the ontological project has been somehow abandoned, or at least weakened, after postmodern thought. Theories, as deconstruction on one side and the endorsed authority to Heideggerian being’s existence as an interpretative endeavour, where existentialism still proves to be significant. Cfr. Priest, *Merleau-Ponty*. pp. 237-8.\(^{565}\) Gadamer, *Truth and method*. p. 306.\(^{566}\) The problem is put apart as secondary from the present considerations.\(^{570}\)
existential philosophy on the other, have limited alternative interpretations of human existence.\textsuperscript{571} Thus, what here is proposed offers an understanding of conservation intentionality in order to consider architectural place in its constant becoming. The ontological outline of CSA in Chapter 4 and the phenomenological approach to the assimilation of its transformation in Chapter 5 are taken as evidence of an existential and more fundamental condition for conservation. The thesis departed from Ingarden’s ontological framework as a still subject-object understanding; however, it proposes now a shift into a relational hermeneutical approach. To finish the open dialogue with Brandi in relation to conservation, in particular of architecture, it is also necessary to engage again with the significant issue of architecture as inhabited art and the correlative issue of his concept of \textit{astanza}.

In section 6.1 “Bodily Primordiality of the Event as Image” the architectural place is interpreted as an event in the presentation of an image result from its sensual perception. In the context of conservation, the paradigmatic condition of the architectural image is emphasised as part of the modern gaze, the everydayness of Dasein and its dominance in Western culture, because human may prefer not having it as absent.

Section 6.2 “History and Myth as Meaningful Processes” questions whether conservation is authentically approaching architecture as a significant process. Historical and mythical accounts relate together in architecture taken as transformative processes in contrast with the situational condition of the image. The risk of transformation of the stakeholder is at play in this

\textsuperscript{571} Heidegger proposed a particular interpretation, but he suggested also that it was not the only one, neither a permanent one. Cfr. M. J. Inwood, \textit{Heidegger a very short introduction} (Oxford:
interpretation. The temporal identity in which Dasein is concerned is presented as the origin of the notion of historical time.

A final excursus to the problem of architecture as work of art is the main issue of section 6.3 “Unconcealing Object of Scinded Conservation.” As Brandi conceives it, conservation of architecture is revealed as scinded from Dasein’s existential character and focused only in architecture’s artistic conditions. He had arrived to the deduction of the structure of art from a Kantian path. This marked his approach as epistemological in contrast with the existential deduction of Heidegger. The concept of truth in both is contrasted to reveal the same meaningless and intemporal qualities of architecture as art.

Section 6.4 “Conservation of the Place Accompanying Dasein” presents architecture not only as something to take care of, but as the privileged place where cultivation and care may take place as a comprehensive conservation intentionality. The architectural place constitutes importantly the in of Dasein’s being-in-the-world originally founded in human inhabitation. In the last discussion, architecture emerges as the previously intuited humanised entity that, as a becoming character, accompanies human existence.

Oxford University Press, 2000).
6.1 Bodily Primordiality of the Event as Image

Change presupposes a certain position which I take up and from which I see things in procession before me: there are no events without someone to whom they happen and whose finite perspective is the basis of their individuality.

Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of perception*, 1945.\(^{572}\)

During her breakfast, a hypothetical bank executive listened to the radio waiting for the weather forecast to decide if she needed to wear the raincoat. Before escaping from home, she looked into her *Ipod touch* for instructions to navigate to an important appointment in the city centre. She never looked out of the window to check the weather or asked on the street for directions to her destination. She trusted all the information received since, after all, the sky and the city should not be *so* wrong. In contrast, in ancient times or in primitive cultures, understanding and orientation about the world was an inherent ability of human being. People knew with certain precision the weather conditions according to the colour of the sky, the form of the clouds, and the humidity of the air; they knew where they were according to the smells of the place, the temperature of the seawater, or the position of the stars. Advances in modern technology brought precision but at the cost of an abandonment of this awareness of being in the world. The world resulted mediated, represented and its experience weakened. The distancing of Dasein from its dwelling place and from its world in general seems reinforced by modern technology. It seems to be a common view that something was lost concerning the awareness of

\(^{572}\) Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of perception*. 

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Dasein’s relation with its environment with the arrival of modernity. According to Heidegger, such a separation of Dasein from the perception of its world is not so much originated in the scientific revolution represented paradigmatically by Descartes with his division of *res extensa* and *res cogitans* – that later evolved into phenomenological considerations of the kind of the epigram above – but from the initial steps of Western philosophy with the notion of a separation between theoretical idea and a world-as-lived.  

How all this is connected with conservation? It seems that modern conservation considers the architectural place where Dasein dwells, not as *somewhere* with which Dasein belongs together, but as a separated *something*. Architecture in its manifestations as image or as event is sometimes limited to reveal itself to Dasein as its existential place. Modern conservation within the paradigm of this separation between subject and object is but a way of Dasein approaching the world while concealing its existential role *there*, hindering the revelation of the world where Dasein is. In this explanation, the importance of the body in the configuration of architectural space is only equalised by the significance of memory. Body and memory are the two ingredients that seem indispensable in the configuration of place, either by real presence and experience, or by implication. The body can be implied in place intentionality,

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573 De Beistegui describes this analysis of Heidegger. Cfr. “[…] the world can be envisaged from the point of view of its ‘look’ (*eidos*), or ‘form’ (*idea*), in which case it becomes an object of wonder and curiosity (*curiositas*). […] At the most primordial level, though, the meaning of the world is pre-theoretical: we do not understand and navigate the world as a result of its theoretical representation, but of our pragmatic comportments towards it. […] to the extent that the movement of caring is a living inclination towards the world, life tends to lose itself in the world, to be sucked into it. It takes the form of a propensity towards becoming absorbed in the world, and ‘forgetting’ its own being […] in this absorption. There is […] a basic factual tendency in life towards falling away from itself (*Abfallen*), a fall through which life detaches itself from itself and falls into the world.” de Beistegui, *The new Heidegger* pp. 17-8. Heidegger calls care to this inclination towards fallenness. It seems as if for him, Husserl
but also memory can be implied. One can believe remembering; one can
evocate in the presence of a place. However, somehow in both cases
architecture is emerging in the form of an image, an image that is limited to
convey only the sensual parts of the architectural manifold.

**Individual Sensual Experiences**

A matrix of the elements constituting the existential determination of
Dasein, could be organised having on one side the individual and the collective
dimensions of being and in the other space and time. This way, the body and
the first environment that surrounds it constitute individual primordial space.
This first level of spatial awareness is conceived here in the way suggested by
Priest in his critique to Merleau-Ponty, when he suggests that

> [t]he spatiality of the soul makes it intuitively more comprehensible how there
should obtain causal relations between mental and physical events. Both are
spatial so a mental event may act on a physical event by being where it is.
Finally, because the body-subject is located at the centre of subjective space,
the assumption of the Platonists that the soul is ‘in’ the body has to be given
up. The soul is not located in the body. The body is located in the soul.574

Priest calls soul that which needs to be understood as consciousness.

We correlate this idea of the body located in consciousness with the ontological
structure suggested by Bergson, in which the body is the interface that
communicates matter and time. Progressively, the collective space is
constituted by the *architectural place*, as the place of Dasein in its collective
manifestation in the form of buildings and cities. This is the place where CSA
and its possible conservation as temporal intentionality are located. The
possible individual time is constituted by the existential cone of *life-time*

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transcendental phenomenology was but the last point of the journey of a phenomenological
evolution of Cartesianism.
already used in our phenomenological approach to temporality in Chapter 5 that fixes its possible horizons of experience on the individual birth at one extreme and on the own death at the other. However, “[m]etaphysically there is no time that is not now. There is no time but the present. [...] the metaphysical now is when all my thoughts and experiences happen. It is a subjective time that is phenomenologically analogous to the subjective space [...].”575 The last position of this matrix would be constituted by the historical and mythical dimensions of the temporal narrative of Dasein, discussed in Chapter 5. Perceiving architecture from each one of these positions involves the emergence of different manifestations of architecture. This section deals with the emergence of the body position in the matrix. (Figure 6-1)

Figure 6-1 Matrix of elements of existential determination of Dasein. (Own diagram)

We have made emphasis on the image as a perceptual feature of experience in the constitution of CSA. However, the being of architecture is not only perceived through the vision. In the perception of being, of architecture or whatever entity that is, the body is “a kind of model of being. [...]because in

574 Priest, Merleau-Ponty p. 235.
575 Ibid. p. 236.
perception being *qua* being is absent.\(^{576}\) The perception of architectural objects then is partially present and partially absent and in consequence the presence of the being of architecture as such emerges more from the absent than from the present. This seems consistent with Brandi’s aesthetic theories in which the interplay of the phenomena of *astanza* and flagrance is suggested as the essential characteristic of the work of art.\(^{577}\)

Bodily perceiving architecture as event means dealing with a static image, an *eikon* that presents a constant now. It could be suggested that this is one of the main noematic structures that architecture has offered after the arrival of the modern gaze. However, the noematic apprehension of architecture is not only so in its materiality, but in its temporality. In this sense, an instant is individualised, selected and privileged among any other possible. The existential attitude towards this singled out moment seems related to nostalgia. The temporal gaze is localised in time as eternal, or as a-temporal, and it looks at all the moments from that arbitrary moment, being usually an equally de-localised present. This apprehension of architecture departs from the present and is always looking at the past. When the moment of conservation comes, what is being preserved is not an environment but an object, usually a *seen* object. Image as event comes to be the optical givenness that Brandi considers for architecture as a work of art and that constitutes the filling of conservation intentionality at the expense of other elements of the architectural

\(^{576}\) Ibid. p. 219.
\(^{577}\) According to Merleau-Ponty, this paradox of being present and absent is not only human. However, the difference between objects and the human body is the “exhibiting of the *pour soi/en soi* distinction.” Ibid. p. 220. For Merleau-Ponty “Being is the presentation of an absence. Being is invisible.” Priest, *Merleau-Ponty* p. 223. On this grounds we can relate some asseverations of Brandi and overcome them to say that other than the absence that *astanza*
manifold. Architecture as event or image may be correlated with the everydayness of Dasein because it offers a background to life. Dasein in the state of fallenness, in Heidegger’s terms, would not be able to engage in reflection about its architectural place and thus this possible relation of embeddedness is concealed. That relation is latent only at sensual level with the pre-eminence of the optical giveness fundamental for Brandi. Ricoeur describes this primordial level of contact with the architectural place in its mnemonic presentation saying that

[...] we have the corporeal and environmental spatiality inherent to the evocation of a memory. [...] The memory of having inhabited some house in some town or that of having traveled in some part of the world are particularly eloquent and telling. They weave together an intimate memory and one shared by those close to one. In memories of this type, corporeal space is immediately linked with the surrounding space of the environment, some fragment of inhabitable land, with its more or less accessible paths, its more or less easy to cross obstacles.

We have seen in Chapter 5 that awareness about the architectural place starts since childhood and from the body. This seminal assimilation of the architectural place through the senses originates its image in consciousness in the form of memories and recollections. Thus, when it comes the moment of objectivising architecture, the image of an event in time comes as one of the basic ways to concretize it. In philosophy, the study of the sensual body experiences has been focused in the visual. In his Phenomenology of perception, Merleau-Ponty for instance privileges in his phenomenological analysis the sense of sight.

represents in art, there is more than that absence in the revelation of being. This will prove important in Section 6.3 when the relation with architecture as a work of art is retaken.

Ricoeur, Memory, history, forgetting p. 148.
The Pervasiveness of the Image

The prevalence of the visual is evidenced in the commonness of the image in Western culture and conservation is not an exception of this. We have seen in Section 3.1 how in Brandi’s theory of restoration, image comes to be the privileged locus of the manifestation of *astanza*. However, the image that conservation privileges is not always support of art. Despite the privileged character of the image, the body is existentially the first possible contact with Dasein’s spatiality. The primordial space is the womb, the own body, the space that occupies and the first atmosphere that surrounds it. At this primordial level, we are as one with the environment. The air that we breathe belongs to us when is inside and when it is expelled it detaches from us; nevertheless, the limit is not sharply perceived. Food is ingested but, when is it already part of our body? The vision of this embeddedness of the body in the medium is concealed in the modern gaze and the architectural place does not manifest itself as an environment but as alien material buildings and mathematically definable spaces. In Heidegger’s philosophy, the body

[...] ‘remembers’ places and orients itself accordingly. The body, as it evolves within specific surroundings [...] is itself constituted through a process of sedimentation, each region and local situation leaving its mark in the body, which by now has become the unconscious of existence, its ontological memory. And throughout, *it approaches the world with the depth and the thickness of these accumulated strata, the world thus becoming the continuation of its own body, its own body becoming world.*

This first memory of the body progressively constitutes within consciousness the embedded pre-understanding of the world that is later forgotten. In modern times, theoretical knowledge explains the world as alien in a relation subject-object. The combination of these two kinds of
apprehension of architectural place – as enveloping environment and as alien object – combines together to form part of the manifold manifestation of CSA. However, in modern conservation the elements of the manifold that belong to that body memory of pre-theoretical understanding are usually disregarded. These basic elements of the spatiality of memory and place have been discussed by Ricoeur saying that

To be sure, my place is there where my body is. But placing and displacing oneself are primordial activities that make place something to be sought out. And it would be frightening not ever to find it. We ourselves would be devastated. The feeling of uneasiness – *Unheimlichkeit* – joined to the feeling of *not being in one’s place, of not feeling at home*, haunt us and this would be the realm of emptiness.\(^580\)

This feeling of the uncanny is one of the existential features of authentic Dasein according to Heidegger. When Dasein is not in state of fallenness – namely the state of being drawn in the everydayness of the *they* and the forgetting of authentic self – Dasein is aware of the separation from its place; its not being in a place cleared for it to dwell.\(^581\) Thus, authentic Dasein is destined to look for its place during its existence, in a constant interplay of unveiling and closure, of finding and losing. At individual level, Dasein is looking for home, and at collective level is looking for the city, the polis. It is in this context in which architecture demands to be conserved. It is there where care, in the Heideggerian sense is concerned with architectural place.\(^582\)

Ricoeur proposed the analogy between narrative and construction – as stated in the epigram of this Chapter – suggesting that the city is more emotively

\(^{580}\) Ricoeur, *Memory, history, forgetting* p. 149. (Our emphasis).
\(^{581}\) de Beistegui, *The new Heidegger* p. 68.
\(^{582}\) Between these two levels of place-search, individual corporeality and collective public space, Ricoeur suggests that geometric space is intercalated. Cfr. Ricoeur, *Memory, history, forgetting* p. 150.
complex than the house. He suggested that moving from the constructed space of architecture to the one of inhabited land of geography deserves a science to study it. However, we stop before, in the architectural place, where concerns of conservation of CSA demand attention, although being aware of this necessary connection with the whole inhabiting of Dasein.

We may distinguish possible incomplete apprehensions of architecture, for instance, the one characterised by its closure to consider the event as part of a complete temporality. An instance of analysis of this phenomenon is the interpretation done by Vesely in his *Architecture in the age of divided representation the question of creativity in the shadow of production*, who suggests that “[...] the development of perspective into an illusionistic mode of representation is the main source of modern relativism, beginning the process of divided representation.” According to him, a paradox is generated between the different visions of reality, “a source of an unprecedented freedom to produce networks but also an overwhelming relativism, loss of meaning, and narrowing range of common references – and, as a result of a general cultural malaise.” This paradox and “the concentration on private experience, imagination, and fantasy appears contradict the very nature of architecture, which is always open to a shared public culture.” In conservation of CSA, this discussion would support a conservative attitude toward transformations in a way that can be correlated with the ways that Halbwachs suggests society accepts changes in traditions, described in Chapter 5. It seems that

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583 Ibid. p. 151.
584 Vesely, *Architecture in the age of divided representation the question of creativity in the shadow of production* p. 173.
585 Ibid. p. 35.
586 Ibid. p. 37.
transformations in CSA should be accepted by society in a progressive way with attitudes that justify changes according to its also changing system of updated values. Suddenness in change seems related with a perception of architectural values preferably perceived in its manifestation as image.

The perception of architecture as image is not judged here in terms of being better of worst than other kinds of perception, instead what is tried to be exposed is the partial disclosure that such a perception arises. The primordiality of this apprehension of architecture reconnects it with the temporal primordiality of the body as rememberer of the architectural place. Differently to what Brandi seems to suggest, the image is not reduced to the optical givenness, but to any event of sensual perception of architecture. In this sense, the importance of the haptic as an imaginary dimension – seeing as touching – comes forth also. The level of experience of architecture as image emerges the same from the performance of the sensual body than from the dimension of meaning when perceiving image as representation. The collection of images of the architectural place along life form a reservoir with which more complex constitutions of architecture are built up, such as the mythical and the historical. The image of the architectural place understood as its sensual apprehension cannot be simply avoided; instead, it demands to be considered in its adequate dimension in the problem of conservation of CSA, taking it as part of the architectural manifold and not as an end in itself, such as in certain myths and historical constructions as temporal concretizations.
6.2 History and Myth as Meaningful Processes

If, in fact, the facts are ineffaceable, if one can no longer undo what has been done, nor make it so that what has happened did not occur, on the other hand, the sense of what has happened is not fixed once and for all. In addition to the fact that events of the past can be recounted and interpreted otherwise, the moral weight tied to the relation of debt with respect to the past can be increased or lightened.


In English, the term theophagy comes defined as: “[...] the eating of God (in the mass or communion rite); [or in anthropology] the eating of meals at which the participants believe that they ingest a deity with the consecrated food.” However, in the *Diccionario de la Lengua Española*, the equivalent term *teofagia* is ignored. Peculiarly enough, in the Spanish dictionary the term *transustanciación* (Spanish for transubstantiation) is defined as “conversion of the substances of bread and wine into the body and blood of Jesus Christ,” as if that was the case in reality. The point is not to discuss here the theological doctrines behind it, but to highlight two different ways to approach the same temporal commemoration. Discussing the dichotomy between material and immaterial in the concept of Aristotelian sign, Gumbrecht has already explained different conceptions of temporality through the transubstantiation of the sacrament of the Eucharist in medieval culture in contrast with more recent Protestant theology.

It was only that the temporal distance that separated each individual mass from the Last Supper as its point of reference began to turn into an  

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588 The *Oxford English Dictionary* ([cited]). (Our emphasis).
unbridgeable ‘historical distance,’ and here we begin to understand that a connection exists between the emerging, specifically modern conception of signification and the dimension of historicity – as conquest of modernity. For in modern understanding, signs at least potentially leave the substances that they evoke at a temporal and spatial distance.590

Thus, whilst for Catholics the liturgy was an ontological productive gesture in a sense that we further outline, for Protestants the gesture had become a process of signification.591 Heidegger, in his attack to Western metaphysics, substitutes the previous importance of the notion of truth, as a correspondence of meaning, with the development of “the idea of an un-concealment of Being (in which context the word Being always refers to something substantial) [...].”592 The model that seems privileged by the historical temporality is the one that was born after the Enlightenment and that was transferred to conservation intentionality in its modern form. Brandi was very aware of the flaws of what he called the historical search of meaning.593 For him art was not on the side of historical flagrance but on the one of artistic astanza. In this sense, the apprehension of architecture as process such as the mythical or the historical seems always more related in one way or another with the search of meaning, significance and explanation.

If one then eliminates the metaphysical dimension, one of the transcendental dimensions of Dasein emerges as the manifestation by its capacity to inherit. Animals do not have inheritance as an attitude. Therefore, Ricoeur has highlighted that

590 Gumbrecht, Production of presence what meaning cannot convey p. 30.
592 Gumbrecht, Production of presence what meaning cannot convey pp. 46-7.
593 Brandi, Teoria generale della critica p. 8.
humanity is to be defined as the speaking living being, which makes genealogy a structure irreducible to the functions of reproduction. Genealogy is the institution that makes life human life. In this sense, it is a component of standing for, constitutive of historical intentionality.  

Echoing Ricoeur’s words of the epigram, we can say that conservation as a temporal intentionality is characterised by its being in appearance traditionalist and conservative, trying to keep truthfully the symbol or representation of the past. Paradoxically, as Gadamer has suggested, these kinds of attitudes are guided by the projection of values that are rationally and freely accepted.

Even the most genuine and pure tradition does not persist because of inertia of what once existed. It needs to be affirmed, embraced, cultivated. It is, essentially, preservation, and it is active in all historical change. But preservation is an act of reason, though inconspicuous one. For this reason, only innovation and planning appear to be the result of reason. But this is an illusion. Even where life changes violently, as in ages of revolution, far more of the old is preserved in the supposed transformation of everything than anyone knows, and it combines with the new to create a new value. At any rate, preservation is as much a freely chosen action as are revolution and renewal. 

If conservation takes care of what has been handed from the past, however, the temporal distance between facts has not always been considered as we do nowadays in Western culture. This latter has been so strongly influenced by the scientific paradigm that any different way of temporal intentionality – especially for conservation in the relation with architectural place – seems unconceivable.

Open Transformative Processes

We mention in Section 6.1 a temporally incomplete apprehension of architecture as sensual image for the purposes of its conservation. Other

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594 Ricoeur, Memory, history, forgetting p. 379.
possibilities of incomplete apprehensions of architecture seem open to take it as part of a more comprehensive temporality of Dasein. The open interpretation of architecture as event, as Jones presents it in his *The Hermeneutics of Sacred Architecture*, is an instance of this. Although not being an event stricto sensu, given its duration and its development through stages, we correlate it with the manifestation of architecture as part of a process. He argues that architecture creates architectural events that depend on the attitude of receptors and not only on the building and its form. Thus, there should be an occasion for sacred architecture. The simple viewer who is not involved cannot grasp the complete experience without those events. Nevertheless, the relevant issue for us is that, architecture is not only conceived as situational, as he says, but also as a manifold of entities, as deduced in Chapter 4, which are apprehended according with different concretizations.\(^{596}\) He argues that,

We must resist the still endemic modernist tendency to retreat from our hermeneutical stance to objectivist (or subjectivist) modes of interpretation. The really hard challenge is to hold all our interpretations up to the level of architectural events [although, understood here as processes], not retreating to the analysis of buildings.\(^{597}\)

This seems to be the misleading attitude of modern conservation in which buildings are interpreted as objects and not as places where life is performed. The particular case of sacred architecture offers maybe one of the extreme environments of transformation for Dasein. However, the rest of the architectural place gives opportunities, although with less intensity and in different ways, for Dasein to be gradually transformed. In the composition of the ritual-architectural situation, Jones identifies three elements: interactivity,

\(^{596}\) Jones, *The hermeneutics of sacred architecture experience, interpretation, comparison. Monumental occasions : reflections on the eventfulness of religious architecture* p. 43.

\(^{597}\) Ibid. p. 45.
seriousness and transformation. Interactivity implies performativity of actors. Seriousness implies what Ricoeur calls *wager* at stake; the participant has to risk its own self. Transformation involves the change in the ontological condition of the participant after the ritual-architecture. Certainly, the architecture of the everydayness does not involve these same elements, at least with the same intensity. Nevertheless, in the context of changes to CSA the situation demands interactivity, seriousness and transformation from the dweller. In the confrontation with transformed CSA, the dweller is challenged to assimilate and as a result, he or she is transformed.

This hermeneutical situation has been characterised in two ways: the indigenous experience of architecture and the academic reflection on those experiences. Jones discussed the significance of tradition and history in the architectural experience underlining the “transformative, potentially coercive, power of ritual-architectural events, which enables such occasions to facilitate changes that are profound though not always pleasant.” Accordingly with this view, transformations of CSA are not perceived in the same way by indigenous dwellers, more existentially involved in the architectural place, than by academic critics. Consequently, architectural experiences of transformation, innovation, or destruction of CSA, are considered in this context as transformative events that in several occasions, as we have seen, may be experienced as problematic, as the example in Chapter 5 illustrates.

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600 Ibid. p. 60.
Analogously, the relation with novel architectural concepts can be taken also as an increasing of being. In this sense this incorporation of the new is not only physically transformative, as it is evident to the user, but in the ontological root of the experience as experience. The experience can be transformative even when it is not established in the form of ritual. Changes are considered and incorporated as pleasant and uncanny at the same time in the architectural experience. In this way, the experience of architecture passes through a series of transformations that, along time, modifies and increases its essence, passing from a period of strangeness to a period of assimilation until it reaches total integration. Jones observes that,

deeply philosophical treatments in the Heideggerian tradition accentuate the sense in which the experience of art and architecture is ontologically or existentially productive. Gadamer, who maintains that ‘transformation is not change, even a change that is especially far-reaching,’ is adamant that the alterations effected by hermeneutical apprehensions of architecture are not simply shifts in attitude or modifications in one’s state of mind. Alternatively, for Gadamer, experiencing art and architecture facilitates actual ‘transformations in being,’ that is, transformations in the being, or ontological status, of both the human beholders and the works of architecture.601

The productive being of the architectural place makes its meaning constantly transformed and relived. Discussing about the loss and recovery of the past, Jones states that architecture cannot freeze it. He says with Gadamer that architecture as art in general is perpetually new, that a past world cannot be brought back and be restored as it was. He quotes the words of Gadamer when he says that “a hermeneutics that regarded understanding as the reconstruction of the original would be no more than the recovery of a dead meaning.”602 This seem consistent with Brandi’s idea of restoration as critique, analysed in

601 Ibid. p. 95.
602 Ibid. pp. 143-4.
Chapter 3, that considers even the presentation of the work of art as part of this critical and interpretive approach.\footnote{Cfr. Brandi, 
*Carmine o della pittura* p. 138.}

**Mythical Memories**

The previously suggested phenomena of productive processes that take place in the encounter with CSA configure collective temporal identities for architecture in the context of mythical and historical narratives. However, already Eliade had noticed the difference between the archaic human and the one of Western society contrasting the importance of the cosmos for the former and of history for the latter. He observed how the sacred is born from different forces that change the essence of some objects in their confrontation with man. He explained that,

> Among countless stones, one stone becomes sacred – and hence instantly becomes saturated with being – because it constitutes a hierophany, or possesses mana, or again because it commemorates a mythical act, and so on. The object appears as a receptacle of an exterior force that differentiates it from its milieu and gives it meaning and value. This force may reside in the substance of the object or in its form; a rock reveals itself to be sacred because its very existence is a hierophany: incompressible, invulnerable, it is that which man is not. It resists time; its reality is coupled with perenniality.\footnote{Cfr. Brandi, *Carmine o della pittura* p. 138.}

CSA performs its humanised lasting capacity in a similar fashion to the mentioned rock that resists time, in the particular ways that have been mentioned in Section 4.3, in the interplay of endurance and destruction. This capacity opens for architecture a particular sense of sacredness that old buildings disclose in the way of having-been-place for Dasein. Although, Dasein in Eliade’s theory is connected with foundational and original acts that generate significance. “Their meaning [of human acts], their value, are not
connected with their crude physical datum but with their property of reproducing a primordial act, of repeating a mythical example.”

This chain of gestures embedded in tradition is perceived as processes in which Dasein is concerned. In that case, normal life is put between brackets and transformation in participants occurs. In this way “[t]he memory of the collectivity is anhistorical. [...] This reduction of events to categories and of individuals to archetypes, carried out by the consciousness of the popular strata in Europe almost down to our day, is performed in conformity with archaic ontology.” Eliade observes how in order to avoid this process of mythification witnessing is not enough. For archaic human, personal memory is of little importance. The sense of history, then, is not present in archaic cultures instead everything is constantly repeated in cycles related to cosmic rhythms. Thus, in contrast with our actual contemporary condition “[e]verything that we know about the mythical memories of paradise confronts us, on the contrary, with the image of an ideal humanity enjoying a beatitude and spiritual plenitude forever unrealizable in the present state of fallen man.” In contrast, the idea of history as a source of knowledge for the present life has been over exploited in Western culture leaving nothing to expect today but rhetoric. The invention of historical time after

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602 Ibid. p. 34.
603 Ibid. p. 44.
604 Ibid. p. 45.
605 Ibid. p. 47.
608 Gumbrecht, Production of presence what meaning cannot convey p. 118.
Enlightenment, as a new concept of temporality, stimulated that attitude of learning from the past trying to discover laws of historical development. Between the past as reservoir of knowledge and the future of open expectations, there is proposed a wider present whose blocked future encourages “nostalgia cultures.”\(^{612}\) It has been suggested that “[...] by crossing the life world threshold of our birth, we are turning away from the ever-threatening and ever-present future of our own deaths.”\(^{613}\)

Conservation of CSA nowadays seems trapped in the paradigm of this bracketing out of the symbolic dimension of the architectural place in terms of temporality. The emphasis has been so far put into the preservation of the material traces as if they were able to keep memory alive. This concern is the one manifested in historical observation of traces such as the ones that are objects of study in archaeology.\(^{614}\) We have already described some of the characteristics of historical knowledge in Chapter 3, in the context of Brandi’s ideas and in Chapter 5, in the context of the analysis of temporality. For that reason, we highlight here the accent that has been put in conservation of CSA in order to offer scientific explanation and facilitate historical understanding. In this sense, total conservation as an operation to preserve everything in the expectation of an unknown future question seems the most radical position.

The problem we have underlined in this section is the one of the kind of contract between conservator and receptor of CSA. If the receptor is compelled to deal with conserved CSA as history, or as myth, these need to be authentic

\(^{612}\) Ibid. p. 119-21.  
\(^{613}\) Ibid. Out of the cycles or linear temporal patterns of myths, history asks for an objectification of temporality in the form of narrativity.
and in such a case, historical or mythical representations, in the form of frozen
past time, would not be acceptable. We have already seen how matter cannot
guarantee memory, consequently architectural place should always be kept
alive, or become dead archaeology. Brandi’s theory of restoration, although
being theoretically informed about the nature of art in temporal terms, still
seem too permeated with the aim to keep the authentic evidence of the past,
without any concession to the existential dimension for the relation between
architecture and Dasein. For that temporal dimension, the dialectic between
recollection and image in historical representation through the architectural
place is solved by Ricoeur saying that,

The historian’s representation is indeed a present image of an absent thing;
[...] disappearance into and existence in the past. [...] absence as intended by
the present image [,] absence of past things as past in relation to their ‘having
been.’ [...] At this point the epistemology of history borders on the ontology
of being-in-the-world. I will call our ‘historical condition’ this realm of
existence placed under the sign of a past as being no longer and having been.
[...] the epistemology [...] reaches its internal limit [...] against the borders of
an ontology [...].

Ricoeur reaches that limit of his epistemological interpretation of
memory and history suggesting a path of critical and hermeneutical ontology.
Although for us, this path demands previously a final excursus to conclude the
problem that was for Brandi the main concern, namely the one of the nature of
art in the context of the architectural place and the problem of forgetting being.

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614 Ricoeur calls these remains and vestiges “unwritten testimonies.” Ricoeur, Memory, history,
forgetting pp. 170, 78.
615 Ibid. p. 280.
6.3 Unconcealing Object of Scinded Conservation

A building, a Greek temple, portrays nothing.

Martin Heidegger, *The Origin of the Work of Art*, 1950

A painting, a sculpture, a poem, a novel, a play, a work of art in general seems to have its existential point of departure in its material manifestation to the senses and to certain kind of consciousness. Thus, in Heidegger terms, art appeals to Dasein’s being through art’s being but what it really offers is the manifestation of an existence that it is not given in matter. As Ingarden would suggest, art is supported on the matter of the work – through which it is revealed – but the artistic quality is immaterial; it is pure presence, or in Brandi’s terms pure reality: *astanza*. Brandi was an art scholar very philosophically informed and, as this section illustrates supported mainly on Heidegger’s existential analysis, he had understood some of the philosophical problems at issue in art in the dialectics of flagrance and *astanza*; he ignored other existential issues though. As presented in Chapters 2 and 3, the fact that his theory has been frequently misunderstood as elitist and too focused on the work of art is but evidence of the difficulties to understand it and locate it in the big map of theoretical trends. However, his latest thought in *Teoria Generale della Critica*, in which he developed issues of phenomenology, structuralism and existentialism concerning art could have illuminated his restoration theory with wider existential insights. For the case of architecture, the inclusion of the existential dimension of Dasein would have been a
significant achievement given its fundamental characteristics of dwelling in contrast with other forms of art.

We call scinded conservation not to the conservation intentionality that in limited form focuses in the scientific, meaningful or flagrant fact of the architectural phenomena – which within its paradigm is instead very consistent – but to the kind of attitude that we have described in which only art as pure presence or astanza is considered. We describe it as scinded because, despite arriving to a seemingly correct deduction of the structure of the work of art, it does not consider the existential dimension that we consider as an enriching condition to approach the conservation of the architectural place, which participates of both a meaningful dimension and a presence one. This scinded conservation intentionality is evidently coincident with Brandi’s notion of restoration for the work of art as an intemporal and meaningless entity. In the same way in which the intemporal quality of the work of art seems to be accepted in phenomenology, already some scholars have placed emphasis in the preconceptual or pre-meaning part of the aesthetic experience; Brandi has been one of them. In this sense, it is our contention that meaning – including language, signification, predicative thought, flagrance and so for – and presence, understood as the meaningless astanza in Brandian terms, are both but different aspects of the manifold condition of the architectural place, in which the latter may offer the aesthetic intemporal dimension.

Meaningless Architectural Presence

According to Heidegger, in Western culture the notion of art seems detached from its authentic origin. Let us explore how he and Brandi deduce its same meaningless. 617 Brandi, within the context of Teoria Generale della Critica, seem to understand the original sense of meaning when he distinguished the origin of what he call the referent, namely the possible correlative to the linguistic sign that can be a non real being. 618 However, because of his understanding of sign was originated by the Kantian theory of the schema, he detaches the language from any ontological compromise with the notion of truth. This detachment is not done, as in the case of Heidegger, as an interplay between concealment and unveiling of being, but as a false problem “[...] the horizon to which one cannot ever be next, because we ourselves are the horizon. The reality, as possession of the real, is a progressive approach that leaves us always at the same distance.” 619 In any case, from different ways, Brandi arrives to the notion of art as detached from any possible

617 He explains that, the scission between a supposed core of the thing and the characteristics that are composing the rest of the thing around this core is originated in a misleading translation from the Greek terms to Latin. “Hypokeimenon [the already given core of things] becomes subjectum; hypostasis [sensible matter] becomes substantia; symphebēkos [the characteristics of the thing] becomes accidens. However, this translation of Greek names into Latin is in no way the innocent process it is considered to this day, beneath the seemingly literal and thus faithful translation there is concealed, rather, a translation of Greek experience into a different way of thinking. Roman thought takes over the Greek words without a corresponding, equally original experience of what they say [...] The rootlessness of Western thought begins with this translation.” Martin Heidegger, “The Origin of the Work of Art,” in Basic writings from Being and time (1927) to The task of thinking (1964), ed. Farrell Krell, David (London: Routledge, 1993), pp. 153-4. Scholars have highlighted that the Aristotelian concept of sign “[...] brings together a substance (i.e., that which is present because it demands space) and a form (i.e., that through which a substance becomes perceptible), aspects that include a conception of ‘meaning’ unfamiliar to us.” Gumbrecht, Production of presence what meaning cannot convey p. 29.

618 Brandi, Teoria generale della critica pp. 52-3.

619 Ibid. p. 52. “In realtà il problema della verità è un falso problema: la verità è come l’orizzonte a cui non ci si avvicina mai, perché noi stessi siamo l’orizzonte. La realtà, come possesso del reale, è un progressivo avvicinamento che ci lascia sempre alla stessa distanza.” (Our translation).
significance as the manifestation of *astanza*. However as it is also suggested in Section 6.1, Heidegger links aesthetics back to its sensual origins; he says that

 [...] we do not need first to call or arrange for this situation in which we let things encounter us without mediation. The situation always prevails. In what the senses of sight, hearing, and touch convey, in the sensations of color, sound, roughness, hardness, things move us bodily, in the literal meaning of the world. The thing is the *aisthēton*, that which is perceptible by sensations in the senses belonging to sensibility. Hence the concept later becomes a commonplace according to which a thing is nothing but the unity of a manifold of what is given in the senses. Whether this unity is conceived as sum or as totality or as *Gestalt* alters nothing in the standard character of this thing-concept.\(^{620}\)

He suggests that after that misunderstanding of identifying thing with idea, truth also came to be understood as correspondence between, in Brandi’s terms, sign and referent.

In Heidegger’s discussion about the peasant shoes in a Van Gogh’s painting, he pinpointed that the disclosure of what equipment is in truth was realised through the work of art. According to him “[t]he painting spoke. In the nearness of the work we were suddenly somewhere else than we usually tend to be [...]”\(^{621}\) Thus, the work of art brings forth the presence of something that was not there before, that is what something is in truth. Heidegger calls to this an unconcealedness of Being, what the Greeks called *alētheia*. With an existential approach completely different to that epistemological of Brandi, Heidegger suggests that truth happens in the work of art through the disclosing of a particular being. “The essence of art would then be this: the truth of beings setting itself to work [...]”\(^{622}\) From this point of view, while for Brandi the

\(^{621}\) Ibid., p. 164.
\(^{622}\) Ibid., pp. 164-5. Heidegger’s interpretation of art in existential terms is not at all exclusive. For instance if for Heidegger the disclosure of being is done through Dasein as the privileged place where being is unveiled, for Merleau-Ponty instead being is disclosed through the invisible. Priest, *Merleau-Ponty* p. 217. “The being that the invisible is the Being of is the
astanza of architecture is manifested in the mutual and revealing opposition between exterior and interior, for Heidegger architecture would constitute art in the happening of truth of its inhabitation, in its allowance of dwelling. Brandi does not ignore inhabitation, nevertheless it is only important as the way to visualise architecture in the flagrance of the phenomena and detaching architecture from the phenomena of signification: “[...] a house is not built in order to communicate that it is a house, but to inhabit it.”

Heidegger suggests that in the work of art there is strife between lighting and concealing in which by “[s]etting up a world and setting forth the earth [...] the unconcealedness of being as a whole, or truth, is won.” This bringing forth of a being is done in a way never done before and never to be repeated and we correlate it with the epiphany of the work of art to which Brandi constantly appeals. In the case of architecture this effect is multiplied by the plurality of Dasein’s inhabitation; inhabitation concealed or revealed never stops. Heidegger explained that for the Greeks, craft and art were named by the same word: technē that was a mode of knowing and not a mode of world: what is.” Priest, Merleau-Ponty p. 218. This can be related with the contrast between astanza and flagrance in Brandi’s aesthetic theories. The notion of Merleau-Ponty has been explained saying that “[w]hen one thinks of what is as not perceptually present one nevertheless thinks of what is as existing. The disclosure of being requires the abstraction or mental stripping away of empirical properties, but this process is already facilitated in the thinking of the invisible.” Priest, Merleau-Ponty p. 218. Merleau-Ponty gives the phenomena of painting as example of the essence of being in the invisible in which by portraying something in visible form is illustrated some invisible possible. “Visibility is revelatory of what is being what it is but invisibility is revelatory of what is tout court.” Priest, Merleau-Ponty p. 219. (Emphasis in the original) Another interpretation from the existential point of view worth being explored is the already mentioned of Sartre that influenced the concept of art in Brandi. Cfr. Cesare Brandi, “Sulla filosofia di Sartre,” L’Immagine (1947). Moreover he adds significantly that “[t]he unconcealedness of beings – this is never a merely existent state, but a happening. Unconcealedness (truth) is neither an attribute of factual things in the sense of beings, nor one of propositions.” Heidegger, “The Origin of the Work of Art,” p. 174.

623 Brandi, Teoria generale della critica p. 308. “[...] non si costruisce una casa per comunicare che è una casa, ma per abitarla.” (Our translation).

making.\textsuperscript{625} Through \textit{technē} then it was possible to reach \textit{alētheia}. In contrast with our present notion of art in Western culture, art was for the Greeks part of the common knowledge of the essence of beings in everyday life. For Brandi the implicit evidence of inhabitation was its being the result of a need. However, the fact that architecture portrays nothing, as he constantly insists is never related with mimesis as the suggestion of spatial behaviours, as a \textit{portrait} or depiction of architectural inhabitation. Architecture, Brandi sustains, is not a mimetic art. \textit{Technē} would then, in the original Greek sense, allow ways of inhabitation to emerge through legitimate architectural creation. Brandi did not see this because of the predominance of the Kantian schematism on his thought; for him “[…] before the primitive hut, there was no concept or image; there was only – within the vital human consciousness – a vague intention of that need for shelter from the inclement weather, the dangers of beasts and other men, and who knows what else.”\textsuperscript{626}

In the interplay between \textit{alētheia}, as disclosure and concealedness, Heidegger suggests that “[…] art is the preserving of truth in the work. Art then is the becoming and happening of truth.”\textsuperscript{627} Conservation in this sense would be subsumed in the notion of art and not considered an independent intentionality. Brandi distinguished restoration from the rest of possible activities that take care of architecture in that it was specifically dedicated to deal with the artistic part of the work. This, in Heideggerian terms corresponds to the misleading understanding of art as a quality and not as a happening.

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\textsuperscript{625} Ibid., p. 180.
\textsuperscript{626} Brandi, \textit{Teoria generale della critica} pp. 122-3. “[…] avanti che la capanna sorgese, non esisteva né concetto né immagine, esisteva solo, interiormente alla coscienza vitale del’uomo, una imprecisa intenzionalità, quel bisogno di riparo dalle intemperie, dai pericoli delle belve e degli altri uomini e che so io.” (Our translation)
\end{flushright}
Brandi correctly deduced a specific activity to deal with the artistic manifold然而；the existential dimension was never integrated in such an intentionality for the case of architecture. For Heidegger, preservation would be to inhabit – to dwell – in the way that architecture is asking Dasein to participate in the unconcealing of truth. We explore this particular dimension of inhabitation in Section 6.4. What is noteworthy here is that, preservation – within which we include conservation – is not conceived as an independent intentionality dedicated to take-care-of, in the way of a recognition in architecture of an alien artistic object as in Brandi’s notion of restoration, but as part of the primordial sense of temporality of Dasein that would be a non-deficient mode of care.  

**Aesthetics, Truth and Language**

According to Heidegger, aesthetics came to be treated as the epistemological approach to sense, sensation, feeling and their determination, especially in beauty. However, aesthetics derived into the reflection about art. He attempted to explore art outside aesthetics in order to avoid its consideration as an object produced for a subject in order to offer an experience. Heidegger suggested that aesthetics as reflection on art was not needed in Ancient classical Greece, because art was instead the way of

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629 de Beistegui, The new Heidegger p. 129.  
630 Ibid. p. 130. According to recent interpretations “[...] if Heidegger is right in claiming that that there is an essential – albeit unthought – connection between metaphysics and the question of truth, and if he is also right in claiming that aesthetics is concerned with the question of art from the point of view of the beautiful, then there must be a crucial link between truth and art. This link, which runs through virtually the whole of metaphysical aesthetics, revolves almost
knowledge itself; it was the way in which Dasein was related with its world “integrated into a unified and meaningful totality.”

It was later in the Greece of Plato that beauty was understood as the manifestation of truth, in the eidos of things. However, the eidos is more evident in the idea, the philosophical concept of the concept. Thus,

[art] can provide an image (eikon) of truth, but in doing so it allows the idea to show itself by appearing through something else. [...] Philosophy alone can provide truth itself, truth as such. [...] we could say that whereas art can only ever provide an imitation (mimesis), or a representation of truth (understood as the manifestation and presence of a thing), philosophy can provide its (direct) presentation. [...] This is how the birth of metaphysics, as the transformation of the sense of truth, from truth as alētheia to truth as correctness (orthotes) and correspondence (homoiosis), coincided with the subordination of the artwork to the concept.

This latter concept of truth reduces art to the role of imitation of the idea and not as the privileged place of alētheia that Heidegger finds as its essence. With this notion of art as alētheia or unconcealment of the work of art, art itself would be the origin of the work of art and the artist. The detachment between architecture and mimesis for Brandi was a difficult one, because in contrast with other kinds of work of art, of which he says that “given its figurative nature, exist in spatial autonomy that is the prerequisite of pure reality [.]” it seemed obvious that architecture does not imitate any kind of truth. However, what kind of imitation an eventual architectural mimesis could suggest to Brandi in order to discard it? The key for his approach to architecture as art can be found in his use of the Kantian schematism, which still establishes an epistemological position and not an existential one.

631 de Beistegui, The new Heidegger pp. 130-1. (Emphasis in the original).
633 de Beistegui, The new Heidegger pp. 130-1.
635 de Beistegui, The new Heidegger pp. 130-1.
633 Brandi, Basile et al., Theory of restoration p. 78. (Emphasis in the original).
It has been suggested that in the demand for universal assent in the question of aesthetic taste, in the Kantian tradition, there may be an appeal to a human community of sense as a possible destiny “perhaps never to be realized.”\(^635\) According to this interpretation “through [Heidegger’s] detailed discussion of the problem of presentation and representation, of what he calls schematism and symbolism, Kant has problematized, and to certain extent neutralized, the question of imitation.”\(^636\) It is on this epistemological loop that Brandi falls in his establishment of architecture as art. As it has been analysed in Chapter 3, he discusses about this since his *Eliante* and until *Teoria Generale della Critica*. The approach of Brandi towards art, especially for architecture, was mainly epistemological, for that reason his theory of restoration is easily interpreted as suggestion for *praxis*. On his side, Heidegger attempted then, to overcome the metaphysical concept of aesthetics that highlighted the aspects of production and imitation and to bring art back to the concept of *alētheia*. Thus for different reasons, mimesis was removed from the notion of art in Brandi and Heidegger. Additionally for conservation in the modern paradigm, architectural mimesis was destined to disappear because of the incompleteness of the worlds that originated those architectures as art.

For Heidegger, language plays a primordial role in bringing forth the essence of beings, clearing the concealment of Being itself. He calls poetry to this unconcealing and projecting saying of language.\(^637\) In this thesis however, we do not stress so much in the linguistical essence of the bringing forth of

\(^{635}\) de Beistegui, *The new Heidegger* p. 136.
\(^{636}\) Ibid.
truth, but in the non linguistical manifestation of the unconcealedness of the Being of beings. Heidegger has said

Art, as the setting-into-work of truth, is poetry. Not only the creation of the work is poetic, but equally poetic, though in its own way, is the preserving of the work; for a work is in actual effect as a work only when we remove ourselves from our commonplace routine and move into what is disclosed by the work, so as to bring our own essential nature itself to take a stand in the truth of beings. The essence of art is poetry. The essence of poetry, in turn, is the founding of truth. We understand founding here in a triple sense: founding as bestowing, founding as grounding, and founding as beginning. Founding, however, is actual only in preserving. Thus to each mode of founding there corresponds a mode of preserving...638

On this preserving, conservation finds its origin; it seems again a preservation of truth as in the scientific model; however, it is not anymore an epistemological or theoretical explanation about truth, but – in Heidegger’s terms – its keeping it in the clear being the free Being of beings. Brandi did not consider language in this originary sense that Heidegger assigns it; he instead brought it back to be product and tool of the “gnoseological process.”639 In fact, he seemed opposed to Heidegger when discussing about the union of word and thing – the possession of the truth in the word – declaring that

There is identity or rather universality only in the gnoseological process, of which the language is product and instrument at the same time. The truth was not saved: ontology and gnosiology would not have met anymore... In the last attempt, that of Heidegger, truth and being coincide up to constitute the ultimate and supreme identity. It remains, however, that the truth is a meaning, which referent is the existent, and the existent leads to being. The problem of being cannot be extrapolated from that of language: truth as meaning is not the same thing than being as the foundation of the referent. 640

639 Brandi, Teoria generale della critica p. 52.
640 Ibid. “L’identità o meglio l’universalità sta solo nel processo gnoseologico, di cui la lingua è prodotto e strumento al tempo stesso. La verità non era salva: ontologia e gnosologia non si sarebbero più riunite... Nell’ultimo tentativo, quello di Heidegger, verità ed essere si fanno collimare fino a costituire l’identità ultima e suprema. Resta tuttavia che la verità è un significato, il cui referente è l’esistente, e l’esistente rimanda all’essere. Il problema dell’essere non può estrapolarsi da quello del linguaggio: la verità come significato non è la stessa cosa dell’essere come fondamento del referente.” (Our translation).
This illustrates the fundamental difference between the conceptions of truth of Brandi and Heidegger. Brandi would have never found the foundation of conservation of the work of art of architecture in an existential matrix as Heidegger did. His way was inspired in the epistemological and neutral Kantian schematism and not in an ontological analysis. Conservation was a way of recognising the artistic process as process developed in time. In terms of temporality instead, Heidegger suggests that truth becomes historical through art constituting the origin of creators and preservers.\(^{641}\)

Heidegger made a subtle critic to the modern conditions of the art’s notion in Western culture when he said that

\[\ldots\] reflective knowledge is the preliminary and therefore indispensable preparation for the becoming of art. Only such a knowledge prepares its space for art, their way for the creators, their location for the preservers. In such a knowledge, which can only grow slowly, the question is decided whether art can be an origin and then must be a forward spring, or whether it is to remain a mere appendix and then can only be carried along as a routine cultural phenomenon.\(^{642}\)

It is precisely at this underlined point where conservation as an activity has been captured since its beginning as objectivising activity and not as an existential performativity founded on care. Brandi’s theory of restoration was not an exception, although being an outstanding example of philosophical reflection. Theoretical reflective knowledge is not to be disregarded; however, the choice that Heidegger presents would demand a change of attitudes not only concerning architecture as a work of art, as privileged place of manifestation of the truth of being, but as the first, last and only place where Dasein dwells.

\(^{642}\) Ibid.
Intemporal Architectural Presence

It is with philosophical investigations about presence that we can reconnect with some of the concepts intuited by Brandi in his theories, especially in terms of art’s intemporal condition. For instance, attention has been called about certain conditions of extreme temporality, which are paramount in aesthetic experiences. The suddenness and the ephemeral character of these conditions relate directly with Brandi’s aesthetic theory, as already analysed in Chapter 3, in which art is characterised as intemporal. Moreover, Brandi’s aesthetic theory seemed to agree with some of Gadamer’s remarks about art, as when this latter explains that

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\text{[t]he fact that works stretch out of a past into the present as enduring monuments still does not mean that their being is an object of aesthetic or historical consciousness. As long as they still fulfil their function, they are contemporaneous with every age.}\]

The theoretical issue in Brandi’s thought that allows considering this possible insertion of the work of art in history is the double instantiation for the purposes of conservation, namely the historical and the aesthetic. The historical is implied in the existence of the architectural object in time and eventually in its constant use; the aesthetic is given by the recognition of the work of art as such and is given in exceptional moments. The first instance seems to be the one in which temporality is manifested to the common sense; however, Gadamer suggests that “[a]n entity that exists only by always being something different is temporal in a more radical sense than everything that belongs to history. It has its being only in becoming and return.” Gadamer has said that

\[\text{643 Gumbrecht, } \textit{Production of presence what meaning cannot convey} \text{ p. 58.}\]
\[\text{644 Gadamer, } \textit{Truth and method} \text{ p. 120.}\]
\[\text{645 Ibid. p. 123.}\]
[...] the being of art cannot be defined as an object of an aesthetic consciousness because, on the contrary, the aesthetic attitude is more than it knows of itself. What constitutes the characteristic feature of the work of art is the thing that comes into existence in the work.  

Nevertheless, the problem persists for architecture in contrast with other forms of art since architecture, as suggested in Heidegger’s epigram of this section, portrays nothing. The capacity of architecture to shelter inhabitation is limited.

Coincidently with the recent concept of *aesthetics of appearance*, Brandi also distinguished in art the appearance that became meaning from the appearance that revealed an intemporal absence in the work of art. 647 The hermeneutical relation with art concerning this dimension out of meaning, demands the interpretation of the aspects of the work that impact in the performance that the work produces. 648 This is especially relevant for architecture in which the implied performance of authentic inhabitation is at play. Brandi had already highlighted this double conception of culture when he distinguished between the aspects of flagrance in opposition to the aspects of *astanza*. He did not disregard the meaningful dimension of art, however he never lost the view that the essential originality of art was on the side of its intemporal presence. Meaning arrived later on through cultural, social and historical processes. 649 In support of this, Gadamer recalled that monuments bring into presence what they represent in the form of inscriptions of general significance. However, when the monument is also a work of art, it brings into

646 Ibid. p. 117.
648 Grumbecht has highlighted that “Gadamer calls the nonhermeneutic dimension of the literary text its ‘volume’ (*Volumen*), and he equates the tension between its semantic and its nonsemantic components with the tension between ‘world’ and ‘earth’ that Heidegger develops in his essay *The Origin of the Work of Art.*” Ibid. p. 64.
existence something on its own, independent of the temporal occasion of the monument. Architecture is for Gadamer the most privileged form of art, since through satisfying its function and by adding something spatially to its emplacement it presents an increase of being. He seems to agree with Ingarden considering architecture as the “happy solution” to an “architectural problem.” However, architecture comes to show also how aesthetic differentiation is not primordial.

We know how difficult the relation between Brandi and the Modern Movement was, moreover in the junction with the historical city, not so much in terms of temporality – or historicity – but in terms of spatiality. In contrast, Gadamer suggested negotiation between new modern buildings and historical context. Against the historicism, he said that

> [e]ven if historically-minded ages try to reconstruct the architecture of an earlier age, they cannot turn back the wheel of history, but must mediate in a new and better way between the past and the present. Even the restorer or the preserver of ancient monuments remains an artist of his time.

Here the difference between Gadamer and Brandi is definitive. Whilst for the former the conservator is still an artist of his or her time, for the latter the restorer of works of art is not an artist but a critic. Restoration is but a methodological recognition of the work of art as a fact already given, not as something to work with. Gadamer instead believes that preservation implies

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649 Thus, we can understand the distinction established by Brandi between his concept of history of art and iconography, à la Panofsky. Brandi, Teoria generale della critica pp. 119-20.  
650 Gadamer, Truth and method p. 149.  
651 Ibid. p. 156.  
652 Ibid.  
artistic activity because for him architecture has the mission to spatially mediate drawing the attention to itself and redirecting it to the world that it accompanies. Architecture is not important as an attractive artistic object but as the sanctuary of Dasein’s existence. Thus, the approach to the architectural work of art is different. For Gadamer it seems to be correlated to Heidegger’s notion of dwelling, whilst for Brandi it represents an exceptional artistic epiphany.

For Gumbrecht, the epiphany – understood as the tension between presence and meaning – of the aesthetic experience presents three characteristics that constitute the interplay between presence and meaning. The first is its suddenness, its coming from nothing; the second is its spatial articulation; and the third is its temporal appearance as event. Brandi’s notion of astanza as the pure reality of art can be described in a similar fashion. We have already mentioned suddenness and eventfulness – “like a bolt of lightning” – as characteristics of the artistic recognition in Brandian theory. Additionally, it seems worth noticing that for Brandi the spatiality of the work of art is fundamental, not only for architecture in which it is more difficult to distinguish between the phenomonic spatiality and the spatiality of astanza, but also for the rest of the artistic expressions. Then, in the contrast established between meaning-culture and presence-culture, for the latter the body and its

655 Ibid. p. 158.
656 Gumbrecht, Production of presence what meaning cannot convey p. 111.
657 Brandi, Basile et al., Theory of restoration p. 61. However, art’s epiphany seems to be a less analytic phenomena than this recognition, more on the side of astanza than on the one of flagrance.
first environment is found as the primordial interface of negotiation between Dasein and its world whilst for meaning, time is the primordial dimension.\textsuperscript{658}

Architecture may have an undeniable dimension as art. However, Brandi’s view of the art of architecture seems detached from the existential considerations that architecture originally has. Heidegger’s existential approach deduced the condition of art as a happening in the work of architecture, as an act of revelation: \textit{alētheia}. Both views agree in the meaningless and the intemporal conditions of architecture as a work of art; however, the notions of conservation that is possible to deduce from these positions could not be more opposed. While Brandi’s notion of restoration isolates the artistic qualities in its recognition, without concern for its condition as a place to dwell; Heidegger’s concept of preservation seems comprehensive of both, disclosure of the truth of being and care for Dasein’s place to dwell. The existential approach to conservation intentionality should be a significant contribution that can help conservation in its modern form, to overcome the impasse whose crisis is starting to be evident in the change of fulcrum mentioned in Section 5.4. Overcoming this crisis would recover dwelling as the mission of architecture.

\textbf{6.4 Conservation of the Place Accompanying Dasein}

The real dwelling plight lies in this, that mortals ever search anew for the essence of dwelling, that they must ever learn to dwell. What if man’s homelessness consisted in this, that man still does not even think of the real

\textsuperscript{658} Gumbrecht, \textit{Production of presence what meaning cannot convey} p. 83. The existentialist relation of Dasein with its temporal intuition in terms of the horizon of expectation has been explained saying that “[…] only our death, only the moment in which we become pure matter (and nothing but matter), will truly fulfil our integration into the world of things. Only our death will give us that perfect quiet for which – sometimes in our lives at least – we long.” Gumbrecht, \textit{Production of presence what meaning cannot convey} p. 117.
plight of dwelling as the plight? Yet as soon as man gives thought to his homelessness, it is a misery no longer.

Martin Heidegger, *Building Dwelling Thinking*, 1954. 659

It could be suggested that in contemporary Western world, works of architecture are every time more different to each other. They respond to a myriad of factors that determine their form, uses, longevity and significance. We have passed from a former historical architectural place, sometimes misleadingly nostalgic, made of constancy and gradual changes to a hectic context where the rule seems to be continuous and rapid transformation. In the confrontation between new and old, the battles seem sometimes lost for the conservationists and on the other side, new valid architectural projects are frequently hindered. We suggested in Chapter 5, the emergence of *cultivation and care* as the base of a common collective understanding in order to conserve not only CSA but also the architectural place in general. We have seen how conservation of the artistic part of the architectural manifold can be a significant activity to protect certain objects. Nevertheless, architecture may constitute not only an artistic object, or one that is simply present or merely useful. Architecture participates in an inseparable way of Dasein’s existence. The problem seems to be the disappearance of the world that supported the emergence of certain architecture. Sometimes Dasein is forced to exist in a world that is not *there* anymore.

We have seen that architecture is not only given to us in sensual presentation, but also as constituent of an environment where our body exists.
The delayed issue of the definition of the core of architecture finds in these correlations its proposed answer in Dasein’s dwelling. The in of the being-in-the-world starts with the body. For all the life of Dasein, the body is the first and the only exclusively occupied space. After that first being there that the body characterises, Heidegger would suggest that the spatiality of Dasein “[...] is the point at which we need to return to the aroundness (das Umhafte) of the environment (Umwelt) of Dasein as being-in-the-world [...]”\textsuperscript{660} Heidegger’s notions of concern and care, relate with the region that we had provisionally called cultivation and care. Some philosophical insights are finally incorporated to attain an attitude that completes a notion of care pertinent to our times. The influence in conservation as intentionality towards the architectural place may shift from a fallen emphasis given to objects of the past, towards a futural sense of the existence of being-among-others.

**In-the-World**

According to the interpretation of Heidegger, considering the aroundness (das Umhafte) of its environment (Umwelt), and the in-ness of its being-in-the-world both understood as dwelling is necessary to understand the spatiality of Dasein. It has been suggested that the in-ness can be understood in two senses, one of inclusion and one of dwelling, one of being and one of understanding.\textsuperscript{661} Thus, the sense that Heidegger seems to privilege is the one of dwelling.

\textsuperscript{660} de Beistegui, *The new Heidegger* p. 64. (Emphasis in the original).
\textsuperscript{661} Ibid.
The world to which Dasein relates by in-habiting it is precisely not an empty container, pre-given and pre-constituted, awaiting to be filled up with things and events. [...] Dasein is its world. And this must be understood transitively: Dasein exists its world; its being is precisely its ‘worlding’. Between Dasein and the world, then, there is a relation that is not one of indifference, but of concern (Besorgen) and care (Sorge): in the very way in which Dasein is, or exists its own existence, its own being is at issue for it. [...] To be in something in such a way that we inhabit it or feel ‘at home’ in it thus presupposes this relation of familiarity born of an impossibility not to be concerned with, or to care for, that within which we find ourselves.  

Paradoxically, some preoccupation about something assimilable to a comprehensive environment for human being is evident in Brandi’s theory of restoration when he discusses about ruins, where the artistic essence has disappeared. He sustains that some beautiful landscapes merit the treatment of restoration or conservation in a similar way than the work of art.  

Brandi recognises this possibility of conservation beyond the purity of the work of art in the context of the historical instance of restoration; therefore, a theoretical aim is behind his conservation intentionality. Heidegger instead approaches care as a pre-theoretical attitude, a form of concern that never abandons Dasein.  

We have seen in Chapter 5 how the world is given to Dasein not as a Cartesian system of spatial coordinates but as a framework made out of the things objectively present that help it to orientate within the world configuring a particular spatiality. Heidegger has suggested that the way in which Dasein sees the world is obtained from within it and consequently spatiality is pre-objective, existential-ontological and not physical-mathematical.  

[...] we orient ourselves in this world on the basis of those pre-established regions, those buildings and those places, those landscapes which we in-habit,  

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662 Ibid.  
663 Nevertheless, he pinpoints that this is because that particular landscape aspires to be form in consciousness. Brandi, Basile et al., Theory of restoration p. 67.  
664 de Beistegui, The new Heidegger p. 66.
and which provide us with our sense of space, our sense of belonging to a place, familiar or unfamiliar […], close or distant […].

Brandi’s conservation intentionality instead is directed to acquire a recognition, thus a cognitive apprehension of the work of art. Architecture as work of art for his theory presented the challenge of being imbricated with an existential dimension that he did not face, at least for the purpose of restoration. He did not see architecture as the whole that constituted a human environment to be conserved integrally with its artistic nature. The instances to conserve were scinded in artistic and historical. Additional conservation was out of the sphere of the architectural place. We are not saying that Brandi’s theory of restoration is of no value for conservation as care and cultivation. All the opposite, his aesthetic theories – including the notion of artistic restoration, but not exclusively, as the exploration of his Teoria Generale della Critica demonstrates – were steps ahead of previous attempts that did not approached the artistic phenomena from the phenomenological perspective. What we are suggesting is that the inclusion of an existential perspective – for the present thesis in Heideggerian key – could have added an additional value for the particularities that architecture presents as the place of dwelling of Dasein.

Architecture as a work of art cannot be purely considered as something present-at-hand (such as mere things) or ready-to-hand (such as equipment); however, it can be taken as both when its artistic nature is concealed. For instance in terms of architecture’s utility for inhabitation it is revealed as something ready-to-hand. Nevertheless, as soon as we perceive architecture we

665 Ibid.
perceive the others of the world. However, as a work of art, architecture would demand a different interpretation in Heidegger’s thought. Being a non figurative art, architecture cannot but bring inhabitation as its revealing happening, but inhabitation is about Dasein not about other objects. For architecture, Brandi would ask for the restoration of its double spatiality; Heidegger would claim for its allowance to dwell. This can establish a difference between architecture as equipment and as a work of art. Brandi seems trapped in between the flagrant conditions of the historical instance and the astanza of the artistic pure presence. In the voice of Delano – the American organicist architect character of his Eliante – Brandi has said that

The house is primarily shelter, a place where to live and to rest, and therefore it is an internal space, a room of air and light, but also of welcoming shade and siesta. One must shape it on the base of human’s life, and not only on certain functions, isolated and geometrically met.

Nevertheless these characteristics of human inhabitation are not connected with the artistic conservation that his notion of restoration implies. Architecture as art is scinded from Dasein’s being-in-the-world.

In his famous essay Building Dwelling Thinking, Heidegger emphasised the roots of cultivation and care for the terms building and dwelling. He

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666 “[b]y ‘Others’ we do not mean everyone else but me – those over against whom the ‘I’ stands out. They are rather those from whom, for the most part, one does not distinguish oneself – those among whom one is too.” Heidegger, Being and time p. 154.

667 For instance, in the case of the peasant shoes described by him in Van Gogh’s painting, he finds that “equipment belongs to the earth, and it is protected in the world of the peasant woman. From out of this protected belonging the equipment itself rises to its resting-within-itself.” Heidegger, “The Origin of the Work of Art,” p. 163.

668 This may prove being confusing since the reliability of a preserved architecture in Heidegger terms should suggest “the repose of equipment resting within itself [...]. Only in this reliability do we discern what equipment in truth is.” Ibid., p. 164.

669 Brandi, Elicona. III-IV. Arcadio o della Scultura. Eliante o dell'Architettura p. 111. “La casa è prima di tutto un riparo, un luogo dove si viene per vivere e per riposarsi: e dunque è uno spazio interno, una camera d’aria e di luce, ma anche di ombra accogliente e di siesta. Si deve modellare sulla vita dell’uomo, e non solo su certe sue funzioni prese, isolate e soddisfatte geometricamente.” (Our translation, emphasis in the original).
discloses relations of the words with notions of cherish, protect, preserve and care. Also, with modes of building such as cultivate or edify. When Heidegger concludes with the epigram of this section, one can suggest preservation of architecture as the privileged place for Dasein to dwell, and consider the clearing of the space for it to be freed and safe. We suggest that this ideal is constituted by the architectural place, of which CSA is a significant part, but in no case the only one, and not always the most important for inhabitation of the collectivity of Dasein. Whether it is still in need to dwell, in Heidegger terms, or another existential interpretation is still a matter of discussion. Nevertheless, the necessary recognition of being-in-the-world and among-others for Dasein’s social existence seems to be an incontrovertible and urgent necessity.

**Being Temporalizing Beings**

We suggested since Chapter 5, the existence of a region that we characterised as of cultivation and care. We mentioned that this region of Dasein’s life was a collective field where merged familiar perceptions, public opinion and individual participation, that was filled in pre-modern times by the

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670 Heidegger, "Building Dwelling Thinking," p. 325. His concept of dwelling is grounded in an almost poetic fourfold that he deduces from the basis of care. Earth and sky, divinities and mortals compose this fourfold. Thus, he says that Dasein preserves the fourfold by dwelling among the things that it cultivates and builds. Heidegger, "Building Dwelling Thinking," p. 329. The things that are built to make some space (Raum) that receives the fourfold configure a place. Heidegger, "Building Dwelling Thinking," p. 332. Heidegger suggests then that when one says human, one is already stating its dwelling in the fourfold among things. Heidegger, "Building Dwelling Thinking," p. 334. Nevertheless, building is only such if it brings forth the fourfold into that construction. This is the sense of technē, to produce in order to let appear. “Technē thus conceived has been concealed in the tectonics of architecture since ancient times.” Heidegger, "Building Dwelling Thinking," p. 337. In Heidegger’s thought, earth is manifested in the powers of nature. The world of human production and activity is its counterpart; architecture is located here. The divinities are manifested in the given things, natural conditions, even Dasein’s concept of himself and its finitude is part of this awareness of the divinities. Mortals are the human beings.
traditional world and its slow evolution. Modernity and post-modernity broke
that balance leaving that field to be filled with what Heidegger would have
called the fallenness of the world. Fallenness is characterised as one of the
constituents of care in Heidegger’s thought, the one that puts its emphasis in
the present. Cultivation and care, as they used to happen in pre-modern times,
to create and preserve the architectural place were delayed; the present is now a
dominant concern.

However, at this point we must precise our use of the terms cultivation
and care. Although, they are motivated from an existential approach, we are
associating cultivation with Gadamer’s concept of Bildung, which he relates
with the one of Kultur, but without evocating the tradition that Bildung makes
of humans having in its spirit the image of God, which they cultivate within.

Bildung as the notion of formation “describes more the result of the process of
becoming than the process itself. [...] It grows out of an inner process of
formation and cultivation, and therefore constantly remains in a state of
continual Bildung.”\textsuperscript{671} Gadamer said: “what constitutes the essence of Bildung
is clearly not alienation as such, but the return to oneself – which presupposes
alienation, to be sure.”\textsuperscript{672} For Gadamer, and that is a fundamental point for us

the general characteristic of Bildung [is] keeping oneself open to what is other
– to other, more universal points of view. [...] To distance oneself from
oneself and from one’s private purposes means to look at these in the way that
others see them.\textsuperscript{673}

Consequently, the idea of cultivation is the one of looking after the
environment from the most comprehensive horizon in the benefit of the others

\textsuperscript{671} Gadamer, \textit{Truth and method} p. 11.
\textsuperscript{672} Ibid. p. 14.
\textsuperscript{673} Ibid. p. 17.
that exist with oneself.\textsuperscript{674} Cultivation then implies a letting ourselves growing in the opening towards the others.

The notion of \textit{care} instead relates with some of the Heideggerian senses of care in its fundamental connection with temporality. Heidegger first conceived care (\textit{Sorge}) as “the care-taker of beyng, such a care-taking involving an irreducible operation of creation.”\textsuperscript{675} He understands the primordial truth of existence as anticipatory, resolute disclosedness (\textit{vorlaufende Entschlossenheit}). It supposedly reveals existence on the basis of itself and for him this means that Dasein’s existence is always and essentially towards its own death.\textsuperscript{676} Dasein’s existence, as also suggested in our description of temporal relations in Section 5.2, has death as the extreme of its horizon. According to Heidegger, in resolute disclosedness Dasein does not avoid its finite existence but anticipates it, changing its attitude in relation to its surrounding world. This phenomena points to his notion of care.\textsuperscript{677}

Dictated by death as the ultimate horizon of the existence, for Heidegger, temporality is revealed in these three dimensions of care: the facticity of being-already-in-a-world (past); the existentiality of being-ahead-

\textsuperscript{674} This notion is reminiscent of Ricoeur’s discovery of historical memory that he sustains is a “genuine acculturation of externality [that is] a gradual familiarization with the unfamiliar, with the uncanniness of the historical past.” Ricoeur, \textit{Memory, history, forgetting} p. 394.

\textsuperscript{675} de Beistegui, \textit{The new Heidegger} p. 57.

\textsuperscript{676} Ibid. p. 70.

\textsuperscript{677} “Care characterizes the various aspects of existence as involving three moments or dimensions […]: a dimension of throwness into the world (\textit{Geworfenheit}), through which, each time, existence finds itself disposed towards or attuned to it in a certain way; one of self-projection towards a realm of possibilities (\textit{Entwurf}), through which existence carries itself out as freedom; and one of being-alongside other beings in the world. With the phenomenon of anticipatory resoluteness, the fundamental existential phenomenon of care as Dasein’s being is rooted ontically. […] anticipatory resoluteness reveals Dasein as an essentially futural (\textit{zukünftig}) being […].” Ibid. p. 71.
of-itself (future); and the falling of being-alongside (present). “Temporality reveals itself to be the sense of authentic care.”\footnote{Heidegger, \textit{Being and time} p. 374.} It has been observed that

[w]hat we witness with Heidegger [...] is a decisive shift in the perception of where time originates: the centre of gravity of temporality is no longer the present, as was the case in the tradition, but the future (\textit{die Zukunft}). [...] As a result of [...] present-centrism, and as early as Plato and Aristotle, \textit{presence (parousia)} defined the underlying meaning of being (\textit{ousia}): to be always (implicitly) meant to be present.\footnote{Ibid. pp. 70-1. De Beistegui explains “[w]hat Aristotle called \textit{ousia} (a substantive forged after the present participle of the verb \textit{einai}, to be, subsequently translated in Latin as \textit{essentia}) was the fundamental, primordial meaning of being, from which all the other meanings (or ‘categories’) of being were derived. And \textit{ousia} was itself interpreted further as \textit{parousia}, or \textit{praesens}. The task of exhibiting this basic presupposition of metaphysics, and of extracting its unthought, is what Heidegger called ‘de(con)struction.’” de Beistegui, \textit{The new Heidegger} p. 71. This means that “Dasein can be its past only insofar as it comes back to it on the basis of its own future.” de Beistegui, \textit{The new Heidegger} p. 72. This is the essence of what Heidegger calls temporality (\textit{Zeitlichkeit}), in which Dasein grasps the other beings of its world coming to itself futurally. What is then the present in this existential essential approach to Dasein’s temporality? It is the derivative and not essential result of the future and the having been. “The ‘alongside’ of the being-alongside, then, does not suggest immediately a temporal dimension, but a spatial one. It is presence, more than the present, which is here emphasized.” de Beistegui, \textit{The new Heidegger} p. 73. Temporality then is established by Heidegger as a complete whole that is not separated in past, present and future, but is the meaning of care while it temporalizes itself. The present is only an ecstasies of temporality. de Beistegui, \textit{The new Heidegger} p. 75. In resolute disclosedness, Dasein is aware of its limited existence and understands temporality as the unfolding of time as a whole and not separated in future, present and past, it needs to understand itself as being as time.} 678

Heidegger’s revelation of the original sense of the being of Dasein redefines it as futural, as always to come, always becoming.\footnote{Ibid. pp. 70-1. De Beistegui explains “[w]hat Aristotle called \textit{ousia} (a substantive forged after the present participle of the verb \textit{einai}, to be, subsequently translated in Latin as \textit{essentia}) was the fundamental, primordial meaning of being, from which all the other meanings (or ‘categories’) of being were derived. And \textit{ousia} was itself interpreted further as \textit{parousia}, or \textit{praesens}. The task of exhibiting this basic presupposition of metaphysics, and of extracting its unthought, is what Heidegger called ‘de(con)struction.’” de Beistegui, \textit{The new Heidegger} p. 71. This means that “Dasein can be its past only insofar as it comes back to it on the basis of its own future.” de Beistegui, \textit{The new Heidegger} p. 72. This is the essence of what Heidegger calls temporality (\textit{Zeitlichkeit}), in which Dasein grasps the other beings of its world coming to itself futurally. What is then the present in this existential essential approach to Dasein’s temporality? It is the derivative and not essential result of the future and the having been. “The ‘alongside’ of the being-alongside, then, does not suggest immediately a temporal dimension, but a spatial one. It is presence, more than the present, which is here emphasized.” de Beistegui, \textit{The new Heidegger} p. 73. Temporality then is established by Heidegger as a complete whole that is not separated in past, present and future, but is the meaning of care while it temporalizes itself. The present is only an ecstasies of temporality. de Beistegui, \textit{The new Heidegger} p. 75. In resolute disclosedness, Dasein is aware of its limited existence and understands temporality as the unfolding of time as a whole and not separated in future, present and past, it needs to understand itself as being as time.} 680

Seen under this perspective all the notion of conservation demands to be redirected in its temporal emphasis. To conceive his theory of restoration – understanding it here as one conservation intentionality of Dasein – Brandi departed from the, for him, impossible human intervention in the time of creation or during the interval of time between creation and recognition. In the same way, he discarded the internal temporality that the work of art has and that, in the case of architecture, we suggest the coming forth of previous authentic inhabitation, a sort of architectural mimesis, would constitute it. The reason of these
exclusions was based on a different understanding of temporality in which the presence (as *parousia*) is equal with being present, being there. Brandi could grasp that art was “parousia without ousia,” thus, presence without existence; however, for him the centre of temporality was still located in the present.\footnote{“*parousia senza ousia*” Brandi, *Teoria generale della critica* p. 133. (Our translation) This present centrism with the view put in the past is at the origin of some of the polemical cases of inclusion and assimilation of the new into the existent.}

We suggest that, in the same way as Halbwachs considered individual memory and collective memory merging together as described in Chapter 5, the authentic temporalizing performance of Dasein does not distinguish between the individual and the collective being-there. Care always presupposes the others of the world.\footnote{Some more recent critique to the privileged attention to Heidegger’s approach in contrast with other thinkers such as Bollnow, has been arisen observing that, for instance, “Norberg-Schulz suggests that Bollnow is too philosophical and not enough affiliated with the discipline of architecture, while author’s central notion of ‘existential space’ is indebted to phenomenological philosophy. This discrete rejection of Bollnow philosophical approach does not, however, hinder Norberg-Schulz to refer systematically to Heidegger despite the fact that he, neither, wrote explicitly or concretely about architecture. This ignorance for Bollnow in the architectural discourse became institutionalised.” According to De Bleeckere, Heidegger emphasis is put on the abstraction of Dasein and the ontology of time, whilst Bollnow treats the existential space, based on an exploration of the fundamental concept of moods. “Bollnow argues that human existence is much richer than Heidegger’s reduction to fear. [in] [h]is *Wesen der Stimmungen*, Bollnow opens the phenomenological analysis of the existential basic-moods with regard to security. On that, he tops other moods, especially those of happiness, throwing a different light on ‘man’” According to De Bleeckere “[f]rom Bollnow we learn that the secured ‘house’ of the womb constitutes the first living space of men.” Cfr. De Bleeckere, “The transcendental origin of architectural space”.} We have mentioned previously some criticism addressed to Heidegger’s notions that could also assist in a renewed understanding of the transformation of the architectural place. For instance, it has been observed that some approaches of Bollnow may integrate an intimate dimension linked, instead than to the limit horizon of death, to the horizon of the mother’s womb as source of architectural understanding. \footnote{Further research seems very suggestive in this direction. Cfr. Ibid. Another example of alternative interpretations of Dasein’s temporality is Ricoeur’s reluctance towards Heidegger’s} Ricoeur expresses another criticism that claims for an alternative to Heideggerian resolutness when he asks:
Does not the jubilation produced by the vow [...] to remain alive until... and not for death, put into relief by contrast the existentiell, partial and unavoidably one-sided aspect of Heideggerian resolutness in the face of dying? [...] it is only at the end of a long work on oneself that the entirely factual necessity of dying can be converted, not to be sure into the potentiality-of-dying but into the acceptance of having to die.  

Because of its humanised condition, already suggested in Chapter 4, the architectural place in the form of particular buildings, complex of them, or cities, participates of characteristics of the work of art, such as painting, music or sculpture, but also of features that transform it into an almost animated character. The authentic being a place to dwell of architecture connects it intimately with Dasein’s existence. If Dasein temporalizes itself in its different dimensions of care, architecture seems to mirror this effect. Architecture emulates a being that temporalizes other beings. Architecture shelters cultivation and provides care to Dasein, not only in Heideggerian but also in possible alternative senses that other forms of art are not feasible to offer; architecture performs as mother’s womb, as lovers’ bed, as final tomb. It accompanies Daseins’s complete existence offering – when authentic dwelling is given – an opening of clearness in which freedom to live and security to die seem, at least philosophically, possible. The ethic responsibility of such a mission does not only fall over architects and conservators. Echoing Heidegger, the changes that human inhabitation demands through history invites Dasein to learn how to dwell. However, Dasein needs to acquire positive existential attitudes that – finding the “happy memory” that Ricoeur demanded from memory, that “miracle of recognition,” in order to remember – help it to

doctrine of care because it “does not seem [...] to make room for the very particular existential that is the flesh, the animate body, my own body, as Husserl had begun to develop this notion in his last works [...].” Ricoeur, Memory, history, forgetting p. 345.
Ricoeur, Memory, history, forgetting pp. 357-8.
overcome the modern impasse of conservation and, because architecture is
never complete, to forget and forgive. Dasein’s uncanny fate seems to be in any
case – in the collective and the individual – the search of authentic polis, the
perennial search of home.

Conclusions

The suggested hermeneutical path started with the body and, passing
through temporal representations and art, arrived finally to the existential place
to dwell. The sensual perception of architecture as image is first exposed as one
partial disclosure. Its primordiality evidences the body as rememberer of
architecture. Thus, the image is not reduced to the optical givenness, but to any
event of sensual perception of architecture. The level of experience of
architecture as event emerges from bodily inhabitation and from the
significance in culture that demands to be considered as just one factor in
conservation. The receptor of conservation of CSA should deal with authentic
historical and mythical representations in which matter cannot guarantee
memory. Therefore, architecture should always imply life. However, Brandi’s
theory of restoration, despite considering architectural art as intemporal, still
aims for the evidence of the past. His notion of restoration of architecture
considered its artistic condition as a quality detached from any existential
consideration. Heidegger’s approach deduced its condition of being art as a
happening in the work of architecture. Both views agree about the meaningless
and the intemporal conditions of architecture as art; yet, the notions of
conservation originated on these views seem opposed. For Brandi, restoration
isolates the artistic qualities in its recognition, without concern for its condition
as a place to dwell; Heidegger concept of preservation seems aware of \textit{alētheia} and care. We suggest that the existential approach to conservation could help conservation to overcome its limited modern form. Being a dwelling place, architecture connects intimately with Dasein as art and as an almost animated character. As we have deduced, architecture temporalizes Dasein emulating a being that temporalizes other beings. Architecture shelters \textit{cultivation} and provides \textit{care} to Dasein offering place for freedom and security accompanying its existence.

For architecture and its conservation, a philosophical compromise seems here suggested, other than the merely practical accomplishment of inhabitation and the transcendental dwelling. In the present world, since Dasein dwells in a plurality of forms according to its particular existential conditions, there arises the need to establish perpetual open dialogues between individuals and between collectivities. The constant becoming of Dasein requires an always-changing position, not only of itself, but also of the place of the other on whose feet it needs to be able to stand up in order to encourage human empathy. Dasein’s own \textit{conservation and care} of its place to dwell should not ignore that being-among-the-others that its existence imply. The call is for cities and homes to be open and not to be closed. Many others have had this uncanny dream before.
Chapter 7: Conclusions: The Architectural
Habituating to the Constant Becoming

Time
The period of your life
can be divided into three parts; see, consider
Time past and see, ungrateful one,
see its rejection by the divine powers,
see your own mistake.
See the present, which dies at birth;
beyond, hidden behind a dense veil,
lies in the future.
See whether your eye cannot discover
the open road to hope and good works.

Beauty
I hoped to find in truth
the pleasure that I discern in it still.
Indeed my harsh destiny makes me grieved
at the sight of it,
and it fades and wastes away.

Benedetto Pamphili, *La Bellezza Ravveduta nel Trionfo del Tempo e del Disinganno*, 1707.685

The conventional understanding of Dasein’s temporality – such as the
one exhibited in the words above from Handel’s oratorio – supposed the
dimensions of past, with all the traces of former inherited actions and their
consequences; present, with the ephemeral running perception of the here-now;
and future, with the infinite and open field of possibilities up to the horizon of
the final individual death. The objectification of time – and with it of temporal
objects, architecture among them – in which the present supposed to contain
the centre of gravity, is fruit of this theoretical understanding. The main
achievement of the research of this thesis is, as a conclusion, the finding of an
alternative possibility to approach time and architecture in the context of
conservation. This suggested understanding of the relationship between
architectural place and time, despite having as ontological point of departure a

685 Pamphili, *La bellezza ravveduta nel trionfo del tempo e del disinganno*. (Translation by
Rinaldo Alessandrini).
theoretical phenomenological approach, concludes with the existential awareness of architecture as part of Dasein’s world and not as a separable object. This different temporality defines Dasein and its existential world as manifold beings always in the process of becoming towards a future, finite for the individual Dasein, grounded on the more fundamental attitudes of cultivation and care.

The confirmation of some starting hypothesis revealed architecture as a manifold being that shares humanised characteristics, given its ontological origin. Architecture was taken in the thesis in two differentiated but related senses. Firstly, CSA was ontologically defined – by correlating Ingarden’s ontology for the work of art in analogical fashion – as a culturally significant object, whose concretization is found in the building but is not necessarily always coincident with it. Secondly, the concept of architecture was extended to the place of human being since, as described in Chapters 4 and 5, there would not be such a place that is not humanly relevant. We obtained then the manifold presentation of architectural objects constituted by several other objects. Some of these are physical and others are obtained from individual and collective concretizations, including the significant aesthetic dimension of the work of art. With the investigation developed mainly in Chapter 2 – through the epistemological analysis of Brandi’s aesthetic theories – and Chapter 4 – developing an ontological outline of CSA – we demonstrated phenomenologically its manifold constitution as the architectural place to conserve. This answers the first of the formulated questions in the problematization of conservation, namely **how are the meaning, structure**
and essence of architecture conceived in conservation theory? We offer the conclusive answer to this ontological issue in Section 7.1 “Architecture’s Changing Manifold.”

Consciousness of time is offered towards the architectural phenomena as it is evidenced in conservation intentionality. This initial notion of temporality has been proved as an incomplete form – after Chapter 3, in the epistemological analysis of Brandi’s Theory of Restoration; and Chapter 5, with the phenomenological account of memory and temporality – given its detachment from a human existential dimension. Temporality in modern conservation, then, has been focused on the past, as demonstrated with the analysis of Brandi’s Theory of Restoration. The need to update conservation was evidenced by the necessity of human being to assimilate change and due to the exhibited constant becoming of memory. Conservation then was revealed as a human intentionality towards change of its existential place in time. In this way, an answer is offered for the second question: What does memory mean for conservation of architecture? and for the second order of research questions, namely: how memory – especially collective memory – and conservation intentionality are correlated? How architectural memories have projection towards the future? In Section 7.2 “Architectural Memory as Future Assimilation” then, we present the conclusions about these temporal issues.

An ontological definition for architecture was outlined as the human place to exist; and a phenomenological description for conservation was defined as temporal intentionality towards change. Subsequently, a
hermeneutical approach towards conservation, as an epistemic manifestation of a wider existential endeavour in Western culture since the arrival of Enlightenment, was accomplished in Chapter 5 and especially in Chapter 6. This interpretation was triggered by the questions: **how is architecture perceived as changing in time?** In addition, **how is conservation founded in relation to the time and place of human being?** The conclusions obtained by an existential approach that gives answer to these questions are presented in section 7.3 “Assimilating Place along Time, Encompassing Time around Place.”

Thus, the thesis attempts to move the professional discussion on conservation along towards a wider understanding in terms of human existence and not only as the preservation of architectural objects. In the theoretical perspective, it is expected that this research stimulate further developments with similar approaches to conservation contributing to overcome the impasse in which it seems trapped in its modern limited form. On the practical side instead, the understanding of the existential dimension in the context of CSA represents additional challenges that go beyond the mere solution of technical problems in conservation of CSA, compelling stakeholders, institutions and conservators to negotiate and consider these issues in future proposals.

With the epistemological, ontological and existential analysis offered, we have responded to the research questions that we faced as the problematisation of conservation of CSA. However to conclude the thesis, the research revealed several areas worth of being explored as part of an interest to enlarge the understanding of architecture as Dasein’s place to exist and the
approach to its conservation as a more transcendent enterprise. These areas are succinctly outlined in order to suggest future lines of investigation in section 7.4 “Beyond and Before Knowing.”

7.1 Architecture’s Changing Manifold

The first intention of this research was to suggest a phenomenological ontology of CSA following Ingarden, suggesting its structure and essence as phenomenon, as a theoretical precondition for any conservation intentionality. The initial intuition of architecture as a manifold entity was phenomenologically confirmed. Since the epistemological exploration of the research, focused on the case of the Theory of Restoration of Brandi and the rest of his aesthetical theory, architecture emerged as this manifold being. During this analysis, this condition of the notion of architecture was detached from the idealist influence and a phenomenological approach was privileged. Architecture in Brandi’s thought exposed two main sides: the temporal facticity that he called flagrance, and the intemporal pure presence that he called astanza. Whilst flagrance deals with the material and factual features of architecture, astanza has to do with the bringing forth to presence something that was not previously there, before the constitution of the work of art.

In the mapping of Brandi’s journey in his approach to architecture in particular, as a form of art, we have emphasised two significant consequences from idealist notions that influenced him. One is the awareness of architecture as being constituted by a manifold identity, one of whose elements is its manifestation as art. The second was the significance of the notion of mimesis,
which remained fixed in the notion of reproduction or copy. Brandi discarded
the duality between idealist spirit and factual sensuousness of the idealism. He
reinterpreted their presence distinguishing them in a manifold composed
primarily by flagrance and *astanza*. As made evident in the epistemological
analysis of an important part of Brandi’s theoretical corpus, developed in
Chapters 2 and 3, he overcame the Crocean idealism that preceded him with
subtle critical reactions. One of the main notions that he opposed was the
identity between intuition and expression arguing against the semiotical trends
of the age, which identified art with language considering it as a form of
communication. Thus, this detachment and the incorporation of new
approaches to the study of art – and in consequence of architecture as a form of
art – characterised his way of overcoming idealism in consonance with the
trends of the age, and although not being him a leading figure of this movement
his theoretical developments did not lack originality. However, we have
demonstrated how Brandi deduced the essence of the artistic phenomena,
particularly architecture, always bracketing out other realities that the artistic
phenomenon affects, at least for the purposes of restoration. He approached
architecture phenomenologically within the frame of Kantian schematism.
Nevertheless, flagrance and *astanza* revealed two manifold dimensions of
architecture implying consequences in relation to temporality and conservation.

We have approached conservation in the thesis as a temporal
intentionality. Within this phenomenological frame, the work of art was for
Brandi the fundamental focus of his restoration’s approach as a form of
conservation, as it has been explained in Chapter 3. He privileged the
manifestation of the work of art from two main points of view, which
constituted the instances of application of his theory of restoration, namely, the aesthetical and the historic. The phenomenological and existentialist influence, mainly from philosophers such as Husserl and Sartre, played an important role in his more evolved aesthetic thought. However, his aesthetic theory did not reveal the issue, fundamental for us, of inhabitation as part of the architecture’s manifold nature.

The epistemological analysis of conservation in Chapter 3 suggested that architecture should be considered as an object with aesthetic, historic and significant values as part of its manifold condition and additionally as part of human dwelling in the dialectic of stasis and assimilation. In consequence, from the perspective of the thesis, we suggest that social institutions protecting monuments should evaluate the varied attitudes of stakeholders when dealing with CSA. CSA needs to be approached at the same time as a manifold object for the social sciences and as the place of collective life. As evidence of this emerging need, organisations dealing with the protection of cultural heritage have already started to shift towards a wider understanding of these collective intentionalities as part of its manifold constitution. In consequence, additionally to the consideration of architecture as a possible valuable work of art, conservation depends on the nature of intentionalities with which architecture as a manifold place to live is approached. This does not endorse with a relativist outlook in the context of conservation but – all the opposite, as the ontological proposal attempts to demonstrate – the necessity of keeping active an ontological research is revealed in order to better define CSA when it is subject of conservation.
The phenomenological approach of Ingarden to the work of art helped to structure an analogous ontological outline of CSA in order to locate architecture within its different possible manifestations to human consciousness. The aesthetic theories of Brandi seem to be in accord with some of the most significant deductions of Ingarden. Brandi’s implicit characterisation of architecture as a manifold being is done with an ontological purpose that he explored more thoroughly in his *Teoria Generale della Critica*; however, as evidenced in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, he did not connect his theory with the existential dimension of architecture in relation with human inhabitation. In consequence, the artistic condition of architecture resulted isolated for the aims of conservation.

The ontological bases of Ingarden, adapted for the purpose of our analysis in Chapter 4, in many senses demonstrated consistency with those of Brandi’s notion of architecture as work of art. The different possibilities of being in Ingarden’s theory, revealed ways in which architecture can be delivered to consciousness. Whether architecture is given as event, process or enduring object depends on particular ways of setting consciousness in order to apprehend architecture. As outlined in Chapter 4, these ways of being of architecture are more or less dense in noematic possibilities, being the object enduring in time the one that offers richer nuances given its affinity with human beings. This manifold way of being offers to consciousness different sides of phenomenological profiles that depend on the attitudes with which architecture is intended. The architectural object acts as a support for possible concretizations of architecture configuring for CSA an identity that is flexible, despite having an intimate core, whose concealed definition was existentially
tackled in Chapter 6. The formal structures of CSA revealed an identity for architecture that, for instance, cannot be only meaning, only function, or only form. CSA appears constituted by a rich manifold existence that is revealed according to attuned attitudes of groups of observers, depending on degrees and nuances of their collective cultural interpretations. Within the controversial notion of social constructions, the conservator comes to be a rooted agent with unlimited possible approaches.

The deduced conclusions obtained in Chapter 4 for conservation as a temporal intentionality from the ontological structure are significant for this thesis. The first consequence is that instances of CSA are evidenced as temporal manifolds, and consequently significant for conservation that develops in time. This paradox suggests different ways to approach CSA in conservation according with its apprehension as a mere work of art or as the multifarious place to live within. The second consequence is that the architectural work of art appears as a third order of concretization; therefore, it is not only the result of an aesthetic attitude in relation to an object-building, but also a special connection between creator and observer in different times with no temporal continuity. Brandi saw this phenomena as well as a connection with what he called *universal consciousness*. These conclusions are relevant to conceive CSA as a manifold of moments of existence, which finds its origins in the building – its events, processes and object-being related presentations – but whose manifestation can be very varied. Architecture – as building, as work of art, and as CSA – constitutes a manifold of elements that amalgamate together forming part of the real world inhabited by humans, created by them, by their techniques and against laws of nature.
The manifold being of architecture is manifested, not only in its given presentation to consciousness, but also in temporal terms, as the phenomenological exploration of temporality suggested in Chapter 5. In this sense, conservation of CSA should not be considered an uncreative activity; it may imaginatively develop a manifold identity for a diverse past anchored in the present. Architectural memory’s identity is varied, plastic and malleable and recognises both extremes: a blurred and uncertain beginning in the past and the lively running present.

The existential analysis of our hermeneutical layer presented sensual perception of architecture as an image exposing a partial disclosure of its manifold being. Its primordiality evidenced the body as rememberer of this architectural manifold. Therefore, the notion of image is not reduced to the mere optical givenness, but to any event of sensual perception of architecture. The level of experience of architecture as event emerges from both, bodily inhabitation and the significance in culture that demands to be considered as just one factor in its varied constitution in order to conserve.

### 7.2 Architectural Memory as Future Assimilation

The second research intention was to find the origins of the lack of existential understanding of temporality in recent conservation theory, focusing in the interpretation of the outstanding case of restoration intentionality proposed by Brandi. Memory was in this thesis one of the privileged access doors towards the exploration of the main issue of temporality due to its relation with conservation in its modern form. The contrast between the
The temporal approach of Brandi’s theories and the phenomenological description of memory evidenced singular characteristics for conservation. Brandi reinterpreted some of the problems of idealist notions and overcame a view that was still attached to that paradigm. However, for the problem of conservation, despite its lucid phenomenological approach to the phenomena of art creation and reception, he did not conceive the architectural artistic nature merged with the human existence that architecture shelters.

In the epistemological exploration of Chapters 2 and 3 through the theories of Brandi, the issue of mimesis was an identified significant legacy from idealism. If the image was for him a constant object of theoretical reflection, the concept of mimesis instead remained fixed in the notion of mere reproduction or copy. As stated before, the possibility of the notion of mimesis encompassing cultural practices to be re-ennacted – within the theory that Brandi established – could be promising of a positive evolution in the paradigm of conservation. Brandi defined *astanza* as an intemporal form of presence for the work of art, including architecture. However, to deal with architectural conservation means to deal with human temporality. Then, we analysed conservation as temporal intentionality. Art was for Brandi the fundamental category of his approach to conservation and therefore the peak of culture. He privileged it from two main points of view: the aesthetical and the historic. The consideration of *astanza* granted this privilege to art of being the superior form of human creation. For conservation in Brandi’s thought, memory as temporal intentionality is supported through the object to restore. Architecture keeps the record and the traces of past human ways to live, evidenced in the form, and charged of meaning in both: *astanza* and flagrance, although with different
manifestations. However, the centre of gravity of his temporal intentionality is situated in the present, to where the rest of the worldview confluences. If cultural memory is relevant, it is so because of the permanence of matter. Matter is for Brandi the vehicle of memory, constituting not only the artistic monument, but also the historical and cultural ones. Architectural monuments, then, are valuable not only as works of art but also as temporal portraits of ways of being, of seeing, and of imagining the world. This mimetic dimension of the monument finds relevance in the historical transmission of culture in two ways: in the flagrance of reality and in the astanza of art. The monument constitutes the link between an individual perception of particular architectural experiences and the summation of collective intentionalities that integrates cultural identities. Architecture as cultural monument finds a problematic juncture, though. Thus, as suggested before, architectural place as cultural heritage would need to either be approached as a separable object of analysis for history, art history and the social sciences; or to be assimilated within the flux of collective life. The shift towards this wider understanding of the significance of CSA for those most involved is evident nowadays.

Architecture then is temporally presented as a being in a constant state of becoming, in which it additionally offers the manifold condition that characterises it. Architectural transformation is given in the context of the dialectic interplay of tradition and innovation. The ontological analysis defined an outline of CSA and the phenomenon of its temporality, mainly focused in the paradigmatic case of memory. Memory itself was revealed as a creative attitude that gives the past as different every time it presents it. The misleading consideration of architecture as a form of materialised memory can instead find
a solution in an interpretation of the concept of mimesis, that suggests former ways of inhabitation to creatively be re-enacted. Some of these forms of inhabitation constitute cultural constructions that are now challenged by the conditions of post-modernity.

Significant conclusions for conservation are deduced from the temporality of architecture’s ontological structure suggested in Chapter 4. Their implications affect not only architecture as work of art but also the construction of cultural and social objectivities, CSA being one of them. One of these conclusions, as stated before in Section 7.1, is that instances of CSA are temporal and thus significant for a conservation that develops in time, in contrast with Ingarden’s deduction about the architectural work of art as paradoxically extra-temporal. Another conclusion is that the work of art being extra-temporal – consistently with Brandi’s aesthetics – cannot constitute a form of memory as other socio-cultural concretizations can. Instead if memory, or in a wider sense temporality, is in some way embedded in architecture, it is because of its manifestation as CSA and not as a work of art, according to the proposed ontology. Architecture then is perceived by society as representation of different times in the present and mainly in the past, whose invented forms are culturally significant forms constituting a fundamental part of cultural memory.

Architectural perception in time, as described in Chapter 5, is revealed as belonging to two different worlds. The first is the one of matter and the other is the one of humanised memory to be re-enacted. Thus, the architectural mnemonic power is exposed through the mimesis that inhabitation suggests
with the variants that the thickness of the present world demands. This memory is born from the body memory that is always as one with the architectural place. It offers shelter to selfness because in confront with a past that “begins now and is always becoming,” it remains humanly persistent; memory does not stop there in a past event, it is always being built.\textsuperscript{686}

We suggest as part of the conclusions that, conservation of CSA should not be an uncreative activity; it may creatively develop an identity for a past anchored in the present. This identity is plastic and malleable and recognises both extremes: a blurred and uncertain beginning and the running present. In consequence, conservation detached from memory would become a rigid institution trying to solidify what is naturally fluid. If instead memory is accepted with all its phenomenological implications, attitudes concerning assimilation should evolve in order to learn to receive creatively the new. As mentioned before, this does not imply endorsing irreflexive postmodern trends of everything goes. It means that conservation of CSA has to be open to the transformation of the image that we have of its past according with the emergence of its varied manifold appearances. It is our contention that memory has to remain an integral part of the theoretical elements of conservation. Nevertheless, this implies the acceptance of the nature of memory and therefore asks that society – in particular, conservation theoreticians and practitioners – improves its understanding of what and how we conserve. We suggest that this effort has to be addressed in social education about memory, heritage and the

\textsuperscript{686} Casey, Remembering, a phenomenological study p. 275.
architectural place; in the research about the conditions of collective memory of involved cultural groups; and in the ontological analysis of objects of conservation. If the past is not an essential part of the present, the stable idea that society has about it is challenged and society needs remembering creatively.

As stated before, the suggested hermeneutical path of Chapter 6 started with the body and, passing through temporal representations and art, arrived finally to the existential place to dwell. The receptor of conservation of CSA should deal with authentic historical and mythical representations in which, as deduced in Chapter 5, matter cannot guarantee memory but constitutes one among other appearances of architecture. Therefore, architecture should always present the lively manifestations that inhabitation entails. However, Brandi’s theory of restoration, despite considering architectural art as intemporal, still aimed for the theoretical explanation of art concerning its temporality. His notion of restoration of architecture considered its artistic condition as a quality detached from existential considerations. The constant becoming of Dasein requires an always-changing position, not only of itself, but also of the place of the other in order to encourage human empathy.

7.3 Assimilating Place along Time, Encompassing Time around Place

The last research intention was to suggest a reconnection of temporality – memory included – with architecture and its conservation, proposing the hermeneutical dimension for human existence within the relation of place with
time. The main criticism presented in this thesis to the theory of restoration of Brandi is the separation of the notion of art from the existential conditions of architectural inhabitation. This scinded notion of conservation is considered as deficient or incomplete, since architecture, as deduced in Chapters 4 and 5, is not merely art, but it constitutes additionally the dwelling place of Dasein, in Heidegger’s terms. The existential analysis brings forth the necessity of a more comprehensive approach that considers inhabitation as part of the conservation endeavour.

Along the epistemological discussion of Chapter 2 and 3, we have suggested the significance of architectural values beyond the characteristics of architecture’s presence in order to update Brandi’s theoretical frame. His choice to continue towards the construction of an understanding of the ontological structure of architecture, and in a wider sense the human world, is significant for this thesis. As we have suggested his approach was phenomenological in method and ontological in goals. This seemed to detach his philosophy from the trends of Critical Theory and link it more to the neo-Kantian and phenomenological enquiry, despite the criticism received from structuralistic and semiotic commentators.

However, the ontological project was relevant for other strands of philosophers discussing human existence. The fact that architecture is the conformation of the human place – and its artistic condition – triggered the question of what this human place is. Art, according to Brandi’s theories, is the privileged manifestation of *astanza*. However, Brandi defines *astanza* as an intemporal form of presence. Thus, architecture lingers in the middle, between...
the role of the dynamic and changing place of human dwelling and the one of support of the intemporal work of art. To deal with its conservation means to deal with human temporality, and this made us shift our investigation towards conservation as a form of temporality.

As already stated, the existentialist influence seemed to play an important role in Brandi’s more evolved aesthetic thought. However, his theory did not propose paths of interpretation other than criticism and restoration, as distinct from the privileged epiphany of art. Architecture, other than being art, should be the human place to live that demands additional interpretation. Brandi already had implied a moral dimension for restoration. This suggested other possible dimensions of understanding of architecture, merging the factual reality with the intemporal presence of *astanza*. Conservation intentionality, as analysed here, merges these two attitudes: the temporal and intemporal.

As mentioned above, either, CSA is considered as an object with exclusive aesthetic, historic and significant values, isolated from real life by a *musealisation*, or it enters in the dynamic of the human dwelling in the dialectic of stasis and assimilation. Social institutions protecting monuments need to balance these views. Although the artistic dimension is fundamental for architecture, for the focus of this thesis architecture needs to be situated considering better its conflation as cultural heritage and as the architectural place to live. Society has the option to consider it as an object to protect separated from daily life, or as the meaningful place that evolves along with time. The significance of the consequences of such a hermeneutical endeavour
demanded, even if only as point of departure, an ontological outline that considered the architectural phenomena in its constant becoming.

The ontological structure deduced from the theories of Ingarden revealed the building as the paradigmatic architectural object. This object acts as a support of possible concretizations of architecture configuring for CSA an identity that is flexible, despite having an intimate core, whose existential definition was finally approached in Chapter 6. This core is constituted by the happening of truth in the form of a concerned human dwelling grounded in the attitudes of cultivation and care. As mentioned before and as identified in Chapter 4, a consequence of the ontological structure suggested is the being of the work of art as an extra-temporal entity – consistently with Brandi’s aesthetics. This is because art is revealing in its pure reality – *astanza* in Brandi’s terms – an existence out of time: *parousia without ousia*. The disentangling of the notion of presence as different from being present, that Heidegger revealed, proves to be relevant for the integration of art as part of the phenomena of dwelling, as explained in Chapter 6.

The succession of architectural memories – since the intimacy of the family home, up to the shared space of the collectivity – supports the social environment, which promotes cultivation and care, as already intuited in Chapter 5. These tacit memories of significant architecture have been gradually ignored in conservation, giving preference to the determination of Objective time and Cartesian space. This becomes problematic in conservation of CSA when inhabitation is involved. Consequently, it seems that if memory is

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687 “*parousia senza ousia*” Brandi, *Teoria generale della critica* p. 133. (Our translation).
accepted within the theoretical manifold of conservation, attitudes should evolve in order to learn how to assimilate transformation. Individual and social constructions in the form of values, memories, symbols, and so forth acquire relevance in the constitution of a meaningful architectural place that conservation of CSA seemingly supports. However, the post-modern conditions nowadays present considerable challenges to actions of conservation given its plurality and the rapidity of changes.

The perennial effort of understanding and interpretation of the architectural place has to be considered under the light not only of objective determinants – as it has been the case so far – but also taking into consideration the intersubjectivity that a lived world implies, a world lived within the society. This consideration of diverse and varied collective intentionalities is the cause of the shift in some recent trends in conservation. However, the interpretation of human existence in the juncture of architectural place and existential time suggested a region where pure phenomenology – à la Husserl – was limited and a hermeneutic approach was attempted. Significant concerns about the intersubjectivity of being-in-the-world guided then the approach.

The hermeneutical path started with the body and, passing through temporal representations and the peak of art, arrived finally to the existential place to dwell. As already suggested, architecture should always imply human life. Heidegger’s approach deduced its condition of being art as a happening of truth in the work of lived architecture. Heidegger’s and Brandi’s views agree about the meaningless and the intemporal conditions of architecture as art; yet, the notions of conservation originated on these views seemed opposed. For
Brandi, restoration isolates the artistic qualities in its recognition, without concern for its condition as a place to dwell; Heidegger’s concept of preservation demands awareness of alētheia and care. Accordingly, we suggest that an existential approach helps conservation to overcome its limited modern form. Being a dwelling place, architecture connects intimately with Dasein as art and as an almost animated character. Architecture seems to temporalize Dasein emulating a being that temporalizes other beings. Architecture shelters cultivation and provides care to Dasein, accompanying its complete existence offering a place where to find freedom and security.

For architecture and its conservation, we suggested a philosophical compromise, other than the merely practical accomplishment of inhabitation and the procurement of transcendental dwelling. In the present world, since Dasein dwells in a plurality of forms according to its particular existential conditions, there arises the need to establish perpetual open dialogues between individuals and between collectivities. As already mentioned, the constant becoming of Dasein requires an always-changing position in order to stimulate human empathy. Dasein’s own conservation and care of its place to dwell should not ignore that being-among-the-others that its existence imply. Cultivation and care, in the different explained senses, emerge as the fundamental attitudes behind conservation intentionality in the relation of Dasein and its architectural place as the paradigmatic place to dwell, in the form of the house in its intimate manifestation and in the form of the city in its collective one. The approach to conservation from a non-theoretical point of view, but an existential one, revealed the need to consider the architectural place as a part of the world-environment and not as a separable object to care
about. Architecture implies a place to live within. The condition of plurality of
the world demands to keep openness to integrate a diversity of horizons and not
closure that fossilise, freeze and hinder communication between Dasein.

7.4 Beyond and Before Knowing

During the development of the research that supports this thesis, some
issues emerged that merit lines of investigation in their own right and that can
constitute further research. The epistemological exploration of the Theory of
Restoration of Brandi and the rest of his aesthetic thought exhibits an important
theoretical reflection that has not been disseminated in philosophical studies
about conservation in the English spoken world. The relevance of such a
relevant theoretical corpus is correlated with charters and international
documents for the protection of heritage that are inspired on it. The awareness
and complete understanding of its philosophical origins can explain different
attitudes towards architectural heritage in particular, and artistic in general, that
are currently being applied in certain countries. The influence of the inheritance
from idealist trends in these theories explain some of the controversies that
hinder both: cultivated innovation and careful conservation.

The emergence of alternative approaches to theoretical research with
ontological focus was evidenced during the development of the thesis. This has
been developed with a point of departure inspired in an ontological theoretical
orientation. However, new post-ontological lines of investigation can also
illuminate the area of cultural studies, architectural conservation in particular.
In this sense, the analysis of collective intentionalities concretizing social
constructions as a result of differences instead of identities, promises different theoretical outcomes. As mentioned in the introduction, these proposals sometimes risk being sophisticated in two senses: in the sense of being based in naively or deliberately misleading sophisms; and sophisticated in the sense of being highly developed and complicated, reaching a peak nowadays in the proposals of a post-ontological age, where reality is described in terms of differences. For us, as suggested before, the threat is to separate theoretical explanation from authentic life; to explain, and then to suggest, practices that are far from the essence of dwelling as authentic Dasein.

The existential approach comes forth also as a relevant alternative that, despite its direct relevance with the human being-in-the-world, proposes new ways to understand the architectural place in ways that have not been explored by the current trends in conservation thought. In this sense, the Heideggerian alternative chosen by us for the interpretation of the architectural place to live is not suggested as definitive or the only one valid. As already indicated in Chapter 6, alternative existential approaches have been suggested by philosophers such as Bollnow, Merleau-Ponty, Sartre and others whose lenses of interpretation of what means to be in the world as human being can illuminate the nature of architecture and its conservation. More recently, scholars such as Seel and Gumbrecht have started to explore the pre-conceptual reality of an aesthetic of appearances. They suggest that, more than obtaining theoretical explanation from aesthetic experience, one can merely enjoy and get advantage of the sense of immediate being-in-the-world in contrast with the concealing unease of post modern chaos and anxiety.
Another promising field of research is the phenomenological constitution of values in relation with conservation. The plurality of cultural identities and their rapid processes of transformation, evolution, hybridisation, and so forth, demand analytical instruments for the social sciences in order to relate philosophical research and conservation practice. The disentangling of cultural identity seems a complex challenge, since the nature of these realities presents complicated manifold identities that additionally are in constant becoming. In this context of cultivation and care as fundamental notions at the base of conservation of the human architectural place, one final suggestion is the inclusion of themes such as issues of politics of democracy, discrimination and gender that urge attention in an every time more changing, difficult and contrasting condition of being-in-the-world.
Temporal and intemporal traces of the intimate and unavoidable connection between the worked stone – of a humble tomb or a sumptuous palace – and the flesh and mind of human being are manifested to consciousness as the uncanny personalised emanation that accompanies us constantly in the form of architecture.


The poem of García Lorca seems to suggest those absences with which architecture is sometimes even more a presence for us than in its material flagrance; it does not make too much difference whether it is to be born, to live, or to die, such as the unfortunate bullfighter to whom the poem is dedicated. Being \textit{there}, if authentic Dasein, always will compel us to grow and to care about our place.
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